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This study primarily examines the dynamics of the long-term relationship between the 
BBC World Service and its mainly Muslim Northern Nigerian audiences. It broadly 
explores the pattern and consequences of Northern Nigerians’ interactions with 
international media, focusing particularly on their engagement with the BBC World 
Service. Employing a multidimensional qualitative research approach, the study 
examines the historical background of the relationship, the transformations it has 
undergone, and how the current dynamics of global geopolitics and advances in 
communications technologies are redefining it. It looks at the complex processes and 
procedures of both media content production and reception. On the production side, it 
unveils the BBC’s contradictory functions of providing ‘impartial’ international news 
service and promoting British public diplomacy, the complexity of its relationship 
with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the nature of its engagement with 
distribution technologies. On the reception side, the mainly Muslim Northern 
Nigerians are found to be high consumers of BBC news and current affairs 
programmes but with considerable level of selectivity. Although they see BBC as the 
most credible international broadcaster that aids their comprehension of international 
affairs and generally influences their everyday life, they still regard it as essentially a 
Western cultural and ideological instrument that portrays the West positively and 
depicts the Muslim world and Africa negatively. The findings point to patterns and 
particularities of postcolonial transnational audiences’ consumption of media that 
suggest new conceptual and theoretical strands in reception research. They indicate 
audiences’ tendency to exhibit a phenomenon of selective believability in their 
interactions with transnational media; the mediating role of religion, culture and 
ideology in such interactions; and the dynamics of credibility and believability. 
Credibility is found to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for believability in 
audiences’ consumption of dissonant media messages.  
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Advances in communications technologies and the changing dynamics of global 
geopolitics are transforming international broadcasting and audiences‘ engagement 
with the media. New frontiers for reaching audiences have been opened, old 
barriers to mediated interactions torn apart, and conventional definitions of 
international broadcasting have been rendered inadequate. Modern production 
techniques and distribution technologies have facilitated the proliferation of 
broadcasters, offered opportunities for wider and greater audience participation, 
and engendered fierce competition among both the old players and new entrants in 
the field. Underlining all these permutations is the quest to reach and influence the 
hearts and minds of transnational audiences, for all international media 
organisations ‗are in some measure missionaries of ideological and cultural 
hegemony‘ (Price et al., 2008, p. 153). But as the media scene is being 
transformed into a landscape never seen before so also are the patterns and perhaps 
the consequences of their consumption. The continuous multiplication of media 
with their multiple platforms delivering deluge of messages to multitude of 
audiences with overt and covert intents has stirred up fresh patterns of interacting 
with them and new ways of mitigating their impact. The contemporary media-
audience relationship is a new territory the nature of which the existing conceptual 
and theoretical postulations appear incapable of adequately explaining, and the 
examination of which the traditional methodological tools seem unable to 
sufficiently handle.  
 
Amid this quest for rethinking media and their audiences lies the case of an ‗old‘ 
medium that has constantly been reinventing itself to keep abreast of the changing 
times and technologies so as to maintain a hold on its audiences. Nowhere has this 
been so glaringly exemplified as in its relationship with transnational postcolonial 
audiences. The international arm of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC 
World Service, has established and maintained an enduring and complex 
 2 
relationship with audiences both in territories once controlled by Britain and in the 
rest of the world. Its engagement with audiences in Nigeria, a former British 
colony, has been undergoing tremendous transformation brought about by the 
combined forces of geopolitical considerations and communications technologies. 
It is the measure, or perhaps the marvel, of such enduring engagement that, despite 
the fall of BBC audience figures in many parts of the world and despite the 
misgivings of many Nigerians over some aspects of its coverage and despite a ban 
by the Nigerian government of foreign stations‘ news rebroadcast on the country‘s 
local radio stations, Nigeria has consistently remained the BBC World Service‘s 
largest radio market in the world (BBC World Service, 2007, 2008; BBC Global 
News, 2009, 2010).  
 
Established in December 1932 as Empire Service (Briggs, 1985), BBC World 
Service is arguably the best-known international broadcaster with a considerable 
range of cultural capital and ‗a reputation exceeded by none‘ (Mytton, 1993; 
Economist, 2010; Sreberny et al., 2010b; FACOM, 2011, p.3). Originally launched 
as a modest monolingual outfit targeting British ‗expatriates and loyal subjects of 
the King‘ in the then British Empire (Briggs, 1985, p.138), the World Service is 
now a big multimedia corporation delivering programmes in 27 languages (45 
during the Second World War) to an estimated 241 million international audiences 
through its radio, television and online offerings (Hiller, 2010a; BBC News, 
2011). Once described by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan as 
‗perhaps Britain‘s greatest gift to the world‘ (cited in FACOM, 2011, p. 3), it is 
generally recognised as a leading provider of international news service and a 
promoter of ‗British values across the globe‘ (FACOM, 2011, p. 3; Sreberny et al., 
2010a, 2010b). It has managed to achieve these by a combination of quality 
journalism, relative independence (compared to its rivals) and stable funding from 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, sometimes receiving more than a third of 
Britain‘s public diplomacy budget. It was, for instance, allocated £225 million in 
2004/05 fiscal year out of the public diplomacy budget of £617 million for that 
year (FCO, 2005, p.6), and the allocation continued to rise in the subsequent 
years—£239.5 million in 2006/07 and £255 million in 2007/08 (BBC, 2008)—
reaching its zenith of £272 million in 2009/10 (Hiller, 2010b).  
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But the World Service is not immune to difficulties. Poor finances have forced it 
to consider cutting its workforce (Thompson, 2011), it has cut the number of its 
language services (BBC News, 2011), the competition from its rivals appears to be 
fiercer than its managers and paymasters had envisaged, and most significantly it 
is now facing greater funding pitfalls as Britain struggles to survive one of its 
worst financial crises for decades (Robinson and Sweney, 2010). The BBC‘s 
commercially-oriented arm, BBC Worldwide, does raise funds [£1 billion in 2009 
(Economist, 2010)] and could help the World Service, but the issue is beyond that. 
The real blow to the World Service was delivered by the government‘s Spending 
Review Settlement of 2010 under which it was slammed with an unprecedented 16 
per cent budget cut and its funding ordered to be transferred to the BBC licence 
fee in 2014 (Robinson and Sweney, 2010; Foster, 2010). Although the then 
chairman of the corporation‘s governing board, the BBC Trust, Sir Michael Lyons, 
had said the settlement, reached on 19 October 2010, had guaranteed ‗certainty 
and stability‘ (Lyons, 2010), subsequent events show that it has done anything but. 
In January 2011 the BBC announced the closure of five language services 
(Albanian, Macedonian, Serbian, Portuguese for Africa and English for the 
Caribbean), with an estimated 30 million fall in the audience, and said it would 
also slash ‗650 jobs from a workforce of 2,400 over the next three years‘ to save 
£46 million a year (BBC News, 2011; Thompson, 2011).  
 
Concerns over the World Service‘s future provoked reactions from many quarters, 
prompting the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FACOM) to 
launch an investigation, which found that the decisions to both cut and transfer 
funding were unwise (FACOM, 2011; Burrell, 2011). ‗We believe that the BBC 
World Service is of such value to the nation that its income should be ring-fenced 
against spending cuts,‘ the parliamentarians state in their 90-page report released 
on 13 April 2011. ‗The recent dramatic events in North Africa and the Middle East 
have shown that the ―soft power‖ wielded through the World Service is likely to 
bring even more benefits to the UK in the future than it has in the past, and that to 
proceed with the planned cuts to the World Service would be a false economy‘ 
(FACOM, 2011, p. 3). They warn that the transfer of funding responsibility to the 
licence fee could allow BBC senior managers to ‗raid‘ the World Service funding; 
and that it may also jeopardise foreign languages‘ news services and weaken the 
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‗Parliament‘s right to oversee its work‘ (p.8). The new chairman of the BBC Trust 
Lord Patten echoes the committee‘s position, promising to persuade Foreign 
Secretary William Hague to help initiate a reversal of the government‘s decisions 
and mitigate the effects of the actions taken so far (Wynne-Jones, 2011). Whether 
or not the key decisions are reversed, the scenario has provided a hint of the 
dynamics of the BBC World Service‘s relationship with the government.  
 
The nature of that relationship has obvious consequences on the structure and 
operations of the World Service itself, on its engagement with technologies, and 
ultimately on its relationship with the audiences whose hearts and minds it seeks to 
influence. Indications of these could be noticed from the kind of swift changes the 
funding decisions generated and the responses to them, and from the nature of the 
influence the broadcaster is perceived to have been exercising. It is the concern 
over the potential weakening of the World Service‘s influence that provoked the 
campaign for cuts reversal and it is for the same reason that the broadcaster itself 
said that it would employ strategies to mitigate the impact of the spending cuts on 
its core services (Thompson, 2011). This was why the language services cut and 
the planned posts closures were not those deemed to be at the core of its 
operations. Services targeting those areas considered important for the broadcaster, 
such as the Middle East and Nigeria and Afghanistan, were not cut, and measures 
were taken to ensure that they are not seriously affected by the new changes 
(FACOM, 2011). Geopolitical considerations and the impact the broadcaster feels 
it has in an area are among the factors that determine the provision of the core or 
peripheral services. 
 
The World Service sees Nigeria as one of the key areas where it has outstanding 
impact, with the country being its largest radio market in the world (BBC World 
Service, 2007, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010), as noted above. Providing a 
weekly radio audience figure of 21.5 million, Nigeria remains a major focus for 
the broadcaster (BBC Global News, 2010). Significantly, Nigerians too regard 
BBC as the foremost foreign broadcaster that provides credible international and 
national news services to them (BBC Global News, 2009, 2010). The majority of 
the audiences are Hausa-speaking Muslims who live in Northern Nigeria, the main 
target of the BBC Hausa Service. Radio is perhaps the most significant mass 
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medium in this region (Larkin, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010) where many 
inhabitants have turned ‗radio-listening‘ into ‗a habit‘ (Abdulkadir, 2000, p.130)—
a situation long facilitated by easy access to ‗cheap, portable, battery-powered 
transistor radio‘ (Mytton, 2000, p.21). Television is the second most significant 
medium in the region and in Nigeria as a whole, with over two thirds of the 
population viewing it weekly, and over a quarter of them getting access to cable 
and satellite channels (BBC Global News, 2010). Internet usage is also growing 
rapidly—over 28 per cent of the population have access (Internet World Stats, 
2011)—with the BBC Hausa Service online recording 1.2 million users in April 
2010, a figure that was projected to double this year (Tangaza, 2010). 
 
The background 
Northern Nigerians have a long history of interactions with other peoples and 
cultures outside their territory both directly through trades and travels and wars, or 
such similar means, and indirectly through many forms of mediated 
communications. One of the most defining encounters they had was the one with 
North African traders, particularly Arabs and Berbers, that began around the tenth 
century and through which they came into contact with Islam (Davidson, 
1969/2004; Batran, 1989) which later became not just a religious belief but a state 
ideology for the largest part of the region (Fisher, 1975; Stewart, 1986). The other 
defining encounter was the one with Europeans along which came Christianity and 
colonialism (Lugard, 1902; Dudley, 1968; Barnes, 2004) and later various forms 
of postcolonial state instrumentalism (Williams, 1984; Dorward, 1986). Added to 
these key encounters are several others that collectively form Northern Nigerians‘ 
complex political, socio-economic and cultural experiences.  
 
As a geopolitical entity, Northern Nigeria was formally formed by Britain in 1900, 
following the transfer in 1899 of the territories located in West Africa that were 
under ‗the exclusive trading rights‘ of the British Royal Niger Company (Dudley, 
1968, p.12). The company was originally on a trading mission in the area, had 
entered into trade agreements with some of its local rulers and the Berlin 
Conference of 1885 had assigned the area to Britain (Lugard, 1902). France and 
Germany—both of whom had interests in the region—had recognised those 
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trading rights; but there were still competitions among them and resistance from 
some of the local rulers. To forestall further trouble, Britain declared Northern 
Nigeria as its Protectorate, with Frederick Lugard as chief commissioner (Dudley, 
1968). Prior to this declaration the territories were actually made up of the Sokoto 
Caliphate, Bornu (Borno) Kingdom and some smaller autonomous chiefdoms and 
communities with their respective independent rulers (Fisher, 1975; Stewart, 1986; 
Last, 1989). Borno was a big Islamic kingdom in its own right (Last, 1989) and 
Sokoto Caliphate was a vast Islamic empire comprised of several emirates, with 
well-organised system of government based on Islamic law or Sharia (Stewart, 
1986). After the conquest, Britain left the old system largely in place and operated 
what came to be known as ‗Indirect Rule‘ whereby local rulers exercised power 
under the supervision of British colonial administrators (Dorward, 1986; Lugard, 
1922). British Common Law was brought in to run alongside the Islamic and 
traditional legal systems; the Common Law was being applied largely in criminal 
cases while Sharia was being mainly used in civil matters (Dorward, 1986; 
Stewart, 1986).  
 
The Northern Protectorate was merged with the Southern Protectorate in 1914 to 
form the present-day Nigeria, which was run as a single colonial entity made up of 
three regions marked by the division of the three major ethnic groups in the 
country—the Hausa-dominated Northern Region (the same Northern Nigeria), the 
Ibo-dominated Eastern Region and the Yoruba-dominated Western Region 
(Williams, 1984). This regional arrangement remained in place even after 
Nigeria‘s independence in 1960 until first the Mid-West Region was created in 
1963 during the first civilian administration and later states were created during 
military regimes to reduce ethnic tensions and reflect the diversity of the 
country—though this did not stop the brutal civil war of 1967-70 and series of 
ethno-religious clashes in the country (Williams, 1984; Koehn, 1989; Oyovbaire, 
2001; Kastfelt, 2006; Uche, 2008). The numerous changes produced the present 
36-state federal structure in the country, with the central city of Abuja as the 
Federal Capital Territory. But even this, as Oyovbaire notes, does not fully reflect 
the level of Nigeria‘s complexity and ethnic diversity. ‗The use of sociological, 
anthropological, cultural and linguistic classifications could assign as low as 375 
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minority ethnic nationalities and as high as 1,450 such groups in the country‘ 
(Oyovbaire, 2001).   
  
Northern Nigeria is currently made up of 19 states (and Abuja) out of the 36 states 
of the Nigerian federation. It covers well over half of the country‘s territory of 
about 923,733 square kilometres and well over half of its current estimated 
population of 166 million—based on the National Census which put Nigeria‘s 
population at over 140 million in 2006 (FGN, 2007). The predominant religion 
remains Islam, although there are large numbers of Christian and other non-
Muslim populations, particularly in the southern part of the region, often referred 
to as the Middle-Belt, where ethno-religious tensions appear to be more 
pronounced, especially in recent years. The frequent ethno-religious conflicts in 
the region with their deep socio-economic and political linkage (ICG, 2010) are 
creating what Kastfelt (2006, p.14) describes as ‗enclave culture…where social 
pluralism is being replaced by a growing concern with defining, creating and 
maintaining community boundaries‘, a phenomenon that he appropriately links to 
the problem of ‗postcolonial citizenship‘. The region was witnessing its own 
internal transformation when colonialism came along with its own form of nation-
state structure. In some respects it has succeeded in creating a new entity; in others 
it has exposed the difficulties involved in such enterprise. Northern Nigeria has an 
estimated 250 indigenous ethnic groups—there is no agreed definite number of 
ethnic groups in Nigeria (Oyovbaire, 2001; Philips, 2004)—with Hausa-Fulani as 
the largest group and Hausa language, which had been ‗reduced to writing long 
before the advent of the British‘ in the region (Williams, 1984, p.331), serving 
largely as the lingua franca and English as the official language. 
 
The Nigerians‘ mediated encounters with other cultures have also been long; and 
perhaps its defining moments too began first with the spread of Islamic education 
centuries before British colonisation and later with the spread of Western 
education following the advent of Europeans in the territory. Both have long and 
complex histories that are beyond the scope of this study, but they both facilitate 
the mediated encounters that the modern media are now much credited with 
engendering. The presence of media in Nigeria preceded British colonialism as the 
first newspaper was established in 1859, five-and-a-half decades before Britain‘s 
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proclamation of Nigeria as a country. It was a Christian evangelical Yoruba 
newspaper Iwe Irohin (The Newspaper) which came to symbolise the character of 
the early print media that first started as tiny outfits before moving into small 
private concerns and later expanded into medium and large entities with both 
private and government involvements (Oyovbaire, 2001). Today the Nigerian 
press is seen as very vibrant and one of the freest in Africa, though there have been 
cases of closure of media houses, harassment of journalists and corruption among 
the practitioners (Uche, 1989; Oyovbaire, 2001; Olutokun and Seteolu, 2001; 
Yusha‘u, 2008; Auduson, 2010). The print media have been mainly independent 
while the broadcast media are largely government-controlled, though their 
liberalisation in the 1990s and the emergence and rise of what Larkin (2008, 
p.354) calls ‗video culture‘ and its attendant ‗infrastructure of piracy‘ have put a 
significant part of the broadcast media out of government‘s hand. The new media 
space too has been expanding rapidly with the Internet and mobile telephony 
spreading very fast across the country (BBC Global News, 2009, 2010). 
 
Broadcasting, to put it into its historical context, was introduced to Nigeria by 
Britain in the form of radio networks and mobile cinemas to promote the interests 
of the colonial regime and to bring a Western model of modernisation to the 
people of the area (Ladele et al., 1979; Sambe, 2005; Larkin, 2004, 2008). They 
were the forms of media that dominated the public sphere of the colonial Northern 
Nigeria. ‗The mobile cinemas of the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) (majigi in Hausa) 
shared with radio the aim of advancing the needs of the modernising colonial 
state,‘ notes Larkin (2004, p. 356). Commercial cinema, added to the colonial film 
units and radio, opened up the region to ‗the global influences of foreign media, 
from Hollywood to Indian films, and made these media an everyday part of 
Nigerian life‘ (p. 356). Government‘s control of broadcasting remained tight even 
after independence and was only loosened in the 1990s when pressures from the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the implementation of the 
economic Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the country forced its 
liberalisation (Larkin, 2004, 2008). This led to rapid changes in the country‘s 
broadcasting scene with the establishment of several private broadcast stations. 
According to Nigeria‘s broadcasting regulator, the National Broadcasting 
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Commission (NBC), the number of broadcasting stations in the country rose from 
30 to 394 within the last 20 years (NBC, 2009).  
 
The Nigerian film industry has seen an even more phenomenal growth, producing 
more than two films (in video format) every day and turning the country into the 
world‘s second biggest movie-maker, behind only India and far ahead of the 
United States (UNESCO, 2009; Bengali, 2009). The films are popular both within 
Nigeria and in many African countries. The industry is private-sector driven, 
relying on private financing and entrepreneurial skills of its owners and managers 
and the raw talents of its artists to succeed. It is virtually free from government‘s 
control, with the exception of the regulatory role of government agencies like the 
National Film and Video Censors Board (NFVCB) at the national level and some 
local censors at the state level. Although collectively known as Nollywood, often 
identified with its English-language films, in reality it is a multi-lingual industry, 
with about 56 per cent of the films being produced in the three major Nigerian 
languages. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation‘s 
(UNESCO) figures for 2009 show that English language films account for 44 per 
cent while Yoruba (31%), Hausa (24%) and Igbo (1%) make up the balance 
(UNESCO, 2009). The Hausa films are dominant in Northern Nigeria, and their 
influence extends to both Niger Republic and the huge Hausa-speaking 
communities in Benin Republic, Cameroon and Ghana (Larkin, 2008).  
 
The dominance of the local films may have reduced the influence of foreign films 
in the country, with UNESCO confirming that ‗Nigeria has virtually no formal 
cinemas‘ (UNESCO, 2009) and that many Nigerians do watch local home videos. 
But then, access to foreign films is also common through local television stations, 
video compact discs (VCDs), digital video discs (DVDs) and satellite television 
channels and perhaps marginally through the Internet too which, as noted above, is 
being accessed by more than 28 per cent of Nigerians (Internet World Stats, 2011). 
It is the rapid spread of the distribution technologies that makes global cultural 
goods more readily available to Nigerians and it is this availability that widens the 
scope of the mediated cultural interactions. Nigerians‘ consumption of global 
media products, for instance, appears to have increased with the rise in the number 
of global broadcasters (BBC Global News, 2010). Cable and satellite television 
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stations such as the BBC World News, the Cable News Network (CNN), France 
24, Sky News, Al-Jazeera and even Iranian Press TV, among others, are all now 
competing for audiences in Nigeria. 
 
The BBC is perhaps the first foreign broadcaster in Nigeria, having started 
broadcasting to the country virtually since the establishment of the Empire Service 
in 1932 (Briggs, 1985; Larkin, 2008). It began with wired broadcasting whereby 
BBC programmes were relayed to the audiences ‗by means of wires connected to 
loudspeakers installed in the homes of subscribers‘ and at public places (Ladele et 
al., 1979, p.8; Larkin, 2008). The broadcast then was only in English language and 
the subscribers were mostly expatriates and few influential Nigerians, and as such 
the majority of the audiences had to rely on the public loudspeakers to listen to it 
(Larkin, 2008). Later, when wireless broadcasting was introduced in Nigeria in 
1951, the audiences‘ access to BBC‘s broadcasts expanded rapidly (Ladele et al., 
1979). But perhaps the most remarkable part of the early experience was the 
introduction of the BBC Hausa Service in 1957 as part of the British Colonial 
Office‘s new initiative for Africa (Briggs, 1985). The BBC was at that time 
committed to ‗providing certain territories with programmes more closely 
designed to appeal to special local interests‘ and the Hausa language service was 
designed for West Africa (BBC Handbook, 1958). Since then the relationship 
between the broadcaster and Hausa-speaking audiences has been widening. The 
service has been expanding and the audiences have been steadily increasing, 
reaching a weekly figure of about 26 million in 2007 (BBC, 2008). The offerings 
are on radio, online and on mobile telephony, along the BBC‘s multimedia 
initiatives. 
 
The BBC Hausa Service does face competition from other international radio 
broadcasters such as the Voice of America (VOA), Germany‘s Radio Deutsche 
Welle and Radio France International (RFI), all of which broadcast in Hausa 
language targeting the same audiences. But the BBC‘s historical connection to its 
Nigeria audiences, its perceived reputation of impartiality and its effective 
deployment of delivery technologies appear to have given it an edge over its 
rivals. Several BBC audience surveys (BBC World Service, 2007, 2008; BBC 
Global News, 2009, 2010) show that its audience figures are consistently higher 
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than those of its major rivals in the region—with the VOA and Radio Deutsche 
Welle often coming second and third respectively [the RFI began its Hausa 
transmission in 2007 (Sennitt, 2007) and so far none of the surveys has included 
its audience figures]. Historically, there were other Hausa service competitors such 
as the then Radio Moscow and very marginally Radio China International, but 
apparently the ending of the Cold War ended the competition—particularly with 
Radio Moscow (Jaggar, 2001), which is now known as Voice of Russia. The 
BBC‘s services on radio (World Service English, Focus on Africa and Network 
Africa) and on television (BBC World News and BBC Arabic Television) and 
their online services, all of which have audiences in Northern Nigeria (BBC 
Global News, 2010), combined with the head start it had with massive Hausa 
Service audiences, clearly give it an unparalleled advantage in Northern Nigeria. 
 
Whether it is seen as a provider of global news and current affairs programmes or 
as an instrument of British public diplomacy or both, the BBC World Service has 
maintained a remarkable relationship with its Northern Nigerian audiences. This 
engagement has been long and complex; and the dynamics of global geopolitics—
from colonialism and Cold War era to post-September 11 period—and changes in 
delivery technologies (from wired broadcasting to multimedia broadcasting) have 
ensured the sustenance of this complexity. This is further guaranteed by the 
‗complex, contested and competitive setting of international broadcasting and 
public diplomacy‘ (Price et al., 2008, p.150). The paradox of Northern Nigerians‘ 
high consumption of BBC products and their apparent negative perceptions of the 
West widened the complexity. Although (as stated above) a series of BBC surveys 
did show evidence of high consumption of BBC products and favourable 
credibility rating of the station in Northern Nigeria (BBC World Service, 2007, 
2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010), the region appears to be experiencing what 
Huntington (1996) calls ‗Islamic resurgence‘, which is also projected to rise in the 
region in the coming years with accompanied anti-Western sentiment (US NIC, 
2008; ICG, 2010). Previous studies elsewhere do suggest that the West, 
particularly the United States, has negative image in the Muslim world (Gentzkow 
and Shapiro, 2004; Pew Center, 2004, 2006; Pintak, 2006), and that the use of 
what Nye (2004a) calls ‗soft power‘ could be helpful in changing such image. 
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There is, however, a dearth of empirical evidence to show how successful this 
effort has been. 
 
This study attempts to examine both the nature and the impact of BBC‘s long-term 
engagement with its Northern Nigerian audiences. It explores the general nature of 
Northern Nigerians‘ consumption of news and current affairs programmes of 
global broadcasters and its apparent impact on their everyday life. It attempts to 
assess the BBC‘s influence in shaping the Northern Nigerians‘ perceptions of 
global events as well as its impact in moulding their conceptions of the West in 
general and Britain in particular. It also examines the nature of the cumulative 
consumption of the BBC broadcasts by its Northern Nigerian audiences and how 
this enhanced (or failed to enhance) favourable perceptions of Britain by these 
audiences—and why. It is a study that investigates both the production and 
reception aspects of media, the dynamics within them and the complexities of the 
relationship between them as well as the nature of their relationship with other 
affiliated forces.   
 
It is a study done with the full consideration of the existing fluidity of the media 
landscape. In the current ‗hypermedia space‘ where the new and old media are 
‗locked in an inter-dependent, mutually re-enforcing, complementary relationship‘ 
(Kraidy and Mourad, 2010, p.11) and where audiences simultaneously act as 
producers and consumers of media texts, little can be left to chances. ‗And in a 
more vicious world, as the Cold War‘s geopolitically distinct fields of contestation 
fade in favour of the porous borders and group networks of a newly 
conceptualized ―long war on terror‖, other defining features of international 
broadcasting blur as well‘ (Price et al, 2008, p.153). These realities present 
formidable challenges that call for the use of comprehensive theoretical and 
methodological frameworks that could integrate all the major aspects of the 
subject and their complexities for thorough examination. The problem, though, is 
that audience research is still battling with a dearth of standardised conceptual 
research schema (Barker, 2006; Michelle, 2006); and this gets even worse when 
the research involves transnational audiences that Ang (1996) says ‗would be 
ludicrous‘ to find a definitive framework of researching ‗precisely because there is 
no way to know in advance which strategies and tactics different peoples in the 
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world will invent to negotiate with the intrusions of global forces in their lives‘ 
(p.143).  
 
Still, this study has made effort to find what Thussu (2006) calls an innovative and 
inclusive multidisciplinary framework that could address the various dimensions 
of a research of this nature. It reviews various conceptual and theoretical 
postulations related to different aspects of the subject, draws useful insights from 
them and come up with an interdisciplinary multidimensional framework that 
guides the research. Stuart Hall‘s (1980) encoding/decoding model, Joseph 
Klapper‘s (1960) limited effects theory and Joseph Nye‘s (2004a) concept of soft 
power have all proved useful in providing the theoretical framework, and so have 
David Morley‘s (2006) advice on the need for multidimensional methodology and 
Carolyn Michelle‘s (2007) consolidated model in furnishing the methodological 
approach. The multi-method approach employed for the study combined in-depth 
individual interview method with focus group, content analysis and documentary 
research techniques to thoroughly examine the production, the content and the 
reception aspects of the media. The primary data drawn through these qualitative 
methods was supplemented with statistical data obtained from the BBC‘s large-
scale surveys to help provide both general and specific insights into the Northern 
Nigerians‘ engagement with global broadcasters.   
 
Scope of the study 
This study broadly investigates the pattern and consequences of Northern 
Nigerians‘ consumption of news and current affairs programmes of global 
broadcasters. It focuses primarily on examining the mainly Muslim Northern 
Nigerians‘ engagement with the BBC World Service, particularly the BBC Hausa 
Service, the production processes and the nature of the products produced for 
them, the distribution and  consumption of the products and the overall 
consequences of the engagement. It looks at the historical backgrounds of both the 
BBC World Service and Northern Nigeria, the pattern of their relationship, the 
forces that shape it and the trajectory of the relationship. The World Service‘s 
relationship with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its engagement with 
distribution technologies are also briefly examined in the process. This study 
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limits itself to the investigation of the mainly Muslim Northern Nigerians‘ long-
term engagement with the BBC within the realm of production and consumption 
of news and current affairs programmes; it does not go into the entire relationship 
between the BBC and Nigeria as a whole. It does not, for instance, touch on the 
work of the BBC World Service‘s charity arm, the BBC World Service Trust, 
which offers technical and material aids to local broadcasters and runs health and 
other developmental media campaigns in Nigeria. Similarly, this study neither 
assesses the BBC World Service‘s influence in English language education in 
Nigeria nor does it examine the BBC Hausa Service‘s contributions to the 
standardisation of Hausa language, even though both are important components of 
the dynamic relationship between the broadcaster and Northern Nigerians. 
Focusing on the specific areas stated, and excluding others, form part of this 
study‘s strategy to have proper direction and produce clear and unambiguous 
results. In any case, the truth is that it is simply not feasible for a single study to 
exhaust all aspects of audiences‘ relationship with the media (Hoijer, 1990). This 
is even more so when dealing with vast and complicated subjects, such as the ones 
this study handles. ‗The BBC is a highly complex cultural institution and a 
daunting subject even for the serious scholar‘ (Chignell, 2008). Northern Nigeria 
presents an even stronger challenge. But neither is beyond human comprehension 
and both, particularly the former, have indeed been the subject of intense scrutiny. 
Combining them together and interrogating both their internal dynamics and the 




To unveil the pattern and particularities and impact of Northern Nigerians‘ 
interactions with the BBC in particular and other global broadcasters in general, 
answers to series of relevant and interrelated questions need to be found. The most 
significant of these questions are as follows: 
a) How have international broadcasters, especially the BBC World 
Service, delivered international affairs for specific audiences?  
b) How does the BBC produce content that is relevant to Northern 
Nigerians? 
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c) How has the regular consumption of BBC World Service radio in 
troubled Northern Nigeria influenced audiences‘ attitudes to 
international affairs? 
d) To what extent has the regular consumption of BBC World Service‘s 
products influenced Muslim Northern Nigerians‘ perceptions of events 
in Nigeria, Africa and Islamic world as well as in Britain and its 
Western allies? 
e) What are the implications of the study‘s findings for audience research 
and public diplomacy supported by broadcasting? 
 
Rationale for the study  
This study investigates the pattern and consequences of the consumption of global 
media goods by the mainly Muslim Northern Nigerians at the time when both the 
media landscape and the audiences‘ consumption patterns are undergoing radical 
transformations. First, it is a pioneering attempt under this situation to assess the 
impact of Western cultural goods on non-Western society, with specific reference 
to BBC and Northern Nigerians, and to offer insights into this particular cultural 
encounter—revealing the audiences‘ mode of resistance and rejection, as well as 
that of assimilation and adaptation, of Western media texts. It holds out potentials 
for epistemological and theoretical development in media and cultural studies. 
Previous studies of non-Westerners‘ encounter with the Western media, such as 
Daniel Lerner‘s (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society and Tarik Sabry‘s 
(2010) Cultural Encounters in the Arab World (despite their wide temporal and 
theoretical disparities), have provided useful accounts on the dynamics of such 
interactions and strengthened its intellectual base. Additional endeavour is both 
imperative and desirable.  
 
What is more, a study of Northern Nigerians‘ interactions with global broadcasters 
is effectively a reception research—an area that is vital to communications studies 
but which has been in decline, and is in dire need of revival (Michelle, 2007; 
Morley, 2006; Barker, 2006). ‗Audience research, after a promising period during 
which some crucial advances were made, seems to be in decline in several ways,‘ 
Barker (2006, p.123) laments, ‗yet its tasks remain as important as ever‘. Its 
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heydays when important works such as media effects theories (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1944/1979; Gerbner and Gross, 1976), uses and gratifications 
(Herzog, 1941; Katz et al., 1973) and limited effects models (Klapper, 1960; Katz 
and Lazarsfeld, 1955/2006) emerged were long gone; and even later works such as 
Morley‘s (1980) application of Hall‘s (1980) encoding/decoding model and Liebes 
and Katz‘s (1993) Export of Meaning are not really being matched by new and 
significant audience studies. Barker‘s argument—reinforced by Michelle‘s 
(2007)—is that, although there have been series of reception studies in the last two 
to three decades, they are not enough, and that they generally lack proper 
conceptual and theoretical focus. What is required, they insist, are studies guided 
by ‗elaborated conceptual framework‘ (Barker, 2006, p.128) or ‗conceptual 
schema‘ (Michelle, 20007, p.183) that would enhance clear understanding of 
‗audience reception in its full complexity‘ (p.193). An attempt on this is a 
worthwhile venture.  
 
This is even more significant in view of the kind of transformation being 
witnessed in the media scene, as stated above. With the changing media landscape 
and an equally changing mode of consumption, comprehensive theoretical and 
methodological frameworks that could integrate these changes and the various 
dimensions of the study are required. This is what informs the choice of a unique 
methodological approach that combines different qualitative techniques to 
simultaneously study both the production and consumption aspects of media for a 
comprehensive examination of the subject. The study, as stated earlier, attempts to 
combine individual interviews (Priest, 1996; Berger, 1998) with focus groups 
(Morrison, 1998; Morley, 1980) and content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004) 
techniques to thoroughly investigate the production side of the media, the content 
itself and the reception side (the audiences) to get comprehensive results. They 
are, as noted above, complemented with ample statistical data generated from 
large-scale BBC surveys to provide both general and specific insights into the 
audiences‘ engagement with the media. The ability to combine different 
qualitative research tools and complement the data they generated with the one 
obtained through surveys confirmed the complementary roles the two 
methodological traditions play (Morrison, 1998). Similarly, putting focus group 
technique in operation tests its viability in unveiling group dynamism and in 
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generating rich material (Morrison, 1998; Greenbaum, 2000). Overall, it is a novel 
methodological endeavour the application of which signifies potentially important 
improvement in reception research and can possibly transform the shape and form 
of transnational audience study.  
 
Since this study focuses on examining BBC‘s long-term relationship with its 
audiences in Northern Nigeria, it in essence assesses the World Service‘s 
performance in the region both in the provision of news service and in promoting 
British public diplomacy—issues that are of significance not only to BBC 
personnel and public diplomacy operators but also to media scholars and 
international relations academics. The BBC‘s roles as provider of global news 
service and promoter of British public diplomacy have long been noted by many 
scholars (Rampal and Adams, 1990; Nye, 2004a, 2004b; Sreberny et al., 2010a, 
2010b) but it would be interesting to test the veracity of the claim with empirical 
evidence from its engagement with Northern Nigerians. This is particularly 
essential in view of the complex nature of the relationship. It is indicated above 
that, although series of BBC‘s audience surveys do show high consumption of the 
station‘s products and high rating of its credibility (BBC World Service, 2007, 
2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010), the Muslim Northern Nigerians‘ 
perceptions of the West do not appear to be favourable. It is an intriguing situation 
that could only be unravelled by a carefully planned and well-focused research of 
this nature.  
 
Furthermore, the insights this study provides could serve as vital tools for 
assessing the role of media in public diplomacy and for formulating effective 
programmes within that remit. This is significant too, given the amount of 
resources Britain devotes to public diplomacy works and the high expectation it 
has on the BBC World Service to contribute towards such efforts. The 
government, as stated above, devotes over a third of its public diplomacy budget to 
the World Service as a public diplomacy partner that brings benefits to Britain 
(FCO, 2005, p.6). The funding had even been increasing rapidly (Hiller, 2010b) 
until Britain‘s rising debts and deficits forced a climb down (Robinson and 
Sweney, 2010; Foster, 2010; Thompson, 2011). But even with the economic crisis, 
as noted earlier, there are considerable efforts to spare the World Service of further 
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funding cuts (FACOM, 2011; Wynne-Jones, 2011). All these underline the 
significance attached to media‘s role in public diplomacy and what a study 
towards understanding it entails. This may equally have special resonance with the 
West‘s battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslims (Thussu, 2005, 2006; Price 
et al., 2008), for such understanding can provide clues on the prospects of its 
success or the pitfalls of its failure. The strength of this study, however, lies on its 
potentials for wider applicability in media diplomacy and related disciplines, for as 
Sreberny (2010b, p. 280) argues, ‗even bad public diplomacy is better than war, so 
we might do well as scholars of transnational media, communications, and politics 
to understand it better‘. 
 
Another significant area that this study investigates is the pivotal role of 
communications technologies in relation to both the BBC‘s and the audiences‘ 
engagement with them. The convergence of the old and new media, and the way 
they are being leveraged for content distribution represent some of the most 
radical transformations taking place in the media industry today. The BBC‘s 
record of effective deployment of delivery technologies—right from its early days 
when much of the current technologies were non-existent and those available were 
in rudimentary stages (though they were considered marvel then) to these days 
when their advancement appears to have surpassed expectations—is one of the key 
factors that puts it ahead of its rivals (Briggs, 1985; Price et al., 2008). The 
corporation‘s current use of ‗multimedia strategy‘, delivering its contents through 
multiple platforms, has enabled it to survive tough competitions and retain huge 
audiences (Hiller, 2010a, p. 2). For the audiences the technologies are their main 
link to the world, providing the infrastructure that brings cultural goods to them 
(Larkin, 2008). ‗Media technologies are more than transmitters of content, they 
represent cultural ambitions, political machineries, modes of leisure, relations 
between technology and the body, and, in certain ways, the economy and spirit of 
an age‘ (Larkin, 2008, p. 2). Examining their roles does not only unfold the nature 
of the broadcaster‘s strategies of delivering its contents and the audiences‘ 
relationship with them, but it also unpacks the historical and cultural dynamics of 
their influence in the everyday lives of Northern Nigerians. The BBC‘s 
engagement with the new technologies is both part of its survival strategy and part 
of maintaining its competitive edge. It is, for instance, the new delivery 
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technologies that help drive its interactive programming which many Northern 
Nigerian audiences seem to enjoy. The findings reveal that the new technologies 
do not only enhance engagement with the audiences (both in delivering the 
products to them and in receiving feedback from them), but they also bring 
corporate efficiency and efficiencies among media personnel. 
 
Another strategy that this study has found to be working for the BBC (which 
others too could benefit from) is its employment of diasporic personnel with their 
‗transnational cultural capital‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010b, p. 282) to work in its 
language services. Sreberny et al. (2010b) note that the ability of the diasporic 
figures to represent the targeted region and ‗to portray British cultural activities 
and social life (usually in a positive light)‘ and the leveraging of the online 
services could serve as key to World Service‘s survival (p.282). This study reveals 
that the strategy serves another purpose too: it enhances BBC‘s credibility. Some 
of the Hausa language audiences, for instance, feel that the diasporic personnel, 
with whom they share common cultural and religious values, are unlikely to put 
out contents that would be harmful to them. Incidentally, this strategy could also 
help to mitigate the problem of delivering dissonant messages to more discerning 
audiences. Although the findings have not shown any evidence of this happening, 
they do suggest that combining this with careful selection of content might deliver 
good results. The practical application of this strategy could indeed go down to the 
level of guiding broadcasting executives and producers in content selection in their 
specific programme-making endeavours and general journalism practice. All these 
would have greater chance of working, though, when given a holistic treatment 
based on the conceptual and theoretical thrusts brought out by this research. 
 
An overview of the chapters 
This work is organised into ten broad chapters with multiple subheadings for easy 
access, referencing and comprehension. This first chapter is an introductory note 
that sets out the study, stating its nature, its scope, its focus and its limits. It 
outlines the historical and contextual backgrounds of the key elements of the 
study, their internal dynamics and the dynamics of their relationships. The major 
research questions the study strives to answer and the rationale of the research 
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itself are also laid out here. Chapter II, Literature Review, provides a critical 
assessment of previous audience studies, the conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks that underline them and the ones produced by them as well as the past 
and present trajectories of the field. It specifically reviews in detail different 
theories on media-audience relationship, paying particular attention to media 
effects and dominant ideology theories, uses and gratifications, active audience 
and selectivity models and related concepts. It also looks at the radio and African 
audiences, international radio broadcasting and public diplomacy, international 
communications and transnational audiences before it draws up a dynamic 
multidimensional theoretical framework that guides this study. 
 
Chapter III, Historical Context, unpacks the Northern Nigeria‘s past detailing its 
long engagement with Islam, its pre-colonial political and socio-economic 
structure, its colonial and postcolonial restructuring and its status in present-day 
Nigeria. The British historical ties with the region—ranging from the proclamation 
of the Northern and Southern Protectorates, through to their amalgamation as one 
entity, to the final granting of independence to Nigeria—and the forces that shaped 
the developments all form the first part of the chapter. The second part examines 
the historical development of media in Nigeria—the print media and the broadcast 
and film industries—their structures, the role they played at different stages of 
Nigeria‘s evolution and their transformations to their present state. Chapter IV, 
The BBC and Northern Nigerians, deals with both the historical and current 
dynamics of BBC‘s relationship with its audiences in Northern Nigeria. It traces 
the BBC‘s development from its early days as Empire Service to its present 
position as the leading international broadcaster with the contradictory roles of 
providing impartial news service and promoting British public diplomacy. Its 
complex relationship with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the difficult 
balancing act of attending to their demand and that of the audiences are also 
highlighted here. The chapter equally examines the BBC‘s interests in Nigeria—
first as a British colonial outpost and now as its largest radio market—highlighting 
its different roles in the changing times.  
 
Chapter V, Methodology, reveals all aspects of the methodological tools employed 
for this research along with the justification for doing so. It highlights the 
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qualitative methods used in drawing the primary data for the research—individual 
in-depth interviews and focus groups—the qualitative content analysis technique 
used to study a selection of transmitted programmes and the documentary research 
that enhances the study. It also explains how the statistical data drawn from BBC‘s 
large audience surveys complements the primary data drawn from the field and 
helps in enriching this research. The chapter goes on to unveil the sampling 
procedure employed in selecting the participants, their regional locations and 
backgrounds, the nature and quality of the data generated from them, the ethical 
issues concerned with the research as well as the general problems encountered 
and how they were addressed. Chapter VI, Contents and Quantification, contains 
an overview of the editorial policy and guidelines that inform content selection 
and programme-making in the BBC World Service. It also analyses a selection of 
BBC Hausa Service programmes transmitted to its audiences as well as BBC‘s 
quantitative surveys in Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the results obtained in 
the last four consecutive years, unveiling its audience figures and its performance 
in the country, the audiences‘ demographics and their assessments of local and 
international broadcasters.  
 
Chapter VII, Results and Analysis I, deals with the empirical data obtained from 
audiences in Nigeria through in-depth individual interviews. It reveals the 
individuals‘ pattern of consumption of international media products and the 
apparent consequences of such consumption. It shows that there is a high 
consumption of global media products by Northern Nigerian audiences and that 
they have positive perception of the BBC, although they hold strong reservations 
about its coverage of the Muslim world and Africa. It reveals that the audiences 
have ambivalent perceptions of the West—slightly deferential but overwhelmingly 
negative—and are highly critical of what they perceive to be the West‘s unfairness 
to the Muslim world. Chapter VIII, Results and Analysis II, presents the findings 
of the investigation of the production side revealed by the data obtained through 
in-depth interviews with the BBC executives, producers and reporters. It outlines 
the rigorous and systematic procedures and processes of the selection and 
production of BBC Hausa Service‘s contents, and the nature of the relationship 
between the managerial and operational staff. The chapter also unveils the nature 
of BBC‘s engagement with new communications technologies, its focus on 
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interactive programming and its treatment of audiences‘ complaints. It reveals the 
BBC personnel‘s perspectives on the broadcaster‘s relationship with the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, its public diplomacy role and its influence in Northern 
Nigeria. 
 
Chapter IX, Results and Analysis III, teases out the study‘s most comprehensive 
findings on the audiences‘ interactions with global broadcasters. It shows the 
pattern, particularities and apparent consequences of their consumption of news 
and current affairs programmes of the global broadcasters. The audiences, the 
findings indicate, are highly selective in their dealing with unpleasant messages 
but less so when consuming congenial content; and that the mediating variables of 
religion, ideology, culture, other social forces and personal predispositions do play 
roles in audiences‘ selectivity. Chapter X, Discussion, Implications and 
Conclusions, examines the most significant findings of the research and highlights 
the conceptual and theoretical strands they reveal. The findings suggest that the 
changing media landscape is transforming audiences‘ pattern of consumption 
giving rise to a more complex form of selectivity—selective believability—and 
that extra-communication factors exert influence in media consumption, with the 
strongest among them serving as the primary mediator. For the mainly Muslim 
Northern Nigerians, the findings reveal, Islam—which serves as a religious, 
ideological and cultural force—appears to play the primary mediating role in their 
consumption of news and current affairs programmes of global media. They 
suggest that in audiences‘ consumption of unpleasant messages credibility is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for believability. The chapter also outlines 








  Literature Review 
 
Introduction                      
Researching media-audience relationship has always been an integral part of 
communications studies, notwithstanding the contention that it still contends with 
the question of standardised research schema (Barker, 2006; Morley, 2006; 
Michelle, 2007). This study focuses on examining the long-term relationship 
between transnational audiences and international media, using a comprehensive 
conceptual framework to look at not only the reception but also the production 
side of the media and relevant aspects of international communications and public 
diplomacy. And since the study is focusing primarily on the BBC World Service 
and its audiences in Northern Nigeria, it devotes two separate sections—the 
‗Historical Context‘ and ‗The BBC and Northern Nigerians‘ chapters that follow 
this one—for the provision of their historical backgrounds. This particular chapter 
is, however, devoted to the review of related literature concerning the conceptual 
and theoretical postulations in the field. Paucity of qualitative audience studies in 
Northern Nigeria—though Brian Larkin‘s (2004, 2008) works in the area are of 
great significance—might have been one of the factors that prompted this study, 
but it has also necessitated the review of related literature from other regions. This 
chapter reviews previous studies and theories on media-audience relationship 
(ranging from media effects theories to audience selectivity and active audience 
models), radio and African audiences, international radio broadcasting and public 
diplomacy, international communications and transnational audiences—and draws 
up the theoretical framework that guides the study. 
 
The effects theories 
From the moment the production and distribution of cultural goods reached 
industrial scale, the quest for unravelling their influence on their consumers began. 
Early attempts yielded what came to be known as media effects theory or 
hypodermic needle model which could be traced back to the period of the First 
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World War—and which held sway in the inter-war years (during the rise of 
Fascism in Western Europe and consolidation of Communism in Soviet Union) up 
to the end of the Second World War. The idea of using media for propaganda was 
effectively recognised in the early periods of film and radio, and those in control 
of power embraced it with enthusiasm, as one of the leading American 
communications theorists, Harold Lasswell, notes in his book Propaganda 
Techniques in the World War (1927). ‗During the war period it came to be 
recognized that the mobilisation of men and means was not sufficient; there must 
be mobilisation of opinion,‘ he writes. ‗Power over opinion, as over life and 
property, passed into official hands‘ (pp.14-15). McQuail (2005) concurs, 
explaining that the contending nations in the First World War mobilised the press 
and film for their war aims. ‗The results seemed to leave little doubt of the potency 
of media influence on the ―masses‖, when effectively managed and directed‘ 
(McQuail, 2005, p.51). There was the feeling then that effective Allied forces‘ 
propaganda had helped shorten the length of the First World War by a year 
(Seaton, 1997b). ‗The Times in 1918 had argued that effective propaganda had 
hastened victory by a year, and consequently saved a million lives‘ (p.129). 
 
The debut of cinema at the close of the nineteenth century and the commencement 
of radio transmissions in the West at the beginning of twentieth century provided 
the impetus for broadcasting. The Russian communists, at the peak of their 
revolutionary triumph over the ruling Tsars in 1917, ‗were one of the earliest 
political groups to realize the ideological and strategic importance of broadcasting‘ 
(Thussu, 2006, p.15), and the message of their leader, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, was 
the first public broadcast to be recorded in the history of wireless propaganda. The 
Soviet Union was in 1925 the first country to use short-wave radio in Moscow 
from where they began to broadcast communist propaganda to international 
audiences (Browne, 1982; Thussu, 2006). When the Nazis assumed power in 
Germany in 1933, they put much energy on using media to disseminate ‗racist and 
anti-Semitic ideology of the Third Reich‘ (Thussu, 2006, p.15). Paul Josef 
Goebbels, the head of the country‘s propaganda ministry, was reported to have 
said: ‗Propaganda means fighting on all battlefields of the spirit, generating, 
multiplying, destroying, exterminating, building and undoing‘ (cited in Thussu, 
2006, p.15). Similarly, when the National Fascist Party came to power in Italy, its 
 25 
leader, Benito Mussolini, adopted similar techniques ‗to promote Fascist ideals‘ 
(Thussu, 2006, p.15). The Second World War saw rapid increase in deploying 
media for mass mobilization, with Britain using the BBC Empire Service (Briggs, 
1985; Seaton, 1997b)—and later the United States too using Voice of America 
(VOA)—to counter the German, Japanese and Italian propaganda machines 
(Browne, 1982; Thussu, 2006). 
 
These were the backgrounds upon which early studies on media influence were 
conducted, and the emerging trend at that time produced the hypodermic needle 
model. This theory is essentially based on the proposition that the media are 
powerful organs of public communications, capable of injecting into the minds of 
the passive mass audiences the dominant view of the ruling elites. It was largely 
conceived from the works of the Marxist-dominated Frankfurt School‘s critical 
theorists who had noted both the use of media for propaganda by Nazi Germany 
and the advent of consumerism in the United States (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1944/1979; Marcuse, 1964). And indeed from the works of others before them—
such as Lasswell‘s (1927), noted earlier, who believes that the media had been 
effectively used for propaganda to weld ‗thousands and even millions of human 
beings into one amalgamated mass of hate and will and hope‘ (p.220). In their 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944/1979), Adorno and Horkheimer identified and 
analysed what they saw as the process of commodification of culture and 
stultification of the masses. ‗The flood of detailed information and candy-floss 
entertainment simultaneously instructs and stultifies mankind,‘ they argue (p. xv).  
 
This view was informed by their perceptions of how malleable masses were being 
subjected to Nazi propaganda in their experience in Germany, and of the massive 
entertainment and advertising messages corporate America was bombarding 
people with in their American experience. ‗Movies and radio need no longer 
pretend to be art,‘ they argue. ‗The truth that they are just business is made into an 
ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce. They call 
themselves industries; and when their directors‘ incomes are published, any doubt 
about the social utility of the finished products is removed‘ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1944/1979, p.121). The media have been turned into commercial 
enterprises to reinforce consumption capitalism, and be reinforced by them.           
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   The might of industrial society is lodged in men‘s minds. The entertainment 
manufacturers know that their products will be consumed with alertness even when 
the customer is distraught, for each of them is a model of the huge economic 
machinery which has always sustained the masses, whether at work or at leisure…  
                                                                 (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944/1979, p.127) 
 
Adorno in particular has a deep dismal view of cinema which he sees as having 
spectacularly negative effects on people‘s consciousness. In his Minima Moralia 
(1951/1978), he says: ‗Every visit to the cinema leaves me, against all my 
vigilance, stupider and worse‘ (p.25). It is a view he ironically shares with a 
French right-wing author Georges Duhamel (1931) who dismisses cinema as ‗a 
past time for the slaves, an amusement for the illiterate, for poor creatures 
stupefied by work and anxiety‘ (cited in Stam, 2000, p.67). Adorno‘s aversion to 
any control of people‘s consciousness was hardly in doubt. ‗To adapt to the 
weakness of the oppressed is to affirm in it the pre-condition of power, and to 
develop in oneself the coarseness, insensibility and violence needed to exert 
domination‘ (Adorno, 1951/1978, p.26). It is worth noting, however, that the 
Frankfurt School‘s perspective on film theory—though often presented as a 
unified coherent view represented in Adorno and Horkheimer‘s (1944/1979) 
concept of culture industry—is not free of dissenting views (Stam, 2000), at least 
as reflected by the opinion of a member of the school, Walter Benjamin (1968), 
incidentally Adorno‘s close friend, who argues that the film spectator is not 
‗spellbound in darkness‘ (cited in Stam, 2000, p.67). Predictably, Adorno in turn 
criticises what Stam calls Benjamin‘s ‗technological utopianism‘ for ‗ignoring the 
alienating social functioning of (cinema) in reality‘ (Stam, 2000, p.67).  
 
Significantly, as noted earlier, it is not only the Frankfurt School theorists that 
identified the powerful—and often negative—nature of the media at that time, but 
that even prior to the publication of their famous works, Gunter (2000) observes, 
the consensus among researchers in the 1920s and 1930s was that ‗the media 
exercised a powerful and persuasive influence‘ because the period ‗witnessed the 
emergence of mass audiences on an unprecedented scale as a function of the 
growth and establishment of the press, film and radio‘ (p.10). It is also important 
to note that even at the later age the hypodermic model did get an extended boost 
from the findings of behavioural studies, such as the ‗Bobo doll experiment‘ 
(Bandura and Walters, 1963), which concluded, among others, that children do 
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copy violent behaviour from violent media content. The Bobo doll experiment, 
though, has been roundly criticised on the premise that ‗a simple, controlled 
laboratory experiment has very limited application to the complicated conditions 
under which we interact with the various media in our social lives‘ (Branston and 
Stafford, 2003, p.150).  
 
Another variant of the media effects tradition that receives attention from many 
researchers is the cultivation theory, conceived and developed by media theorists 
George Gerbner and Larry Gross (1976). It emanated from many studies 
conducted in the United States in the late 1960s at the period of great concern 
about violence in the country following the assassinations of the black civil right 
activist Martin Luther King (1929-1968) and Senator Robert ―Bobby‖ Kennedy 
(1925-1968). The studies, commissioned by the US National Commission on the 
Causes and Prevention of Violence, focused on the influence of television on the 
prevalence of violence in the society. Gerbner and Gross (1976) argue that 
television viewing has a significant effect in moulding people‘s minds, stressing 
that television is ‗a medium of the socialization of most people into standardized 
roles and behaviours‘ (p.175). Cultivation analysis, Morgan and Signorielli (1990) 
later write, ‗represents a particular set of theoretical and methodological 
assumptions and procedures designed to assess the contributions of television 
viewing to people‘s conceptions of social reality‘ (p.15). It was, they note, a 
departure from the more traditional media research which focuses on individual 
messages or programmes and their ability to produce immediate change in 
audience behaviours. ‗Cultivation analysis is concerned with the more general and 
pervasive consequences of cumulative exposure to cultural media‘ (p.16).  
 
Cultivation theory upholds some of the basic premises of dominant ideology 
thesis. ‗Mass-produced messages bear and help perpetuate the assumptions and 
cultural ideologies of the organisations that produce them‘ (Morgan and 
Signorielli, 1990, p.226). It, however, does not see media effect as ‗a 
unidirectional flow of influence…to audiences, but rather (as) part of a continual, 
dynamic, ongoing process of interaction among messages and contexts‘ (Morgan 
and Signorielli, 1990, p.19). Further studies in the US local media based on this 
theory widen the issue to link television viewing practice with the question of 
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personal safety. In her research Cultivation and Involvement with Local Television 
News, Elizabeth Perse (1990) examined the relationship between television 
exposure and perceptions of personal risk and found that ‗perceptions of personal 
safety were linked to an entertainment orientation to local news‘, and that 
‗cultivation is an incidental learning process‘ (p.64). 
 
In international media studies, Morgan (1990) argues, cultivation theory tends to 
be linked to cultural imperialism thesis, though with some cautions. Weimann 
(1984), for instance, studied Israeli college students‘ heavy consumption of US 
media and found that they idealized ‗rosier‘ image of life in the United States. 
Kang and Morgan (1988) did a similar study on Korean college students of both 
sexes and found that while among the female students exposure to US television 
was associated with more ‗liberal‘ perspectives, such exposure generated hostility 
towards US among the male students, producing what Morgan (1990, p.232) later 
calls a ‗backlash effect‘. This prompted Morgan himself to warn that the 
‗hypodermic models of cultural imperialism are not overwhelmingly supported by 
international studies of cultivation‘ (p.232).  
 
In his own comparative study of the ‗sex-role stereotypes among adolescents‘ in 
the US, Argentina, South Korea and China, Morgan (1990) found that ‗the U.S. 
and Chinese adolescents tend to be relatively less likely to endorse ―traditional‖ 
sex-typed perspectives, and the Argentine and Korean students tend to support 
more stereotyped views of sex-roles‘ (p.236). However, he argues, this variation 
tends to decline with more exposure to television products. ‗In countries as 
different as Argentina, Korea, and China, adolescents who watch more television 
generally tend to believe that women are happiest at home raising children, (and) 
that household chores should be done by women,‘ he notes. ‗The size and 
baselines vary greatly, but television viewing is also associated with an erosion of 
the impact of background factors on these attitudes‘ (Morgan, 1990, p.244). 
Findings like these show the extent to which cultivation theory reinforces, though 
with moderation, the early media effects theories. 
 
However, despite its resilience and the frequent metamorphosis of its variants, the 
hypodermic model has not been able to withstand serious scrutiny. It has 
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consistently and severally been dismissed as simplistic and inadequate (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955/2006; Ang, 1996; Gunter, 2000; Gauntlett, 2005; Morley, 2006), 
and as such incapable of explaining the complexity of media-audience 
relationship. Claiming the demise of the model, David Gauntlett (2005) asserts 
that ‗the effects paradigm should be laid to rest, of interest only as part of the 
natural history of mass communications research‘ (p.5). But it is also important to 
quickly note that, each time it is assumed that the hypodermic model days of 
relevance are over, something would come up to indicate a sign of its revival.  
 
Two relatively recent studies on youths‘ consumption of media, carried out by 
healthcare and behavioural scientists in the United States, point to that direction. 
The first study (Ybarra et al., 2008) examined the link between exposure to 
violence in the Internet and violent behaviours among youths, and concluded that 
the media influenced such behaviours. ‗Compared with otherwise similar youths‘, 
those exposed to violent content in the Internet ‗were significantly more likely to 
report seriously violent behaviour‘ (p.929). The second research (Chandra et al., 
2008) focused on youths‘ exposure to sexual content on television and found that 
television played a significant role in the high rates of teenage pregnancies in the 
United States. Predictably, fundamental questions were raised about these 
findings—similar to the ones raised about similar previous findings. The first is 
that ‗correlation is not causation‘, as Pratter (2008) rightly points out. The second, 
and even more significantly, is the issue of whether the youths‘ exposures to the 
violent and sexual media contents were originally informed by their prior 
tendencies towards such behaviours, rather than the media being responsible for 
prompting such behaviours. 
 
The latest and perhaps the most remarkable indication of effects tradition‘s 
revival, however, appears to have been sparked off by the phenomenal rise of the 
new media and the perceived powerful influence they seem to have in people‘s 
lives. The Internet and mobile telephony—and the accompanied social networking 
media such as the Facebook, Twitter and YouTube—have, either independently or 
while synchronised with the old media of television, radio and newspaper, 
transformed the global media landscape into what Kraidy and Mourad (2010, p.1) 
call ‗transnational hypermedia space…the social and political implications of 
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which we are only beginning to discern‘. The way they are being deployed for 
social and political activities around the world, the events they are being 
associated with (revolutions, uprisings, transformations and so on) and the phrases 
they help produce all give a hallmark of a phenomenon that has profound impact 
on the lives of the people. As with the case of the advent of the printing press, 
film, radio and television before them, it is the political and social roles of the new 
media that capture the attention of the public.  
 
Their convergence with the old media, their simultaneous utility as personal and 
social devices and the ease of their applicability to multiple functions allow them 
to be used as effective tools for public mobilisation and political activism. 
Instances such as the April 2009 anti-election fraud protests in the East European 
nation of Moldova, organised by activists using Twitter (Stack, 2009), and similar 
ones in Iran over the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2009 
(Muir, 2009) showed their potentials. And by time the Arab uprisings began in 
Tunisia around December 2010/January 2011 and spread to the rest of North 
Africa and the Middle East (Pintak, 2011), leaving in its wake regime changes in 
Tunisia and Egypt (Beaumont, 2011) and threatening to topple others in Libya 
(Tisdall, 2011), Syria (Abouzeid, 2011), Yemen and even Bahrain, talks of Twitter 
revolutions and tsunami (Basu et al., 2011) filled the global public sphere. Pintak 
(2011) argues that this is a continuation of the Arab media revolution that began 
with the spread of satellite televisions in the region 15 years ago, and that 
authoritarian regimes could no longer roll it back. ‗The electronic dam has burst 
and with it, their ability to control the flow of information‘ along with the 
‗crusading journalists and digitally armed activists‘ (Pintak, 2011). The media are 
once again being credited with powerful influence and the effects tradition may 
appear to have received a new lease of life. 
 
However, it is worth noting that it was an even bigger euphoria about the supposed 
power of the media that marked the introduction of the then new media of radio 
and television in the twentieth century. The media do indeed play a role in the 
changes taking place around the world today, but it may take a while to make 
accurate assessments of this role. Even in the particular case of the role the media 
are playing in the ongoing uprisings in the Arab world, MacKinnon (2011) 
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cautions against reaching hasty conclusions. ‗The Internet, mobile phones and 
social networking platforms were the tools of a smaller, tech-savvy 
vanguard…(who) used these tools skilfully—as successful revolutionaries always 
manage to do with the most disruptive technologies of their day,‘ she notes. ‗Now 
as then, the people (not the technologies) are the heroes‘. Closer examination 
seems to reveal that the media are playing a complementary role to the major 
driving forces at play in the ongoing changes. 
  
Active audience debate 
The inadequacy of the hypodermic model was exposed by series of studies that 
questioned the power of the media and rejected the claimed passivity of its 
audiences. One of such studies was conducted by Austrian-born American 
sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, Bernard Berelson and Hazel 
Gaudet, which was published in their book The People‘s Choice (1948). It was a 
study of political communications and voting behaviours in the 1940 US 
presidential election campaigns during which they found that the flow of mass 
communications was less direct than had commonly been assumed. Personal 
influence, they note, plays a much stronger role in making people make choices 
than do the media. ‗In the last analysis, more than anything else people can move 
other people‘ (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948, p.158). This work was later complemented 
by further research on media influence in America, conducted by Katz and 
Lazarsfeld (1955/2006). It validates the earlier findings that the media had no 
direct effects on people‘s voting decisions. The two works, which gave birth to the 
two-step flow model of communication, rejected the idea of atomised passive 
audience subjected to omnipotent media. ‗Communications studies have greatly 
underestimated the extent to which an individual‘s social attachments to other 
people, and the character of the opinions and activities which he shares with them, 
will influence his response to the mass media,‘ write Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955/2006, p.25) stressing the mediating role of personal influence in media-
audience relationship. Katz (1957) went further to write a journal article in which 
he clearly highlights the importance of such social attachments. ‗The image of the 
audience as a mass of disconnected individuals hooked up to the media but not to 
each other could not be reconciled with the idea of a two-step flow of 
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communication‘ (Katz, 1957, p.61). Furthermore, Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955/2006) note, ‗personal influence seems to be singularly effective‘ when it 
performs what they call reinforcement function. ‗When a mass media influence-
attempt coincides with an interpersonal communication, it appears to have much 
greater chances of success‘ (pp.82-83). It is a view reinforced by Dawson and 
Prewitt‘s (1969) research on media use in political socialisation which found, 
among others, that ‗the media tend to reinforce existing political orientations 
rather than create new ones‘ (cited in Kraus and Davis, 1976, p. 24).  
 
However, the two-step flow model of communication is not devoid of major 
defects, particularly because of its ‗implicit denial or subordination of the original 
―one-step‖ process of influence direct from media to individuals, especially in the 
age of television‘ (McQuail and Windall, 1993, p.64)—and now of the Internet. 
The advent of the new media has not only debunked the concept of two-step flow, 
but it has also shown that there is a multi-step flow of information in a reversed 
form: from the new media directly to the consumer who now seeks more 
information from the traditional media and experts for reinforcement (Case et al., 
2004). Donald Case and his colleagues (2004) conducted a research on 
information sources about genetic testing and the influence of the Internet on 
information seeking behaviours of the public. Their findings show that, although 
people now go directly to the Internet to seek information, they still go for further 
inquiries in public libraries and then to doctors. ‗The diffusion of the Internet has 
radically expanded the readily available sources for information of all types,‘ they 
write. ‗Information that was once obtained second-hand from friends and 
acquaintances—the traditional ―two-step flow‖—is now found easily through the 
Internet‘ (Case et al., 2004, p.660). They note that people ‗were most likely to first 
turn to the Internet for information about cancer genetics, second to public 
libraries, and third to medical doctors‘ (p.660). Littlejohn and Foss (2008) also 
stress the idea of ‗multiple-step‘ flow approach (though not in the reversed form 
noted above), particularly in those cases where media are being used for diffusion 
of new ideas and innovations. ‗Recent research on two-step flow has shown that 
the dissemination of ideas is not a simple two-step process. A multiple-step-model 
is generally accepted now as more accurate in terms of the actual process‘ 
(Littlejohn and Foss, 2008, p.321, emphasis original). Not only that but Gunter 
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(2000) also argues that the ‗role played by interpersonal relations is simply not 
reducible to mechanistic solutions such as the two-step flow‘ (p.17).  
 
Similarly, Gauntlett (2005) raises concern over the inadequate coverage of all 
social factors by the two-step flow thesis, arguing that while the ‗model went some 
way to breaking apart the notions of the audience as unconnected individuals, and 
media messages as guided information-missiles with an objective consistency of 
meaning and power, it still left other social factors out of the picture‘ (pp.82-83). 
Robinson (1976) equally questions the efficacy of the model on the issue of 
interpersonal influence, even though he stresses that it ‗did correctly emphasize 
that when interpersonal sources and mass media sources are compared or are in 
conflict, interpersonal sources wield greater influence. However, that condition of 
―when‖ needs to be stressed‘ (p.315). Furthermore, even the key assumptions of 
the two-step flow model with regard to less direct flow of information and 
diminished influence of media, endorsed by many US researchers at that time, 
were challenged by the findings of audience research elsewhere. Iliya Harik 
(1971) conducted a survey in an Egyptian village, Shubra el-Gadida, based on the 
people‘s use of radio, and found ‗that mass media messages reach the majority of 
the public directly and effectively‘ (p.740). He argues that, although opinion 
leaders do serve as mediators of information, they do so to only a small group of 
people who have less access to media. ‗The findings from the Shubra study 
obviously do not confirm the role attributed to oral dissemination of information 
by the authors of the two-step flow of communication hypothesis‘ (Harik, 1971, 
p.740). Crucially, Harik‘s work also indicates that a finding of audience study in 
the United States may be at variance with what is obtainable in the Middle East or 
Africa. 
 
Still, this does not diminish the role played by the founders of the two-step model 
in pioneering a new line of research in mass communications. As McQuail and 
Windall (1993) rightly put it, the two-step model does show that ‗mass media do 
not operate in a social vacuum but have an input into a very complex web of social 
relationships and compete with other sources of ideas, knowledge and power‘ 
(p.63). Littlejohn and Foss (2000) also maintain that the model ‗had a major 
impact in our understanding of the role of mass media‘, pointing out that it ‗was 
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the beginning of a line of research on how information and influence are 
distributed in society‘ (p.321). But perhaps one of the most outstanding 
contributions of the model to audience research—and it is the one that really 
withstands criticism—is its reaffirmation of the activeness of the audiences and 
dismissal of the earlier conception of their passivity. This adds significantly to the 
then emerging concept of active audience and strengthens the evolving uses and 
gratifications research (Herzog, 1941/2004; Halloran, 1970; Katz et al., 1973; 
Blumler and Katz, 1974). 
 
The uses and gratifications model, as it comes to be known, is a remarkable 
research tradition that sees an audience member as an active user of media—not its 
victim. Austrian-American communications theorist Herta Herzog, whose seminal 
work on women‘s listening of radio was among the earliest that laid the foundation 
for the model [Liebes (2005) actually calls her the founding mother of 
gratifications research], attempted to unveil audiences‘ motives of interactions 
with the media. Her key work, On Borrowed Experience (1941/2004), offers 
insights into housewives‘ engagement with the radio, revealing their selectivity 
and the joy they drive from ‗satisfactory consumption of radio stories‘ (p.141). 
The audiences were the ones using the radio—not the other way round. ‗The radio 
people give advice and never ask for it, they provide help without the listeners 
having to reveal their need for it,‘ she writes. ‗The listener enjoys their company 
because it raises her own social level‘ (p.151). Crucially, the radio listeners feel 
that ‗they have been helped by being told how to get along with other people, how 
to handle their boyfriends or bring up their children‘ (Herzog, 1941/2004, p.153). 
Despite its tendency to ignore what effects tradition regards as the harmful effects 
of media, Herzog‘s effort is generally seen as a pioneering work in audience 
research, contributing not only to the development of the uses and gratifications 
model but also to that of qualitative research approach (Liebes, 2005). 
 
Further works on the gratifications approach (Halloran, 1970; Katz et al., 1973; 
Blumler and Katz, 1974) equally stress the shift away from the emphasis on the 
power of the media to the power of the audiences. Katz et al. (1973) note that 
earlier gratifications research focused on audiences‘ needs and the way they were 
gratified by the media. The audience member needs the media ‗to match one‘s 
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wits against others, to get information or advice for daily living, to provide a 
framework for one‘s day, to prepare oneself culturally for the demands of upward 
mobility, or to be reassured about the dignity and usefulness of one‘s role‘ (Katz et 
al., 1973, p.509). The early studies revealed all these but failed to conceptualise 
the approach because they did not explore the links between the detected 
gratifications and ‗the psychological or sociological origins of the needs that were 
so satisfied‘ and the interrelationships among the functions of the media, they note 
(p.509). It was after establishing those links and interrelationships, they argue, that 
the approach was transformed into a model. Its key elements include its 
conception of audiences as being ‗active‘ and selective and that ‗the media 
compete with other sources of need satisfaction‘ (Katz et al., 1973, p.511). Again, 
despite its tendency to exaggerate the power of the audiences (more on this later), 
the gratifications model provided a significant paradigm shift that gave rise to the 
transformation of reception research. 
 
The limited effects theories—usually identified with the works of Joseph Klapper 
(1960) but also linked to those of Lazarsfeld et al. (1948), Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955/2006) and others—tend to avoid the mistakes of stripping the media of their 
major influence but instead point to the mediating roles of other forces that limit 
the influence. Klapper‘s main work was based on massive research conducted in 
different spheres by many authors to assess the effectiveness and limitations of 
media in influencing their audiences. Like the case of others before it, it was the 
unresolved contention over the influence of media that provided the impetus. ‗As 
the more fearful have pointed to the impressive successes of various propaganda 
campaigns, the more phlegmatic have pointed to the impressive failures of other 
campaigns,‘ Klapper (1960, p.12) notes. ‗Neither group has been hard put to it to 
find evidence to support its position.‘ After going through the bulk of the research, 
however, he came to the conclusion that the media are most effective in 
performing ‗reinforcement‘ function—the same conclusion reached by Katz and 
Lazarsfeld (1955/2006) whose work was among those compiled.  
       Within a given audience exposed to particular communications, reinforcement, or 
at least constancy of opinion, is typically found to be the dominant effect; minor 
change, as in intensity of opinion, is found to be the next most common; and 
conversion is typically found to be the most rare.  
                                                                                                                 (Klapper, 1960, p.15)                                                   
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He argues that factors such as ‗predispositions and related processes of selective 
exposure, selective perception, and selective retention‘ as well as group norms and 
interpersonal influence, though external to communication, do play mediating 
roles to limit the influence of the media (pp.18-19). 
 
Subsequent studies reaffirm this position and highlight the mediating roles of 
psychological, sociological and cultural factors in audiences‘ interactions with the 
media, revealing clear cases of selectivity particularly in their consumption of 
dissonant media products (Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974; Piepe et al., 1978; Morley, 
1980; Mutz, 1998; Liu and Johnson, 2011). In their study of a popular US 
television show All in the Family in the early 1970s, which dealt with racial 
prejudice, Vidmar and Rokeach (1974) found how the phenomena of selective 
exposure and selective perception influenced audiences‘ consumption of the 
programme, and concluded that the show reinforced, rather than reduced, racial 
and ethnic bigotry. Piepe et al. (1978) also noted the phenomenon of selective 
perception among audiences and even gave it a class perspective. First, they found 
the working class to be ‗heavy‘ consumers of television products, with ‗relatively 
high involvement in (the) medium‘, and the middle class to have ‗light viewing 
(and) relatively low involvement in (the) medium‘ (p.46). More significantly, they 
argue that the middle class viewing practices appear to be marked by ‗selective 
perception‘ while those of the working class seem to be characterised by ‗blanket 
perception‘ (p.46). Morley (1980, p.29) dismisses the class distinction, though, 
noting that his own research ‗shows plenty of examples of selective perception, 
rejection of dissonant messages and a distinctively cognitive orientation to the 
medium on the part of working class groups, with an equally complex set of 
responses and interpretations on the part of the middle class groups‘ (more on 
Morley later). A recent study (Liu and Johnson, 2011) noted a growing evidence 
of audiences becoming more selective in media consumption. With the 
multiplicity of media and communication networks, they argue, ‗selective 
perception of news media messages as a mechanism of processing information 
plays a critical role in the survival of preference diversity‘ (Liu and Johnson, 2011, 
p.26). Once again, the concepts of selectivity and interpretative power of the 
audiences are taking centre stage. 
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Sonia Livingstone (2007) has taken a broader view of the issue and argued that the 
concept of ‗active and interpretative audiences, plural, counter-posed the creativity 
of a locally-resistant viewer against the hitherto-confident claims of media 
imperialism‘ (p.1). This is not just to challenge the claims of supreme power of the 
media and audience passivity but to also underline the inherent creativity in 
audiencing and assert audiences‘ plurality. ‗It undermined forever the 
unimpeachable authority of the analyst‘s identification of the singular, underlying 
meaning of any media text by demonstrating that polysemy operated not only in 
principle but also in practice‘ (p.1). Her argument has a wider perspective than the 
one offered by the uses and gratifications model; but it is largely informed by the 
concept of audiences‘ interpretive power in their engagement with the media.  
 
In his Radio, Television & Modern Life, Paddy Scannell (1996) has advanced the 
audience power argument, stressing the listeners and viewers‘ ability to select 
which media to engage with and what content to consume. He notes that the 
‗power in this relationship (in the first and last instance) rests more with those on 
the receiving end rather than with those who produce what is on offer... If listeners 
and viewers don‘t like what they find they can simply switch over or switch off‘ 
(p.12). The changing technology empowers the audiences even the more. Tamar 
Liebes (2005) observes that ‗the ever-expanding multiplication of technologies, 
feeding on one another, acting as unstoppable golem, results in endowing 
(television) users with maximal control, but at the same time undermining the 
pleasure of viewing‘ (p.372). Perhaps even more importantly, it is the audience 
member that decides what to do with the media product. ‗People, it was argued, 
manipulated—rather than were manipulated by—the mass media‘ (Gunter, 2000, 
p.13). 
 
This celebration of the power of active audience, however, does not sit well with 
the works of many media theorists, including those who had faulted the media 
effects thesis (Morley, 1980, 2006; Fiske, 1987; Ang, 1996). David Morley (2006) 
questions audience works that ‗exaggerated, and wrongly romanticized the 
supposed power and freedoms of media consumers‘, stressing that it is wrong to 
assume that audiences are in constant struggle with the media, ‗in which they 
constantly produce oppositional readings of its products‘ (p.102). Ang (1996) 
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argues that ‗audiences may be active in myriad ways in using and interpreting 
media, but it would be utterly out of perspective to cheerfully equate ―active‖ with 
―powerful‖, in the sense of ―taking control‖ at an enduring structural or 
institutional level‘ (p.139). She admits that audiences do have the power to 
appropriate media products to suit their practices, but it is, as Fiske (1987) equally 
notes, a weak power. It ‗is the power not to change or overturn imposed structures, 
but to negotiate the potentially oppressive effects of those structures where they 
cannot be overthrown, where they have to be lived with‘ (Ang, 1996, p.8). Morley 
(1991) too maintains that audiences‘ power to reinterpret meaning is not 
equivalent to the discursive power of the media institutions to produce the 
products which the audiences then interpret. 
 
Both Morley and Ang—though hers with some qualifications—are more at home 
with Stuart Hall‘s (1980) encoding/decoding model which identifies three forms of 
audience readings of media text (preferred, negotiated and oppositional readings) 
that shows an audience member‘s ability to accept, negotiate or reject the 
producer‘s intended meanings of texts. Hall‘s (1980) work in cultural studies goes 
far beyond the gratificationists‘ concept of active audience or their selectivity, but 
speaks of them in social context and their ability to decode meanings of media 
texts. Furthermore, in his introduction to Morley‘s (1986) Family Television, Hall 
says: ‗People don‘t passively absorb subliminal ―inputs‖ from the screen. They 
discursively ―make sense‖ of or produce ―readings‖ of what they see‘ (cited in 
Morley, 1986, p.8). Television viewing, he notes, is both an active and social 
process, and changes with differing circumstances. ‗We are all, in our heads, 
several different audiences at once, and can be constituted as such by different 
programmes‘ (p.10). 
 
It was based on the Hall‘s original encoding/decoding theoretical framework that 
Morley carried out his pioneering work, The ‗Nationwide‘ Audience (1980), which 
contains the study of audiences‘ consumption of a television programme 
Nationwide in Britain (London and Midlands). He used 27 different groups, drawn 
from different levels of educational system, social and cultural backgrounds and 
political affiliations—all of whom were shown the programme, prior to conducting 
focus group interviews. His findings reveal diversity in the audiences‘ readings of 
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the same programme, influenced by factors such as ethnic and socio-economic 
backgrounds (Morley, 1980). The work was, however, criticised by Jordin and 
Brunt (1988) who argue that there was no direct connection between social 
position and the way audiences interpret mediated text. They also fault the way 
they say he used focus group technique like a survey method, treating respondents 
as individual representatives of social groups (Jordin and Brunt, 1988)—a rather 
unfair criticism, given the fact that Morley has clearly explained that he used the 
approach in such a way that it ‗treats the audience as a set of cultural groupings 
rather than as a mass of individuals or as a set of rigid socio-demographic 
categories‘ (Morley, 1980, p.163). Of course, the encoding/decoding model does 
have its own limitations as Morley himself later admits, accepting Walkerdine and 
Blackman‘s (2001) argument that it would be a mistake ‗to continue to prioritize 
the cognitive and rational dimension of media consumption over the emotional and 
affective‘ (Morley, 2006, p.109); but its viability in audience research has been 
clearly established. Ellen Seiter (1999) suggests that the ‗model seems to work 
better for news and non-fiction programming than it does for entertainment 
programming where it is much more difficult to identify a single message or even 
a set of propositions with which audience members could agree or disagree‘ (pp. 
20-21).  
 
Essentially, the formulation of the encoding/decoding model can be seen as one of 
the cultural studies‘ major contributions to audience research, and has in a way 
maintained a balance between the two extremes of the media effects and 
gratifications debates—though there seem to be a struggle within the cultural 
studies itself between those, who, like the critical theorists, emphasise the 
dominant ideology thesis, and the so-called populists, who stress the sovereignty 
of media consumers. However, as Golding and Murdock (1991) argue, the 
‗romantic celebration of subversive consumption is clearly at odds with cultural 
studies‘ long-standing concern with the way the mass media operate ideologically, 
to sustain and support prevailing relations of domination‘ (p.17) as has been 
expounded in the concept of hegemony (which will be discussed later in this 
review). It is a division that extends to the fields of international communications 
and transnational audience studies. 
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Radio and African audiences 
Amid the media effects and active audience debates comes the issue of radio 
audiences in Africa. Since its advent in the West, radio has always been seen as an 
important medium of communication for various purposes. As noted above, it was 
effectively used by the major powers, especially during the Second World War 
and in the Cold War period, for propaganda purposes. ‗Radio, used by Hitler and 
Stalin to mobilize the support of the masses, had demonstrated it was all-powerful‘ 
(Liebes, 2005, p.369)—a realisation that, as stated earlier, facilitated the 
emergence of the hypodermic model. Similarly, some of the pioneering works on 
audience studies, such as Herzog‘s (1941) gratifications research cited earlier, 
were conducted on radio listeners. Radio, American anthropologist Brian Larkin 
(2008, p.50) argues, is a unique medium that, ‗through the sublime nature of its 
technology and the authoritative nature of its content‘, aids the mobility and 
circulation of ideas beyond the realm of the source. ‗The peculiarity of radio as a 
medium was the separation of sound from source, of voice from body‘ (Larkin, 
2008, p.50). David Hendy (2000) argues that radio has other particularities that set 
it apart from other media. ‗While being a local medium par excellence, radio is 
able to reach across large spaces, potentially threatening place-specific cultures 
with its homogenized content, potentially forging new delocalized communities of 
interest… It betrays a commercial imperative to reach large, high-spending 
audiences, but it also has a cost structure, which creates at least the possibility of a 
community station surviving on the tiniest of audiences,‘ he notes. ‗It is, in short, 
the most adaptable of media in ―finding‖ its audience‘ (p.215, emphasis original). 
The key questions here are on the role of this medium at different times and in 
different environments. Its role in the West—in war and peace times—takes 
different dimensions, just as that also differs with the role it plays in the lives of 
Africans (Spitulnik, 2000). The surprising thing, though, is that its role in Africa is 
grossly under researched, although it has been identified as an area with great 
academic potentials. ‗Radio impinges so widely on African public life, and is 
doing so in such rapidly changing ways, that it does seem safe to predict that 
research on virtually any aspect of contemporary Africa that neglects radio will be 
missing a large part of the big sound stage‘ (Fardon and Furniss, 2000, p.19). The 
studies that have so far been done have produced remarkable results.  
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In her work, Documenting Radio Culture as Lived Experience, anthropologist 
Debra Spitulnik (2000) used ethnographic approach to study radio audiences in 
Zambia, and found that radio consumption and use were far beyond the audiences‘ 
interactions with its content. ‗In Zambia, the consumption of radio includes the 
culturally-specific ways that people attune themselves to (or attenuate themselves 
from) the radio machine, its technology, its portability, its commodity status and 
the fact that it produces unique sounds which can travel through communities‘ 
(p.160). She notes that more than in the West where radio technology has ‗relative 
invisibility in use‘, in Zambia this technology is not invisible. ‗The impact and 
meaning of radio in Zambia is strongly linked to its portable physical form, which 
equally permits relocation around the home and theft from the home,‘ she 
observes. ‗Radios are carried to the office when presidential press conferences or 
football matches are to be broadcast, and they are sometimes brought in the field 
to listen to while farming‘ (p.155). For Zambians, Spitulnik (2000) further argues, 
radio is ‗more important than the sound emanating from it‘ because people are not 
only mindful of its ‗physicality and commodity status‘, they are also conscious of 
its ‗potential display in a social situation‘ (p.160). This feeling is not far different 
from what obtains in neighbouring Zimbabwe. 
 
In his study of the ‗dynamic relationship between Radio Zimbabwe‘ and its 
audiences, Winston Mano (2004, p.iii) came to the conclusion that radio has ‗a 
significant impact on Zimbabwean everyday life‘ (p.258). Using a multi-method 
approach, Mano examined the audiences‘ consumption of Radio Zimbabwe‘s 
music and talks programmes, and got significant insights into the role the national 
public radio plays in the lives of Zimbabweans. Among other things, he found that 
‗Radio Zimbabwe reflects and affects the emergence of a commonly shared 
Zimbabwean public daily life‘ (p.246). Of course, other media forms too might 
have been playing their roles in this respect, but the study reveals that in 
Zimbabwe ‗radio appears to have an unrivalled status as the country‘s ―true‖ mass 
medium‘ (p.2). The ‗national radio is at the centre of national tensions and 
struggles involving languages, dialects and music tastes, in the face of a rapidly 
changing national and global society‘ (p.258). But the study has also shown 
radio‘s compatibility with local content, its affordability and its ability to 
accommodate local languages. 
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It is a view shared by Larkin (2008) in his groundbreaking ethnographic study of 
media in Nigeria, focusing particularly on the role of media and technology on the 
lives of people in one of Nigeria‘s biggest cities, Kano. He argues that when radio 
was first introduced in the predominantly Islamic Northern Nigeria by the then 
British colonial administration, it ‗entered into a highly contested social field‘ 
associated with colonial authority and Christianity (p.11). Later, however, radio 
and cinema ‗began to generate new forms of leisure in urban Nigeria, creating 
cultural possibilities‘ (p.11). He maintains that radio was a political instrument that 
first began as a public technology before it became a domestic one, as permitted 
by its technological transformation from an expensive wired receiver to a cheap 
portable transistor set. Reinforcing Spitulnik‘s (2000) earlier observation, Larkin 
insists that radio‘s functions in the lives of Africans extend far beyond the spheres 
of politics and leisure. ‗The role of the radio in African domestic life was not 
simply as a conduit for news and music but as a prestigious object of consumption 
that represented the transformation of a whole way of life‘ (Larkin, 2008, p.68). 
 
It is the realisation of the importance of radio in the lives of the people that 
prompts governments in many African countries to always insist on controlling the 
broadcast media, even in the face of growing agitation for its liberalization. At the 
early part of the postcolonial era, the control might have been prompted by the 
need among the emerging nationalist leaders to use the media to reorient their 
emergent nations towards a new path of development, Katz and Wedell (1977) 
argue. The broadcast media, they note, could even be more crucial in African 
leaders‘ efforts to unite different ethnic nationalities in countries created by the 
departing colonial powers, in some cases for the colonialists‘ economic benefits 
and administrative convenience. This was still in the 1960s when media were 
being seen as crucial organs of forging national unity and development since they 
could ‗plant the seed of change‘ in the people (Schramm, 1964, p.42). Even a few 
decades later, the broadcast media were still regarded in many parts of Africa as 
being capable of effecting such changes, though there was no empirical evidence 
to prove such effectiveness (Okigbo, 1995).  
 
There are, of course, cases of using radio for negative purposes in Africa too, the 
classic example of which was that of utilising it to encourage the infamous 1994 
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genocide in Rwanda (Prunier, 1995; Thompson, 2007; Straus, 2007; Pinkerton and 
Dodds, 2009). There, conflict between the majority Hutu ethnic group and the 
minority Tutsis prompted the use of radio to encourage one group to slaughter 
thousands of people in the rival group. ‗The ensuing genocide was later to 
encapsulate no fewer than 800,000 lives and the International Criminal Tribunal in 
Arusha (Tanzania) indicted broadcasters associated with Radio Television Libres 
des Mille Collines for their role in transmitting ―hate propaganda‖‘ (Pinkerton and 
Dodds, 2009, p.13). Even at that, though, Scott Straus (2007) argues that the 
Rwandan hate radio, sometimes called ‗Radio Machete‘, was not the primary 
determinant of the genocide in the central African nation. It did play contributory 
role in the genocide, he admits, ‗which take on significance only when situated in 
a broader context of violence‘, but it was not the primary cause of the unfortunate 
event (p.609). And, ironically, it was radio that was later mobilised to play a role 
in the healing process.  
 
This was, of course, not the first time in Africa that the broadcast media played 
both negative and positive roles in the life of a nation. In Nigeria, for instance, 
despite the negative role radio (and media as a whole) played during the country‘s 
civil war from 1967 to 1970 (Uche, 1989), the positive role it later played in 
encouraging national unity made many people to have positive attitude towards it. 
Osabuohien Amienyi (1993), in a study conducted in north central Nigeria, found 
that many people have developed positive attitude towards the media, and that 
they believe that the media, particularly radio, do play important role in uniting 
people of diverse ethnic nationalities. ‗This is not surprising in the light of the 
numerous positive contributions that the Nigerian mass media have made to 
communication, cultural exchange and national integration,‘ he notes. ‗Through 
the mass media, Nigerians, regardless of patterns of social differentiation, have 
gained access to instantaneous, uniform and consistent information, both at the 
national and state levels‘ (Amienyi, 1993). 
 
Radio‘s place in the lives of Africans has its global dimension among the 
communities exposed to international broadcasters as has been the case in many 
parts of Africa. Mytton and Forrester (1988) reveal that international radio 
broadcasters have huge audiences in Africa arising from easy access to ‗cheap, 
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portable, battery-powered transistor radio‘ (Mytton, 2000, p.21) and the 
broadcasters‘ quest to extend their sphere of influence. ‗As proportions of the 
general population,‘ Mytton and Forrester (1988) observe, ‗the audiences to the 
BBC in English in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zambia are higher than 
anywhere else in the world‘ (p.469). Fardon and Furniss (2000) maintain that the 
exposure to international broadcasters may make some Africans more informed 
about global scene than some of their Western counterparts; and that such 
exposure does not entail cultural homogenization. ‗The Swahili, Hausa or Somali 
services of the Deutsche Welle, the Voice of America or the BBC‘s World Service 
may allow supposedly local, isolated, rural people of ―under-developed‖ parts of 
Africa to be better informed about international scene than some of their 
counterparts in the supposedly information-rich US or EU (European Union)… 
Yet to characterize the situation in Africa, on these grounds, as being one of 
straightforward media imperialism and homogenization would be to misrepresent 
the effects of the many changes underway‘ (pp.2-3). These changes, they note, 
include the diversification of radio stations that engage in local rather than global 
discourses, the expansion of satellite televisions and the spread of computer and 
telephony technologies that have profound influence in both local and 
international communications. 
 
International radio broadcasting and public diplomacy 
Although radio broadcasting began at the opening of the twentieth century, as 
stated earlier, international broadcasting did not get significant attention until well 
over 20 years later, with the communist Russia‘s pioneering broadcasts on short-
wave radio in 1925 (Thussu, 2006; Browne, 1982). Afterwards the train moved 
very fast. Browne (1982, p.1) observes that the progress was such that by early 
1930s Germany‘s Josef Goebbels was speaking of ‗international broadcasting…as 
a powerful instrument of international diplomacy, persuasion, and even coercion‘. 
It was a belief held by many governmental and non-governmental organisations. 
‗The growth of international radio was as diverse as it was rapid, and by the late 
1930s international broadcasting was being employed by national governments, 
religious organisations, commercial advertisers, domestic broadcasters and even 
educators to bring their various messages to listeners abroad‘ (Browne, 1982, p.2). 
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It enjoyed significant rises during the Second World War, at the heat of the Cold 
War and in the post-September 11 period. ‗The Second World War saw an 
explosion in international broadcasting as a propaganda tool on both sides,‘ writes 
Thussu (2006, p.16) explaining how the Axis and the Allied powers engaged each 
other in ‗the battle of the airwaves‘. The subsequent Cold War arising from the fall 
out of the victorious Allies—the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist 
West—gave rise to ‗communist propaganda‘ and ‗capitalist persuasion‘ (pp.16-
17). Although the 1947 United Nations‘ General Assembly Resolution 110 (II) 
condemned ‗all forms of propaganda‘ that could threaten peace, Thussu (2006) 
observes, ‗both camps indulged in regular propaganda as the battle lines of the 
cold war were being drawn‘ (p.17). 
 
The Soviet Union directed its communist propaganda primarily at the Eastern bloc 
and the Third World, with Moscow Radio becoming ‗the world‘s largest single 
international broadcaster‘ by the late 1960s, broadcasting in 84 languages and 
putting out 1,950 hours of external programmes per week in 1973 (Thussu, 2006, 
p.17). Browne (1982) notes that the ‗sheer physical power and linguistic scopes of 
Radio Moscow are awesome to behold‘ (p.224). ‗Soviet broadcast policies were 
aimed at countering Western propaganda and promoting Moscow‘s line on 
international affairs among the world‘s communist parties‘ (Thussu, 2006, pp.17-
18). However, the Soviet broadcasts ‗had little impact in the West‘ compared with 
the popularity of those of the West in the Eastern bloc, Thussu further notes. 
Similarly, he continues, Radio Moscow could not match Western broadcasters‘ 
transmission powers and broadcasting outlets. The United States alone used both 
‗the official Voice of America (VOA) and the clandestine Radio Liberty (RL) and 
Radio Free Europe (RFE)‘ to advance its foreign policy objectives (p.18). The 
VOA, established in 1942 to help advance the cause of the Allies during the 
Second Wold War, has always been an organ of American public diplomacy 
(Browne, 1982; Rampal and Adams, 1990; Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009). As an 
external broadcasting arm of the US government, the VOA ‗operated a global 
network of relay stations to propagate the ideal of ―the American way of life‖ to 
international listeners‘ while the US-funded ‗Munich-based RFE and RL (before 
they were moved to Prague in 1995 after the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe) were covert organizations carrying out a propaganda war against 
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communism in Europe‘ and beyond (Thussu, 2006, p.19). America also supported 
other clandestine radio stations and religious radio stations to help fight ‗Godless 
communism‘ around the world (pp.22-23). 
 
Perhaps in a more subtle and sophisticated way than both the US and defunct 
Soviet Union, Britain too was executing its own side of the campaign. The BBC‘s 
External Services [as the World Service was then known (Browne, 1982)] ‗played 
a key part in the cold war through its strategically located global network of relay 
stations‘ (Thussu, 2006, p.24). More significantly, its policy of presenting 
balanced view ‗gave it more international credibility than any other broadcasting 
organization in the world‘ (p.23), enabling it to gain audiences‘ trust by argument 
rather than losing it by using overt propaganda. ‗Other Western stations, such as 
Deutsche Welle and Radio France International (RFI), also contributed to the war 
of words,‘ notes Thussu (2006, p.23), stressing, however, that France did not play 
a very significant role in the Cold War‘s media battle, concentrating instead on 
promoting its cultural and commercial interests in its former colonies.  
 
During the Cold War the general feeling was that the West generally used less 
overt propaganda than the Soviet Union in the struggle to expand their spheres of 
influence. ‗In the post-World War II period, Western nations have generally de-
emphasized the overt use of international radio for propaganda purposes and put a 
greater emphasis instead on using this medium as one of the legitimate means of 
carrying out their foreign policy objectives‘ (Adams and Rampal, 1990, p.94). 
Such claim, though, might have ignored the fact that the United States used 
clandestine radio stations for overt propaganda against communist regimes around 
the world, as noted earlier. The collapse of the communist bloc and the 
disintegration of Soviet Union in the 1990s ended the Cold War, and funding for 
propaganda outfits began to decline (Thussu, 2006). ‗Despite the growing 
importance of television in implementing foreign-policy agenda, the US Congress 
had reduced the budget for international broadcasting—from $844 million in 1993 
to $560 million for 2004‘ (p.23). However, Thussu (2005, 2006, p.23) notes, the 
11 September 2001 attacks in the United States ‗revived the need for public 
diplomacy‘ and led to a resurgence of Western-funded international broadcasting 
as part of efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Muslims (more on this later). 
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Although religious bodies, commercial concerns and other non-state operators do 
engage in global broadcasting—as distinct from international broadcasting which 
in classic terms is usually associated with state-sponsored external service 
broadcasting (Price et al., 2008), though political and technological changes have 
since altered this conception—to achieve their set objectives, international radio 
broadcasting has always been linked to the foreign policy objectives of the 
broadcasting nations or the ideology of the broadcasting groups. ‗In terms of the 
global media industry, all media organizations from Doordarshan (the Indian 
national broadcaster) to the BBC, Al-Manar (of the Lebanese group Hezbollah), 
Al-Jazeera, and CNN are in some measure missionaries of ideological and cultural 
hegemony‘ (Price et al., 2008, p.153). But then, all media-audience issues could in 
some ways be linked to ideology. ‗No analysis of the audience, its position in the 
social formation, its relationship to the texts and technologies of the media, can 
ignore the ways in which ideologies are formed and in turn claim subject positions 
for those who receive a constant diet of public communications‘ (Silverstone, 
1994, p.138).  
 
It is also significant to note that it is not only big countries with known global 
ambitions that engage in international broadcasting, many ‗small‘ nations are also 
involved in it. As far back as 1988 Mytton and Forrester (1988) reported that ‗over 
80 countries support broadcasting services addressed to listeners outside their 
countries‘ (pp.458-459). This did not include commercial, religious and other 
kinds of global broadcasters. Mytton and Forrester (1988) actually placed 
international broadcasters into five categories: state-funded broadcasters, 
commercial international stations like Radio Monte Carlo, religious broadcasters 
like Radio Vatican, domestic stations targeting neighbouring countries, and 
clandestine radio stations. This was done before the explosion of communications 
technologies and the state-funded ones were based on the narrow definition of 
international broadcasting to state sponsorship of transmission of programmes to 
external audiences. With the advancement of communications technologies and 
their spread across the globe, governmental and non-governmental groups 
engaging in global broadcasting are on the increase. However, while some 
traditional international broadcasters like former Radio Moscow (now Voice of 
Russia) had, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, been in decline, others like the 
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Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) which runs radio, television and 
online services, appears to be rising now to pursue Iran‘s foreign policy objectives 
(Dehshiri and Majidi, 2009; Press TV, 2011; Wikia, 2011). 
 
In international relations the attention international broadcasting receives emanates 
from the role it is perceived to be playing in public diplomacy (Cohen, 1986; 
Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009). The term ‗public diplomacy‘ itself was coined by law 
academic Edmund Gullion of Tufts University (Sreberny et al., 2010b); and 
according to Browne (1982), it was in 1967 during a conference on international 
public diplomacy at that university that international broadcasting was described 
as an ‗instrument of public diplomacy‘ (p.30). Harvard academic Joseph Nye 
(2004a) developed this further in his ‗soft power‘ concept in which he argues that 
nations can use their persuasive skills and cultural wherewithal, rather than their 
hard military or coercive power, to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Soft 
power, he says, refers ‗to the power of attraction that often grows out of culture 
and values‘ (p.5). It ‗rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others‘, and to 
make them do for you what you want without coercion (Jisi and Nye, 2009). ‗The 
soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places 
where it is attractive to others), its political values (when the country lives up to 
these values at home and abroad), and its foreign policies‘ (Jisi and Nye, 2009). 
The media are integral part of this, and ‗that information technology was making 
soft power more relevant than ever‘ (Nye, 2004a, p.5). The term public diplomacy 
has no universally accepted meaning but at the core of it is the issue of enhancing 
a country‘s ability to influence others based on its positive reputation. One of the 
clearest definitions of the term was given by Lord Carter‘s UK Public Diplomacy 
Review Team in 2005 in reference to Britain‘s case. They define public diplomacy 
as the ‗work aiming to inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, 
in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a 
manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals‘ (FCO, 2005, 
p.4). Their definition was encompassing enough to include not only the activities 
involved, but also the objectives and justifications for seeking to achieve them.   
 
National governments do recognise the potentials of their international media in 
public diplomacy and devise strategies of employing them to help achieve their 
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foreign policy objectives. Whether they are easily identified as the mouthpiece of 
their governments (as in the case of Voice of Russia and Voice of America) or 
they have built a more credible reputation (as in the case of the BBC World 
Service) or they want to be called agencies for cultural exchange (as in the case of 
Deutsche Welle), they all serve as instruments of their nations‘ public diplomacy. 
Writing about the post-Nazi Germany‘s international broadcaster Deutsche Welle, 
founded in 1953 ‗to inform audiences abroad about the new Germany‘, Zollner 
(2006) notes that it has since been effectively transformed into ‗a significant 
instrument of (Germany‘s) public diplomacy‘ and officially recognised as such 
(p.171). Since the September 11 attacks, Zollner further observes, the German 
broadcaster ‗has been trying to engage in some form of ―dialogue‖ with the 
Arab/Muslim world‘ (p.161). They are not alone. The United States, the direct 
victim of the September 11 attacks, and being the arrow head of Western 
hegemony, has been doing much more than any other nation in that regard. Its 
Department of State is funding ‗a plethora of new radio stations and local language 
broadcasting in the hope that America‘s ―soft power‖ will be able to persuade 
millions in the Global South not to support violence directed against American 
personnel and material interests‘ (Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009, p.12). 
 
The BBC World Service, despite its global reputation as an ‗impartial‘ 
broadcaster, has long been identified as a soft power resource for the United 
Kingdom (Sreberny et al., 2010b; Nye, 2004a). And in one of the most significant 
government‘s confirmation of assigning such a role to the BBC, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office has classified the World Service as a public diplomacy 
partner alongside the British Council (FCO, 2005, p.4). Both Lord Carter‘s UK 
Public Diplomacy Review Team and the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee (FACOM) have affirmed that Britain benefits greatly from the BBC‘s 
public diplomacy role (FCO, 2005; FACOM, 2011). Lord Carter‘s team went to 
the extent of suggesting that the World Service and British Council, as public 
diplomacy partners, ‗must prove themselves able and willing to work 
collaboratively within an agreed strategic framework‘ (FCO, 2005, p.4). This, 
Sreberny et al. (2010b) note, is a significant change in the relationship between the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and BBC World Service. But then, the post-
September 11 global scene is a radically different environment that brings with it a 
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new international broadcasting landscape. As earlier cited, Price et al. (2008) has 
argued that ‗in a more vicious world, as the cold war‘s geopolitically distinct fields 
of contestation fade in favour of the porous borders and group networks of a newly 
conceptualized ―long war on terror,‖ other defining features of international 




Despite its dismissal as being inadequate and simplistic, the hypodermic model 
exerts significant influence in the emergence of many theories of international 
communications, especially those that broadly fall within the cultural 
homogenization thesis. Herbert Schiller‘s (1969) cultural imperialism theory, 
Boyd-Barrett‘s (1977) media imperialism, Antonio Gramsci‘s (1971) concept of 
hegemony and Herman and Chomsky‘s (1994) propaganda model do all have 
substantial elements of hypodermic model. And, to some extent, the same could 
also be said of some aspects of Daniel Lerner‘s (1958) modernization model and 
Wilbur Schramm‘s (1964) development theory, even though these two do integrate 
Katz and Lazarsfeld‘s (1955) two-step flow model of communication which, as 
noted earlier, stresses the mediating role of personal influence in audiences‘ 
engagement with the media.  
 
Lerner‘s (1963) tendency to emphasise the power of the media is evident in his 
argument that the diffusion of information ‗stimulates the peasant to want to be a 
free holding farmer, the farmer‘s son to want to learn reading… the farmer‘s wife 
to want to stop bearing children, the farmer‘s daughter to wear a dress and to do 
her hair‘ (p.348). He argues that the media bring ‗psychic mobility‘ (or empathy) 
to people by ‗depicting for them new and strange situations‘ and familiarising 
them with a range of options. ‗Empathy,‘ he writes, ‗endows a person with the 
capacity to imagine himself as proprietor of a bigger grocery store in a city… to be 
interested in ―what is going on in the world‖ and to ―get out of his hole‖‘ (p.342). 
Essentially, Lerner‘s main work was laid out in his major book, The Passing of 
Traditional Society (1958), which was a product of the research done in the 
Islamic nations of Middle East on their exposure to media. His focus was on using 
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mass media which he describes as ‗mobility multipliers‘ (p.52) to transform the 
traditional societies of these developing nations into modern societies based on 
Western model. ‗What America is,‘ he says, ‗the modernizing Middle East seeks 
to become‘ (p.79). Blaming what he calls the ‗majestic past‘ as being the 
impediment to modernisation, Lerner argues that the people of the region would 
have to choose either ‗Mecca or mechanisation‘—of which he shows his 
preference for the latter. ‗The crux of the matter has been not whether, but how 
one should move from traditional ways toward modern life-styles. The symbols of 
race and ritual fade into irrelevance when they impede living desires for bread and 
enlightenment‘ (Lerner, 1958, p.405, emphasis original). 
 
However, Lerner‘s modernization model was criticised, among others, for its 
simplistic top-bottom approach (Sparks, 2007a) and for failing to understand that 
‗the dichotomy of modern versus traditional was not inevitable‘ (Thussu, 2006, 
p.45). After all, Thussu notes, despite the persistent media-modernisation efforts 
by the West, ‗Islamic traditions continue to define the Muslim world, and indeed 
have become stronger in parts of the Middle East‘ (p.45). Furthermore, many 
Muslims decided to choose both Mecca and mechanisation since, as Samuel 
Huntington (1997) argues, modernisation is not synonymous with 
Westernisation—which Lerner did actually admit, only that he seemed to believe 
that the Western model was superior. And, in a clear case of backlash effect 
(Morgan, 1990) or ‗boomerang effects‘ (Klapper, 1960, p13), Islamists in the 
region and elsewhere use modern media to promote anti-Western ideology 
(Mohammadi and Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1994; Thussu, 2006). This was seen as a 
failure to promote Western ideology, which was believed to be the main motive of 
Lerner‘s work, as he had been linked to American clandestine audience research 
(Larkin, 2008, p.116) and ‗the Psychological Warfare Division of the US Army 
during the Second World War‘ (Thussu, 2006, p.45).  
 
The failure might have resulted from Lerner‘s disregard (or unawareness) of the 
warnings contained in the works of one of his contemporaries, German critical 
theorist and Frankfurt School scholar Siegfried Kracauer, who was also linked to 
the American clandestine audience studies (Larkin, 2008). The studies in question, 
as Larkin‘s archival research shows, were the ones sponsored by the US State 
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Department and conducted by Lazarsfeld-led Bureau for Applied Social Research 
(BASR) at Columbia University on the penetration and effectiveness of US media 
in the Middle East as well as the influence of communism in the region. According 
to Larkin, the reports ‗represent some of the most ambitious and in-depth studies 
on the influence of media in non-Western societies‘ (p.112). The reports were 
‗summarized and condensed in a secret report written for the State Department 
by…Siegfried Kracauer‘ in 1952 (Larkin, 2008, p.112). It ‗outlines many standard 
ideas about the inertia and fatalism of the Arab mind and the barrier Islam presents 
to modernization,‘ Larkin notes (p.266). For instance, Kracauer says in the report 
that ‗cultural and religious prejudices‘ hamper Arab man‘s use of media, and that 
‗spiritual preoccupations may overshadow his concerns with poverty and injustice‘ 
(cited in Larkin, 2008, p.266).  
 
These aspects were equally acknowledged in Lerner‘s work; but what was ignored 
or perhaps wished away was Kracauer‘s key warning of the Muslims‘ rejection of 
Western culture. Kracauer argues that in the Middle East the Western media 
messages were ignored because there was ‗an ingrained aversion, strongest in rural 
areas, to let the doubtful blessings of civilization interfere with age-old traditions. 
The Bedouins reject whole-sale the infidels and their devilish inventions‘ (cited in 
Larkin, 2008, p.114). Incidentally, Larkin believes, it was from the same Middle 
East reports for the State Department that Lerner produced The Passing of 
Traditional Society (1958). ‗Lerner had been one of the original country 
researchers on the project, but he stripped his book of all its political origins and 
focused instead on the intellectual question of media‘s role in social change,‘ 
Larkin (2008, p.116) insists. The political origin of the book might have been 
hidden, but, as noted above, the ideological motive of the work was hardly 
invisible.  
 
Generally, the modernisation model (or even the whole dominant paradigm under 
which it falls) has been dismissed as a top-down unworkable approach (Sparks, 
2007a) that has failed to achieve the goals it was intended for. The efforts of two 
other advocates of the model, Wilbur Schramm (1964) and Everett Rogers (1962, 
1976), might have added to its intellectual appeal, but neither has guaranteed its 
workability. In his book, Mass Media and National Development (1964), adopted 
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by development workers and many governments (Sparks, 2007a), Schramm 
asserts that the role of the media is to ‗speed and smooth the task of modernising 
human resources behind the national effort‘ (p.27). His assumption was that 
communications would ‗plant the seed of change‘ among the people in the 
developing world that would make them ‗accept new goals, new customs and new 
responsibilities‘ (p.42). The media, he argues, ‗need to encourage both personal 
and national aspirations‘ (p.130). In a similar fashion, Rogers (1962) stresses 
media‘s role in international communications and development, and reiterates 
Lerner‘s idea of using media to transform traditional lifestyle into a modern one. 
However, in 1976 Rogers published a critical account of the model, The Passing of 
the Dominant Paradigm, admitting its weaknesses.  
 
More evidence of its failure was identified by other academics. ‗The first and most 
withering criticism of the dominant paradigm was that it did not work,‘ Sparks 
(2007a, p.39) writes, citing, among others, the example of the 1975-76 Satellite 
Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) in India, which produced a less 
successful attempt to use modern media to engineer socio-economic change in 
rural India. A similar disappointment was also noted in Africa, Okigbo (1995) 
observes. ‗After many decades of employing the modern mass media as tools for 
development, the records in many African countries show that very little has been 
achieved in such critical areas as political mobilization, national unity, civic 
education, and the diffusion of new agricultural techniques‘ (p.4). Other key 
reasons why the paradigm failed to work were that its advocates did not clearly 
take into account the cultural differences between the developed and under-
developed societies (Gunder-Frank, 1969), and that the ideological intention of 
some of its scholars was to shape the economic and political direction of the Third 
World in line with the Western capitalist ideology (Gendzier, 1985). 
 
Herbert Schiller‘s cultural imperialism theory and its narrower variant, Oliver 
Boyd-Barrett‘s media imperialism model, offer an alternative approach to 
understanding international communications. As a broader concept, cultural 
imperialism, Schiller (1976) says, ‗describes the sum of the processes by which a 
society is brought into modern world system and how its dominating stratum is 
attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions 
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to correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant 
centre of the system‘ (p.9). Media imperialism, as the narrower version, is the 
‗process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in 
any one country are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures 
from the media interests of any other country or countries, without proportionate 
reciprocation of influence by the country so affected‘ (Boyd-Barrett, 1977, p.117).  
 
Formulated and developed in the 1960s and 1970s, the imperialism paradigm got 
wide acclaim at that period on the back of anti-imperialism climate amid growing 
dominance of US military-industrial complex with its linkage to international 
communications. Schiller‘s series of work (1969, 1976, 1996, 1998) highlights the 
links between global power structures and communications industries, particularly 
in the United States, and their overriding influence on the cultural autonomy of the 
developing world. The US, which was then replacing the old British and French 
colonial empires, was also using its dominance of communications in the 
ideological fight against the then Soviet Union. American imperial power was 
being helped by what Schiller calls the marriage between economics and 
electronics. Cultural and media imperialism theories became appealing in 
international communications and attracted the attention of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) where they ‗were 
operationalized into political programme…that came to be known as the New 
World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and was designed to 
complement, at least terminologically, the New World Economic Order, adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly on May 1 1974‘ (Sparks, 2007a, pp.107-
108). 
 
They also complement the media hegemony thesis which stemmed from Antonio 
Gramsci‘s (1971) concept of hegemony that was further developed by Louis 
Althusser (1971), a French Marxist philosopher, who regards the media to be part 
of the ‗ideological state apparatuses‘ (p.143). The thesis is broadly based on the 
Marxist proposition that the dominant class which controls the economic base of 
the society is also the custodian of its superstructure—the political and ideological 
instruments—which it uses to advance its own interests. It echoes Karl Marx‘s and 
Friedrich Engels‘ famous declaration in The Communist Manifesto (1848/1967) 
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that the ‗ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class‘ 
(p.102). The main focus of the media hegemony thesis is to unveil how the control 
of the mass media by the dominant elites facilitates their exercise of hegemony. 
The key assumptions are that the organisation of media establishments, the 
orientation of the media professionals and the media content they produce are all 
shaped and moulded by the prevailing dominant ideology. Such assumptions were, 
however, faulted by those who point to the diversity of media establishments, the 
independence of journalists and the plurality of media content (Altheide, 1984). 
 
But further work by US economist Edward Herman and linguist Noam Chomsky 
(1994) on what is known as propaganda model tends to support the media 
hegemony thesis. Their examination of the US mass media shows ‗a systematic 
and highly political dichotomisation in news coverage based on serviceability to 
important domestic power interests‘ (Herman and Chomsky, 1994, p.35). 
Chomsky had earlier put it even more succinctly in his Necessary Illusions (1989) 
where he illustrated how the dominant class ensured conformity to its ideology. 
‗Case by case we find that conformity is the easy way, and the path to privilege 
and prestige; dissidence carries personal costs that may be severe, even in a 
society that lacks such means of control as death squads, psychiatric prisons, or 
extermination camps,‘ he argues. ‗The very structure of the media is designed to 
induce conformity to established doctrine. In a three-minute stretch between 
commercials, or in seven hundred words, it is impossible to present unfamiliar 
thoughts or surprising conclusions with the argument and evidence required to 
afford them some credibility‘ (Chomsky, 1989, p.10). Later, in another book, 
Hegemony or Survival (2004), Chomsky notes that because coercion was a tool of 
diminishing utility, huge industries were developed to control public opinion and 
attitude.  
 
However, the propaganda model, as advanced in Herman and Chomsky‘s 
Manufacturing Consent (1994) was criticised for its ‗polemical style‘ (Thussu, 
2006, p.52). Sparks (2007b), in highlighting the weakness of the model, notes that 
‗it is insufficiently sensitive to the nature of the pressures and constraints on news 
production arising from the economic and political realities of capitalist 
democracy‘ p.68). Attempting to refine the model, Sparks suggests an inclusion 
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into it of a range of opinions to reflect the ‗divided nature of the capitalist class, 
the presence of powerful critical currents which find legitimate public expression 
in a capitalist democracy, the need to address the concerns of a mass audience, 
(and) political differentiation as a marketing strategy‘ (p.81). In essence, for the 
model to be a useful tool of explaining the current situation, it needs to be more in 
tune with the dynamics of the contemporary capitalist economy, with its 
contradictions of preaching plurality and suppressing dissent in subtle ways.  
 
The same charge of inadequacy slammed on propaganda model equally applies to 
the media and cultural imperialism theories discussed earlier. They were rejected 
for regarding global media flow as a one-way flow of influence, instead of seeing 
it as heterogeneous and multidimensional in nature (Barker, 1997; Waters, 2001; 
Chadha and Kavoori, 2005). Furthermore, says Morley (2006), these theories ‗are 
inadequate—not least because they were premised on an inadequate hypodermic 
model of media effects on their audiences‘ (pp.104-105). But an even ‗more 
fundamental problem‘ of the cultural imperialism model, Ang (1996, p.152) adds, 
‗is its implicit assumption of ―culture‖ as an organic, self-contained entity with 
fixed boundaries, whose traditional wholesaleness is presumed to be crushed by 
the superimposition of another, equally self-contained, ―dominant culture‖‘. 
 
However, to narrow down Schiller‘s thesis strictly to cultural homogenization 
issue or to overstress its link with hypodermic model is to ignore the main focus of 
his works. For, as Sparks (2007a) rightly points out, the central concern of 
Schiller‘s works was directed on ‗the realities of corporate capitalism inside the 
USA, and their effects upon the life of the American media and American people, 
rather upon the imperialist depredations it was wreaking abroad‘ (pp. 90-91). 
Furthermore, Sparks (2007a) argues, ‗Schiller was attempting to develop a much 
more subtle and complex account of the nature of contemporary US imperialist 
control of the world through the power of its mass media than was necessary for 
analysing the old colonial empires‘ (p.87). It is as a result of such effort that he 
(Schiller) noted the US cultural imperialism, just as Boyd-Barrett (1977) too came 
up with the concept of media imperialism after identifying the hegemonic 
tendency of the US-dominated international media, though two decades later 
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Boyd-Barrett (1998) modified his original version to incorporate issues of intra-
national media and ethnic complexity.  
 
Obviously, the one-way cultural flow thesis or homogenization model does not 
adequately explain the relationship between global media and transnational 
audiences. There is the undeniable fact of contra-flow (Thussu, 2006), 
hybridization of culture (Ang, 1996) and glocalisation (Robertson, 1992). But it 
would also be wrong to underestimate the extent of Anglo-American domination 
of global media (Herman and McChesney, 1997; Tunstall and Machin, 1999; 
Thussu, 2006). There is, as Ang (1996) admits, ‗unequal power relations that 
continue to characterize the relentlessly globalizing tendencies of modern 
capitalism‘ and the ‗cultural consequences of these power relations as they 
intervene in shaping particular local contexts, particularly those positioned at a 
relatively powerless receiving end of transnational cultural and media flows‘ 
(p.158). Despite this, she notes, ‗we have to recognize the hybrid, syncretic and 
creolized, always-ready ―contaminated‖ nature of diversity in today‘s global 
cultural order, a fluid diversity emanating from constant cultural traffic and 
interaction rather than from the persistence of original, rooted and traditional 
―identities‖‘ (p.155).  
 
Globalisation may be an important guide to our understanding of the mankind‘s 
transition into the third millennium (Waters, 2001), but it would be wrong to 
equate globalisation of communication with homogenization of culture. Global 
interaction of cultures, as anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1990) argues, produces 
‗heterogeneous dialogues‘, rather than monolithic cultural dominance. Similarly, 
Appadurai (1996) further notes, ‗electronic mediation transforms pre-existing 
worlds of communication and conduct‘ (p.3); and with the global movement of 
cultural texts, ‗more persons in more parts of the world consider a wider set of 
possible lives than they ever did before‘ (p.53). In any case, Tomlinson (1991) 
contends, globalisation weakens ‗cultural coherence‘ even in the ‗imperial powers 
of the previous era‘ (p.175). Dramatic increase in transnational flow of 
information, facilitated by rapid development of communications technologies, 
widens such possibility. ‗With the expansion of Internet access, more and more 
people are entering into the global computer networks that instantaneously 
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circulate ideas, information and images throughout the world, overcoming 
boundaries of space and time‘ (Thussu, 2006, p.63). All these tend to strengthen 
the claims of globalisation theorists about the centrality of media and 
communications, the erosion of powers of the nation-states, ‗the 
―deterritorialization‖ of audiovisual production and the elaboration of 
transnational systems of delivery‘ (Morley and Robins, 1995, pp.1-2).  
 
But Sparks (2007a) has strongly challenged globalisation thesis, questioning its 
viability as a social science theory. ‗We can say with some confidence that the 
evidence of global interconnectedness is not necessarily only to be explained by 
the globalization paradigm. It might fit better into another theoretical framework 
which does not depend upon the claim that we are living in a new epoch with 
different social laws to those that prevailed over most of the last two centuries‘ 
(p.152). He argues that globalisation model‘s rejection of ‗economic reductivism‘ 
was disproved by the subordination of cultural and media realms to the whims of 
economics, exemplified by ‗the fact that the main site of international discussion 
about culture and the media today has shifted from the culturally-oriented 
UNESCO to the unequivocally economic WTO (World Trade Organisation)‘ 
(p.185). Similarly, he continues, ‗the development of new technologies, notably 
satellite television, does not abolish national boundaries, since states, business and 
audiences remain firmly rooted in terrestrial realities‘ (p.185). Globalization fails 
to provide sufficient explanations to the issues it raises, he contends. ‗The master 
category that explains them all is not globalization but capitalism, in its most 
recent and expansive phase‘ (p.188). Still, Sparks (2007a) admits, globalisation 
theorists have played valuable role in directing our ‗attention towards international 
displacement and transnational exchange‘, though they did so ‗at the expense of 
considerations of power and of inequality, which are traditional themes of social 
sciences‘ (p.186).  
 
Cottle and Rai (2008), however, argue that the complexity of global 
communications could hardly be explained by sticking to a single rigid model. 
‗Enough has been documented nonetheless to demonstrate that there is indeed a 
communicative complexity both within and across global news channels, a 
complexity that should no longer be simply ignored or collapsed in reductionist 
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fashion under theoretical positions of ―global dominance‖ or ―global public 
sphere‖—though both can summon empirical findings in partial support of their 
respective claims.‘ (p.175). All these point to the peril of sticking to a single model 
to explain the dynamics and complexity of international communications; they do 
essentially suggest the need for evolving a more comprehensive approach in 
addressing the issue. Studying the complexity of global interactions in digital age, 
as Thussu (2006) observes, requires an innovative and more inclusive 
multidisciplinary research agenda that can address the emerging pattern of global 
communications.  
 
Transnational audiences and theoretical perspective 
This need for innovative inclusive research agenda brings with it the issue of 
finding appropriate theoretical perspective in dealing with transnational audiences. 
However, as Ang (1996) argues, ‗it would be ludicrous…to try to find a definitive 
and unambiguous, general theoretical answer to this question…precisely because 
there is no way to know in advance which strategies and tactics different peoples 
in the world will invent to negotiate with the intrusions of global forces in their 
lives‘ (p.143). Still, an attempt would be made here to explore the possibility of 
employing what Morley (2006, p.111) calls ‗multi-dimensional model‘ that 
incorporates the insights of different models to capture the various dimensions of 
media-audience engagement. Carolyn Michelle (2007) too highlights the need of 
adopting a conceptual schema she describes as ‗consolidated model‘ that could 
facilitate a systematic investigation of how audiences‘ interpretations of media 
texts are ‗shaped by social group memberships, cultural competencies, and 
discursive affiliations‘ (p.181). This is because, as Burton (2005) notes, there is 
hardly a single model that provides sufficient explanation of media-audience 
relationship. What should be noted, he says, is that the relationship between media 
and their audiences ‗is dynamic and that it is evolving and changing‘ (p.1). It is 
based on this assumption that he speaks of dynamic model which recognises the 
changing nature of such relationship. ‗Rather than choose between critical 
positions summarized in terms of ―the media do things to people‖ or ―people do 
things with the media‖, I want to propose that both views are true,‘ he states 
(p.82).  
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Examining a number of transnational audience studies, one can easily notice such 
complexity. For instance, while Rungsrisawat‘s (2006) study concludes that Thai 
youths‘ consumption of global media does not seem to have effects on their Thai 
identity, that of Yang et al. (2008) on South Koreans and Indians‘ exposure to US 
television suggests that it has a significant influence on their feelings of relative 
deprivations. Similar inconsistencies have already been noted in a number of 
studies reviewed above. There is little doubt, as Raymond Williams (1974/2003, 
p.5) observes, that ‗television has altered our world‘; but it does not do so in a 
uniform way. Indeed, all transnational media have their peculiar way of affecting 
the global public sphere as the audiences too respond to messages based on their 
cultural constraints and possibilities as well as their creative and interpretive 
abilities. Sreberny (2000) argues that exposure to transnational media tends to 
affect leisure patterns, but it does not lead to change of beliefs among audiences. 
And, as Liebes and Katz (1993) discovered in their transnational audience 
research, a media message may be understood differently by those with different 
sets of values and beliefs. In their study of consumption of the vastly popular 
American programme Dallas by Israelis, Japanese and Americans, Liebes and 
Katz found diversities of responses between these nationals and among sub-
cultures. Even within a single country the tendency for diverse readings is 
significant. ‗The ethnic and cultural communities that make up most societies, not 
to speak of the aggregates of age, education, gender, and class, are all different 
enough to raise the possibility that decodings and effects vary widely within any 
given society‘ (Liebes and Katz, 1993, p.8). The complexity widens even more 
significantly in the case of transnational audiences. This view was stressed by 
Burton (2005) in his assertion that ‗there is nothing meaningfully coherent about 
those watching CNN news in Washington and Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) at the same 
time. Indeed, it is the differences in reception that are most significant‘ (p.344).  
The sharp contrast in culture and value systems between the West and the Islamic 
world, for instance, can indeed be a key factor in identifying differences in their 
reception and interpretation of media messages (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; 
Pintak, 2006), despite the apparent resurgence of McLuhan‘s (1964) ‗medium 
theory‘ and the sophistication of ‗the information age‘ (Castells, 2004). This is a 
crucial issue in this research. The level of consumption of BBC products by 
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Northern Nigerian Muslims, for example, is very high and the credibility rating of 
the station among these audiences is also very high (BBC World Service 2007, 
2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010), yet the perception of the West in the region 
appears to be negative. Many studies elsewhere have indeed suggested that the 
West, particularly the United States, has negative image in the Muslim world, and 
that the unfavourable perception between the two sides (the US and Muslim 
world) is mutual (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; Pew Center, 2004, 2006; Pintak, 
2006). ‗There exists today a fundamental disconnect in communications between 
the USA and Muslims around the world,‘ Lawrence Pintak (2006) writes. ‗At its 
root lies an essential truth: each side sees the world through a very different prism‘ 
(p.188). Similarly, in their study (based on data from a survey of over 10,000 
respondents in nine predominantly Muslim countries on their perceptions of the 
United States), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) did find that the perceptions were 
indeed negative. ‗Responses to similar questions by Americans reveal that the 
feeling is mutual,‘ they observe. ‗Moreover, this antagonism is not only driven by 
opposed interests or disagreement about the moral or ethical meaning of the events 
that have transpired. It also reflects radically different, and often distorted, 
perceptions of the facts themselves‘ (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004, p.117). This, 
they note, is a worrying reality between the two sides.  
 
The question of antagonism was taken to an even stronger level in Huntington‘s 
(1996) concept of ‗clash of civilizations‘, which he postulates in the field of 
international relations to explain the uneasy relationship between the West and the 
Muslim world. In The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington (1996) asserts 
that cultural identities play a major role in relations between states, and that 
competition and conflict between the West and Islam are inevitable. His central 
arguments are that cultural identities ‗are shaping the patterns of cohesion, 
disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world‘; that ‗global politics is 
multipolar and multicivilizational‘; and that the ‗West‘s universalist pretensions 
increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with 
Islam and China‘ (p.20). He says this arises partly because of the West‘s refusal to 
accept its declining influence in the world and partly because of the assertiveness 
of the once-dominated but now resurging non-Western societies. ‗As their power 
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and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own 
cultural values and reject those ―imposed‖ on them by the West,‘ he states (p.28). 
Their conviction on the efficacy of their ideas and righteousness of their beliefs 
further embolden them to take such path, he notes. ‗The West won the world not 
by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in 
applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners 
never do‘ (Huntington, 1996, p.51). Taking all these into consideration, he 
concludes that the ‗dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the 
interactions of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness‘ 
(p.183).  
 
His thesis generates severe criticisms, not least for its sweeping generalisations 
and cultural reductionism. His assertion that religion or cultural identity, rather 
than other forms of ideology or economics, was the primary source of competition 
and conflict was rejected by many scholars as untenable. Palestinian-American 
literary theorist Edward Said (2001) dismisses the entire thesis as ‗the clash of 
ignorance‘, saying it fails to comprehend ‗the internal dynamics and plurality of 
every civilization‘, and the exchange and cross-fertilization among them. ‗―The 
Clash of Civilizations‖ thesis is a gimmick like ―The War of the Worlds‖, better 
for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the 
bewildering interdependence of our time‘ (Said, 2001). Kai Hafez (2008) takes a 
similar line, arguing that ‗Huntington was wrong because there is no such thing as 
an unavoidable ―clash of Islam and the West‖. But the media sometimes prove 
him right because in certain situations of international conflict they clearly give 
way to hegemony‘ (p.42). Even with that, he says, there is ‗no evidence that the 
negative image Western media creates of Islam has substantially influenced 
European or Western political relations towards Islamic governments or even 
towards Islamist movements‘ (Hafez, 2008, p.43). Western policy towards Islamic 
governments and movements, he argues, is driven by ‗Realpolitik‘ (p.43). 
  
Huntington thesis is certainly full of sweeping generalisations, as is usually the 
case with theories that make ambitious attempt of taking such wide and complex 
issues as global politics, cultures and identities; but it is equally simplistic to 
completely dismiss it as ‗entirely wrong‘ or to equate it with ignorance. Hafez had 
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a valid argument in stressing that there was no such thing as an unavoidable West-
Islam clash, but a caveat was required to qualify it—of course, no clash is 
unavoidable if precautionary measures are taken to avoid it. Huntington has over 
generalised and exaggerated the West-Islam‘s dichotomy, but his thesis has 
apparently got sympathetic listening ears among some American neoconservative 
and intelligence circles. The US National Intelligence Council‘s report on Global 
Trends (US NIC, 2008), for instance, appears to reinforce some key aspects of the 
thesis. Although it stops short of endorsing Huntington‘s claim of primacy of 
cultural identity in global conflicts, it does support his assertions on multipolarity 
of the world, resurgence of Islam and decline of the West. ‗The international 
system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost 
unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing 
economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to 
East, and the growing influence of non-state actors (including tribes and religious 
organisations),‘ the report says. ‗By 2025, the international system will be a global 
multi-polar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between 
developed and developing countries‘ (US NIC, 2008, p.vi, emphasis original). 
Even before this report was compiled, many events happening around the world 
seem to highlight the West-Islam divide. The September 11 terrorists‘ attacks in 
the United States, the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the current 
‗war on terror‘ have all sharpened the West-Islam‘s tense relations, which have 
been getting prominence in the global media but which have also become a major 
worry on both sides. And this takes us back to the issue of public diplomacy and 
the use of soft power, rather than hard power, to achieve results. 
Ending antagonism or reversing negative perceptions among nations is a key focus 
of public diplomacy; and media diplomacy often gets significant place for such 
tasks (Cohen, 1986). International broadcasting is certainly not the only instrument 
of promoting public diplomacy [there are several other tools too, such as public 
engagements, cultivation of political groups, diplomatic trips and so on (Cohen, 
1986)], but many nations tend not to ignore its significance (Browne, 1982; 
Cohen, 1986; Adams and Rampal, 1990; Sreberny et al., 2010b). British author 
Simon Anholt (2008) has argued that national reputation does shape a country‘s 
global image, and that the use of ‗soft power‘ (Nye, 2004a) could be helpful in 
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changing such image. The main thrust of the concept of soft power, as noted 
earlier, is for a nation to avoid using its hard military and economic powers that 
rest on ‗inducements and threats‘ to achieve its objectives; but to concentrate 
instead on using its other resources—‗attractive culture, political values and 
institutions‘—to get ‗others to want the outcomes‘ it wants (Nye, 2004a, p.5). This 
involves using media for public diplomacy; and it is not really a new strategy 
(Browne, 1982; Cohen, 1986; Nye, 2004a). ‗The BBC, for example, was an 
important soft power resource for the UK in Eastern Europe during the Cold War,‘ 
Nye explains (p.90).  
However, although he praised Britain for using its soft power resource wisely, Nye 
(2004b) criticised George W Bush administration in the United States for misusing 
theirs due to what he sees as that administration‘s adherence to hawkish policies. 
‗During the Cold War, radio broadcasts funded by Washington reached half the 
Soviet population and 70 to 80% of the population in Eastern Europe every week; 
on the eve of the September 11th attacks, a mere 2% of Arabs listened to the Voice 
of America‘ (p.18). The September 11 attacks and the US decision to launch ‗war 
on terror‘, however, forced the Bush administration to equally resort to using the 
US soft power resources to advance its foreign policy agenda (Pinkerton and 
Dodds, 2009). ‗The mass media form a very significant part of this ―soft power‖ 
which the US government has skilfully used as part of its public diplomacy to 
legitimize imperial adventures‘ (Thussu, 2005, p.273). Its post-September 11 
resurgence saw the US government setting up more broadcast stations, such as 
Radio Sawa (Arabic for ‗Radio Together‘), Al-Hurra Television (‗The Free One‘) 
and Radio Farda (‗Radio Tomorrow‘ in Persian language), to win ‗the battle for 
hearts and minds in the Muslim world‘ (p.274). 
 
The availability of alternative media, however, poses a new challenge to such 
efforts: ‗The emergence and growing importance of the pan-Arabic network Al-
Jazeera, whose coverage of both the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts has made US 
public diplomacy less effective‘ (Thussu, 2005, p.281). Perhaps even more crucial 
is the core question of credibility and effectiveness of media in public diplomacy, 
especially when its content is not designed to perform what Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955/2006) call reinforcement function. One study conducted on college students 
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in five Arab countries who listen to Radio Sawa and watch Television Al-Hurra, 
for example, found that their perception of the news credibility of these media was 
negative (El-Nawawy, 2006). ‗Moreover, the study revealed that the students‘ 
attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy had worsened slightly since they started 
listening to Radio Sawa and watching Al-Hurra,‘ he writes (p.183)—an apparent 
case of backlash effect (Morgan, 1990). 
 
The picture is even more complex in the case of the relationship between the BBC 
World Service and its Northern Nigerian audiences, who incidentally share Islamic 
identity with the Arabs. In contrast with the Arabs-US media‘s case, the Northern 
Nigerians‘ perception of BBC‘s news credibility (as noted earlier) is positive 
(BBC World Service 2007, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010), even though 
their perception of the West is believed to be negative (in line with that of the 
Arabs). This intriguing picture alone points to an obvious knowledge gap that 
needs to be filled. And when this is combined with the global hypermedia space 
(Kraidy and Mourad, 2010) and geopolitical complexities (Pinkerton and Dodds, 
2009), an even more solid case for rigorous and dispassionate inquiry is clearly 
laid. The complex nature of media-audience relationship (particularly global 
media and transnational audiences, as revealed by this review) and the diversity 
and vastness of the subject matter suggest that this could only be done effectively 
by employing an interdisciplinary multidimensional approach (Morley, 2006). 
This study therefore draws insights from different theories of media-audience 
relationship and aspects of cultural studies and international relations to come up 
with a comprehensive theoretical framework that provides the main guideline for 
the research. It specifically draws useful insights from Hall‘s (1980) 
encoding/decoding model, the concept of audience selectivity [in Klapper‘s (1960) 
limited effects tradition], Michelle‘s (2007) consolidated model and Nye‘s (2004a) 
concept of soft power to formulate the interdisciplinary multidimensional 







This chapter has critically reviewed previous audience studies and various theories 
of media-audience relationship and international communications; and examined 
the role of radio in Africa, the dynamics of transnational audiences and the nature 
of international radio broadcasting and public diplomacy. It in particular reviews 
extensively the media effects tradition, tracing its historical development and 
explaining its variants, its efficacy, its lapses and its regular resurgences. It equally 
examines in detail the active audience debate, putting it in its historical context 
and explaining its related concepts and theories, such as the concept of audience 
selectivity, the two-step flow theory, the uses and gratifications model, the 
minimal effects tradition and the encoding/decoding model. International 
communications models ranging from Lerner‘s (1958) and Schramm‘s (1964) 
development model, Gramsci‘s (1971) hegemony thesis, Schiller‘s (1976) cultural 
imperialism, Boyd-Barrett‘s (1977) media imperialism, Herman and Chomsky‘s 
(1994) propaganda model and globalisation discourses were all examined in this 
chapter. The focus has been to get a clear picture of the past and present state of 
the field and its related areas so as to lay down coherent theoretical and 
methodological foundations for this study. And it comes up with an 




















In July 2009 series of clashes occurred in Northern Nigeria between security 
forces and members of a militant Islamic sect Boko Haram. The security forces 
initially appeared to have overpowered the group, captured and killed its leader 
Muhammad Yusuf and many of his followers (Daily Trust, 2009; Herskovits, 
2009; Newstime Africa, 2009). An estimated 1,000 people, mostly sect members, 
were reportedly killed in the first main clashes that lasted for about a week (Bello-
Barkindo, 2009; Al-Jazeera, 2010). The government‘s view about the group was 
that it was an anti-modernity sect [they oppose Western education and science 
(Boyle, 2009; Gorman, 2009)] that sought for a violent overthrow of the secular 
government in the country. The sect‘s original version was different. They wanted 
to establish an Islamic government in the country, they admitted; but insisted that 
they were neither opposed to modernity nor did they seek for a violent change of 
government. Media reports, however, showed that they did attack several police 
stations, government buildings and churches (Boyle, 2009; Daily Trust, 2009; 
Schulze, 2009; Smith, 2009). They initially insisted, though, that they were only 
retaliating to earlier attacks on them by the security forces (Herskovits, 2009; 
Gorman, 2009). Later, they came out openly to admit that they were now at war 
with the government after series of bomb attacks on police stations, bars and 
buildings (Africa Confidential, 2011). Their most audacious operation (as at June 
2011) was what appeared to be a suicide car bomb attack at the national 
headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in the capital Abuja, not very far away 
from the presidential palace, killing several people (Africa Confidential, 2011, 
Campbell, 2011; Jacob et al., 2011). 
 
Their name, Boko Haram—a combination of Hausa and Arabic words meaning 
‗Western education is forbidden‘—gives a hint of what they stand for, but the 
deeper meaning is that they are mainly opposed to Western culture. The name the 
group calls itself is Jama‘atu Ahlus Sunnah lid Da‘awati wal Jihad (approximately 
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‗Movement for the Enthronement of Righteous Deeds‘)—the tag Boko Haram was 
given to them by the public because of their perceived negative perceptions of 
Western education. As their leader said before his execution in police custody, the 
sect was essentially opposed to those Western values and products that contradict 
the teachings of Islam (Daily Trust, 2009; Gorman, 2009; Smith, 2009). They 
were neither anti-modern technology nor anti-education in general, as their general 
portrayal by the media tends to stress. The sect‘s leader and many of his associates 
and family members had acquired Western education (Boyle, 2009) and had been 
using modern technologies in their everyday life—and in their campaigns of 
violence. The majority of his followers, though, were unemployed illiterate 
youths—giving credence to argument that the primary factor of the uprising was 
socio-economic rather than religious (Herskovits, 2009; Jega, 2009; ICG, 2010).  
 
The sect is certainly a fringe group within the context of present-day Northern 
Nigeria which is largely populated by politically moderate, culturally conservative 
Sunni Muslims (ICG, 2010). But the group‘s anti-Westernisation stance was 
neither new nor unpopular in the region. Other groups before it had exhibited 
similar tendency, and even the mainstream movements tend to encourage a shift 
away from Westernisation. The re-introduction of the strict Islamic law (Sharia) in 
most parts of the region by populist politicians over a decade ago following 
Nigeria‘s return to civilian rule in 1999 was a popular move among many 
Muslims, even though the motive of the politicians was less holy, as many of them 
were later alleged to be involved in embezzlement of public funds, and their states 
turned out to be among the worst run in the country (Herskovits, 2009). So, 
although the Boko Haram sect is generally seen an extremist group, their members 
do share a common anti-Western sentiment with the mainstream Hausa Muslim 
Northern Nigerians. The Hausa word boko being used to refer to Western 
education since its introduction in the region over a century ago—though derived 
from English word ‗book‘ (Philips, 2004)—is actually a derogatory term to 
portray Western education as ‗hollow‘, although increased enrolments in Western-
style schools has significantly softened the derogatory conception (Jega, 2009).  
 
Ironically, this is a region that was once conquered and controlled by Britain, was 
seen by the colonial administrators as a model of British outpost (Larkin, 2008), 
 69 
and has been a key target of the Hausa language service of the BBC for several 
decades now (Briggs, 1985; Gumel, 2007). The level of consumption of BBC 
products in the region is one of the highest in the world: as stated earlier, Nigeria 
as a whole is the largest radio market for the BBC World Service (BBC World 
Service, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010) and the BBC Hausa Service, which 
has a weekly audience figure of 26 million (about 75 per cent of them live in 
Northern Nigeria), is the leading language service in the BBC in terms of audience 
figures (BBC, 2008). So, why, despite all these, the Muslim Northern Nigerians 
still seem to have negative perceptions of the West? This is part of the key issues 
raised in this research. To see how the past might have offered a guide to 
understanding the present, this chapter examines the historical background of 
Northern Nigeria in particular and Nigeria in general. The second part looks at the 
historical development of the media in Nigeria and the role they played at various 
stages of the country‘s development.  
 
The historical background 
The peoples living in the territory that later came to be known as Northern Nigeria 
have a long history of interactions with various cultures and peoples from other 
territories. One of the most defining encounters they had was with the North 
African Arabs and Berbers that began probably in the tenth century through trade 
and travels, and through which Islam was brought into the region (Davidson, 
1969/2004; Batran, 1989). The other outstanding encounter was with the 
Europeans through travels, trade and conquest, and through which colonialism and 
Christianity came to the region (Lugard, 1902; Dudley, 1968; Barnes, 2004). As a 
geopolitical entity, Northern Nigeria was formally formed by Britain on 1 January 
1900 following the transfer in 1899 of the West African territories that were under 
‗the exclusive trading rights‘ of the British Royal Niger Company (Dudley, 1968, 
p.12). The company, formerly known as United Africa Company under Sir George 
Goldie in 1878 and later renamed National African Company before it was granted 
the royal charter by the British government in 1886, was originally on a trading 
mission in the area and had entered into trade ‗agreements with the multifarious 
peoples of the middle Niger and Benue‘ (p.12).   
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The Berlin Conference of 1885 that partitioned African continent among 
contending European powers had given lower River Niger to Britain. As the man 
who later became the first British head of colonial Northern Nigeria, Frederick 
Lugard (1902, p.5), wrote, Sir George Goldie had ‗succeeded in securing the 
disappearance of all foreign flags just in time to announce at the Berlin Conference 
of 1885 that the Union Jack alone flew on the lower Niger, and thus to secure to 
Great Britain the sole custodianship of its navigable waters‘. Competition from 
France and Germany—both of whom had interests in the region—was minimised 
through another agreement that offered the company exclusive trading rights along 
the Niger-Benue basin; but there was still some competition among them and 
resistance from some local rulers. To forestall further trouble, mainly from the 
French, ‗the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was declared‘ and the territories 
were taken over by the British Colonial Office, with Frederick John Dealtry 




Map showing in 1900 the Protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria and Lagos Colony (all 
under British sphere of influence) and the territories under French, German and Spanish control at that 
time. The two rivers that ‘dissect’ Nigeria—River Niger (left) and River Benue—are shown by in blue lines. 
 
Figure 3.1 Online Source: Zum.de  




North‘s long Islamic tradition 
Prior to the British proclamation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, the 
territories that constitute this region were actually made up of the Sokoto 
Caliphate, Kanem-Bornu Kingdom and many autonomous chiefdoms and 
communities with their respective independent rulers and long histories. ‗The 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria,‘ Lugard (1902, p.1) wrote, ‗is almost the only 
part of the British tropical Africa which possesses a history extending over many 
centuries.‘ The Sokoto Caliphate at the time he met it was a huge Islamic empire 
made up of several emirates, with a well-established system of government, based 
on Islamic laws (Stewart, 1986). The caliphate, founded in 1800s by Sheikh 
Usman dan Fodio, was one of the Islamic states in southern Sahara and Sudanic 
belt that traced their origins to ‗Islamic reform movements that predated European 
colonial interests in the region‘ (p.193). Centuries before the establishment of the 
Sokoto Caliphate, Islam had spread in the region with many of the Hausa rulers 
and their subjects practising it (Adamu, 1984). The Kanem-Bornu (Borno) 
Kingdom in the east was also a well-established Islamic state which was a 
‗caliphate‘ in its own right before the Sokoto Caliphate took over its hegemony in 
the nineteenth century (Last, 1989, p.588). Islam had also spread down to Nupe 
land (around River Niger) whose leader was also a Muslim long before the 
establishment of Sokoto Caliphate (Fisher, 1975). 
 
The spread of Islam in the region started with the trans-Saharan trade between 
North Africans and West Africans in the tenth century or even earlier (Davidson, 
2004/1969), resulting in continuous contact and cultural interactions. ‗Across the 
years they drew the cities and their courts and commerce into the world of Muslim 
culture… Schools of learning were established. Scholars travelled back and forth‘ 
and the fame of West African kings ‗spread out across the Muslim lands‘ (p.218). 
As Sudanese historian Abdul Aziz Batran (1989, p.545) also noted, ‗in Hausaland, 
Massina and Senegambia, West African rulers not only exhibited a commitment to 
Islam, but also had intimate relationship with the Muslim trading and scholarly 
communities‘. The king of the Hausa state of Kano, Muhammad Rumfa (reigned 
1465-99), had as his adviser the itinerant North African scholar, Muhammad ibn 
Abdal-Karim al-Maghili, who was then teaching in Kano. ‗Al-Maghili wrote for 
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him (Ta‘if fi ma yajib al-Muluk) the Obligation of the Princes, to explain how a 
Muslim ruler should organise his affairs. It marked the beginning of a systematic 
Islamisation of Hausa government,‘ Davidson (2004/1969, p.220) explained. The 
Islamisation was even stronger in Borno whose contact with the Muslim world 
was much wider, as one of its rulers, Idris Alooma, was reported to have met 
ambassadors of ‗Ottoman Sultan in 1600 with flashing troop of soldiers‘ (p.222). 
 
In the late eighteenth century, alleged misrule and neglect of Islamic practices in 
Hausaland led to the emergence of an Islamic reform movement and the launching 
of djihad (holy war) by Usman dan Fodio. The war was formally declared in 1804 
after Usman dan Fodio‘s hijra (migration) from Degel to Gudu where he was 
chosen as amirul muminin (the leader of the faithful). Some historians drew 
parallelism between this hijra and Prophet Muhammad‘s in 622 AD from Mecca 
to Medina, and on how the reformists used it to add legitimacy to their cause 
(Batran, 1989; Last, 1989). Similarly, Batran (1989) argued that religious and 
political developments in the wider Islamic world had also inspired the West 
African reformists to launch their djihad, citing the effect of the capture of Mecca 
in 1803 and Medina in 1805 by the Wahhabi Islamic sect. ‗Notwithstanding the 
rejection of some of the Wahhabi doctrines by a large segment of Muslims (the 
reformers in Hausaland belonged to Sufism which Wahhabis condemned), the 
Wahhabi revolution had naturally served as a catalyst for militant action in the 
world of Islam‘ (Batran, 1989, p.543). The djihad culminated in the replacement 
of the Hausa rulers with Fulani rulers and wider spread of Islam and its adoption 
as a state religion in the new empire. Elements of the traditional Hausa form of 
governance were merged with Islamic ones to run each of the semi-independent 
emirates, with Sokoto as the headquarters of the caliphate. ‗Under the overall 
supervision of the caliph,‘ Ajayi (1989) noted, ‗the individual amirs (emirs) had 
certainly achieved more durable political structures than the Hausa rulers they had 
displaced‘ (p.778). Although the emirs later re-absorbed ‗many aspects of Hausa 
nobility and privileges‘, as Ajayi further observed, ‗the relative degree of peace 
that the caliphate enjoyed, the attention to the markets, industries, crafts and trade 
routes, the power of judges and other officials and the control of amirs over the 
officials, all ensured a higher degree of executive authority in the state‘ (p.778). 
This was how the caliphate was run for about a century before its own internal 
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difficulties began to put strains on its own cohesion and the advent of British 
colonialism brought it to its knees. 
 
Indirect rule 
After the British conquest, the colonial authority left the existing system of 
administration largely intact and operated what came to be known as ‗Indirect 
Rule‘ (Dorward, 1986; Stewart, 1986). A dearth of colonial administrators and the 
sophistication of the emirate system made it convenient for Britain to adopt the 
indirect rule system (Lugard, 1904; Nafziger, 1973; Dorward, 1986), just as it did 
in its other West African protectorate of Sierra Leone. ‗With only one British 
administrator for every 100,000 Africans in Northern Nigeria, and five 
administrative officers for the entire Sierra Leone Protectorate with a population of 
over one million,‘ Dorward (1986) wrote, ‗day-to-day responsibilities for 
maintaining law and order, mobilising labour and/or collecting taxes devolved 
upon the local African authorities‘ (p.402). The ‗system reached its fullest 
elaboration in Northern Nigeria‘ where Lugard ‗had found the sophisticated 
Hausa-Fulani government and Islamic judiciary well suited to his needs; it was 
strengthened by the system of ―native treasuries‖ developed by (the lieutenant 
governor of the region) H. R. Palmer between 1906 and 1911‘ (Dorward, 1986, 
pp.402-403). Its introduction in Northern Nigeria was informed and facilitated by 
Lugard‘s experience in dealing with Muslim communities in India. Stewart (1986) 
observed that ‗colonial attitudes towards Islam were influenced by early Muslim 
responses to colonial intrusion and by past experience in dealing with Muslim 
populations. British administrators in the Sudan and in Northern Nigeria drew 
upon experiences in India in matters of Islamic laws‘ (p.202).  
 
Under the indirect rule system, British Common Law was brought in to run 
alongside Islamic and traditional justice system. The Common Law was being 
applied mainly in criminal matters while Sharia was being used in family and 
personal matters. There has been debate on whether the adoption of this system 
had hindered or helped the caliphate. The claim that indirect rule favoured the 
caliphate was backed by arguments that it extended the hegemony of the caliphate 
to the so-called ‗pagan‘ areas where its influence had not reached prior to the 
British conquest, and that the application of Sharia, though reduced from its 
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original form, was being extended to those non-Muslim areas. Stewart (1986, 
p.205) argued that although the codification and administration of Islamic law 
under the British indirect rule had ‗undermined the adaptability‘ of Sharia to local 
customary law that characterised it prior to the conquest, it extended it to some 
communities where it had little effect before. In Northern Nigeria ‗the extent and 
enforcement of the Islamic law was surpassed in the Muslim world only by legal 
practice in Saudi Arabia‘ (Stewart, 1986, p.206).  
 
However, the argument that indirect rule had aided the caliphate ignored the 
fundamental fact that the caliphate as whole was now a conquered territory, with 
its leaders serving as agents of British Colonial Office. ‗The change in regime, 
however much a notional ―colonial caliphate‖ sustained the image of continuity, 
required very different ways of administration: offices and office-hours, careful 
book-keeping, the beginnings of a formal bureaucracy,‘ noted Last (2003, p.5). ‗It 
involved new styles of doing justice, within the framework of a modified shari‘a 
law. It involved writing Hausa not in Arabic but roman script, using ‗Arabic‘ 
numerals (and not the numerals Arabs use) and new methods of mathematics‘ 
(p.5): real colonialism. Emirs who did not conform to British colonial policies 
were deposed and replaced with those amenable to them. The head of the caliphate 
(Sultan of Sokoto) himself, the emirs of Kano and Bauchi, the Etsu Nupe, the 
Lamido Adamawa and so on were all overthrown—some of them violently—and 
replaced with compliant rulers (Lugard, 1904).  
 
Similarly, attempts to challenge British supremacy often met violent suppression, 
as seen in the Satiru village incident near Sokoto in 1906 when Mahdist‘s attack 
on a British column resulted in the razing of the entire village by the British forces 
(Stewart, 1986, pp.198-199). In any case there were many Muslim leaders who 
refused to accept colonial rule, regardless of the compromise offered to them. 
Muslim clerics and local leaders who did not want to be associated with the British 
rule withdrew ‗from the political realities of infidel occupation,‘ Stewart (1986, 
p.201) stated. Some even ‗emigrated from the European occupied lands… Among 
the thousands who did so were the Hausa saint, Umar Janbo (who lived in Darfur 
under Ali Dinar before fleeing to Mecca where he died in 1918) and Sultan Mai 
Wurnu (son of a former Sokoto notable who settled in Sudan in 1906)‘ (p.201). 
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They were influenced by the radical views of the North African scholar 
Muhammad al-Maghili who had urged a flight from what he called ‗infidel rulers‘ 
to Islamic territory (Batran, 1989). He was reported to have said: ‗The inhabitants 
of any land reflect the true religious sentiments of the ruler. If the ruler is Muslim, 
his land is Bilad al-Islam (Islamic city), if the ruler is kafir (infidel), his land is 
Bilad al-kufr and a flight from it to another is obligatory‘ (cited in Batran, 1989, 
p.543). Heeding this advice, many Muslim leaders rejected British rule and fled. 
For them the codification and administration of Sharia under the indirect rule 
system was still no match to the application of Sharia under the pre-colonial 
caliphate, no matter how compromised the application had become, which was 
actually the case at the dying days of the caliphate (Last, 2003). 
 
The implementation of British indirect rule itself provoked other forms of reaction 
too. Within the Muslim communities many Islamic leaders criticised emirs and 
other local officials for becoming agents of British colonial authorities (Stewart, 
1986). The Christian world was also critical of the system, as the Christian 
missionaries expressed displeasure over reports that the colonial administrators 
had entered into an agreement with the Muslim leaders to restrict Christian 
missionary activities to non-Muslim areas only following hostilities between the 
missionaries and the Muslim authorities in 1900 (Stewart, 1986; Barnes, 2004). 
There was an exception, though, in the case of Zaria emirate where the emir had 
allowed the Church Missionary Society (CMS) to establish a mission headed by 
Dr Walter Miller (Barnes, 2004). But in general Lugard had pledged to the Muslim 
rulers that the Colonial Office would not interfere with their religion. ‗Government 
will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion,‘ he had said in his March 
1903 address to new Sultan Attahiru, Waziri and other elders of Sokoto (cited in 
Dudley, 1968, p.13) after deposing the Sultan that rejected British rule. This 
agreement essentially meant shutting Christian evangelists out of the Muslim 
areas, to the annoyance of the missionaries. Dr Miller and his estranged sister, 
Ethel (who later defied the order and consistently preached in the prohibited areas 
and published provocative pamphlets denouncing Islam), were very critical of the 
policy (Barnes, 2004). The World Missionary Conference in 1910 also came out 
openly to say that it opposed the idea of identifying ‗British state policy with the 
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predominance of Islam‘ that it said was a danger to both the Christian missions 
and the colonial regime (Stewart, 1986, pp.207-208).  
 
Even among the British colonial officers, the issue of indirect rule and its mode of 
application in Northern Nigeria was a subject of fierce debate. A colonial district 
officer in the North, W. R. Crocker, was so critical of its mode of application that 
he wrote a series of critiques against it, arguing that it had been turned into a 
‗theological formula to be discussed only by the hierarchs‘ producing a ‗pro-
Fulani and pro-Moslem creed of a fervour and a singleness unseen since Dan 
Fodio days‘ (cited in Larkin, 2008, p.31). Later, in his book, Self Government for 
the Colonies (1949), Crocker criticised pro-indirect rule governors who 
‗discouraged, sometimes…banned, the teaching of English and of modern trades 
and techniques and who insulated the people from all outside contacts and 
knowledge in the Holy Name of Indirect Rule‘ (cited in Larkin, 2008, p.31). This, 
he said, was the reason why the Northern Region had to rely on southerners to be 
employed as clerks and technicians to work in government and commerce. The 
indirect rule was also under attack in its later days from the emergent western-
educated northerners who were critical of the wide powers conferred on the 
conservative emirs under the system. But the British colonial authority was keen to 
maintain what Lugard described as the ‗dual mandate‘ of modernising the region 
and maintaining stability (Lugard, 1904, 1922; Perham, 1970; Larkin, 2008).  
 
The attitude of the colonial regime towards Islamic education was, however, 
ambivalent. In one respect it was supportive in the sense that it encouraged some 
integration of Western and Islamic education to produce judicial officers, teachers 
and clerical staff to run the judiciary, schools and local offices. This was what 
informed the establishment of schools in Kano, Katsina and Sokoto and the rest of 
the region (Stewart, 1986). In another respect it suppressed it, making its scholars 
irrelevant in governance and giving Western education a clear priority over it 
(Philips, 2004). It completely neglected tens of thousands of Koranic schools 
spread all over the region; and their products received no certification for formal 
employment or recognition. It is this dual education system with its discriminatory 
pattern and attendant social problems that have remained in the region up to this 
moment—putting Muslim North in weak position in Nigeria‘s educational system. 
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Merging North with South 
When Britain in January 1914 merged the Northern Protectorate with the Southern 
Protectorate to form Nigeria, with Frederick Lugard as governor-general, it 
decided to maintain the indirect rule system in the North. Attempt to introduce it in 
the Ibo-dominated Eastern Region using warrant chiefs was less successful, and 
the British had to more or less rule there directly (Nafziger, 1972). In the Western 
Region too it was not as successful as it was in the North. Even in the North its 
adoption was less successful in the non-Muslim areas of middle-belt region, 
particularly in the Tiv land along the lower Benue River, where centralised 
administrative structure similar to emirate system of the Muslim North did not 
exist. In the Muslim areas too there was serious resistance, first, as noted above, 
from the clerics, then from the emerging educated elite and from the peasants. ‗In 
Sokoto, Potiskum and Borgu, in Muslim Northern Nigeria, the talakawa peasantry 
rebelled against the oppressive and often corrupt native authorities‘ (Dorward, 
1986, p.427). Despite all these, though, the Colonial Office regarded the 
implementation of the system as very successful in the North.  
 
Division between the North and the South did not go away with their 
administrative unification as one country; it persisted throughout the colonial era 
and beyond. The introduction of Richards Constitution in 1946 consolidated the 
1939 division of Nigeria into three regions—Northern, Eastern and Western 
Regions—with their own respective representative bodies at the regional level and 
representations at the national legislative and executive councils (Williams, 1984; 
Sagay, 2009). The former Northern Protectorate was left intact as the Northern 
Region while the former Southern Protectorate was split into Eastern and Western 
Regions. Further changes after the 1953 constitutional conference increased their 
representations in the new federal government. The conference had also accepted 
northern politicians‘ proposal that ‗representation in the proposed national House 
of Representatives should reflect population, which means that on the basis of the 
latest census figures the North would have half of the seats‘ (Williams, 1984, 
p.348). Northern Region‘s population, based on the 1931 census being referred 
here was 11.4 million as against 8.6 million for the other two regions put together; 
the pattern was maintained in the 1953 census with the North‘s 16.8 million 
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against 13.6 million of the other two regions (Williams, 1984, p.348). Thus, with 
the population and territorial sizes larger than the two regions‘ put together, the 
North became the dominant political partner in the Nigerian federation—a 
situation that has been largely maintained up to this moment, though diluted by a 
series of structural changes such as creation of states and local government 
councils and informal recognition of six geopolitical zones (Northwest, Northeast, 
North central, Southwest, Southeast and South-south zones) in the sharing of 
federal political offices.   
 
Pre-independence formation of political parties largely followed ethnic and 
regional patterns, although the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon 
(NCNC)—renamed National Council of Nigerian Citizens after the part of 
Cameroon that was under the United Nations‘ trusteeship and was being 
administered in Nigeria was returned to Cameroon following a plebiscite in 
1961—originally had a national outlook. The Northern People‘s Congress (NPC), 
led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, a great grandson of the Sokoto caliphate‘s founder 
Usman dan Fodio, controlled the Northern Region (Williams, 1984). The Western 
Region was dominated by the Action Group under the leadership of a charismatic 
lawyer Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Akinyemi, 1972). The NCNC, led by Dr 
Nnamdi Azikiwe who had a distinguished academic background from the United 
States and owned the nationalist newspaper West African Pilot (Dorward, 1986), 
controlled the Eastern Region. The three leaders also belonged to the dominant 
ethnic groups in the country—Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo—respectively. There 
were several smaller political parties that challenged the dominance of these 
parties, particularly in the North where the Northern Elements‘ Progressive Union 
(NEPU), the ideological rival of NPC, led by Mallam Aminu Kano, and the United 
Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC), which championed ethnic minorities‘ rights in the 
Middle-Belt, battled NPC; but they were unable to break its control of the region 
(Dudley, 1968; Williams, 1984). The NPC went on to win the pre-independence 
national elections and forge an alliance with the NCNC to form a national 
government to which the British eventually handed over power when the country 
was granted independence on 1 October 1960 (Williams, 1984). Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, the most senior federal minister from the NPC, became prime 
minister—NPC leader Ahmadu Bello declined national leadership and opted to 
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remain the premier of the Northern Region—while Dr Azikiwe became governor-
general and later Nigeria‘s president, a post that was mainly ceremonial in nature 
since the country was then practising British model of parliamentary democracy 
(Williams, 1984; Sagay, 2009).  
 
Postcolonial period 
The three-region structure inherited at independence was maintained until 1963 
when Mid-Western Region was carved out of the Western Region following 
agitation by ethnic minorities in the area (Williams, 1984), but also as a subtle way 
of weakening the influence of the opposition leader Obafemi Awolowo (Uche, 
2008), though he too was an advocate of minorities‘ rights in other regions 
(Alkasum, 2005). The regional rivalries and bitter bickering between rival 
politicians continued until a violent military coup in January 1966 terminated the 
civilian regime, and the lives of several of its leaders (Akinyemi, 1972; Nafziger, 
1972). The coup followed wide spread disturbances in Western Region resulting 
from alleged frauds in the 1965 elections in the region (Akinyemi, 1972). The 
coup leaders, mostly from Ibo ethnic group, killed many military officers and 
political leaders, mostly of Northern extraction, escalating the ethnic and regional 
panic that has been the regular feature of the country‘s political landscape 
(Williams, 1984; Daura, 2010). As one former Nigerian bureaucrat, Sani Zangon 
Daura (2010), recalled, the coup ‗took a very heavy toll‘ on Northern and South-
western leaders. ‗Northern political as well as top military officers were murdered 
in cold blood. Also, Yoruba political leaders (opposed to Awolowo) friends of the 
North along with key Yoruba army officers were similarly killed by Igbo officers,‘ 
he wrote. ‗It became quite clear that the coup was an Igbo-affair designed to take 
over the government at all costs and took over the country alas temporarily‘ (p.13). 
Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and Northern Premier Ahmadu Bello were among 
those killed by the coup leaders (Williams, 1984; Perham, 1970). The new military 
head of state, Major General Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi, himself an Ibo man, was not 
involved in the killings; but he failed to take firm measures to douse the ethnic and 
regional tensions it had heightened. Instead he introduced a unitary form of 
government that worsened the existing tensions (Nafziger, 1972; Williams, 1984). 
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In July 1966 military officers, this time mostly of Northern extraction, staged a 
counter-coup, killing both General Ironsi and the military governor of the Yoruba-
dominated Western Region, Lieutenant-Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi. Colonel Yakubu 
Gowon, a Christian from a northern ethnic minority group, became the new head 
of state (Williams, 1984). However, the military governor of the Ibo-dominated 
Eastern Region, Colonel Odumega Ojukwu, rejected the new arrangement 
(Williams, 1984; Perham, 1970). There were further tension and a near-state of 
anarchy, with the killings of Ibos in many parts of the North (Perham, 1970; 
Bamisaiye, 1974; Uche, 2008). Gowon‘s attempt to stem the tide was largely 
unsuccessful. He abolished the unitary system introduced by his predecessor and 
replaced the regional structure with a 12-state federal structure on 27 May 1967 
(Perham, 1970; Nafziger, 1972; Williams, 1984). Despite series of entreaties, 
Ojukwu refused to recognise the new administration and on 30 May 1967 
announced the Eastern Region‘s decision to secede from the Nigerian federation, 
renaming it ‗Republic of Biafra‘ (Perham, 1970; Uche, 2008). A bitter civil war 
that lasted for three years and claimed on both sides large number of lives was 
fought to keep the country one (Perham, 1970; Williams, 1984). After the war, the 
federal government declared a ‗no victor no vanquished‘ policy and pursued a 
programme of reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction (Cunnliffe-Jones, 
2010). Oil export which by 1970s was making ‗substantial contribution to federal 
revenue‘ helped in funding the programme (Williams, 1984, p.366).   
 
Incidentally, it was the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in 1958 in the then 
Eastern Region that was seen to be one of the factors that propelled and prolonged 
the conflict (Nafziger; 1972; Perham, 1970; Uche, 2008). Many have argued that 
the existence of oil in the region had on one hand emboldened Ojukwu to insist on 
secession, and on the other prompted fierce federal resistance against it (Nafziger, 
1972; Uche, 2008). ‗I am convinced that if there were no petroleum discovered in 
large quantities in parts of the former Eastern Region, the secessionist leaders 
would not have tried to break up Nigeria,‘ the then commissioner for economic 
development Yahaya Gusau told a reconstruction and development conference in 
March 1969 (cited in Nafziger, 1972, p.234). Ironically, the bulk of the oil was not 
located in Ojukwu‘s ethnic Ibo land; it was located in the areas of the ethnic 
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minorities dominated by Ibo under the regional arrangement. And so Gowon‘s 
introduction of the 12-state structure worsened the Ibos‘ case. 
  
Foreign oil firms operating in the country played their own roles too in the 
conflict, relative to the size of their investments and the positions taken by their 
respective countries. British oil company Shell-BP was accused of backing the 
federal side—though there were instances when it was equally accused of helping 
the Biafrans too, in fuelling planes that took arms and aids to them. The French oil 
firm Societe‘ Anonyme Francaise de Recherches et d‘Exploitation Petrolieres 
(SAFRAP), like the French government, backed Biafra, as General de Gaulle 
openly declared that France ‗has assisted, is assisting, Biafra to the extent of her 
possibilities‘ (cited in Perham, 1970, p.241; Uche, 2008). The US Gulf Oil which 
operated in the areas controlled by federal troops paid its royalties to Nigeria‘s 
government (Uche, 2008). Uche argued that Shell-BP, jointly owned by Shell and 
British Petroleum, which prior to the conflict produced about 84 per cent of the 
country‘s 540,000 barrels daily output, sided with Nigeria to protect British 
interests. This, according to him, was impelled by Britain‘s desperation to get 
Nigeria‘s oil at that time ‗because the June 1967 Middle East Six Day War, which 
resulted in the blockade of the Suez Canal, extensively disrupted the supply of 
Middle East oil to Europe‘, and several Arab countries had also banned the sale of 
oil to Britain (p.113). Uche (2008) maintained that, ‗although the Nigerian crude 
oil export to the United Kingdom, at the onset of the war, was worth only £47 
million, representing 10.3 per cent of the volume of UK‘s crude oil imports, it had 
great potential and was increasingly becoming vital to the UK economy‘ (p.113). 
With Shell-BP having invested £250 million in Nigeria and Britain having 
additional £175 million worth of other investments plus an annual trade exports of 
£90 million and 16,000 Britons living in the country, he further argued, the best 
option open to her was to pursue a ‗One-Nigeria‘ policy.  
 
However, Perham (1970), a close associate of Lugard and a distinguished Oxford 
academic who had originally backed Biafra but later called for reconciliation after 
visiting the federal side, argued that Britain‘s policy on Nigeria‘s civil war was 
actually ambivalent. ‗The British had shown a divided mind over the civil war,‘ 
she wrote (p.240). ‗So we have had the strange situation in which British weapons, 
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including Saladin armoured cars, were destroying Biafran lives, while British food 
and medical supplies were being dangerously flown in to preserve them‘ (p.241). 
Some Western nations and organisations were openly supporting Biafra, especially 
after a successful media campaign, aided by a Geneva-based public relations firm 
Markpress which was working for the Biafran side, had presented the conflict as a 
war between Northern ‗vandals‘ and Ibo Christians, with television pictures of 
dying Ibo children being displayed on international television screens (Perham, 
1970; Bamisaiye, 1974). Perham noted that the Pope even ‗used the word 
―genocide‖ in the closing stages of the war, and had quickly to recant‘ (p.240). 
The British ambivalence was perhaps informed by the inherent contradictions of 
addressing its domestic politics and pursuing its international economic and 
political interests. While at home many politicians, trade unions (including the 
dock workers who refused to load arms for shipment to Nigeria) and the press 
were mainly siding with Biafra (Akinyemi, 1972; Bamisaiye, 1974) and urging the 
government to do same, its investments in Nigeria and the fact that the Soviet 
Union was selling arms to Nigeria (Perham, 1970; Uche, 2008) made a definite 
and open support to only one side delicate. ‗The claims of pity and religious 
affiliation clashed with those of economic self-interest and of detached political 
judgment,‘ wrote Perham (1970, p.241). ‗Our links were educational, social and 
most realistic of all, economic, with Shell-B.P.‘s huge investment in an oil of 
excellent quality and much more accessible spatially and politically than that of 
the ambiguous Middle East,‘ she added (p.241). Those economic and political 
interests, threatened by the potentials of Soviet penetration on the federal side and 
French on the Biafra‘s, got the upper hand and Britain tilted more towards the 
federal side which eventually won the war. 
 
Gowon‘s regime lasted for nine years before a military coup in 1975 brought in a 
new government, led by General Murtala Mohammed, who was later killed in a 
failed military coup in 1976 after spending barely seven months in office 
(Cunnliffe-Jones, 2010). He was replaced by General Olusegun Obasanjo whose 
government prosecuted and executed all those convicted of involvement in the 
foiled coup. The government then organised a successful transition programme 
and handed over power to a civilian regime on 1 October 1979 (Koehn, 1989). 
Modelled after US presidential system, the Second Republic, led by Alhaji Shehu 
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Shagari, a Hausa-Fulani Muslim from Sokoto, was meant to be a clean break from 
the 13 years of military regime and the parliamentary system of the first civilian 
regime (Economist, 2004). But the parties that came to power were largely the 
reincarnation of the ones that dominated the First Republic. Shagari‘s National 
Party of Nigeria (NPN) was a resurrection of the Ahmadu Bello‘s NPC, though 
now more national in structure and spread. It formed an alliance with Dr 
Azikiwe‘s Nigerian People‘s Party (NPP), itself a resurrected NCNC, though now 
narrower in spread. The main opposition party, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), 
led by the same opposition leader in the First Republic Chief Awolowo, was a 
mere replica of the Action Group. The former key opposition party in the North, 
NEPU, was renamed People‘s Redemption Party (PRP) and won two states in the 
region. Perhaps the only new party in the new arrangement was the Great Nigerian 
People‘s Party (GNPP), which was actually a splinter group from NPP and also 
had some links with small parties of the First Republic that had support among the 
Kanuri ethnic group in Borno area [of the defunct Kanem-Bornu Kingdom 
(Adamu, 1984; Last, 1989)]. 
 
The Second Republic lasted for only four years before it was toppled by the 
military in December 1983 following alleged electoral frauds (Koehn, 1989). This 
ushered in series of military regimes that lasted for 16 years—with the exception 
of the 83-day interim administration of Chief Ernest Shonekan—before the 
country returned to civilian rule in 1999 that has so far remained uninterrupted 
(Cunnliffe-Jones, 2010). The country witnessed its first civilian-to-civilian 
transition in May 2007 after a national election that was described by both local 
and international observers as deeply flawed (Abubakar, 2007; BBC News, 2007). 
Former military ruler Obasanjo was the one who became the civilian president on 
the return of the civilian rule in 1999 where he spent eight years in power before 
he was succeeded by Umaru Yar‘adua who died while in office in May 2010 
(BBC News, 2007; Nossiter, 2010). The then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan 
completed Yar‘adua‘s term and was elected in April 2011 for a fresh four-year 
term in office (Stearns, 2010)—his election was greeted with violence in the North 
over allegations of vote-rigging (Campbell, 2011). 
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Map showing Nigeria’s 36-state structure and Federal Capital Territory Abuja 
Figure 3.2 Online source: Sahelblog.wordpress.com  
Available from: <http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://sahelblog.files.wordpress.com> [Accessed 16 November 
2010]. 
  
The presidential system of government is still retained and the federal structure 
remains in force. There were some changes introduced during military regimes, 
though, such as the increase of the number of states from 12 to 36 and the 
provision of the third tier of government, the local government councils, which the 
country now has 774 (Hanson, 2007). The whole set up constitutes a huge 
structure that is mainly sustained by oil revenue which, according to one-time 
finance minister Olusegun Aganga, accounts for about 80 per cent of federal 
government‘s revenue (Seria and Bell, 2010). Generally, as noted earlier, the 
Nigerian society is pluralistic and complex. ‗While it may be easy to acknowledge 
the ethnological visibilities and boundaries of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, 
it is certainly not easy to demarcate the boundaries of the minority ethnic 
nationalities. The use of sociological, anthropological, cultural and linguistic 
classifications could assign as low as 375 minority ethnic nationalities and as high 
as 1450 such groups in the country‘ (Oyovbaire, 2001). Northern Nigeria, as noted 
in the ‗Introduction‘ chapter, is currently made up of 19 states (and the federal 
capital Abuja) out of the 36 states of the Nigerian federation. It covers more than 
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half of the country‘s territory of about 923,733 square kilometres and well over 
half of its estimated population of 166 million—based on the 2006 National 
Census that put Nigeria‘s population at a little over 140 million at that time (FGN, 
2007). The predominant religion in the region remains Islam, though there are 
large numbers of Christian and other non-Muslim populations, particularly in the 
southern part of the region, often referred to as the Middle-Belt, where frequent 
ethno-religious conflicts create what Kastfelt (2006, p.14) called ‗enclave culture‘ 
caused by the problem of ‗postcolonial citizenship‘. Northern Nigeria, as stated 
earlier, has an estimated 250 ethnic groups [there is no agreed definite number of 
ethnic groups in Nigeria (Oyovbaire, 2001; Philips, 2004)] with Hausa language 
serving as the lingua franca and English as the official language. 
 
The media in Nigeria 
The history of media in Nigeria did not start with broadcasting; it began with the 
print media in 1859 when the first newspaper was established in Abeokuta, five-
and-a-half decades before Britain‘s proclamation of Nigeria as a country. The print 
media started as a small Christian missionary outfit before moving into small 
private concerns and later expanded to medium and large entities with both private 
and government involvements. They began as organs of spreading Christianity and 
anti-slavery campaign, then moved to agitation for self-determination in the 
struggle for independence before turning to ethnic nationalism, and then 
progressed to the promotion of national unity and civilian rule before diluting into 
big business, supporting diverse interests often dictated by the nature of their 
ownership (Oyovbaire, 2001).  
 
Broadcasting, on the other hand, was introduced during the colonial era and was 
under the tight control of government (both colonial and postcolonial) before the 
wave of economic liberalisation in the 1990s, mainly dictated by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, forced the government to soften its 
control and allow for private ownership (Larkin, 2008). Further changes in the 
country‘s political and economic climate and advancement in communications 
technologies pushed other forms of broadcast media, particularly the film industry, 
further away from government‘s control (Larkin, 2008; NBC, 2009). The same 
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factors are now transforming the print, the wider broadcast industry and the new 
media in their structures, their mode of operations and their engagements with 
both the government and the Nigerian public. 
 
The print media 
It was Reverend Henry Townsend, a Christian evangelist, supported by the 
Anglican Church, who started the print media in Nigeria with the establishment of 
the first newspaper on 3 December 1859 in Abeokuta, the capital of the current 
south-western state of Ogun. It was a bi-monthly newssheet which commenced 
publication in the local Yoruba language and expanded to English language as 
well, carrying ‗articles on religion and society‘ (Falola, 1999, p.22). Known by its 
Yoruba name as Iwe Irohin, the paper focused on anti-slavery campaign and 
promotion of Christianity (Babalola, 2002; Oyovbaire, 2001; Sambe, 2005). 
Southern Nigeria, due to its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, had had earlier and 
much greater contact with the Europeans when compared with Northern Nigeria; 
and Christian missionaries had been establishing their bases in the region. As 
Oyovbaire (2001) noted, several missions—the Church Missionary Society, the 
Baptist, the Methodist and the Catholic Mission—had between 1842 and 1885 
established their presence in southern towns such as Abeokuta, Onitsha (the 
current commercial centre of south-eastern Nigeria) and Calabar (the capital of the 
present southern state of Cross River), where another reverend Hope Waddel of 
the Presbyterian Church of Scotland set up a printing press, producing educational 
pamphlets and later a newspaper, the Calabar Observer (Sambe, 2005, p.120). 
 
Under the guidance of the Church Missionary Society (CMS), Reverend 
Townsend established a viable printing press and Iwe Irohin, saying: ‗my object is 
to get the people to read; and get them to inculcate the habit of reading‘ (cited in 
Oyovbaire, 2001). Many more missionary newspapers followed and the CMS 
expanded its business to book publishing and merchandising through the CMS 
Bookshops that still exist in some parts of Nigeria. Most of the early Christian 
newspapers were short-lived, though, lasting between six to 24 months. ‗The 
important point, however, is that between the 1850s and the late 1920s, the 
Christian press acquired some status of not only discharging the responsibilities of 
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religious proselytization but also of incursion into questioning the emergent 
colonialism and its multiple oppressive practices in Nigeria‘ (Oyovbaire, 2001). 
 
The abolition of slave trade in 1807 and the migration of freed slaves (some of 
them forcibly) from Europe and North America to West Africa in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries had fostered legitimate trade in commodities such as 
cocoa, cotton, diamond, gold and tobacco between Europeans and West Africans 
(Uche, 1989). It also gave way to evangelisation and colonisation of the West 
African coast and the spread of Western education in the region (Uche, 1989; 
Oyovbaire, 2001). Britain, Uche observed, employed gun-boat diplomacy to 
control the region: it annexed Lagos in 1861, deposed its ruler Oba Kosoko and 
replaced him with his nephew whom it had hand-picked; it overthrew Benin 
Kingdom in 1897; and deported the powerful King Jaja of Opobo in the Niger 
Delta region to the West Indies in 1897 (Uche, 1989).  
 
The annexation of Lagos and opening of the hinterland drew many people to 
Lagos, boosting commercial, social and educational activities as well as 
establishing its status as the West Africa‘s most populous and cosmopolitan city—
a position it still retains. It was the city where the first secular newspaper in 
Nigeria, Anglo-African, was founded in June 1863 by a Jamaican freed slave, 
Robert Campbell, who was both a journalist and a printer. Anglo-African was 
regarded ‗as the first real newspaper in Nigeria‘ and showed considerable interest 
in reporting news events (Babalola, 2002; Sambe, 2005, p.123). It was followed by 
The Lagos Times on 10 November 1880 and Lagos Observer on 12 February 
1882. There were other publications coming up around this time, but ‗the most 
successful and influential newspaper‘ of the period was the Lagos Weekly Records 
(Sambe, 2005, p.124), established in 1891 by John Payne Jackson, an Americo-
Liberian, who was regarded as ‗the real founder of Nigerian political journalism‘ 
(Williams, 1984, p.331). Expanded and renamed Lagos Weekly Times in 
partnership with Consul Leigh, ‗the paper was a determined agent in its 
propagation of racial consciousness‘, and ‗dominated the period 1891-1931‘ 
(Sambe, 2005, p.124). The other paper that took similar direction was the Lagos 
Daily News, established in 1925 by Victor Bababunmi but bought by one of the 
best known Nigerian nationalists, Herbert Macaulay, who used the paper to attack 
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British colonial policies, promote cultural consciousness and campaign for his 
party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), which dominated Lagos 
politics at that period (Dorward, 1986). 
 
The British colonial interest began to feel uncomfortable with Macaulay‘s radical 
press and politics, and started taking measures to check him. To do that, some 
British business interests, in alliance with some wealthy Nigerians, established 
Daily Times in 1926 and made Macaulay‘s opponent, a wealthy influential Lagos 
lawyer, Sir Adeyemo Alakija, its chairman (Oso, 1991) and Ernest Ikoli its editor, 
having sold his African Messenger to them. This, as Oso (1991) observed, was the 
beginning of the capitalisation and commercialisation of the Nigerian press 
because ‗most of the earlier newspapers were owned and managed as one-man 
businesses, the owner being the editor, reporter and, in most cases, the printer‘ 
(p.43). The emergence of the Daily Times took the shines off the radical nationalist 
press, never to recover until the arrival on the scene in the 1930s of Dr Nnamdi 
Azikiwe who was among the foremost Nigerian nationalists.  
 
Zik, as he was popularly known, had (as noted earlier) a brilliant academic 
background from the United States that included training in journalism. He had 
edited the African Morning Post in the early 1930s in Accra (the capital of Ghana, 
then known as Gold Coast) where he had ‗had skirmishes with the British colonial 
government‘ (Uche, 1989, p.95). His establishment of the West African Pilot on 22 
November 1937 transformed the face of Nigerian journalism, bringing into it 
greater level of professionalism, vibrancy and clearer focus on the fight against 
colonialism. Sambe (2005) noted that Zik‘s journalism was daring, ‗with shocking 
directness in his editorials and news items…banner headlines to sensationalise 
news and heighten emotions‘, and ‗laced his political messages with human 
interest‘ (p.125). The boldness paid off as it pushed up ‗the circulation figure to an 
astonishing 12,000 copies daily, which was more than doubled in the 1940s‘ 
(p.125). Zik also introduced newspaper chain business in the 1940s, with his 
publishing firm, the Associated Newspaper of Nigeria, launching among others, 
the Eastern Nigerian Guardian in the Niger Delta‘s city of Port Harcourt in 1940, 
the Nigerian Spokesman in Onitsha in 1943, the Southern Nigerian Defender in 
Warri (another Niger Delta‘s city) and in 1949 the Comet in the northern city of 
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Kano, becoming the first daily newspaper in Northern Nigeria (Sambe, 2005, 
p.126; Uche, 1989).  
 
Prior to this, the few newspapers in the region were not daily and were mainly 
published in Hausa language under the control of the colonial administration. 
North, with its dominant Islamic background, lagged behind in Western education. 
‗The colonisers promoted English and Christianity… And as the church controlled 
education, development lagged in the Muslim north‘ (Economist, 2004). Although 
Northern Nigeria had a long educational and literary tradition dating back 
centuries before the British conquest, the tradition was mainly based on Islamic 
and Arabic system (Williams, 1984; Uche, 1989). Its Muslim rulers and scholars 
had been communicating and spreading education in Arabic, Hausa, Fulfulde, 
Kanuri and Nupe languages, not in English, the language introduced to them by 
colonialists and Christian missionaries. This and the Northern Muslims‘ suspicion 
of Western education made English newspaper publication less attractive in the 
region (Uche, 1989). Hausa language which had been ‗reduced to writing long 
before the advent of the British‘ (Williams, 1984, p.331) became the key language 
for the first newspaper publication in the region, with the establishment of a 
quarterly periodical called Jaridar Najeriya ta Arewa (Northern Nigerian 
Newspaper) in 1932 (Yahaya, 1988). Other newspapers, like Yar Gaskiya (The 
Truth), published in Hausa ajami (Hausa in Arabic script), and Suda were both 
established in the 1940s (Yahaya, 1988). But the best known Hausa newspaper at 
the time was Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo (approximately ‗Truth is Worthier than 
Wealth‘), established in the late 1930s (Yahaya, 1988; Auduson, 2010) by a 
government publishing agency, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, which also pioneered 
Hausa serious educational and literary publications (in Roman script), many of 
which were written by one of the best known Hausa intellectuals, Dr Abubakar 
Imam, who was also the first editor of the paper (Yahaya, 1988). Gaskiya Tafi 
Kwabo was—and to some extent still is—a popular Hausa newspaper covering 
various subjects and carrying local, regional and international news, and circulates 
in different parts of the region. The corporation later added an English language 
newspaper, Nigerian Citizen, which later became New Nigerian, based in the 
regional capital, Kaduna, and which still exists (Auduson, 2010). 
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These were (and still are) government-controlled newspapers, and as such the 
credit for producing the first daily private newspaper in Northern Nigeria remains 
with Zik who in 1949 also established the Northern Advocate in the north-central 
city of Jos. All these had in turn helped extend his political reach to the region and 
earned him respect among other politicians. His flagship newspaper also attracted 
praises from his political contemporaries. Chief Obafemi Awolowo was quoted to 
have said: ‗The West African Pilot blossomed into every corner of the country as 
the champion of the common man‘, and that it ‗was a fire-eating and aggressive 
nationalist paper of the highest order‘ (Uche, 1989, pp.95-96). Chief Awolowo too 
engaged in newspaper business with his Amalgamated Press of Nigeria, publishing 
Nigerian Tribune since 9 November 1949 (it still exists as his family‘s enterprise), 
the Daily Service, which he inherited from the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), 
and many more. They all contributed to the nationalists‘ independence struggle 
(Uche, 1989). 
 
The success of Zik‘s chain of newspapers forced the rival Daily Times, linked to 
Mirror Group of London (Sambe, 2005), to reorganise its operation and get more 
foreign capital injection (Uche, 1989). It was at the time the UK press baron Cecil 
King was also trying to prop up British colonial interests in West Africa, acquiring 
newspapers in the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Nigeria to help achieve that goal. 
In his book, Press Gang, British journalist-cum-media academic Roy Greenslade 
(2003) said King‘s media adventure in West Africa was vague. King‘s ‗story of 
his ventures in the region is offensively patronising and his central editorial aim, 
―to keep the political temperature low‖, was overtly political and vaguely 
imperialist‘ (Greenslade, 2003, p.60). But the pro-British media in Nigeria were 
not vague in their mission: they did try to ‗keep the political temperature low‘. As 
Uche (1989) noted, ‗the Daily Times and the Daily Express remained quite aloof 
and unconcerned in the nationalist struggle for an independent Nigeria. These two 
daily newspapers were controlled by private British business enterprises and were 
basically interested in exploiting a hitherto untapped and potentially rich market 
with a very active media audience‘ (p.97). Daily Times did admit that ‗since the 
original company was absorbed by overseas interests…it has maintained a neutral 
role in party politics, while at the same time attempting to promote economic and 
social interests of Nigeria as a whole‘ (cited in Uche, 1989, p.97). 
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The colonial administration too did manage to keep the temperature low by 
embarking on a gradual process of transfer of power through careful and 
prolonged negotiations with the nationalists. The British government, under the 
influence of chief secretary Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon), had decided that 
the Nigerian government would not be ‗overtaken by events‘ as the Gold Coast‘s 
had been in 1948 (when they witnessed a riot initially linked to nationalists), and 
begun series of local conferences to prepare for independence (Williams, 1984, 
p.347). In any case, despite all the hypes about the nationalists‘ agitation for 
independence, the dominant elements in the independence movements were not as 
radical as they were being portrayed: they ‗were moderate, and sometimes 
conservative, closely connected with bourgeois families or with chiefly houses‘ 
(Williams, 1984, p.340). Similarly, as Williams further noted, ‗the nationalist 
leaders who slowly moved to demand—―request‖ is a better word in most cases—
independence were in no case either prompted by outside forces or intent on 
internal social revolution…They sought a transfer of power, not the transformation 
of society‘ (p.340). But it is still fair to admit that they did make appreciable 
efforts in the independence struggle, considering the strength, the bulk of 
experience and the manipulative capacity of the forces they were up against 
(Oyovbaire, 2001). The way they employed the press in prosecuting their 
campaign, as Uche (1989) and Oyovbaire (2001) noted, had also helped to speed 
up the process of terminating the colonial rule. 
 
However, as soon as the independence was attained, the Nigerian press shifted its 
focus away from its idealistic orientation of promoting national interest to the 
pursuit of parochial issues of regional rivalries and ethnic nationalism (Oso, 1991; 
Sambe, 2005). The political parties that came to power were regional in their 
structure, membership and orientation; the mood of the nation took that direction; 
and the leanings of the media proprietors and the content of their publications 
reflected it. Regional governments competed to set up or strengthen their own 
newspapers to project their regions in good light and highlight the failings of other 
regions (Uche, 1989). The Eastern Region‘s government turned its weekly Eastern 
Nigeria Outlook into a daily paper in 1960 and renamed it Nigerian Outlook, 
though the content had not gone hand-in-hand with the new name; Northern 
Region‘s government had its Nigerian Citizen (that looked more like Northern 
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Citizen) and Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo with similar orientation; and the Western 
Region, controlled by the main opposition party at the national level, had its own 
media reflecting that sentiment. The federal government, controlled by the 
Northern-based NPC in alliance with Eastern-based NCNC, established its own 
Morning Post and Sunday Post in 1961 (Uche, 1989). The Western Region, now 
under the control of the opposition leader Chief Awolowo, and being the real base 
of the country‘s print media, capitalised on that advantage to its full benefit and 
used the media to portray the national government as incompetent. ‗Incidentally, 
the press became known by a section of the political class for its reportage and 
advocacy as a vehicle for partisanship, and thus acquired the derogatory image of 
being the ―Lagos press‖‘ (Oyovbaire, 2001). 
 
As the country‘s political scene degenerated into regional and ethnic conflicts, the 
media followed the trend, reflecting, and in some cases aiding, the dangerous 
descent into violence that eventually culminated into the 1967-70 civil war during 
which the media, on both sides of the divide, indulged in massive propaganda in 
support of their sides (Sambe, 2005). ‗The media were not neutral during the 
Nigerian civil war. They actively supported the government of their geographical 
locations. They also acted as the leading organ of the regional and state 
governments in the articulation of the interests and need of their constituencies in 
the federation‘ before and after the war, Uche (1989, p.153) stated. When the war 
ended, the campaign for reconciliation and mobilisation of public opinion on the 
need for nation building were assigned to the media. ‗The task of the press became 
how to make whole what it helped to break,‘ Sambe (2005, p.154) noted, adding 
that the newspapers also broadened their reach and coverage. The Daily Times, 
Nigerian Tribune, New Nigerian and later The Punch ‗devised various scheme to 
wear some kind of national toga‘ (p.154). The military government in 1975 took 
control of the Daily Times and New Nigerian while many state governments went 
on to establish their own local newspapers with each competing for readers with 
the privately-owned newspapers. 
 
The return to civil rule in 1979 saw the emergence of many more newspaper 
houses, the best known of which was the Concord group of newspapers, owned by 
wealthy businessman Chief Moshood Abiola. Established in 1980, the group 
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expanded and published several titles: National Concord, Sunday Concord, 
Weekend Concord, Community Concord (located in many states of the federation) 
and vernacular newspapers in three major languages of Hausa (Amana), Yoruba 
(Isokan) and Igbo (Udoka) (Uche, 1989). The primary motive of establishing 
Concord was political, though the economic and other interests were also 
significant. ‗The National Concord is the only privately-owned post-independence 
Nigerian newspaper that has had a very influential impact on Nigeria‘s political 
development…(and) wielded a very wide political influence during the Second 
Republic,‘ noted Uche (1989, p.103). Chief Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim from the 
south-western state of Ogun, the home state of opposition leader Chief Awolowo 
of UPN, belonged to the ruling NPN that had a stronghold in the North. Trying to 
widen its reach to the South, the ruling party promised to rotate its presidential 
ticket between the northern and southern politicians. Abiola began to position 
himself for contest to become its candidate in the next presidential election and as 
such established his chain of newspapers to help pursue the project. ‗National 
Concord came to exist in order to protect the economic, religious and most 
especially, the political interests of the then ruling National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN),‘ Uche (1989, p.103) asserted, adding that it went about promoting the 
ideals of the ruling party and exposing the alleged misdeeds of the opposition 
leader Awolowo. Uche argued that Abiola needed to demonise Awolowo, who 
was revered in the Southwest, to take over the region‘s leadership and make his 
party acceptable to his people. In the end, however, the gambit failed as the NPN 
re-nominated President Shehu Shagari to run for a second term, with some of its 
leaders claiming that the party‘s ticket was not for sale, and that the North-South 
rotation formula was meant to begin after Shagari‘s two terms. Enraged, Abiola 
officially quit politics, and the Concord Group switched side to UPN which again 
lost to NPN in the 1983 presidential election. But the election was alleged to be 
marred by wide-spread rigging, generating complaints and disaffection that 
eventually led to the return of the military later that year (Uche, 1989). 
 
The Concord Group initially did well under the military regime, some of whose 
leaders were friendly with Abiola. He returned to politics when the military regime 
of his friend, General Ibrahim Babangida, began a transition programme. But after 
conducting the presidential election in 1993, believed to have been won by Chief 
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Abiola, General Babangida annulled the election and remained in power, sparking 
fears of renewed ethnic and regional conflicts. The Concord chain of newspapers 
and The Punch titles were banned by the regime which had also earlier banned the 
Northern-based Reporter newspaper, owned by former deputy head of state, 
General Shehu Yar‘adua, who had also sought for presidency but was barred by 
the regime. Further unrest forced General Babangida to step aside and set up an 
interim government, led by Chief Ernest Shonekan (Cunnliffe-Jones, 2010), who 
hails from Abiola‘s region, to help stem the slide into ethnic and regional conflicts. 
The arrangement did not last long: 83 days after its formation, the interim 
government was toppled by General Sani Abacha whose regime later jailed Abiola 
and Yar‘adua as well as several other politicians, human rights activists and 
journalists who campaigned for an end to military rule. Both Yar‘adua and Abiola 
died in detention in mysterious circumstances. The execution earlier in 1995 of 
playwright and minority rights activist Ken Saror Wiwa by the same regime over 
alleged murder of four moderate leaders of his Ogoni ethnic group had brought 
international condemnation and massive media attention on the regime (Reuters, 
1995; Boddy-Evans, 1995) and it was desperately struggling to survive. 
 
The suppression of independent local press tends to be worse under military 
regimes, forcing some of them, particularly radical publications such as The News 
and Tell magazines, to go underground and operate what they called ‗guerrilla 
journalism‘ (Olutokun and Seteolu, 2001). ‗Successive military governments, from 
the Murtala/Obasanjo regime to Buhari/Idiagbon and from Babangida to Abacha, 
continued to deal serious blows on the press, the most sinister of which were the 
bombings of Dele Giwa in 1986 and Bagauda Kaltho in 1996,‘ Ishiekwene (2008) 
noted. Many more journalists and publishers faced tough times: some, like TSM 
magazine publisher Chris Anyanwu and magazine editor Kunle Ajibade, were 
jailed; a few went into self-exile; and the publisher of the Guardian newspapers 
Alex Ibru was shot and wounded in an assassination attempt during Abacha 
regime (Mumuni, 2008). Even before this incident, the Guardian was a victim of a 
previous military regime, led by General Muhammadu Buhari in the mid-1980s. 
Its assistant news editor Nduka Irabor and diplomatic correspondent Tunde 
Thompson were jailed for violating a military decree that barred publishing false 
report on public office holders, and the paper was fined N50,000 (Uche, 1989). 
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The previous government of General Gowon, which enacted newspaper 
prohibition of circulation decree of 1967 and public officers (Protection against 
False Accusation) decree of 1976 that provides for jailing of its violators to two 
years in prison, and Obasanjo‘s regimes (both military and civilian) did also 
attempt to muzzle the press and intimidate journalists (Uche, 1989; Ishiekwene, 
2008)—though none had put them in as much danger as they found themselves 
under the Abacha regime. 
 
Abacha‘s sudden death in 1998 paved way for the return to civilian rule in 1999 
which saw the emergence as president of one of the people he had jailed, former 
military ruler Obasanjo, who hails from the same Ogun State as Abiola and 
Awolowo. Under the liberalised political atmosphere, the media space widened 
with the emergence of additional titles and expansion of existing ones. Among the 
improvements noted is the emergence of more private press in the North. The 
Abuja-based Media Trust, set up in 1998, added new titles of Daily Trust, Sunday 
Trust, Aminiya (Hausa) and Kano Chronicles to its existing Weekly Trust, formally 
based in Kaduna (Auduson, 2010). New publications such as the Leadership 
newspapers (with nearly similar number of titles) and People‘s Daily, both based 
in Abuja, have also sprung up. In the South too leading newspapers such as the 
Guardian, Punch, Thisday, Tribune, Champion and Vanguard have improved the 
quality of their print and coverage. New ones such as the Independent, The Nation 
(which is a reinvigorated Comet—not Zik‘s—after its purchase by former Lagos 
State governor Bola Tinubu), the Compass and Sun (a replica of Rupert Murdoch‘s 
Sun) and many more, have come out in the South. There was a fairly healthy 
competition among them under a largely free atmosphere (Auduson, 2010). Their 
attention now generally focuses on issues ranging from accountability in 
governance and sustenance of democracy to coverage of celebrities and corporate 
frauds. They have succeeded in, among others, exposing many corrupt politicians 
(Olutokun and Seteolu, 2001) and electoral frauds in the country, and helped in 
scuttling Obasanjo‘s attempt to extend his rule beyond the two terms of eight years 
allowed by the nation‘s constitution. Though the press too are ‗not immune to 
corruption, ethnicity or factionalism,‘ as Olutokun and Seteolu (2001) noted, they 
are ‗providing information of a critical nature, and shaping the discourse agenda in 
ways that deepen the quality and content of Nigeria‘s burgeoning democracy‘.  
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Their independence, being mainly privately-owned and have to compete in the 
market place, might have helped in strengthening their competitiveness and in 
broadening their outlook in handling some national issues, their past parochialism 
notwithstanding. And they turned out to be more successful in private hands than 
under government ownership. ‗Although governments owned newspapers, most of 
them could not stand the rigour of market forces and were more of mere conduit 
pipes for leakage of public funds while some others were deliberately starved out 
of the media scene even by their owners‘ (Oyovbaire, 2001). On the whole, the 
Nigerian press has since its inception in the tiny corner of Anglican mission in 
Abeokuta in the nineteenth century undergone tremendous transformation in terms 
of structure, contents, operations, outlook and number of outlets, ranging from the 
highbrow newspapers and magazines to soft-sell tabloids, all competing for space 
and readership, and performing different functions dictated by the changing nature 
of the Nigerian society.  
 
The broadcast media 
Broadcasting in Nigeria took off on a different note from that of the press. First, it 
was Britain that introduced it in the form of radio networks and mobile cinemas to 
promote the interests of the colonial regime and to ‗modernise‘ the colony (Larkin, 
2004). Secondly, the early development of colonial broadcasting in Nigeria was a 
‗function of three mutually incompatible policies‘: transfer of BBC-modelled 
broadcasting, extending ‗BBC services to British expatriates‘ in the colony, and 
developing ‗local broadcasting service‘ (Katz and Wedell, 1977, p.77). And 
thirdly, broadcasting was tightly controlled by government—in both colonial and 
postcolonial periods—until pressure from the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank for economic and political liberalisation impelled its ‗deregulation‘ in 
1992 and paved way for the emergence of private ownership. Nigeria‘s early 
experience with radio broadcast started shortly after Britain began ‗Empire 
broadcasting‘ with the launching of the BBC‘s Empire Service in December 1932 
‗to keep expatriates and loyal subjects of the King in constant touch with ―the 
mother country‖‘ (Briggs, 1985, pp.138-139). When the Empire Service began to 
beam its programmes to Australia, Canada, India, South Africa and West Africa 
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(Briggs, 1985), the British colonial personnel in Nigeria and their local associates 
were among the early audiences.  
 
The first phase of broadcasting in Nigeria commenced with wired broadcasting, 
whose experimental work started in Lagos in early 1933 and was commissioned 
on 1 December 1935 as Radio Distribution Service (RDS), which was later 
renamed Radio Diffusion Service (Ladele et al., 1979). Wired broadcasting was 
first developed in Britain before it was exported to other parts of the world by a 
firm called Broadcast Relay Service (Overseas) Limited. It was a system of 
relaying radio programmes to audiences by wires that were ‗connected to 
loudspeakers‘ fixed in the subscribers‘ homes; and as such the RDS in Lagos 
would pick up BBC signals from Britain and relay it ‗via a land line to individual 
subscribers‘ (Ladele et al., 1979, p.8; Larkin, 2008, p.50). Two stations were 
established in Lagos relaying, at the beginning, only BBC programmes; but later 
one hour was provided for local programming featuring news, entertainment and 
local announcements (Ladele et al., 1979). The guidelines for subscription had 
earlier been set out in Gazette Notice No. 1098 of 1935, and a subscriber was 
charged half shilling per month ‗after an initial payment of three months rental in 
advance‘ (p.8). The service became an instant hit, with the number of subscribers 
(500 at the beginning with a long waiting list) increasing ‗to about a thousand 
before the beginning of the Second World War in 1939‘ (p.8). 
 
Early expansion of colonial radio 
British policy on colonial broadcasting was often informed by both its imperial 
ambition and a response to its rivals‘. In the run-up to the Second World War, 
Germany had by 1935 established ‗six short-wave transmitters‘ dishing out its own 
propaganda, receivable in British colonies (Ladele et al., 1979, p.12). Britain 
responded to this by trying to expand its own broadcasts to the colonies. The 
Colonial Office in 1936 set up a committee under the chairmanship of the Earl of 
Plymouth ‗to consider and recommend what steps could usefully be taken to 
accelerate the provision of broadcasting services in the Colonial Empire, to 
coordinate such services with the work of the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
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and to make them a more effective instrument for promoting both local and 
Imperial interests‘ (cited in Ladele et al., 1979, p.12).  
 
The committee among others recommended expansion of the overseas service of 
the BBC, urged colonial governments to take practical steps to increase the 
reception of BBC‘s services in their areas, suggested that broadcasting should 
remain in government‘s hands and run as a public service, and that the idea of 
using ‗both wired and wireless broadcasting‘ be considered (Ladele et al., 1979, 
p.13). ‗They were convinced also that colonial broadcasting should serve purposes 
other than entertainment and that it should be used as an instrument of ―advanced 
administration‖ – a means of education and instruction of the people in public 
health, agriculture and rural development. In order to make the most impact, the 
Committee recommended the installation of loudspeakers in schools, halls, town 
squares and other places of public assembly for communal listening‘ (p.14).  
 
The Colonial Office accepted most of the recommendations and began the 
expansion programme. In Nigeria the broadcasting time in the two stations in 
Lagos was increased, and new stations were established in Ibadan in 1939, Kano 
in 1944, Kaduna, Enugu, Abeokuta, Ijebu-Ode, Jos, Zaria, Calabar and Port 
Harcourt in the subsequent years (Sambe, 2005, p.82). Individual subscribers 
listened to the programmes from the loudspeakers installed in their homes; but 
public loudspeakers were also installed by government at public libraries, post 
offices, near chiefs‘ palaces and at other important public places for people to 
gather at fixed time to listen to the broadcasts. The subscribers were mostly 
expatriates and wealthy Nigerians, so the majority of the audiences had to rely on 
the public loudspeakers to listen to broadcasts, which at the beginning were only 
in English, which they did not even understand. But when local music and 
broadcasts of greetings from Nigerian soldiers serving at the Second World War 
overseas were added, radio‘s popularity increased rapidly (Larkin, 2008). Locally-
produced programmes featuring Nigerian artists began in 1939 under the 
supervision of the government‘s public relations department, the present-day 
ministry of information and culture. ‗After the war, radio broadcasting soon 
became relatively well established. By 1948 there were 12,000 radio sets in 
Nigeria, in addition to 8,000 wired boxes‘ (Katz and Wedell, 1977, p.79).  
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The dominant feature of radio at that time—and even afterwards—was its 
publicness both in the way of audiences‘ engagement with it and in the authorities‘ 
utilisation of it. There were persistent efforts to put it into the service of the 
colonial regime for imperial services and to let it serve modernisation function. ‗In 
Nigeria, and indeed in most of the developing world, radio in its early years was a 
public not a private phenomenon,‘ Larkin (2008, p.71) noted. ‗Radio was not 
solely located inside domestic interiors where it created a listening community in 
the precise social locale of the family. Instead it was owned by the state and based 
in community listening centres or broadcast out of loudspeakers over the streets 
and open spaces of the city…(and it) is intimately tied to the necessities of 
colonial rule‘ (p.71).  
 
Switching to wireless broadcasting 
Wired broadcasting in Nigeria lasted for almost 20 years before the country 
switched to wireless broadcasting in 1951 (Ladele et al., 1979). This too was as 
the result of new developments in broadcasting in the British Empire as a whole. 
Technological advancement was also an important factor: cheap wireless radio 
sets, particularly the Saucepan Special made for Africans (Spitulnik, 1998), have 
emerged in the market in the 1950s. The main factor, though, was the British 
decision to improve on the state of broadcasting in its colonies. In 1948 the 
Colonial Office set up a committee, led by BBC engineer L. W. Turner and 
telecommunication engineer F. W. Byron, to carry out a survey on radio 
broadcasting in four West African colonies of Nigeria, Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra 
Leone and The Gambia. The committee found that broadcasting facilities, 
particularly in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, were inadequate; and recommended, 
among others, the introduction of wireless broadcasting and the replacement of old 
broadcasting equipment (Ladele et al., 1979). ‗In the light of these observations, 
the report concluded that there was an urgent need to establish a proper wireless 
broadcasting service in Nigeria, even if existing wired broadcasting systems would 
be continued and expanded where possible‘ (p.17).  
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The adoption of those recommendations resulted in both the establishment of the 
Nigerian Broadcasting Service (NBS) in 1952 to replace the Radio Diffusion 
Service (RDS) and the switch to wireless broadcasting. The Lagos office was 
upgraded and turned into the national headquarters, the stations in Ibadan (West), 
Kaduna (North) and Enugu (East) were restructured and upgraded to regional 
stations, and Marconi transmitters were installed in those cities (Sambe, 2005). 
One of the remarkable improvements noticed in the new service, according to 
Ladele et al. (1979), was the successful transmission of over 30 outside broadcasts 
from various parts of the country during the visit of Queen Elizabeth II and her 
husband Prince Philip in 1956. 
 
The establishment of NBS and the switch to wireless system brought tremendous 
changes in the nature, content and structure of broadcasting in colonial Nigeria. 
Broadcast materials were now coming from national (Lagos) and regional 
(Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu) levels; the direct international broadcasts from the 
BBC no longer took precedence; and the local provincial broadcasts were 
downgraded. The intention appeared to be to use radio to mould listeners into 
Northerners, Westerners and Easterners at regional level; into Nigerians at national 
level; and into members of the British Empire at the international level. The 
attempt to create regional identity was problematic, though, in the sense that none 
of the three regions was homogeneous: they all have ethnic minorities who 
complained of domination by the major ethnic groups. Northern Nigeria with its 
huge area and wide ethnic diversity presented a special case. Although Islam is the 
dominant religion and Hausa is the lingua franca, there are some people in the 
region who are uncomfortable with one or both. Creating a balance was delicate. 
The old Ilorin Province, for example, although it belonged to Northern Region 
geographically and is predominantly Islamic, its people are predominantly 
Yoruba-speaking and many of them tended to prefer broadcasts from the Yoruba-
speaking Western regional broadcasts in Ibadan than the broadcasts from Kaduna 
(Larkin, 2008). Switching to wireless system and initiating programmes from 
regional rather than provincial level meant that local news such us ‗Kano News 
and Zaria News were replaced with a single ―Northern Region‖ broadcast in 
Hausa, a decision that had great consequences for non-Hausa-speaking areas of the 
North,‘ Larkin (2008) observed. ‗Minority languages like Tiv, Igala, and Nupe 
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would now have to receive a news broadcast in their language once a week instead 
of every day. The colonial Resident of Ilorin sent an immediate telegram on 
receiving this news, arguing that ―for political reasons‖ alone there should be full 
regional news in Yoruba‘ (Larkin, 2008, p.67). The response he got from the 
controller of programmes in the Northern Region was that the regional 
broadcasting authority would do programmes that would make them listen to the 
station. ‗It is up to us here in Kaduna to do all we can to provide programmes that 
will keep the Northern Yoruba tuned to the North Regional rather than the West 
Regional Programme,‘ the controller wrote, ‗(but) it will be difficult to stop 
listeners with private wireless sets from listening to Ibadan‘ (Letter of Controller, 
Northern Region, 9 April 1954, cited in Larkin, 2008, pp.67-68).  
 
This idea of choice offered to listeners by the wireless system was a major issue 
that provoked stiff resistance from conservative colonial administrators who saw 
colonial subjects‘ access to rival broadcasters as a threat to British hegemony. 
Wireless system exposed Nigerians to other broadcast stations from places like 
Russia and the Arab world that were competing with Britain for sphere of 
influence in Nigeria. The then emir of Kano was, for instance, said to have been 
going out to Dala Hill in his Rolls-Royce with his radio set to listen to broadcasts 
from radical Gamal Abdel Nasser‘s Egypt in the 1950s, and the emir of Gusau 
requested for the inclusion of radio frequencies of ‗Egypt, the Gold Coast, Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan‘ in the Nigerian Radio Times (Kukah, 1993; Larkin, 2008, 
p.68). This exposure to alternative broadcasts was one of the things the 
conservative colonial administrators had sought to prevent by opposing wireless 
broadcasting. The Resident of Adamawa Province, in his opposition to the 
introduction of the system, had written to say that wired broadcasting ‗has obvious 
scope as a counter to subversive activities‘ and that broadcasting ‗is primarily 
dictated by political consideration‘ (Minute on Radio Diffusion Service, 1951, 
cited in Larkin, 2008, p.66). Similarly, a broadcasting officer at the time Mr 
Bunting had warned of the consequences of switching to wireless, especially when 
he felt that a large number of people could not afford wireless sets: ‗It is these 
people that the government wishes to reach with propaganda and instruction. If 
they did have their own wireless sets, they would be unlikely to tune them in to 
reasonable stations‘ (cited in Larkin, 2008, p.66). 
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Despite the stiff opposition, however, the wireless argument won and Nigerians 
were offered the chance to listen to different broadcast stations—along with their 
political intents as well. The wired loudspeakers that were the hallmark of wired 
broadcasting made way for Saucepan Specials and wooden cabinets that made 
radio an object of domestic consumption (Larkin, 2008)—and highlighted another 
distinguishing feature of the wireless system: mobility. The wireless set is mobile 
and the invention of cheap transistor radio in the 1940s and its spread to the Third 
World nations in the 1960s and 1970s brought massive expansion in radio 
ownership (Mytton, 1993; Mytton and Forrester, 1988) and made it the object of 
both domestic and public consumption.  
 
The switch to wireless in Nigeria had loosened the British colonialists‘ control on 
the choice of broadcasters, but it had not lessened their control of broadcasting in 
the country, much to the annoyance of many Nigerian nationalists. The Nigerian 
Broadcasting Service (NBS) which was supposed to emulate the BBC‘s model of 
impartiality was clearly breaching that, and was siding with the colonial regime 
against the nationalists. A parliamentary motion by independence advocate, 
Anthony Enahoro, calling for self-government in 1956 did not go down well with 
the colonial regime. The colonial government ‗used the radio station to broadcast 
to the people (its own position), but refused the nationalists the use of radio to 
explain their own version of the story‘ (Sambe, 2005, pp.83-84). The nationalists 
then agitated for NBS‘s transformation into a public corporation and succeeded in 
getting it turned into Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) on 1 April 1957 
‗as the first public broadcasting corporation so established in any British colonial 
territory‘ (p.84). But this did not end the alleged partiality against the nationalists. 
Ironically, it was this situation that led to the establishment in 1959 of the Western 
Region‘s television station (Larkin, 2008), the first television station in Africa 
(Mytton, 1983; Sambe, 2005). 
 
The colonial administration in the Western Region used the NBC to criticise Chief 
Awolowo-led Action Group, the dominant political party in the region, and when 
Awolowo demanded the right of reply, he was denied. Then, Awolowo, as premier 
of the Western Region‘s government, entered into agreement with a UK firm, 
Overseas Rediffusion Limited, and established a radio and television station under 
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the Western Nigerian Broadcasting Service in 1959. The Eastern Nigerian 
government imitated this, entering into agreement with the same UK firm, and set 
up its own broadcast station on the day of Nigeria‘s independence, 1 October 
1960. ‗The pattern was repeated later by the Northern State, which in 1961 entered 
into a similar partnership with Granada and EMI of England, and even by NBC in 
1962, which, in reaction to the introduction of television by the regional 
governments, signed an agreement with an American company, NBC 
International‘ (Katz and Wedell, 1977, pp.81-82). Thus, all the three regional 




The regional broadcasting structure that began to evolve in the run-up to 
independence became the dominant pattern of broadcasting in the first phase of 
postcolonial Nigeria, particularly during the First Republic (1960-1966). With 
both the central and all the three regional governments controlling their radio and 
television stations (in partnership with foreign firms in the case of the television 
stations), the policy of trying to simultaneously create both national and regional 
identities continued. But the obvious contradiction in this made it difficult to be 
sustained. The conflict between regional and national identities and the conflict 
among the competing political parties all set in. As such the regional broadcasting 
stations were competing with one another; and the Western regional broadcaster 
that was controlled by the Action Group-led regional government (but in 
opposition at the national level) posed even a stronger challenge to the national 
broadcaster controlled by the ruling NPC-led government. The Northern region‘s 
broadcaster, now known as Radio Television Kaduna, was more supportive of the 
national broadcaster since they were both under NPC government. 
 
The national broadcaster was facing these problems at the time when the country, 
with its massive diversity, required more unifying forces; and the political parties 
were not helping matters. In 1961 all the major political parties in the country—
the opposition Action Group and NEPU as well as the ruling alliance of NPC and 
NCNC—complained that the NBC was not giving them adequate coverage (Uche, 
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1989). The then minister for broadcasting T. O. S. Benson used this complaint and 
the argument in support of national unity to get the broadcasting ordinance of 1956 
amended and allow the federal government to take full control of the NBC 
(Mackay, 1964). ‗The demands of a government needing to assert its authority 
over a country of 50 million people of diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural 
characteristics, between 70 and 80 per cent of whom were illiterate, made closer 
controls of broadcasting inevitable,‘ Katz and Wedell (1977, p.83) noted. 
 
The challenges from the television stations were even more daunting since they 
had the additional problem of logistics. The demands in terms of technology, 
electrification, staffing and financing were huge, and the partnership with the 
foreign firms brought with it the problem of policy formulation and programme 
contents since they had a say on both. ‗This could account for the reasons why the 
early emphasis on programme content was on foreign programmes‘ (Uche, 1989, 
p.62). With all these problems, relations between the foreign partners and the 
regional governments became strained. ‗The private companies very soon realized 
the limitations of the Nigerian market and were subject to heavy losses. This led in 
later years to financial intervention by the regional governments in order to keep 
the services alive, culminating with the private companies selling their shares to 
the regional governments and withdrawing‘ (Katz and Wedell, 1977, p.84). But 
the partnership between the federal government and NBC-International was 
maintained since it was a five-year agreement that stipulated for the sale of the 
firm‘s shares to the federal government at the expiration of the contract. This was 
achieved in April 1967 when the federal government became the sole owner of the 
television station and merged it with the NBC to become NBC-TV. The federal 
government also controlled the Voice of Nigeria which began operation in 1962 as 
the external service of Radio Nigeria to project positive image of Nigeria to the 
outside world (Uche, 1989). 
 
The biggest trouble Nigeria‘s postcolonial broadcasting faced was the country‘s 
divisive regional and ethnic nationalism. And it was the factor that has shaped—
and was in turn shaped by—the broadcast media. Neither the attempt to make the 
NBC serve as a unifying broadcaster nor the warning signals of the obvious 
consequences of regional politics was able to halt the country‘s descent into 
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regional conflict. Both the national and regional broadcasters had played major 
role in this. The controversial Western Region‘s elections of 1965 which worsened 
the regional rivalries saw both the national broadcaster and the Western Region‘s 
broadcaster announcing conflicting results in favour of their respective controlling 
governments (Uche, 1989). The election crisis degenerated into serious violence 
followed by the coup and counter-coup of 1966 and subsequently the 1967-70 
civil war during which the broadcast media played an even more negative role 
than witnessed earlier (Uche, 1989; Sambe, 2005). The NBC was engaged in 
propaganda against the rebellious Biafra and the Biafran Radio was mounting its 
own against the federal government, each using language that encouraged 
violence. Their negative role only came to an end when the war ended. 
 
It was then that broadcasting was again assigned the role of restoring what it 
helped to destroy (Sambe, 2005). The military government took full control of 
broadcasting and its attention was now focused on promoting national unity and 
national development. Since the regional-structure had been replaced by state-
structure headed by military governors who were directly answerable to the 
military ruler, whatever decision the federal government took was binding on the 
state governments; and the broadcasting stations at both the federal and state levels 
were responding in similar fashion. As a one-time director-general of the NBC, 
Christopher Kolade (1977, p.ix), noted: ‗Broadcasting, as a major participant in 
social change, played a vital role in the events of those years. It played a part in 
advancing the cause of rebellion, but it also helped cement national cohesion‘. 
 
Funding was by the federal and state governments, though there were revenues 
from commercials in some stations and licence fees from radio set owners (Uche, 
1989), although the licence fee system was not sustained. In view of the increasing 
role assigned to the broadcast media for nation building, the funding too was 
increased. The federal military government, in its 1975-80 national development 
plan, allocated $82 million for radio development projects that included expansion 
and modernisation of the federal broadcaster (Uche, 1989). The external service, 
the Voice of Nigeria, which was believed to have performed poorly against its 
rival during the civil war, the Voice of Biafra, was given £12.5 million ‗for 
expansion and modernisation‘ (Sambe, 2005, p.87). 
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The military government later promulgated a decree in 1978 restructuring the 
national broadcaster, now renamed Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN), 
decentralising some of its services and specifying national broadcasting linguistic 
zones. In Northern Nigeria, FRCN Kaduna remained powerful, broadcasting in 
Hausa, Fulfulde, Kanuri, Nupe and English languages; in the East, FRCN Enugu 
broadcast in Igbo, Tiv, Izon, Efik and English; and in the Southwest, FRCN 
Ibadan broadcast in Yoruba, Edo, Igala, Urhobo and English; while in its 
headquarters in Lagos it ran only English broadcasts (Sambe, 2005). The federal 
radio stations transmit on the short- and medium-wave and on FM frequency. But 
the state-owned local stations are only allowed to transmit on medium-wave and 
on FM frequency. 
 
This structure was maintained even after the country returned to civilian rule in 
1979, though there were unsuccessful attempts to alter it, and some abuse of it by 
both federal and state governments who installed high-powered transmitters for 
state radio stations that were supposed to have been restricted to transmit only on 
medium-wave. More stations were also established across the country and by early 
1980s there were about 48 radio stations ‗that were sustained by a heavy dose of 
foreign disco music and entertainment programmes‘ (Sambe, 2005, p.95; Uche, 
1989). The issue of partisanship also came up, turning the broadcast media, both 
the radio and television stations, into in some cases organs of the ruling parties at 
the federal and state levels (Mytton, 1983). They played a similar role that they 
had played in the First Republic; and by the time the 1983 elections were 
conducted, their partisanship was so obvious that people did not believe the 
election results they announced (Uche, 1989).  
 
The military seized power barely three months after the discredited elections and 
took total control of the broadcast media. This continued until 1992 when the 
military government of General Babangida, under pressure from the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, agreed to deregulate the broadcast industry. 
Under the National Broadcasting Commission Decree 38 of 1992—amended in 
1999 by General Abubakar‘s regime and later adopted as National Assembly Acts 
38 and 55 of 1999 (see Appendix II)—private ownership of radio, television and 
satellite stations was allowed. The commission was given the power to grant such 
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licences and to monitor and regulate broadcasting in the country. Many private 
individuals and corporate bodies succeeded in getting the licences, and several 
private radio and television stations were established in many parts of the country. 
It brought rapid changes in the broadcasting scene of the country, as noted by the 
commission itself in its report on 3 September 2009. ‗Today, as a result of that 
revolution…the number of broadcasting stations in the country has…risen to 394, 
from less than 30 before deregulation‘ (NBC, 2009). The director-general of the 
commission Yomi Bolarinwa also announced its intention to start granting 
licences for network broadcasting to private individuals and corporate bodies 
(Daily Independent, 2009). Previously, only government was allowed to run a 
network service; the existing networks, FRCN and Nigerian Television Authority, 
were both owned by the federal government. The commission justified its new 
decision on Nigeria‘s plurality and diversity. ‗Given the size of Nigeria, culture 
and her religious diversity, commercial and national interest, plurality of broadcast 
networks is desirable‘ (NBC, 2009). This issue of plurality and diversity has long 
been gaining ground in Nigeria‘s broadcasting industry, with the continuous 
increase of broadcast stations in different parts of the country, though the 
partisanship of particularly government-owned stations still remains undisguised. 
 
The Nigerian film industry 
Perhaps the most recognisable part of the Nigerian media outside the country‘s 
shores, the Nigerian film industry has achieved a phenomenal growth that took 
many by surprise. Neither its poor funding and improvised staffing nor its low 
quality technology and implausible narratives have halted its rapid growth and 
spread within and outside the country. In less than two decades, and without state 
funding or outside aid, the Nigerian artists and local entrepreneurs have built a 
multi-million-dollar film industry that attracts massive audiences across African 
continent and generates jobs and joy for many. ‗Since their introduction in the 
early 1990s,‘ Larkin (2008, p.174) observed, ‗Nigerian films have transformed the 
media landscape not just in Nigeria but all over Africa, becoming the most 
dynamic media forms in African history‘. Though predominantly produced as 
home videos, many of these films are now being screened in cinema houses, 
played on television stations, and are available on many satellite channels, 
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particularly the Africa Magic Movie channel. ‗Nigeria churns out more than two 
feature-length films every day—nearly twice as many as the United States does—
and has become the world‘s second-biggest movie-making country, trailing only 
India‘ (Bengali, 2009). 
 
Known in popular parlance as Nollywood (a derivative from America‘s 
Hollywood and India‘s Bollywood), the Nigerian film industry is often simply 
assumed to be just the English-language home-videos produced mainly in 
Southern Nigeria. In reality it is much more than that. It is a multi-faceted 
industry, with the English-language films as dominant, and the fast rising Hausa-
language films in Northern Nigeria and Yoruba-language movies in South-western 
Nigeria cutting their own sphere of influence within and outside the country. But 
they are all a departure from the early African films that sought to reveal Africa‘s 
cultural heritage and counter the negative portrayal of Africans in Western films. 
On the contrary, some of the current Nigerian English-language movies mimic 
Western films, though they try to combine that with Christian Pentecostalism and 
local witchcraft (Larkin, 2008). Some Yoruba-language movies do build on the 
traditional Yoruba travelling theatres but with the big dose of modern day life. 
And many of the Hausa-language films do copy generously from Indian movies, 
mixing them with Hausa traditions.   
 
Nigerians‘ early experience with film began with its consumption during the 
colonial era when they came into contact with the commercial cinema and colonial 
political films. According to the Nigerian Film Corporation (NFC), the first time a 
film was shown in Nigeria was in August 1903 at Glover Memorial Hall in Lagos 
and the first film shot, entitled Palaver, was in Jos, present-day Plateau State 
capital, in 1904 (NFC, 2009), a decade before the amalgamation of the Northern 
and Southern Nigeria. But the wider experience was in the 1930s when both the 
commercial and political films penetrated deep into the hinterland. Cinema in 
Nigeria at that time was split into two different institutional practices, each with its 
peculiar form, mode of distribution and exhibition (Larkin, 2008). There were, on 
the one hand, the commercial cinemas that showed entertainment films from the 
United States and the United Kingdom to fee-paying urban movie-goers. And, on 
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the other hand, there were the colonial films sponsored by the colonial 
administration to promote its policies and spread British model of modernity.  
 
Concerned with promoting such interests and the need to inspire war efforts 
among Africans, the British government established the Colonial Film Unit (CFU) 
during the Second World War and gave it the task of producing mobile cinemas 
for colonial subjects. A British medical officer in Nigeria, William Sellers, ‗who 
had used magic lanterns and film screenings as early as 1920s to instruct colonial 
audiences about the danger of plague‘, was appointed as its head (Larkin, 2008, 
p.76). Unlike the commercial cinema practice of pay-for-entertainment that was a 
familiar feature around the world, the mobile film units ‗were educational teams 
created by the government to show a mix of documentaries, newsreels, and 
pedagogical dramas intended to instruct audiences about the achievements of the 
state and educate them in modes of health, farming, and civic participation‘ 
(Larkin, 2008, p.77). With funding from the colonial authorities, Sellers and his 
mobile cinema teams moved around rural and urban areas, liaising with local 
officials and traditional rulers, to show the films. The endorsement of the local 
traditional authorities was imperative in Northern Nigeria because of Muslims‘ 
opposition to cinema culture, especially the vices associated with commercial 
cinema practices. But the traditional authorities endorsed the work of the mobile 
film units because it had been portrayed as being an educational and 
enlightenment programme. They reached many areas and attracted huge 
audiences. ‗For millions of Nigerians, and for millions more all over the colonial 
world, mobile cinema units showing educational films were their first regular 
experience of cinema‘ (Larkin, 2008, p.78). The colonial film units produced films 
locally, making among others the ‗Empire Day Celebrations in Nigeria (1948); 
Small Pox; Leprosy; Port Harcourt Municipal Council Elections (1950) and 
Queen Elizabeth II Visit to Nigeria (1956), shot in Eastman colour‘, and showing 
them at village halls, open spaces, civic centres and other public places (Sambe, 
2005, p.144). 
 
Sellers made remarkable efforts in pursuing the project and even produced 
guidelines on making films for Africans and highlighted the need for film literacy 
for colonial subjects. Using language some may consider racist, Sellers in 1948 
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talked of creating films that would suit ‗the visual limitations of Nigerian 
peasants‘ (cited in Larkin, 2008, p.108). In his later work, Sellers still spoke of 
cognitive differences between the ‗illiterate‘ and the ‗educated people‘ in film 
watching. ‗Educated people usually focus their eyes at a point a few feet from the 
screen and by so doing appreciate the entire screen at a glance. The illiterate, on 
the other hand, scans each scene and his eyes travel from one part of the picture to 
another. For this reason, films for illiterate people contain scenes which are much 
longer than is usual in film making‘ (cited in Larkin, 2008, p.110). The tone of the 
language aside, Sellers‘s film practices achieved remarkable success in getting the 
colonial messages and modern health and educational practices across to millions 
of audiences; and his cinema theory found intellectual fit into the then emerging 
discipline of mass communications in the United States, especially the work of the 
Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR) at Columbia University. In fact, 
Larkin put Sellers‘s work as being part of the original foundation of modernization 
theory, often credited to Daniel Lerner (1958). It was a long story, but in its 
shortest form, Larkin (2008) argued that the actual data on which the theory was 
based, the country reports on media penetration in the Middle East, gathered by 
BASR under US State Department‘s sponsorship, were summarised and 
condensed secretly for the State Department by German critical theorist Siegfried 
Kracauer who also had familiarity with Sellers‘s work. ‗The significance of 
Kracauer‘s reading of Sellers and the presence of ideas developed by the CFU 
(Sellers‘s Colonial Film Units) in the work of the BASR is that this shows the link 
between a seemingly marginal film practice and a colonial knowledge regime in 
Nigeria, the emergent discipline of mass communications in the United States, and 
the rise of modernization theory more generally‘ (p.115). 
 
At the end of the British rule in Nigeria, the work of the Colonial Film Units was 
taken over by the ministry of information which continued with the mobile cinema 
practices, producing, distributing and exhibiting documentaries, newsreels and 
dramas to educate and enlighten people on issues of local and national importance. 
With the improvement of communications technologies and increase in ownership 
of television sets, the role was transferred to the federal- and state-owned 
television stations. The government also established the Nigerian Film 
Corporation in 1979 and assigned it the task of developing the film industry in the 
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country. By 1994, the corporation had established a colour processing laboratory, 
commissioned its administrative block and launched the national film policy to 
promote Nigeria‘s cultural heritage (Sambe, 2005).  
 
The development of commercial cinema in Nigeria, though, had a different 
trajectory. It began with films from the United States and Britain being screened in 
cinemas in major urban centres for those who were able and willing to pay for the 
entertainment. Commercial cinemas were largely free from government‘s control 
and concentrated on showing fiction films with foreign images. From the 1930s to 
1950s, Nigerian cinemas were dominated by European and American films; but by 
the 1950s screening of Indian and Egyptian movies had begun while Hong Kong 
movies gained popularity in the 1970s (Larkin, 2008). The popularity of Egyptian 
films did not last long, but the Indian movies gained greater prominence, 
displacing Hollywood films in Northern Nigeria and becoming the main object of 
imitation by the Hausa film industry, locally called Kanywood, derived from the 
name of Hausaland‘s largest commercial city Kano (Adamu, 2009). The 
distribution of the foreign films in those days was monopolised by European, 
Lebanese and Indian businessmen (Larkin, 2008). 
 
The emergence of Nigerian films in the early 1990s has, however, transformed the 
landscape significantly. There are still many foreign films in cinemas [though 
cinema houses are fast disappearing (UNESCO, 2009)], on television screens, on 
VCDs and DVDs—many of them pirated—and in numerous satellite channels. 
But it is the Nigerian films that dominate the market and have been spreading to 
the rest of African continent. Nigerian ‗English-language films dominate other 
Anglophone nations from Sierra Leone and Ghana (in) the west, to Kenya and 
South Africa in the east and south (respectively), and they are beginning to cross 
over into Francophone Africa. Yoruba and Hausa films are dominant in their own 
linguistic communities, which extend well outside of Nigeria into Niger, Ghana, 
Benin, and Cameroon,‘ Larkin (2008, p.174) wrote. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) acknowledged the 
success of this multi-lingualism, stating that ‗about 56% of Nollywood films are 
produced in Nigeria‘s local languages, namely Yoruba (31%), Hausa (24%) and 
Igbo (1%). English remains a prominent language, accounting for 44%, which 
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may contribute to Nigeria‘s success in exporting its films‘ (UNESCO, 2009). The 
UNESCO‘s survey of global film production put Nigeria‘s film industry as the 
second largest producer of films in the world, with 872 productions (in video 
format) in 2006, behind India which produced 1,091 feature-length films and far 
ahead of the third-placed United States that produced 485 major films in the same 
year. ‗The explosive growth of Nollywood attracts considerable attention, 
especially in developing countries looking for alternatives to the U.S. or European 
models of film production and distribution, which require considerable 
investment,‘ the UN body noted. ‗To begin with, Nigerian filmmakers rely on 
video instead of film to reduce production costs. And as the survey points out, 
Nigeria has virtually no formal cinemas. About 99% of screenings occur in 
informal settings, such as ―home theatre‖‘ (UNESCO, 2009). Nigerian film 
producer and distributor, Charles Igwe, gave a figure of 600,000 VCDs being 
pressed weekly in the country and that several crates of VCDs and videocassettes 
were daily transported by air from Lagos to countries across Africa (Larkin, 2008). 
‗This makes Nigeria an emerging force in producing digital media content and in 
innovating modes of distribution and exhibition,‘ Larkin noted (p.174). 
 
However, the Nigerian film industry is not devoid of major lapses. First, the 
filmmakers‘ deviation from the tradition set by early African filmmakers of using 
films to reveal the depth of African cultural heritage is seen by many critics as a 
major weakness. Their imitation of foreign films or even wholesale borrowing of 
themes and scenes from imported films has consistently raised questions about 
their creative capabilities. ‗Nigerian films effortlessly and unselfconsciously 
borrow from a wide range of cultural forms and start with an assumption that the 
audiences and subjects of the film are familiar with and take part in a global mass 
culture‘ (Larkin, 2008, p.177). There are also charges of portrayal of too much 
violence and exhibition of indecent rituals, though the main industry‘s regulator, 
the National Film and Video Censors Board (NFVCB), and state-level regulators, 
like the Kano State censors board, do regularly check contents. The lapses are also 
clear in the preparation and production of the films. ‗The budgets are meagre, the 
plotlines fantastical, the performances hammy and the breakneck shooting 
schedules an affront to logic and the elements,‘ Bangali (2009) observed. The poor 
funding and technical deficiencies yield substandard products. ‗Critics argue that 
 113 
the video films are technically poor, repetitive, and cheaply made…(and) they are 
vulgar, populist entertainment with none of the political or aesthetic skill of their 
celluloid cousin‘ (Larkin, 2008, pp.177-178).  
 
But the critics often fail to critically examine the reasons behind the phenomenal 
success of the Nigerian film industry, despite the weaknesses outlined above. The 
ability to improvise on low quality technology and produce cheap films may be 
seen elsewhere as a weakness, but it is also a key strength of an industry keen to 
attract people with low disposable incomes. Similarly, the Nigerian filmmakers 
might have failed to toe the line of their ‗celluloid cousins‘ to showcase the depth 
of African culture, but they have succeeded in engaging ‗a popular African 
audience in a way that African cinema never has‘ (Larkin, 2008, p.178). While the 
early African filmmakers could afford to indulge in cultural promotion, regardless 
of commercial motive because they had access to national and international grants, 
the current Nigerian filmmakers ‗receive no outside funding and rely solely on 
market success in an African market place, with all the advantages and 
disadvantages that bring‘ (p.178). Similarly, there may be much imitation and 
borrowing from foreign films but many of the narratives in the Nigerian films are 
appealing and compelling to mass audiences. The employment the industry 
generates, the new popular culture it produces and the ‗new visual vernacular‘ it 
creates around the continent have confirmed its viability (p.174). ‗Its ubiquity and 
international presence mean that the Nigerian government is beginning to 
recognise films as a major symbol of private initiative and a key force to counter 
Nigeria‘s international reputation for corruption and violence, offering more 
positive vision of Nigerian culture and industry‘ (Larkin, 2008, pp.174-176). On 
balance, the Nigeria‘s film industry, regardless of the listed lapses, has emerged as 
the most dynamic and vibrant part of the country‘s media landscape. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has looked into the Nigeria‘s past, right from pre-colonial through 
colonial to postcolonial periods, so as to unveil the historical, political, socio-
economic and cultural forces that shaped its formation, its structure and its 
outlook. It has teased out the background of Northern Nigerians‘ long links with 
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both Islam and the West and the dynamics of such complex encounters. It has also 
examined the historical development of various media forms in Nigeria, from their 
early formation to their current state; and explained how the largely independent 
and ubiquitous press, the gradually liberalising broadcast media and the 
freewheeling film industry constitute the main domestic media landscape of the 
country. It has equally shown the kind of roles they have been playing in shaping 
the cultural, socio-economic and political lives of the people in the complex 
pluralistic Nigerian state, as the people too play their roles in moulding the media 




The BBC and Northern Nigerians 
 
Introduction 
The BBC‘s first broadcast to Nigeria in the 1930s marked the beginning of a 
relationship that has continuously been undergoing tremendous transformation. 
From the wired transmission of radio signals to the wireless broadcasting on the 
short-wave radio (which still persists) and the rapidly growing multimedia 
interactive broadcasting that integrates direct audience participation in 
programming, the BBC‘s engagement with Northern Nigerians has been long and 
complex. It began with the Empire broadcasting, expanded with the establishment 
in 1957 of the Hausa language service, and continued to grow with the expansion 
of its operations in Nigeria in the last few years—though budget constraint is 
likely to halt further expansion now. This chapter examines the development of 
this relationship and the emerging trends that currently define it. In so doing, it 
takes a brief look at the origin of broadcasting in general and of the BBC in 
particular, unveiling the historical development of the World Service, its 
relationship with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and its 
engagement with the new distribution technologies that are now playing an 
important role in the transformation of global media and their interactions with 
transnational audiences.  
  
Early days of broadcasting 
Broadcasting precedes the technology that makes it a viable human activity for, as 
Burrows (1924) asserted, ‗nature has been ―broadcasting‖ since the earliest 
thunderstorm‘. Arthur Burrows, the first Secretary of International Broadcasting 
Union and first Programmes Director of the British Broadcasting Company, the 
forerunner of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), viewed the concept 
from both metaphorical and functional perspectives. ‗With the first lightening 
flash,‘ he wrote in the preface of his Story of Broadcasting (1924), ‗wireless waves 
were sent rippling across space, penetrating primeval forests, rocky caverns and 
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the haunts of such animal life as existed…for broadcasting from its beginnings has 
been associated with dramatic happenings.‘ His assertion remains open to debate, 
though, given Jean Seaton‘s (1997a, p.111) equally debatable argument that 
broadcasting ‗is a social invention, not a technical one‘—an argument earlier 
upheld by Raymond Williams‘s (1974/2003) anti-technological determinism. But 
as series of events in its development tended to show, broadcasting is a 
combination of both social and technological endeavours. 
 
Without going deep into the long history of technical inventions and its associated 
controversies, it could be justifiable to begin with few landmarks achieved by 
some remarkable figures linked with the events leading to the advent of radio 
broadcasting. The effort of American inventor Samuel Morse on the invention of 
single wire telegraph in the 1830s and that of the German physicist Heinrich 
Rudolf Hertz on the practical demonstration of the existence of electro-magnetic 
waves in 1888 (Briggs, 1961, p.25) are important landmarks in this direction. 
These were done decades before broadcasting became a practical possibility. Some 
slow but steady technical progress followed before an Italian inventor and 
entrepreneur Guglielmo Marconi came into the scene and brought together many 
of these ‗discoveries and inventions‘ (Crisell, 2002, p.15) to begin the 
transmission of radio signals. Described as ‗the father of radio‘ because of this 
effort, Marconi harnessed those discoveries and inventions into a business and 
thus created a structure that gave impetus for the advent of broadcasting (p.15). 
Marconi came to London in 1896 at the age of 21 and patented his first wireless 
apparatus that was capable of ‗transmitting signals over a hundred yards‘ (Briggs, 
1961, p.5). But these were signals, as Briggs was quick to warn, ‗not words, least 
of all programmes‘ (p.5). By 1901 his firm achieved the feat of sending signals 
covering a distance of over 2,000 miles: from Poldhu in Cornwall (Britain) to St. 
John‘s, Newfoundland, Canada (Briggs, 1961). This prompted Marconi to remark 
that for the first time he ‗felt absolutely certain that the day would come when 
mankind would be able to send messages without wires not only across the 




The credit for the first radio broadcast, however, goes to a Canadian-born 
American engineer Reginald Fessenden of the University of Pittsburgh in USA 
‗who first used wireless waves to carry human voice‘ in 1902, and improved on 
that on the Christmas Eve of 1906 when he transmitted ‗both speech and music 
over a distance of several hundred miles‘ (Briggs, 1961, p.27). It was in the same 
year that the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America hired a 15-year-
old boy, David Sarnoff, as an office boy at a weekly wage of five-and-a-half 
dollars (p.28). Barely ten years after joining the company, Sarnoff had not only 
become a brilliant engineer but he had also acquired the professional confidence of 
predicting the personal and social potentials of radio and its commercial viability. 
‗I have in mind a plan of development which would make radio a ―household 
utility‖ in the same sense as the piano or phonograph,‘ he is reported to have said 
in 1916 (cited in Crisell, 2002, p.17). There were, before this prediction, 
Marconi‘s experimental ―broadcasts‖ of 1913 and 1914 (Briggs, 1961, p.37). The 
First World War, especially from 1914 to 1918, prompted rapid development in 
wireless telegraphy, further providing ground for radio broadcasting. By the end of 
1920, news and sports and entertainment programmes were already being 
broadcast by radio stations in America and Argentina (Briggs, 1961). In 1922 the 
Marconi Company began entertainment broadcasts from Writtle near Chelmsford 
in Britain (Crisell, 2002), and by 1925 the Soviet Union (as noted in the ‗Literature 
Review' chapter) had become the first country to use short-wave radio to broadcast 
communist propaganda from Moscow to international audiences (Thussu, 2006). 
 
BBC at the beginning 
The best known broadcaster in the world did not start as a public service 
broadcaster that gives it much of its current fame; it began as a commercial entity. 
The British Broadcasting Company Limited, as it was first known, came into 
being as a result of tough commercial negotiations among competing wireless 
companies that wanted to set up broadcasting stations in Britain (Briggs, 1961; 
Seaton, 1997a). As a solution to the scarcity of airwaves that could not meet their 
demands, they were advised to merge and get a licence to operate a single 
broadcasting station (Seaton, 1997a). The Postmaster General had received nearly 
a hundred applications from these companies but he persuaded the main ones—six 
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of them—to jointly set up the British Broadcasting Company (Briggs, 1985; 
Seaton, 1997a). It was founded on 18 October 1922 and began its first daily 
broadcast on 14 November 1922, ‗with Burrows reading a six o‘clock news 
bulletin‘ (Briggs, 1985, p.37). Exactly one month later a 33-year-old austere 
Scottish engineer of Calvinist upbringing, John Charles Walsham Reith, was 
appointed its first general manager (Stuart, 1975; Crisell, 2002).  
 
Reith who, by his own admission at that time, ‗hadn‘t the remotest idea as to what 
broadcasting was‘ and would ‗have found difficulty in discovering anyone who 
knew‘ (Stuart, 1975, p.128) later became one of the most domineering figures in 
British broadcasting history. In the fifteen-and-a-half years he spent in the BBC, 
starting as the general manager of the then private company, then its managing 
director and eventually the director-general of the now transformed public 
corporation, Reith moulded BBC into a national institution and laid the foundation 
of making it an international one (Briggs, 1985). Seaton (1997a, p.112) noted that 
‗Reith‘s domination of the Corporation in its early days was massive, totalitarian, 
and idiosyncratic, and for many decades the traditions of the BBC seemed to flow 
directly from his personality‘ using, in Taylor‘s words, ‗the brute force of 
monopoly to stamp Christian morality on the British people‘ (cited in Seaton, 
1997a, p.112).  
 
The BBC spent just four years as a private company before it was turned into a 
public corporation with a Royal Charter granted on 1 January 1927, becoming the 
first public service broadcaster in the world. ‗The Royal Academy and the Bank of 
England function under Royal Charter…So does the BBC. It is no Department of 
State,‘ declares its 1927 Handbook (cited in Seaton, 1997a, p.113). The decision 
followed the recommendation of the Crawford Committee that the commercial 
firm be replaced by a ‗Public Commission operating in the National Interest‘ 
(p.113). This was the result of the growing belief among many politicians and the 
public that broadcasting should be treated as a ‗public service‘, as Labour Member 
of Parliament Charles Trevelyan put it in 1923 (Aitken, 2007, p.9). In any case, 
Aitken (2007) argued, Reith was already ‗managing BBC as a public corporation‘ 
(p.9) even before it became one. ‗The company operates as a public utility service 
and it is of great importance that this should be definitely recognised,‘ Reith 
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(1924, p.57) himself wrote in his Broadcast over Britain. He wanted (and 
managed to maintain his) control over the corporation, even though there were 
governors, one of whom—Ethel Snowden—disliked him and had wanted to 
replace him (Seaton, 1997a, p.118). In the entry of his diary on 11 January 1927, 
Reith expressed his own deep dislike of Ethel Snowden, describing her as ‗a 
poisonous creature‘ (Stuart, 1975, p.142). 
 
Right from the early days, Reith ensured that BBC programming embraced 
variety: news, talks and music; religious and educational programmes; political 
broadcast, though banned, was allowed for the 1924 general elections; and King 
George V‘s speech at the opening of the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley in 
April 1924 was relayed (Briggs, 1985, p.67), becoming the first of the subsequent 
heavy royal representations. ‗Broadcasting in the 1930s was dominated by state 
openings, royal anniversaries, visits, deaths, births, and by the Coronation,‘ Seaton 
(1997a, p.125) stated. Reith believed that broadcasting needed to be a ‗servant to 
culture‘ and that ‗there should be no concession to ―vulgar‖‘ (Briggs, 1985, p.55). 
Attempt to ensure a standard broadcasting code was also part of the early features 
of the BBC, as Briggs (p.69) observed that new artists were handed a card before 
entering studio with a written instruction: ―No gags on Scotsmen, Welshmen, 
Clergymen, Drink, or Medical matters. Do not sneeze at the microphone.‖ Heavy 
dose of serious items prevailed, and Reith was always quick to defend the 
corporation‘s content selection. ‗It is occasionally indicated to us that we are 
apparently setting out to give the public what we think they need—and not what 
they want, but few know what they want and very few what they need‘ (cited in 
Briggs, 1985, p.55).   
 
Another early feature of the BBC was its crave for independence and political 
neutrality, the key ingredients of impartiality. Reith was not a politician, although 
he had attempted to pursue a political career on Tory‘s platform (Seaton, 1997a). 
He tried to put BBC on the path of neutrality. The first major testing time was in 
1926 during the General Strike. Reith preferred neutrality, but the government 
wanted him to shut out union leaders (Seaton, 1997a). ‗(The then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Winston) Churchill wanted to commandeer the BBC, as the 
government has the right to do. Reith argued that if the BBC was taken over the 
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strikers would merely close the service down,‘ Seaton observed (pp.120-121), 
noting, however, that this still did not stop some workers from describing the BBC 
as the ―British Falsehood Corporation‖. In the end government had much of its 
way, but the BBC, at least, had attempted to show neutrality. It ‗emerged from the 
crisis with an ethic of political neutrality, which was expressed as much in the tone 
of its broadcasts as in any formal regulations‘ (p.121). But still, Seaton continued, 
the BBC since 1927 courted government to evade restriction in its reporting. ‗We 
ought to be arbiters of what Government news goes out,‘ wrote an official of the 
corporation, ‗not a commercial company like Reuters,‘ (BBC Written Archives 
cited in Seaton, 1997a, p.122). 
 
More cases of government interference were witnessed in the 1930s. One of them 
was the government‘s pressure in 1935 to bar a communist, Harry Pollitt, from 
participating in a debate with a fascist, Sir Oswald Mosley, because the former had 
earlier made a remark in support of armed revolution. The debate was dropped 
with no mention of the government pressure (Seaton, 1997a, p.122). Similarly, 
when the then Neville Chamberlain Government pursued a policy of appeasement 
in an attempt to avoid going to war against Germany, the BBC toed that line, much 
to the annoyance of pro-war politicians, such as Churchill, who wrote to Reith 
expressing his frustration of ‗the present British method of debarring public men 
from access to a public who wish to hear‘ (cited in Seaton, 1997a, p.126). 
Incidentally, Churchill succeeded Chamberlain in 1940 and led Britain to victory 
at the Second World War. Reith too admitted to persistent government‘s pressure 
during the conflict. ‗Vansittart would like the BBC to get pro-France in our news 
and stop using words like insurgent,‘ he wrote in his diary in 1939 (cited in 
Seaton, 1997a, p.112). It was not only the case of frequent government 
interference that marked the 1930s BBC; it was also the period that saw the 
emergence of the BBC‘s Empire Service, the forerunner of the BBC World 
Service. 
 
From ‗Empire‘ to ‗World‘ Service  
The BBC Empire Service was the product of the corporation‘s dual desire of 
advancing British imperial interests and providing news service to the expanding 
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British Diaspora and colonial subjects. The idea of Empire broadcasting was 
conceived by Reith several years before the service was introduced in December 
1932. Reith had first contemplated it in 1924 but financial and technical 
inadequacies halted it (Briggs, 1985). ‗Trial broadcasts in November 1927,‘ Briggs 
noted, were welcomed; and in 1929 a BBC memorandum to the Colonial Office 
sought government action, having ‗described the limited existing broadcasting 
facilities‘ in Australia, Canada, Ceylon, East Africa, Hong Kong, India, New 
Zealand, Singapore and South Africa, and ‗the complete lack of facilities‘ in 
Colonial Africa, West Indies, Rhodesia and the remaining parts of the Empire 
(p.139). The memorandum spoke of the desire of the countries to see the service 
introduced and noted that, given the growth of external services of other countries, 
it was ‗not impossible to conceive of a situation in which deliberate recourse to 
propaganda might become desirable‘ (cited in Briggs, 1985, p.139). 
 
Still the government did not show keen interest, and so the BBC in November 
1931 declared its intention to do it on its own. The Empire was divided into five 
zones—Australia, Canada, India, South Africa and West Africa—with each zone 
being served by directional aerials opened in December 1932 and the programmes 
beamed to them, in addition to six omni-directional aerials designed for 
transmitting special programmes to listeners around the world (Briggs, 1985). 
Programming was not costing the corporation much as most of the items were 
already prepared for the domestic audiences. The news bulletins which ‗seem to be 
the most generally appreciated items in the daily programme‘ proved easier to run 
as the Empire Press Union, with the cooperation of Reuters and Newspaper 
Proprietors‘ Association, had agreed to the corporation‘s daily bulletin plan 
(p.140). The first week‘s programme cost only ten pounds, and when the Empire 
Service was given a weekly allocation of £100 after the success of the King‘s 
Christmas broadcast, the move was seen as ‗daring‘ (p.140). King George V‘s 
broadcast in 1932, less than a week after the service‘s inaugural broadcast, was the 
first ever Christmas day broadcast (Mytton, 1993). ‗Through one of the marvels of 
modern science, I am enabled this Christmas day to speak to all my peoples 
throughout the Empire,‘ the monarch declared. ‗I speak now from my home and 
from my heart to you all, to men and women so cut off by the snows and the 
deserts or the seas that only voices out of the air can reach them‘ (cited in Mytton, 
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1993, p.2). The event was seen as a major milestone in BBC‘s international 
broadcast. ‗It was the most spectacular success in BBC history thus far,‘ Reith 
(1949, p.169) remarked in his book Into the Wind. ‗The King had been heard all 
over the world with surprising clarity‘. 
 
Although the Empire broadcasting began on Reith‘s personal initiatives, the 
imperial interest was clear from the onset. Cecil Graves, the first director of the 
service, used to consult high commissioners and heads of government departments 
concerned with Empire work ‗before constructing any Empire programmes‘ 
(Briggs, 1985, p.140). He and his deputy, J. B. Clark, shared intense ‗sense of 
imperial interest‘ with Reith which ‗was enlivened in the mid-1930s by the fear 
that the unity of the Empire was being threatened, not so much by the natural 
development of movements towards self-government inside it as by the 
machinations of other great powers‘ (p.140). The Germans and Italians were then 
expanding and intensifying their international broadcasts, and the BBC responded 
by expanding hers too. Rex Leeper, head of the Foreign Office News Department, 
spoke of political and cultural ‗projection‘ of Britain abroad and in 1936 said: ‗We 
must concentrate not only on our own rearmament, but on bringing other nations 
by our side‘ (cited in Briggs, 1985, p.140). Clark was later to succeed Graves as 
the director of the Empire Service, and it was he who oversaw its expansion and 
transformation into Overseas Service in 1939—it became General Overseas 
Service in 1943 (BBC, 2007) and later External Services (Browne, 1982). 
Significantly, Clark played an important role in setting up the first language 
service, the BBC Arabic Service, in 1938. 
 
If there was any ambivalence on the Foreign Office‘s interest in BBC‘s overseas 
broadcasting, the circumstances that led to the emergence of the BBC Arabic 
Service had erased it. The corporation that began the Empire Service initially on 
its own after failing to get government funding was now being persuaded by the 
same government to introduce a foreign language service to be funded by the 
government. Significantly too, the BBC that was as late as March 1937 opposed to 
the idea of a non-English language service, stressing in a report that ‗to introduce 
foreign language into the Empire Service would…inevitably prejudice the 
integrity of the service‘ (cited in Briggs, 1985, pp.138-139), was now, barely few 
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months after that declaration, willing to start one. The threat of the Second World 
War and the need to advance British influence in the Arab world were the key 
factors that prompted such a quick and radical turn. Starting ‗a short-wave BBC 
radio service in Arabic was clearly related to British foreign policies, not least in 
response to the Italian and German state broadcasters having done the same before 
the BBC caught up on January 3 1938,‘ Issawi and Baumann (2010, p.137) 
observed. The Italians were broadcasting to the volatile Arab world from Bari in 
southern Italy; and when the Foreign Office personnel surveyed the situation, they 
felt that a counter service should be put in place. A good share of the Middle East 
was still ‗under some form of British rule‘ at that time, and bombarding them with 
propaganda from Radio Bari was clearly a threat to British interests (Browne, 
1982, p.161). So in October 1937 it was announced in the British House of 
Commons that the Arabic Service would be launched. ‗At first the Foreign Office 
did not contemplate leaving it to the BBC, which was not represented at a crucial 
meeting in September 1937 of a Cabinet Committee on Arabic broadcasting 
presided over by Sir Kingsley Wood…Minister of Health‘ (Briggs, 1985, p.141). 
But after different options were considered and the choice narrowed to BBC, the 
corporation‘s leadership was invited to the committee‘s meeting a month later. At 
the meeting ‗Reith, Ashbridge, and Graves (along with the then Chairman of the 
Governors, R. C. Norman) expressed the BBC‘s willingness to undertake Latin 
American and Arabic broadcasts, ―but in its own way‖‘ (p.141).  
  
This, from the onset, was their expression of how the service would carry out the 
conflicting roles of providing impartial news and promoting the imperial interests 
of the now threatened British Empire. This inherent conflict, and the one between 
the Foreign Office and the BBC, was to emerge on the very day of the Arabic 
Service‘s first broadcast. Launched by a son of the King of Yemen in a big 
ceremony attended by many Arab diplomats, the Arabic Service was ‗aimed at a 
target audience of nearly 40 million people,‘ Briggs (1985, p.142) reported. What 
made the first broadcast important in underlining the tension, and the inherent 
contradiction, was the inclusion of a news item announcing the execution of a 
Palestinian on the orders of a British military court. ‗Another Arab of Palestine 
was executed by hanging at Acre this morning by order of a military court. He was 
arrested during recent riots in the Hebron Mountains and was found to possess a 
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rifle and ammunition,‘ said the third news item of the station‘s first bulletin on 3 
January 1938 (cited in Issawi and Baumann, 2010, p.138). The news provoked 
angry reactions from both the Arab world and the Foreign Office. The King of 
Saudi Arabia reportedly wept at the news and an Iraqi newspaper condemned it as 
lacking in ‗taste‘ (BBC, 2007). Head of Foreign Office News Department Alex 
Leeper wrote a letter to the BBC, complaining that broadcasting such a story was 
unnecessary. ‗Is the BBC to broadcast to the Empire the execution of every Arab 
in Palestine… It seems to me unnecessary, though I suspect it gives its conscience 
a warm glow‘ (cited in BBC, 2007). The BBC responded in a manner that later 
became its standard response to such kind of pressure. ‗The omission of 
unwelcome facts of news and the consequent suppression of truth run counter to 
the corporation‘s policy,‘ Empire Service director Clark stated in a guidance note 
to a sub-editor in the Arabic Service (cited in Issawi and Baumann, 2010, p.138). 
The incident was seen as a major triumph for the corporation as it had 
demonstrated to the Foreign Office—it was still called Foreign Office at that time 
before it was renamed Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 1968 
(Sreberny, 2010a)—its ability to do things ‗in its own way‘, and laid the ground 
for winning the confidence of listeners (Briggs, 1985). But this was just the 
beginning of a series of pressures it was later to face, and the transformation it was 
to undergo, as the Second World War loomed.  
 
Barely three months after the introduction of the Arabic Service in 1938, two new 
language services, the Spanish and Portuguese programmes for Latin America, 
were launched on 15 March 1938 following the realisation that the region was 
‗just as vulnerable to outside pressure as the Middle East‘ (Briggs, 1985, p.143). 
European services—German, French and Italian—were also introduced, 
government grant was increased and more high-powered short-wave transmitters 
were built (Briggs, 1985). Chamberlain Government‘s policy of appeasement was 
still being reflected in both the domestic and overseas broadcasts. Reith was 
persuaded, against his wish, by the prime minister to resign (Briggs, 1985, p.145) 
and was replaced in 1938 by Frederick Ogilvie, a former Conservative Member of 
Parliament who reportedly deferred more to government than Reith had ever done 
(Seaton, 1997a). In 1939, the BBC ‗was protecting the Foreign Office, and passing 
off Foreign Office demands as its own policy,‘ noted Seaton (1997a, p.122). As 
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the war began, the policy of appeasement ceased and the Foreign Office‘s 
demands increased. Barely a fortnight into the war, British diplomats in the Near- 
and Middle-East wrote to the editor of the BBC Arabic Service, asking the station 
to adopt ‗extreme measures of anti-German (or anti-Axis) propaganda‘ (BBC 
Written Archives cited in Issawi and Baumann, 2010, p.139). However, the 
response of the director general, quoted from the same source, was that ‗our 
Arabic bulletins are, as you are aware, already extremely forceful. They are based 
on emphasis on the might and unity of the British Empire and France, day to day 
Arab reaction which is so far entirely favourable, condemnation of Germany‘s war 
methods and reasonably objective communiqués on the fighting‘ (cited in Issawi 
and Baumann, 2010, p.139). The BBC was trying to walk the tightrope of 
maintaining a balance between peddling propaganda and providing reasonably 
objective news service, Issawi and Baumann (2010, p.139) observed.  
 
The fall of France in June 1940 and the beginning of air raids against Britain, 
however, marked a turning point in both the war and the BBC‘s broadcasts. There 
was the feeling that German propaganda facilitated Germany‘s success against 
France, and British officials felt that the BBC needed to do something urgent—it 
was, after all, seen as the ‗voice of Britain‘ (Seaton, 1997b, p.141). The 
corporation was goaded into action to counter the Axis-propaganda. ‗While ―an 
unlimited supply‖ of talks and features on record was sent to different parts of the 
Empire, a number of exile governments were given free access to BBC 
microphones – the Dutch Radio Orange being the first‘ (Briggs, 1985, p.188). 
French exiles too were running Ici la France. ‗It is important to keep General de 
Gaulle active in French on the broadcast,‘ Churchill said, ‗and to relay by every 
possible means the French propaganda on Africa‘ (cited in Briggs, 1985, p.189). 
In the first of the series of his broadcasts to rally the French against Nazi 
Germany, General de Gaulle on 18 June 1940 said: ‗Whatever happens, the flame 
of French resistance must not and will not be extinguished‘ (cited in Tran and 
Davies, 2010). He later expressed his appreciation of the BBC‘s gesture, stating in 
his memoirs that ‗the British, among other merits, had that of immediately 
discerning, and of using in masterly fashion, the effect which a free radio was 
capable of producing upon imprisoned peoples‘ (cited in Briggs, 1985, p.190). It 
was a relationship that the BBC equally cherished: it held a big celebration on 18 
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June 2010 to mark the 70
th
 anniversary of General de Gaulle‘s first broadcast—a 
celebration attended by both British Prime Minister David Cameron and French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy who also expressed gratitude for the British war effort 
(Tran and Davies, 2010).  
 
Apart from giving the exiles opportunity to air their campaigns during the war, the 
British perspective too was significantly maintained. Churchill‘s speeches as 
prime minister were regularly broadcast, even though he had earlier claimed that 
propaganda had limited effects (Briggs, 1985). He was reported in November 1939 
to have reacted to German propaganda by saying: ‗If words could kill, we would 
be dead already‘ (cited in Briggs, 1985, p.196). Yet he became a key player in 
using propaganda to prosecute the war. ‗Churchill was of course an expert 
propagandist, and the government, whatever it said in public, remained desperately 
concerned with the public mood throughout the war,‘ argued Seaton (1997b, 
p.138). And as Britain‘s war prospects looked bleak before America‘s 
involvement in the war, the BBC‘s war efforts increased dramatically in 1940 and 
1941 with greater attention being put on external services and special programmes 
designed for North America aimed at persuading the United States to join the war. 
It devoted ‗seven and a half hours of daily broadcasts to the USA at a time before 
it had entered the war,‘ Chignell (2008) observed. The motive was disclosed in the 
BBC Handbook of 1942. ‗All night long the BBC studios are filled with people 
scorning sleep in order to broadcast to North America,‘ it stated, ‗they know that 
they are doing something to further the cause of Anglo-American understanding, 
on which the future of the world depends‘ (cited in Chignell, 2008). 
  
One other remarkable issue related to BBC‘s role during the war was the 
controversial introduction in 1941 of a V sign by Victor de Laveleye, the BBC‘s 
Belgian Programme Organiser, to signify victory in support of the Resistance 
movements in the occupied territories. The campaign was received warmly by 
many Dutch, French, Belgians and Scandinavians; but was later discouraged as it 
might lead to ‗premature revolts‘ (Briggs, 1985, p.196; Seaton, 1997b). ‗Yet the V 
campaign worried (German propaganda chief Paul Josef) Goebbels, who 
complained about ―the intellectual invasion of the continent by British radio‖, and 
it persuaded Churchill (seldom a believer in words without deeds) to send a 
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message to Europe on 19 July 1941 that ―The V sign is the symbol of the 
unconquerable will of the people of the occupied territories and a portent of the 
fate awaiting the Nazi tyranny‖‘ (Briggs, 1985, p.197). The expansion of BBC 
continued steadily during the war to such an extent that the number of its staff 
jumped from 4,889 in September 1939 to over 10,000 in December 1941 (Briggs, 
1985). ‗By the time Germany was defeated in 1945, the BBC was broadcasting in 
45 languages and was the biggest international broadcasting organisation in the 
world‘ (BBC, 2007). 
 
Cold War BBC 
The victory of the Allied powers in the war relieved the BBC of the intense 
propaganda burden, and the broadcasting expansion programme came to an end. 
‗With the end of the war, a whole phase of broadcasting, we may hope, has come 
to an end,‘ proclaimed the BBC Year Book of 1946, ‗that phase, in which 
deliberately false and misleading propaganda has been loosed upon the world with 
the express purpose of enslaving public opinion, and causing strife among nations‘ 
(p.7). The BBC was blaming the Axis side for the propaganda, saying: 
‗Broadcasting in Germany was consciously used to mutilate the soul of the 
German people‘ (p.7). And since it was over on that side, it was also over on the 
Allied side, the statement suggested, as the contraction began. The number of BBC 
staff was cut and the total hours of broadcasts to Europe reduced. The emphasis 
was no longer on the kind of broadcasts that characterised the war coverage, noted 
Briggs (1985); it was now on ‗talking to Europe about ourselves, our 
characteristics and our institutions, so that our listeners can understand us better‘ 
(p.312). The Cold War that followed presented a different scenario and the BBC 
began to remodel itself to suit the new situation. The main opponents now were 
not the fascists and Nazi Germany; they were the communist Soviet Union and its 
allies in the Warsaw Pact as well as other communist nations and movements 
springing up in different parts of the world. The ideological warfare was mainly 
between capitalism and communism/socialism (Browne, 1982). BBC‘s broadcasts 
in Russian targeting the Soviet Union began in March 1946 and by 1949 the 
Russians reportedly started jamming the station, as it had been doing to the Voice 
of America‘s broadcasts (Briggs, 1985, p.313). 
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Before the Cold War took off firmly the BBC was still downsizing its external 
services and funding was being cut. Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell, 
who later became Labour Party‘s leader, had even contemplated a 20 per cent cut, 
but the then BBC Director General Ian Jacob described the move as ‗the height of 
folly in the present international situation‘ (cited in Briggs, 1985, p.315). At that 
time the international competitors were reported to be increasing their 
broadcasting activities. ‗The Voice of America booms,‘ Daily Mail declared in 
March 1951, ‗the Voice of Stalin roars, the Voice of Britain must whisper‘ (cited 
in Briggs, 1985, p.315). The BBC then responded fully to the Cold War situation 
performing its role of news coverage and enhancing British public diplomacy 
efforts, prompting (as noted earlier) Harvard academic Joseph Nye (2004a) to 
describe it as an ‗important soft power resource for the UK in Eastern Europe 
during the Cold War‘ (p.90).  
 
The intrusive government interventions witnessed during the war had gone; but, as 
Peter Goodwin (2005) noted, subtle pressure continued as seen, for instance, in the 
case of Hydrogen Bomb debate programme in 1954 that the government blocked 
the BBC from running and in the case of Eden Government‘s pressure on the BBC 
over its reporting of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Conservative Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden was displeased with the BBC‘s coverage of the crisis emanating 
from the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on the Suez Canal (Browne, 1982) following 
the nationalisation of the Anglo-French-owned canal by Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdul Nasser. The government put much pressure on the BBC to mellow down. 
Browne (1982) noted that the prime minister was ‗deeply displeased‘ with the 
BBC‘s coverage, and ‗one high-ranking BBC staff member subsequently claimed 
that Eden had plans to take over BBC for the duration of the conflict‘ (pp.163-
165). That did not happen, though. The corporation withstood the pressure and 
became even-handed in the coverage of the crisis both on its domestic and on 
external services mainly because the government and the official opposition were 
divided on the matter (Goodwin, 2005). Opposition leader Hugh Gaitskell 
campaigned openly against the government over the crisis. ‗In the end the BBC 
came through the Suez Crisis with its reputation for independence from the 
Government if anything enhanced,‘ Goodwin (2005, p.113) asserted. 
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Within the British Empire itself the liberation movements in the colonies had 
emerged stronger after the Second World War, and there was very little the 
weakened Empire, smarting from the devastation of the war, could do to suppress 
them. New strategies had to be employed to plan a gradual physical exit from the 
colonies while still retaining a grip on them. The Empire Service—or Overseas 
Service in 1939, General Overseas Service in 1943 and World Service in 1965 
(BBC, 2007)—has (with its combined English and other languages‘ services) since 
become BBC External Services [renamed BBC World Service in 1988 (Mytton, 
1988)]. The British Empire itself has become the Commonwealth (Ladele et al., 
1979). The transformations explain the strategy of exporting British broadcasting 
model—ideological, structural and technological—to the colonies as well as 
targeting their populations as audiences of the BBC‘s international broadcasts.  
 
The case of British colonies in Africa was a good example of this strategy, which 
was essentially an extension of what had long begun. ‗Many a British colony made 
its first contact with broadcasting through the British Broadcasting Corporation‘, 
and their broadcasting systems were modelled after that of Britain (Ladele et al., 
1979, p.4). The Empire Service, as stated before, had been broadcasting to the 
colonies since 1932. The big leap came in 1936 when, following the threats of 
German international broadcasts, the Colonial Office set up Earl of Plymouth 
Committee to ‗accelerate the provision of broadcasting services in the Colonial 
Empire, to coordinate such services with the work of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, and to make them more effective instrument for promoting both local 
and Imperial interests‘ (cited in Ladele et al., 1979, pp.12-13). This led to the 
expansion of British broadcasting interests in the colonies. Those territories that 
had not begun wireless broadcasting were urged to start it; and those with it, such 
as Kenya, ‗the first colonial territory‘ to begin wireless broadcasting service in 
1928, were encouraged to expand theirs (Ladele et al., 1979, pp.13-14). 
 
Similarly, in 1949 the BBC, following a request from the Colonial Office in 
November 1948, commissioned a survey under Turner-Byron Committee to study 
the state of broadcasting in the then British-controlled West African countries of 
Nigeria, Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra Leone and The Gambia (Ladele et al., 1979). 
The committee made recommendations on how to speed up the development of 
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broadcasting in these countries. The Colonial Office forwarded the 
recommendations to the respective countries, and offered them technical and 
financial assistance to help in their implementation. The Colonial Office, for 
instance, offered to release £390,000 from ‗the general reserve‘ to help Nigeria 
meet the estimated £978,000 capital and recurrent expenditures required to 
implement the recommendation in the country—lack of funds in the colony 
prevented full implementation, though (Ladele et al., 1979, p.20). The BBC on its 
part provided technical and managerial assistance, including releasing one of its 
senior staff, former controller of BBC Light Entertainment Programme and war 
time head of presentation Tom Chalmers, to head the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC, 2007). All these were going on at the time when the BBC was 
equally trying to expand its international broadcasts to these countries. Part of this 
effort was the introduction of a West African language service: the BBC Hausa 
Service. 
 
BBC Hausa Service 
BBC Hausa Service was launched on 13 March 1957 as part of the Colonial 
Office‘s new initiative for Africa (Browne, 1982; Briggs, 1985). With colonialism 
coming to an end in virtually all parts of the continent, Britain was reassessing its 
role in Africa and emphasising the issue of Commonwealth. The BBC was now 
paying ‗particular attention‘ to the Commonwealth interests ‗by providing certain 
territories with programmes more closely designed to appeal to special local 
interests,‘ according to its Handbook of 1958. West Africa, it continued, was now 
being served with both the English and Hausa language programmes. Beyond the 
openly declared reasons, however, the decision to introduce the Hausa Service 
could also be explained by the Britain‘s desire to maintain its influence in the 
region beyond the colonial era. As stated in the preceding ‗Historical Context‘ 
chapter, Britain was apprehensive of the region‘s susceptibility to Moscow‘s and 
Cairo‘s influence, part of the key reasons why some colonial officials even 
opposed—though in vain—the establishment of wireless broadcasting system in 
Nigeria (Larkin, 2008). The spread of wireless broadcasting had been making 
available to Africans ‗information outside the imperial circuit of the British 
Empire‘ and they were seen as becoming potentially vulnerable to broadcasts from 
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‗Russia, Egypt, and other challengers to British power‘ (Larkin, 2008, p.67). 
Britain had also long been uncomfortable with the kind of radicalisation that swept 
its other important West African territory of Gold Coast (Ghana), prompting it to 
be taking conscious and deliberate approach in handling Nigeria‘s move towards 
independence more carefully to avoid being ‗overtaken by events‘ (Williams, 
1984, p.347).   
 
The choice of Hausa language was perhaps necessitated by the strategic 
importance of that language, the size and spread of its speakers and the ideological 
motive of the broadcaster. ‗Hausa is a major world language with more first-
language speakers than any other sub-Saharan African language…most of whom 
live in northern Nigeria and in southern areas of the neighbouring Republic of 
Niger, where Hausa represents the majority language‘ (Jaggar, 2001, p.1). Jaggar 
equally argued that Hausa ‗is the most important and widespread West African 
language, rivalled only by Swahili as an African lingua franca, and has expanded 
rapidly as a first or second language‘ (p.1). It ‗is also spoken by diaspora 
communities of traders, Muslim scholars and immigrants in urban areas of West 
Africa‘, such as in Benin Republic, ‗Burkina Faso, Cameroon, (northern) Ghana 
and Togo, as well as the Blue Nile Province and western regions of Sudan‘ (p.1)—
and so broadcasting in it was the best way of reaching its speakers, as one of the 
BBC officials admitted (Shosanya, 2011). Significantly, majority of Hausa 
speakers are Muslims who have great affinity to the Arab world [they were, as 
noted earlier, already showing interests in broadcasts from Cairo (Larkin, 2008)], 
and in the continuous quest for a share of their loyalty, the decision to broadcast 
directly to them using the language they understand well seemed logical.  
  
The first BBC Hausa Service programme began with a 15-minute evening 
broadcast, comprising news bulletin (read by a Northern Nigerian living in 
London Aminu Malumfashi), a talk West Africa in the News (translated and read 
by another Northern Nigerian Abubakar Tunau) and an item on Ghana‘s 
Independence (read by Zakari Muhammed) (Gumel, 2007). The three were all 
Hausa-speaking students in the UK; and the 15-minute programme was initially 
only broadcast twice a week—Wednesdays and Fridays—before it became a daily 
programme in 1958, transmitted both in the afternoons and evenings by full-time 
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staff. After Nigeria‘s independence in 1960 ‗detailed plans for the expansion of the 
service were drawn and in May 1962 the first dawn transmission was also 
introduced and the afternoon transmission was in addition extended by 15 
minutes,‘ wrote Babandi Gumel (2007), a former long-serving staff of the station. 
The target audiences are obviously the Hausa-speakers that (as stated above) 
constitute the largest population in Nigeria and Niger Republic (a former French 
colony) and substantial number of people in Ghana, Sudan and Cameroon and a 
few other African countries. 
 
The Hausa language service was soon followed by two other sub-Saharan African 
language services—Swahili (on 27 June 1957) and Somali (18 July 1957)—for 
Central and East Africa (BBC, 1958). This came just few weeks before seven 
existing services targeting mainly West Europeans were closed. Norwegian, 
Swedish, Danish, Dutch, Portuguese (for Europe), German (for Austria) and 
Afrikaan language services were all closed between August and September of 
1957 (Briggs, 1985). The move further confirmed BBC‘s shift away from Western 
Europe to first Eastern Europe, as noted earlier, and then the developing countries 
of Asia and Africa where it felt its services might have more impact on the 
audiences. A ‗new relay station at Ascension Island aided a big expansion in 
services to Africa, both in English and in local languages,‘ the corporation stated. 
‗This came at a time when Britain wanted to maintain friendly links with its 
former colonies… There were also efforts to appeal to French-speaking Africa, 
with a daily bulletin in French for Africa introduced in June 1960‘ (BBC, 2007). 
 
From the onset the Hausa Service programmes were mainly comprised of 
international news and current affairs, news of local interests to the target 
audiences, interviews with local leaders and features on women, health, education 
and agriculture or on any topical issue deemed relevant to Hausa speakers. Young 
western-educated Hausa elite who were later to play prominent roles in Nigeria‘s 
political and economic development were featuring in various programmes either 
as broadcasters or as contributors. Among the then young Hausa men who worked 
in the early days of the service were Alhaji Umaru Dikko who became Nigeria‘s 
transport minister in the Second Republic (1979-1983), late Abubakar Rimi who 
became the governor of Kano State in the same period, former communications 
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minister late Dr Ibrahim Tahir, Ambassador Shehu Malami, a descendant of 
Usman dan Fodio and first Nigeria‘s high commissioner to South Africa (Malami, 
2010), and a leading Nigerian banker Umaru Mutallab, who is also incidentally the 
father of Umar Faruk Mutallab, the suspected Christmas Eve underwear bomber, 
now on trial in US on terrorism charges (Childress, 2009). Mutallab had several 
months earlier alerted the US and Nigerian intelligence agencies of the suspicious 
movements of his son but the agencies failed to act until he was arrested in 
December 2009 over alleged attempt to bomb a Detroit-bound US airline 
(Childress, 2009). The BBC Hausa Service‘s ability to attract the elite, and 
emerging elite, to be both participants in its programmes and listeners of them was 
an important strategy of exercising influence in the region. 
 
Since the Hausa programming was meant to attract both the elite and the general 
public in the target area, content selection was done to reflect that, with global and 
West African news and current affairs as well as developments in Nigeria and 
Britain getting prominence. Gumel recalled that he once ran a 200-week long 
feature series on world affairs Duniya Ina Muka Dosa (The Global Trends) in the 
early 1980s that discussed the historical, geographical and political backgrounds of 
each country in the world. British writer Jean Boyd initiated another programme 
Nana Asma‘u, presented by Yusuf Muhammed Kankiya, on the life of Islamic 
female scholar Nana Asma‘u, daughter of the Sokoto Caliphate founder Usman 
dan Fodio (Gumel, 2007). There were also entertainment-cum-promotional 
programmes, such as Dan Arewa a London (Life of a Northern Nigerian in 
London), portraying the cultural contrast between Northern Nigeria and Britain. 
 
All these, coupled with the radio listening culture developed among the Hausa 
people since the early days of radio broadcast (Abdulkadir, 2000; Larkin, 2008), 
made Hausa Service very popular in Nigeria and Niger. Its impact expanded in 
terms of the rapid increases in audiences and their interests in international and 
local affairs. A BBC audience survey in 1993, for instance, found that the Hausa 
Service has an estimated weekly audience of 11.5 million in Nigeria where 93 per 
cent of the urban households owned a radio set at that time (Eggerman, 1996, cited 
in Abdulkadir, 2000). British academic Graham Furniss narrated his encounter 
with a Hausa-speaking barefooted farmer in a remote Nigeria-Cameroon border 
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area who fascinated him with discussions on the intrigues of Pakistani politics 
(Fardon and Furniss, 2000). The impact extends to Hausa language itself. ‗The 
long standing use of some African languages in international broadcasting has had 
a profound influence upon the spread of the language and its standardization and 
modernization,‘ Fardon and Furniss (2000, p.4) noted. 
 
BBC Hausa Service kept expanding, with more local contents being added, more 
full-time producers recruited and new stringers employed to file reports from 
Nigeria and Niger, and even a few from Europe (Gumel, 2007). Abba Abdullahi 
who later became the managing director of a Northern Nigerian newspaper 
Triumph, for example, was reporting for the station from Paris; as was Ahmed 
Yerima who sent regular reports from Moscow, particularly during the collapse of 
communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union. In the late 1990s the Hausa 
Service moved to expand the level of its delivery by going into partnership with a 
local private radio station in Nigeria, Ray Power, for relay and rebroadcast of its 
programmes through the local FM stations owned by the local partner. This was in 
addition to the existing short-wave broadcasts. But the partnership suffered a 
major setback in early 2000s when the Nigerian government banned local media 
from transmitting live news broadcasts from foreign stations, affecting the rapid 
rise of the BBC‘s audience figures (BBC World Service, 2004). ‗This ban affects 
BBC FM broadcasts, through its partner Ray Power, in the cities of Abuja, Jos, 
Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, and Port Harcourt,‘ the World Service said. ‗Approximately 
2.3 million adults listen to the BBC on Ray Power only and are the key group 
affected by the ban‘ (BBC World Service, 2004). The corporation later succeeded 
in signing partnership and rebroadcast agreements with some FM stations in the 
neighbouring Niger and Cameroon Republics. The ban remains in force in Nigeria, 
though. Still, further expansion on the range of broadcasts was made and audience 
figures began to increase. One of the highest figures recorded was in 2007 when 
the estimated weekly audience figure was put at about 26 million (BBC, 2008), 
making it the language service with the largest number of listeners in the World 
Service. It was a year after a new production and transmission centre was opened 
in the Nigeria‘s capital, Abuja, and the number of daily transmissions increased to 
four—two in the morning and one each for afternoon and evening programmes of 
30 minutes each (BBC World Service, 2008). 
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Rapid development and spread of communications technologies enabled BBC 
Hausa Service to further improve on its delivery system and reach in recent years. 
In addition to the existing short-wave and FM broadcasts on radio, the service is 
now effectively employing the new media of mobile telephony, Internet and social 
networking sites of Twitter and Facebook to deliver its services to millions of 
audiences. ‗BBC Hausa is now a multimedia broadcaster, using radio, online and 
mobile,‘ said the head of the service Jamilah Tangaza (2009). ‗To help us deliver 
the best for our audiences, we looked at how (the Internet and mobile telephone) 
were changing the way they live their lives and their increasingly sophisticated 
approach to media‘ and made use of them. This led to the introduction of the 
Hausa mobile news service Labarinku a Tafinku (Your News in Your Palms) that 
in turn led to the increase of the online audiences (Tangaza, 2009). 
  
BBC Network and Focus on Africa  
The BBC World Service programmes targeting sub-Saharan Africa are not limited 
to Hausa, Swahili and Somali services alone; there are also Kinyarwanda/Kirundi 
(introduced on 8 September 1994) which is partly in English, BBC Afrique (the 
French for Africa service that began on 20 June 1960, as noted above), Portuguese 
for Africa (since 4 June 1939 but was closed 2011 due to spending cuts) and 
African English service which runs the Network and Focus on Africa programmes. 
Administratively they are all placed under the Africa and Middle East Region 
which includes the Arabic Service that targets Arabic-speaking North Africa as 
part of its focus on the Arab world. The BBC, as stated earlier, mainly broadcasts 
to sub-Saharan Africa on the short-wave. ‗The transmitters used are situated in 
Seychelles, South Africa, Cyprus, Ascension Island and the UK‘ (Mytton, 2000). 
The broadcast range expanded through partnership and agreements with many 
independent local FM radio stations in several countries that relay BBC broadcasts 
to African audiences in good sound quality. Computer and telephony technologies, 
as noted above, led to further expansion and reach to audiences; and they also offer 
opportunities for wider participatory programmes in all the services (BBC, 2008). 
 
The African English service has a wider target of attempting to cover Africa as a 
whole, and has an average of five hours of programming daily (BBC World 
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Service, 2007). It runs the Network Africa programmes that are transmitted in the 
morning, the Focus on Africa programmes transmitted in the evening, Africa Have 
Your Say which is an interactive programme, and the Fast Track which is devoted 
to sports. The service tries to pride itself as being distinctively African with 
reporters spread across the continent and producers in both London and Nairobi 
flouting their African-ness. A one-time editor with the service, Elizabeth Ohene, 
criticised those who tended to see the service as solely a Western medium. ‗Just at 
the level of personnel, this is a simplification,‘ she said in 2000. ‗African Service 
currently has 141 reporters in 51 countries on the African continent… Of these 
141 reporters, I would think that (only) 16 might be described as foreign 
correspondents‘ (Ohene, 2000, p.78). She also maintained that advances in 
technology made ‗control of news from London less and less consequential‘ and 
the local content more significant. ‗Although our news will continue to carry the 
BBC brand name, not only will we get increasingly close to the ground but, so to 
speak, that ground will increasingly come to us‘ (p.79). 
 
The BBC‘s strategy of employing local reporters on the ground and combining 
various services to target Africa enhanced its supremacy in attracting audiences in 
the continent. Even in terms of English language listeners alone in the 1980s, the 
audiences in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zambia, as proportions of their 
populations, were the highest in the world (Mytton and Forrester, 1988). The 
situation remained the same in the 1990s. A BBC audience research in Ghana 
carried out in 1991, for instance, revealed that radio was the most popular medium 
and BBC was the best known international broadcaster (Sieger, 1993). Similarly, a 
survey conducted in 1991 to establish broadcast media penetration and audience 
size in Zambia showed that ‗radio is the main source of entertainment and news 
for the adult Zambian population‘, and that the BBC was among the foreign 
stations listened to by many Zambians (Claypole and Daka, 1993).  
 
The BBC‘s popularity in sub-Saharan Africa was often linked to both the colonial 
factor noted earlier and the lack of competition from local broadcasters, especially 
in the days of state monopoly of the broadcast media in the continent. But the 
liberalisation of the broadcast media in the 1990s did not diminish BBC‘s 
popularity per se: it even created new opportunity for the BBC to enter into 
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partnership and agreements with local FM stations and extend its broadcast range 
in many countries (BBC, 2008). Similarly, the colonial factor argument does not 
hold ground in the case of the former French colony of Niger where the BBC 
Hausa Service was seen as the most popular international broadcaster (BBC, 
2004), benefiting from the fact that Hausa is the biggest language in the country. 
This was how the strategy of glocalisation (Tomlinson, 1991) in terms of using 
multi-language services, opening of local production centres—as in the case of 
Nairobi (Kenya) for central Africa and Abuja (Nigeria) for West Africa—and the 
increase in local contents proved effective. The level of success is such that the 
BBC claimed in April 2003 that the impact of the World Service in countries like 
Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania was ‗as great as Radio 2 (Britain‘s most listened to 
station) in the UK‘ (cited in Aitken, 2007, p.14).  
 
The changing trends of the World Service 
Top of the four aims of the BBC World Service, according to its 2008 Annual 
Report, is to ‗be the world‘s best-known and most-respected voice in international 
news, thereby bringing benefit to the UK, the BBC and to audiences around the 
world‘. The main points of the remaining three aims—to provide the most trusted 
and relevant international news and analysis, facilitate global conversation and 
‗enable people make sense of their increasingly complex world‘ (BBC, 2008)—are 
all supportive of the premier one. Striving to achieve them in a rapidly changing 
global environment presents a new challenge radically different from the ones 
previously faced by the corporation. But then, from its roles in the Empire days 
through to war years and Cold War era to the ones in the present post-September 
11 world, the BBC‘s functions have never been static. Whether as a provider of 
‗impartial‘ international news or as a ‗mediator of British diplomatic relations‘ 
(Sreberny et al., 2010b, p.279), the World Service has managed to maintain its 
relevance throughout those periods, delivering its services through diverse forms 
of distribution technologies.  
 
Its relationship with its paymaster, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, has 
also been dynamic all through those years. It ranges, in Sreberny‘s words, ‗from a 
tighter relationship of propagandistic direction, especially at times of war and 
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political conflict, to a much looser relationship of mutual understanding as to the 
BBC‘s role as ―public diplomat‖‘; and from a tighter control through censorship to 
a subtle control ‗by financial reward or punishment‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010b, 
p.279). One of the most notable changes seen in such relationship in recent years, 
as Sreberny et al. (2010b) rightly pointed out, was the government‘s decision 
during the 2004 Spending Review Settlement to place the World Service under 
Public Diplomacy category, openly acknowledging the public diplomacy role of 
the service. Lord Carter‘s UK Public Diplomacy Review Team made this clear:  
         The UK benefits from the existence of two World-Class institutions with 
strong brands, the British Council and the BBC World Service, and the 
Review Team recognised the valuable role they play, and the importance of 
appropriate editorial and managerial independence… Public diplomacy 
funded by tax payers must support Government goals and objectives, and 
public diplomacy partners must prove themselves able and willing to work 
collaboratively within an agreed strategic framework.  
                                                                                                 (FCO, 2005, p.4)  
  
 
The World Service, the review noted, was the largest receiver of public diplomacy 
funding in the 2004/05 budget, getting £225 million out of the £617 million 
expended that year (FCO, 2005, p.6). Although the director of the World Service 
has only observer status on the Public Diplomacy Board and both the BBC and 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office have insisted that the corporation‘s editorial 
independence is guaranteed by the Royal Charter, its placement on that category 
has a telling effect on its standing (Sreberny et al., 2010b), as does, of course, the 
fact of its funding source and purpose.   
 
Since the 2004 Spending Review Settlement came into effect, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office had ensured a steady increase in the funding of the BBC 
World Service mainly to increase Britain‘s public diplomacy efforts in the Middle 
East—the introduction of the BBC Arabic and Persian television services in 2008 
and 2009 respectively (BBC, 2008; Sreberny et al., 2010a) being the key projects 
(more on this later). The rise in the funding of the World Service was reflected in 
the annual budgetary allocation to it. For instance, the government‘s grant-in-aid 
to the World Service was increased from £225 million in 2004/05 noted earlier to 
£239.5 million in 2006/07 and then to £255 million in 2007/08 (BBC, 2008). The 
amount jumped to its peak of £272 million in 2009/10 (Hiller, 2010b) before 
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Britain‘s debt and deficit crisis forced spending cuts that saw the allocation to it 
for the year 2010/11 first brought down to £261 million and then followed by an 
even more radical change introduced in the 2010 Spending Review Settlement 
(Robinson and Sweney, 2010; Thompson, 2011).  
 
Perhaps the most significant change in government‘s relationship with the BBC in 
recent years, the 2010 Spending Review Settlement did not only cut spending for 
the World Service, it attempted to fundamentally alter its funding arrangement.  
Under the settlement the government resolved to transfer the funding 
responsibility of the BBC World Service from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office to the BBC‘s licence fee with effect from 2014 (Robinson and Sweney, 
2010; Foster, 2010; Thompson, 2011). The agreement, reached on 19 October 
2010, stipulated that the BBC should from its licence fee bear an estimated annual 
cost of £340 million to fund the BBC World Service, the BBC monitoring 
department and the high-speed broadband roll out, and part-fund the Welsh 
language service channel S4C (Robinson and Sweney, 2010; Foster, 2010). The 
deal, endorsed by the Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt and BBC Director General 
Mark Thompson, was reached after what the culture secretary described as ‗the 
fastest negotiation in the corporation‘s 83-year history‘, as the corporation was 
also slammed with an unprecedented 16 per cent funding cut over a period of four 
years (Foster, 2010, p.6). The then chairman of the BBC Trust Sir Michael Lyons 
said although the settlement was ‗tough‘, it guaranteed what he called ‗certainty 
and stability‘ (Lyons, 2010). 
 
However, subsequent happenings showed that Sir Michael‘s optimism was 
perhaps premature.  First, the spending cuts compelled the World Service to 
consider reducing the number of its language services, cutting its staff strength and 
restructuring its offices and operations. On 26 January 2011 the BBC announced 
the closure of five language services (Albanian, Macedonian, Serbian, Portuguese 
for Africa and English for the Caribbean), with an estimated 30 million fall in the 
global audience (BBC News, 2011). ‗Today will be a painful day for the BBC and 
for the millions of people around the globe who value the World Service,‘ Director 
General Mark Thompson (2011) said as he announced ‗a series of cuts that have 
been made necessary by last autumn‘s Comprehensive Spending Review‘. Apart 
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from the closure of the five foreign language services ‗in their entirety‘, the BBC 
also announced ‗the reduction of others to a web presence alone, as well as 
significant cuts to the English language radio service – both reductions in 
programmes and in distribution‘ (Thompson, 2011). It planned to also slash ‗650 
jobs from a workforce of 2,400 over the next three years‘ to save £46m a year 
(BBC News, 2011).  
 
The announcement generated adverse reactions and prompted the House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee to launch an investigation, which found that 
the decisions to both cut and transfer the funding of the World Service would be 
harmful to UK‘s interests (FACOM, 2011; Burrell, 2011). In its 90-page report 
released on 13 April 2011, the committee chaired by Conservative Member of 
Parliament Richard Ottaway said:  
      We believe that the BBC World Service is of such value to the nation that its 
income should be ring-fenced against spending cuts. The recent dramatic events 
in North Africa and the Middle East have shown that the ―soft power‖ wielded 
through the World Service is likely to bring even more benefits to the UK in the 
future than it has in the past, and that to proceed with the planned cuts to the 
World Service would be a false economy.  
                                                                                                       (FACOM, 2011, p.3)  
 
The committee warned that the transfer of funding responsibility to the licence fee 
could allow BBC senior managers to ‗raid‘ the World Service funding, jeopardise 
foreign languages‘ news services and weaken the ‗Parliament‘s right to oversee its 
work‘ (FACOM, 2011, p.8). The report was welcomed by the new chairman of the 
BBC Trust Lord Patten who promised to raise the issue with Foreign Secretary 
William Hague. ‗I know he (foreign secretary) regards the World Service as an 
important part of this country‘s soft power and I‘m sure that with goodwill and 
without megaphones we‘ll be able to sort it out,‘ Lord Patten declared (Wynne-
Jones, 2011). Whether they eventually ‗sort it out‘ or not, the issue has further 
highlighted the complexity of the BBC‘s relationship with the government, even 
when the two have no open confrontation over editorial matters—which usually 
tends to be the source of dispute. Since the release of the 2003/04 Hutton Inquiry 
which censured the BBC following the corporation‘s broadcast of accusations in 
May 2003 that Tony Blair‘s Government had exaggerated Iraqi military capability 
to justify its involvement in war in Iraq (Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009; Hill and 
Alshaer, 2010) and the subsequent reorganisation of the corporation triggered by 
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the inquiry‘s report, relations between the BBC and the government have been 
fairly cordial.  
 
The concerns raised over the World Service‘s spending cuts were prompted by the 
fear that it might lose its influence at a time when global politics is also witnessing 
rapid changes. Even before the changes in North Africa and the Middle East began 
this year, the dynamics of the post-September 11 global geopolitics and the West‘s 
‗war on terror‘ have generally transformed the focus of international broadcasting 
(Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009). And the public diplomacy initiatives among the 
Western nations tend to concentrate on the battle for the ‗hearts and minds‘ of the 
Muslims (Pinkerton and Dodds, 2009; Thussu, 2005, p.274). The BBC is being 
shaped by these changes as it too has been part of the process of shaping them. In 
an era of touch technology and multimedia explosion, it faces the challenge of 
having to deliver on both its roles of providing international news service and of 
mediating British ‗digital diplomacy initiatives‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010b, p.280). 
Series of reports and happenings within the World Service showed the kind of 
strategies the corporation has been employing to face the challenge.  
 
The first major strategy is the use of new technologies by its various services to 
deliver their products. ‗Broadband technology and mobile communications are 
transforming audience behaviour in many markets,‘ Lord Carter‘s review team 
observed in 2005. ‗The BBC claims to be leading the way among international 
broadcasters in introducing greater interactivity and video content in key 
languages‘, it noted, ‗and online forums in which people can express their views 
are now an established feature of BBC websites in many languages‘ (FCO, 2005, 
p.27). Within the subsequent three years the corporation moved fast to further 
integrate both the new and existing technologies for the delivery of its services. By 
the year 2008 BBC World Service was available in about 154 cities ‗on FM, as 
well as via satellite, cable, podcasts, mobiles and online – in addition to short and 
medium wave‘ (BBC, 2008). By harnessing various services to deliver multimedia 
products, the BBC has succeeded in getting an estimated 241 million people using 
its international services weekly through the World Service radio, World News 
television, online and mobile offerings, according to its 2010 audience surveys 
(Hiller, 2010a). This is three million higher than a year earlier, even though the 
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short-wave audience figure has declined by about 20 million from its peak of 188 
million in 2009 (Hiller, 2010a, 2010b). BBC World Service Director Peter 
Horrocks admitted that the drop in the short-wave audiences was ‗dramatic‘, but 
maintained that the surveys also showed ‗the success of our multimedia strategy 
and investments for global audiences‘ (Hiller, 2010a, p.2). His predecessor, Nigel 
Chapman, had in 2008, following a report that showed the success of the World 
Service‘s multimedia approach, said ‗we demonstrated our ability to innovate 
while retaining the affection of audiences who have been loyal to us for a large 
part of our history‘ (BBC, 2008). 
     
It was, as noted earlier, the year the World Service launched the Arabic television 
channel in March which Chapman said was the ‗culmination of a four-year 
journey to secure funding and deliver a high-quality television service in a vital 
region of the world‘ (BBC, 2008). This was not the first time the BBC launched an 
Arabic television channel. It had had one in the mid-1990s as a joint project with 
the Saudis, but it collapsed following a BBC Panorama programme that criticised 
Saudi government (Hill and Alshaer, 2010). The current channel is solely the 
World Service project funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A year 
after its launch, a Persian television channel was also launched, targeting the same 
region and pursuing similar objectives. The two new channels came at a huge cost 
for both the World Service and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. First, they 
had to sacrifice ‗no less than ten other language services to regions that were now 
deemed to be ―democratic‖ and so neither any longer in need of BBC content nor 
any longer of interest to British foreign policy interests‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010a, 
p.130). The 10 language services sacrificed were Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, 
Greek, Hungarian, Kazakh, Polish, Slovak, Slovene and Thai which served 
Thailand that was later hit by political crisis ‗but lacked news feed from the BBC, 
an unfortunate consequence of the cuts‘ (p.130).  
 
The BBC Persian television which targets Farsi speakers mainly in Iran, but also 
in Afghanistan and Tajikistan and in diaspora, has lesser financial allocation, with 
an annual budget of £15 million (Usher, 2009). It was launched in London on 4 
January 2009 amid opposition from Iranian government officials who denounced 
it as an organ of ‗espionage and psychological warfare‘ (Ash, 2009). The Arabic 
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channel, however, costs the Foreign and Commonwealth Office an average of £25 
million annually (Martin, 2008). Still, this was far lower than what was spent at 
the launch of its main rivals, Al-Jazeera in 1996 with $90 million and Al-Arabiyya 
in 2003 with $300 million, by the Qatari and Saudi royal families respectively 
(Hill and Alshaer, 2010). Chapman believed that the BBC Arabic channel was a 
worthwhile project as it complements the ‗revamped radio and online services, 
enabling us to compete effectively as a trimedia broadcaster‘ (BBC, 2008). 
Significantly, the ‗new channel investigates the issues that dominate people‘s lives 
in the Middle East and wider Arab world, from regional politics to global 
economics, from conflict to climate change,‘ he said (BBC, 2008).  
 
However, Hill and Alshaer (2010) viewed these moves as being part of British 
public diplomacy strategies. Analysing specifically the Arabic channel‘s 
interactive programme ‗Point of Debate‘, they noted how the programme ‗has 
sought to encourage the form of questioning and debate that accords with the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office‘s public diplomacy objectives‘ (Hill and 
Alshaer, 2010, p.152). The issue they raised centres on the recurring debate about 
the contradictory context of the World Service‘s funding source and its claim of 
being an impartial provider of international news and analysis—a contradiction 
that both the corporation and its funding body consistently down play. They both 
insist that the BBC has a ‗complete editorial independence‘ (FCO, 2005. p.4). ‗We 
aim to be trusted for the accuracy, editorial independence and expertise of our 
journalism,‘ Chapman said. ‗We will cover hard-hitting stories without fear or 
favour to anyone‘ (Martin, 2008). But Hill and Alshaer (2010, p.153) maintained 
that the fact that it is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that funds the World 
Service ‗raised crucial questions about the degree to which it should be regarded 
as an instrument of foreign policy‘. Despite the claim of editorial independence, 
they argued, ‗the launch of the (Arabic) channel—and the freeing up of resources 
for it by the closure of other BBC services—suggests quite clear political 
concerns‘ (p.165). It is a feeling shared by many audiences in the Middle East who 
see the establishment of the Arabic channel as ‗a subcontracting of the public 
diplomacy side of the War on Terror to the more sophisticated Brits‘ following the 
failure of the American-sponsored Arabic language television Al-Hurra to make 
significant impact in the region (Jarrah cited in Hill and Alshaer, 2010, p.162). A 
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study earlier cited in the literature review here showed that Arab students had 
negative perceptions of the news credibility of both Al-Hurra and the other US-
sponsored Arabic language international broadcaster, Radio Sawa (El-Nawawy, 
2006).  
 
Whether the BBC‘s perceived reputation of credibility and impartiality would 
enable it to do what direct propaganda has failed to do in the Middle East is open 
to interrogation, but it is hard to divorce the BBC‘s focus on the Middle East in 
particular and the Muslim world in general from the renewed Western interests in 
them after the bombings of the New York twin-towers and Pentagon in the US on 
11 September 2001 and the subsequent US-led war on terror (Pinkerton and 
Dodds, 2009). The diversion of resources from other services to establish the 
Arabic and Persian television channels, the concentration of news coverage on 
happenings in the Muslim world and the remodelling of editorial perspective to 
accord prominence to stories that highlight Islam-West cultural divergence are 
clear testimonies to this.  
 
The expansion of the BBC Hausa Service which targets the mainly Muslim Hausa 
speakers in West Africa appears to be in line with this shift. One former staff of 
the service, Bala Muhammad, argued that the establishment of the service in the 
first instance was for propaganda purpose. ‗The British did not set up the Hausa 
Service out of philanthropy or because they loved the Hausas. It is for a 
propaganda purpose, pure and simple, especially targeted towards those peoples 
who have refused, despite colonialism, to change their worldview to that of the 
West,‘ he wrote in his weekly column in Nigeria‘s Weekly Trust (Muhammad, 
2010). The expansion saw the Hausa Service increasing the number of its 
transmissions from three to four per day in December 2006, the same period when 
it opened a big production centre in the Nigeria‘s capital, Abuja, where it now 
carries out its morning transmissions (BBC World Service, 2008). Although 
(unlike the Arabic and Persian services) the BBC Hausa Service does not have a 
television channel, it does, as noted earlier, employ new technologies of telephony 
and Internet to deliver its products to audiences. The short-wave radio transmission 
remains its main platform, but the online and mobile telephony services are 
expanding rapidly. The online audience figure reached 1.2 million in April 2010 
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and was projected to double in a year (Tangaza, 2010). The mobile phone 
approach, the head of Hausa Service noted, has a huge potential, given the fact that 
Nigeria was in 2009 described as the fastest growing mobile phone market in the 
world, with over 70 million subscribers and an annual growth of 8.5 million 
subscribers (Tangaza, 2009; Okonji, 2009).  
 
The Hausa Service has introduced an interactive programme that allows mobile 
phone users to send their stories and pictures to be used on the BBC Hausa web 
page, BBC Hausa.com, and on BBC Hausa Facebook, in addition to accessing 
BBC‘s content through their mobile phones. This has provided user-generated 
content for the station and increased its relationship with audiences, Tangaza 
stated. ‗It‘s a radical departure from how BBC Hausa has served its audience over 
many generations, but by tapping into how our audience wants to communicate we 
are making sure BBC Hausa remains a relevant and essential part of Nigerian life‘ 
(Tangaza, 2009). To further widen audience participation, the service in April 
2010 introduced a weekly interactive programme called Ra‘ayi Riga (Have Your 
Say) in which listeners reach the Hausa Service through phone calls, Skype, text 
messages, Facebook, Twitter and emails to air their views (BBC, 2010a). It is 
similar to the other services‘ audience participatory programmes, such as Africa 
English‘s Africa Have Your Say and the main World Service‘s World Have Your 
Say—all of which are geared towards achieving the BBC‘s ‗global conversation‘ 
objective or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office‘s ‗digital diplomacy 
initiatives‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010b, p.280). ‗Ra‘ayi Riga brings informed debate to 
our diverse and ever-growing audiences, making them part of the global 
conversation,‘ Tangaza noted.  ‗In doing so, it also empowers participants to make 
informed decisions on issues they find important‘ (BBC, 2010a). The online 
services too have been further improved in May 2010 with a new wide-face 
format, multimedia website offering BBC Hausa content in written text, audio and 
video while the mobile version allows mobile phone users to access the online text 
and audio content (BBC, 2010b). 
 
All these are coming out of the reorganisation that has been taking place in the 
World Service to make good use of new technologies and harmonise different 
services. Price et al. (2008, p.161) noted that the World Service ‗seems to have 
 146 
multiplied its interactive practices and more solidly and consistently brought 
listeners into the process of contributing content—bringing old technologies into a 
new media environment‘. Former World Service director Nigel Chapman had 
earlier said that they had been working to modernise all the major language 
services, declaring that ‗we are focusing on multiple means of delivery, whether it 
be through increased FM relays, partner stations, streaming on the web, 
downloadable programmes or podcasts‘ (BBC, 2008). The BBC Arabic Service, 
for instance, is organised on multimedia lines, with its studios located in the new 
BBC News Centre with fully integrated digital radio, television and online 
production systems (BBC, 2008). The BBC News which had long been re-
organised on multimedia lines has streamlined its different platforms to ‗tear 
down‘ what the current World Service director called ‗fortress journalism‘ 
(Horrocks, 2009). This was part of the new drive where ‗all the resources of BBC 
journalism, in the UK‘s nations and regions and across the BBC World Service, 
are drawn together and leveraged for the benefit of all our audiences‘ (Horrocks, 
2009). Such cooperation enables domestic audiences to benefit from the 
programming materials the World Service gathered overseas and the international 
audiences to benefit from BBC‘s domestic materials. Even within the World 
Service, sharing of materials has proved useful for their respective audiences. 
Harmonisation and leveraging also offer mutual benefits to both the BBC‘s 
domestic and international services. It means that the BBC‘s home services, 
funded by the licence fee, would gain from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office-funded World Service and vice-versa. They have, of course, been working 
together since inception, but such corporation is being coordinated now in a more 
vigorous and systematic manner. ‗The BBC World Service has had, for example, 
the immense benefit of synergies with the BBC itself and the capacity to use the 
extraordinarily successful bbc.co.uk news portal,‘ Price et al. (2008, p.160) noted. 
‗It is not only new technologies themselves, but additional opportunities for cross-
promotion and branding, that have provided the World Service with new 
strategies‘ (p.160). Given that the BBC domestic service got £3.5 billion in 2009 
from the licence fee plus £1 billion generated by the commercially-oriented BBC 
Worldwide (Economist, 2010) and that the World Service has substantial diasporic 
cultural capital and wide reach (Sreberny et al., 2010a, 2010b), leveraging their 
services could enable the BBC to remain, at least for now, the mightiest public 
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service broadcaster in the world. Its biggest threats, however, may turn out to be 
the British declining global influence and its struggling economy.  
 
Different strokes: the case of an interview and episodes 
The relationship between the BBC and Nigeria has always been complex in both 
consumption and coverage. Nigeria, as stated earlier, is the largest radio market of 
the BBC World Service, despite a recent decline in the short-wave audience figures 
as indicated in the latest survey that shows a fall of 2.9 million in short-wave 
audiences but a jump of 1.2 million in online audiences (Tangaza, 2010). The 
consumption of BBC products is very high, and the impact considerable. The 
BBC‘s coverage of Nigeria, whether through the Hausa Service (with its large 
number of local reporters stationed in different parts of the country and a huge 
bureau in Abuja) or the BBC Africa English service (with its own set of reporters 
too) or the BBC World Service English (with the foreign correspondent stationed 
in Lagos and contributions from the local reporters) or the BBC online services or 
the occasional special assignments by teams sent from London, has also been 
massive. Because of this wide and multi-layered engagement, the coverage of 
Nigeria does occasionally generate controversies. Two recent incidents—The 
Yar‘adua Interview and Welcome to Lagos episodes—provide classic examples.  
 
The Yar‘adua Interview 
This was a telephone interview conducted by the BBC Hausa Service with the then 
ailing Nigerian President Umaru Yar‘adua while he was on his sickbed in Saudi 
Arabia. The president, who was suffering from both kidney and heart diseases, had 
fallen seriously ill on 23 November 2009 and was rushed to King Faisal Hospital 
in Jeddah. Either because of the seriousness of his sickness at the time of his 
departure or because he did not have much trust on his deputy or because the 
Nigerian constitution was not quite clear about it or a combination of them, 
Yar‘adua left without officially handing over to the then Vice President Goodluck 
Jonathan. Nigeria‘s constitutional provisions on the role of the vice president in 
the absence of the president were not explicit. One particular provision of the 
constitution, Section 145, became the centre of attention at that period. It says: 
‗Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker 
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of the House of Representatives a written declaration that he is proceeding on 
vacation or that he is otherwise unable to discharge the functions of his office, 
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such functions shall 
be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President‘ (FRN, 1999, p.60). 
During Yar‘adua‘s absence, Nigerian politicians and activists subjected this 
section to different interpretations: some said it meant that the vice president 
automatically assumes power in the absence of the president, while others said the 
president needs to send a letter to the National Assembly before the vice president 
can assume power (Okoye, 2010). Whatever the interpretation, concerns were 
mounting over the apparent power vacuum, worsened by a complete lack of 
information on Yar‘adua‘s state of health. 
  
Two months into his medical trip, and amid claims that he was either dead or 
brain-damaged, Yar‘adua granted a telephone interview to the BBC Hausa 
Service. It was recorded in both Hausa and English languages and aired on 12 
January 2010. ‗At the moment I am undergoing treatment, and I‘m getting better 
from the treatment,‘ he told the station. ‗I hope that very soon there will be 
tremendous progress, which will allow me to get back home‘ (BBC News, 2010a). 
Perhaps to underline the currency of the interview, Yar‘adua praised Nigerian 
footballers who were competing in the African nations‘ cup at that time and 
wished them success. The interview, conducted by senior producer Mansur Liman, 
did put to rest the death and brain damage claims, apparently planted by 
opposition politicians in the media. But it neither ended the power vacuum 
controversy nor the demand for clear information about the state of the president‘s 
health, especially as his weak and cracking voice aired on a hazy short-wave radio 
presented a picture of a very sick man. The interview itself generated a new set of 
reactions from many opposition politicians and commentators who questioned the 
authenticity of the president‘s voice and the propriety of using BBC rather than the 
Nigerian media to deliver such a message after over 50 days of absence from the 
country. Journalist Garba Deen Muhammed, in his weekly Sunday Trust column 
Bark Byte, berated both the BBC and the presidential aides for the broadcast. ‗First 
they chose a foreign radio station, the BBC Hausa Service; then they chose only 
audio interview rather than a more convincing video (TV) interview; and then 
because people usually judge others by their own standard, those fellows expected 
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us to swallow such mind boggling absolute rubbish!‘ he wrote. ‗My conclusion is 
that the voice that spoke in that mysterious interview was not Yar‘adua‘s‘ 
(Muhammed, 2010, p.24). His colleague, Tunde Asaju, in the same newspaper, 
argued that the decision to use BBC for the interview was an assault on Nigerian 
government media. ‗It is not the first time that Yar‘adua and government officials 
would pass a subtle vote of no confidence on its own megaphones, but by far this 
is the strongest and shamefully the most painful‘ (Asaju, 2010, p.25). 
 
If some opposition politicians and commentators saw the Yar‘adua‘s BBC 
interview in a negative term, some senior Nigerian politicians viewed it positively 
and turned it into a political tool to resolve the crisis created by the president‘s 
long absence. The country‘s state governors and federal legislators met in 
February and resolved that, to address the problem of the power vacuum, the vice 
president should be appointed as acting president pending the return of the 
president (BBC News, 2010b). But the fact that the president had not given a 
written consent as required by the constitution presented a problem. Then the issue 
of the BBC interview was brought up, and some of them ingeniously suggested 
that it could be used as an alternative to written consent. And so the Nigerian 
Senate on 9 February 2010 voted with an overwhelming majority to appoint Vice 
President Goodluck Jonathan as acting president, citing Yar‘adua‘s interview with 
the BBC as a notice to the parliament that he had gone on medical leave abroad. 
‗We came to the conclusion that the president, through his declaration transmitted 
worldwide on the BBC, has furnished this parliament with irrefutable proof that 
he‘s on medical vacation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,‘ declared Senate 
President David Mark as the Senate passed the vote (BBC News, 2010b). The 
decision was of dubious legality but it held up until Yar‘adua eventually died on 5 
May 2010 and Jonathan was sworn in as the substantive president. Former BBC 
Hausa Service producer Bala Muhammad said the Senate vote has now put an 
official stamp on BBC as Nigeria‘s ‗national‘ radio (Muhammad, 2010). 
 
Welcome to Lagos 
The controversy over The Yar‘adua Interview had not gone before another BBC 
broadcast on Nigeria sparked a new one: this time on alleged negative portrayal of 
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the Nigeria‘s biggest city in its television programme. Welcome to Lagos was a 
three-part BBC documentary series that explored ‗the lives of slum dwellers who 
are living at the sharp end of the fastest growing mega-city in the world‘ (BBC2, 
2010). Lagos, Nigeria‘s largest commercial centre, has 16 million inhabitants with 
an annual growth rate of 600,000 (BBC2, 2010). The BBC‘s series, directed by 
Gavin Searle, looked at the lives of those at the bottom rung. Produced by Will 
Anderson and narrated by black British actor David Harewood, it was run at 






 of April 2010 on BBC2.  
 
The first episode featured the lives of people who live on top of Olusosun rubbish 
dump in houses built with scraps. About one thousand people live on this rubbish 
dump, and the film focused on the everyday life of two of its dwellers, musician 
Eric Obuh (nick-named Vocal Slender) and trader Joseph Orji, who earn their 
living from the scraps in the dump. ‗If there was a bigger, dirtier, ―stinkier‖ dump 
where I could earn more money for my family, then I‘d go there to work,‘ Joseph 
declared (BBC2, 2010). The second episode portrayed the lives of those who live 
and work on the floating slum of Lagos Lagoon. Here, 65-year-old fisherman 
Chubbey, who has 18 children and five grandchildren and lives along with them in 
houses built on rafts, provides for himself and the family on the earnings made 
from building fish ponds and renting out rafts. On another side, two young men, 
Kissme and Daniel, earn their own living diving in the Lagoon and digging out 
sand that they sell to builders. The third and final episode was about the everyday 
life of those who live in illegal shanties on the beach of Lagos. Housewife Esther 
Ogunleke lives here with her husband, Segun, in a house they built with scraps of 
woods, cardboards and tarpaulin that was under a constant threat of government‘s 
task force which regularly demolishes such illegal dwellings. Esther is worried 
about this, as she does about another woman‘s text messages she discovered on 
her husband‘s mobile phone (BBC2, 2010).  
 
In terms of technical and production qualities, Welcome to Lagos is an innovative 
television piece with entertaining narratives that took four months of hard work to 
produce. The BBC hailed it as a series that highlighted how the poor were 
adapting to modern city life, especially now that more than half of the world‘s 
population live in cities. ‗With extraordinary access to some of the poorest parts of 
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town, the series celebrates the resilience, resourcefulness and energy of Lagos‘s 16 
million inhabitants, and shows how successfully many of its slum dwellers are 
adapting to the realities of the world‘s increasingly extreme urban future‘ (BBC2, 
2010). The film received rave reviews in the UK media. The Guardian in London 
did an editorial in praise of it, saying it was worth ‗a repeat‘ as the stars in the film 
‗do not wallow in self-revelation, but are ordinary, resourceful people who get by‘ 
(Guardian, 2010). Television critic Sam Wollaston (2010) said the series was 
‗extraordinary‘ as indeed the life in Lagos has always been. ‗It doesn‘t pretend that 
life is brilliant for these people, but nor does it feel sorry for them. It‘s more a 
celebration of their resourcefulness,‘ he wrote after watching just the first episode. 
British journalist Rachel Cooke‘s hyper praises came after watching just the first 
ten minutes of the first episode. ‗Ten minutes in…and I understood that Welcome 
to Lagos is great: one of the most moving, interesting and uplifting things I have 
seen in years,‘ she stated in the New Statesman. ‗If David Cameron really wants to 
teach young people life lessons, he should just send every 14-year-old in the 
country a DVD of this series‘. For her ‗this documentary shows the BBC at its 
best‘ (Cooke, 2010). 
 
But for many Nigerians, including some prominent personalities, the documentary 
provoked negative feelings towards the BBC. Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka 
condemned the series as ‗condescending‘ and unworthy of the BBC. ‗There was 
this colonialist idea of the noble savage which motivated the programme. It was 
patronising and condescending,‘ he argued. ‗There was no sense of Lagos as what 
it is – a modern African state. What we had was jaundiced and extremely 
patronising. It was saying ―Oh, look at these people who can make a living from 
the pit of degradation‖‘ (Dowell, 2010). Lagos State information commissioner 
Opeyemi Bamidele shared that view and sent a complaint to BBC demanding that 
it should commission an alternative series to ‗repair the damage…caused to our 
image‘ (Dowell, 2010). Nigeria‘s high commissioner to Britain Dalhatu Sarki 
Tafida who equally forwarded Nigeria‘s protest letter to the BBC described the 
documentary as ‗a calculated attempt to bring Nigeria and its hardworking people 
to international odium and scorn‘ (Nwaubani, 2010). Sultan of Sokoto Saad 
Abubakar, the traditional head of Nigerian Muslims, went even further: he wanted 
the government to remove BBC from the cable and satellite portal that beams its 
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television programmes in Nigeria. ‗If I were the government, I would ask NBC 
(Nigerian Broadcasting Commission) to yank BBC off DSTV (‗Digital Satellite 
Television‘ that provides cable and satellite services from South African-based 
media firm Multichoice) until they apologise or show the positive side of Lagos,‘ 
he told a government peer review team that visited him in his palace few days after 
the series were broadcast (Shuaib, 2010).  
 
Those were the reflections of the sharp contrast between the Nigerian and UK 
audiences‘ reception of the series. It has some similarities with the case of the 
Slumdog Millionaire, the 2008 Danny Boyle-directed British film, set in the mega-
slums of Mumbai in India. While the film was greeted with critical acclaim in the 
West winning several Oscars and other awards, many Indians dismissed it as 
‗defamatory‘ and unreflective of the real life situation in their country—it even 
sparked off street protests by slum dwellers who objected to their depiction in the 
film as ‗slumdogs‘ (Weaver, 2009). The contrast was equally clear in the film‘s 
reviews. Wall Street Journal‘s film critic Joe Morgenstern (2009), for instance, 
described Slumdog Millionaire as ‗the film world‘s first globalized masterpiece‘. 
But Indian critic and writer Gautaman Bhaskaran (2009) dismissed it as 
‗superficial and insensitive‘. Significantly, Indian-born British author Salman 
Rushdie (2009) was strongly dismissive of it, saying it failed the test of 
plausibility—striking a cord with Soyinka‘s condemnation of Welcome to Lagos. 
The factual-fictional divide that differentiates the two films did not alter the 
similarities of the reactions they generated. 
  
However, while Slumdog Millionaire—as a work of fiction that blends Hollywood 
with Bollywood styles—has an artistic licence to exaggerate reality or even be far 
away from it, Welcome to Lagos is a factual documentary with no such luxury. 
And being the product of a medium that builds its reputation on claims of 
impartiality, it tends to carry a stronger stamp of authenticity. The sharp contrast in 
its reception by Western and Nigerian audiences reflected both the cultural tension 
and cultural relativism that often mark such encounters. While the depiction of 
how the urban poor endured (and ‗enjoyed‘) the harsh life of Lagos slums served 
as a source of entertainment to some Western audiences, it was seen by many 
Nigerian audiences as a deliberate attempt to sustain the stereotypical Western 
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depiction of Africans as ‗savages‘ (in Soyinka‘s word). It was an age-long 
ideological and cultural contrast in perception. But it also highlighted the 
complexity of reception research. The fact that it is the Western-savvy non-
Westerners, Soyinka and Rushdie in this case, that show more strident opposition 




The BBC and Nigerians, as highlighted above, have a long and complex 
relationship that began in the 1930s and has been undergoing transformation ever 
since. This chapter has traced the historical development of such engagement, its 
changing nature and the emerging trends being shaped by the changing dynamics 
of global geopolitics and advancement of communications technologies. It has 
touched on the BBC‘s roles from its early days as Empire Service—advancing the 
interests of the British Empire and informing its citizens and colonial subjects of 
developments at home and abroad—to its present position as the best known 
global broadcaster with its inherent contradictory functions in providing impartial 
news and enhancing British public diplomacy. Also discussed was the BBC‘s 
complex relationship with its funding body, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, and the difficult balancing act of attending to its demand and that of the 
audiences. 
 
The BBC‘s interests in Nigeria, first as a British colonial outpost and now as the 
largest radio market for the broadcaster, were equally brought into focus. Its role 
as provider of information to colonial Nigeria through wired broadcasting and its 
assistance in establishing local broadcasting outfits as well as the establishment of 
the BBC Hausa Service and the latest expansion of its operations in Nigeria were 
all highlighted. The Nigerians‘ engagement with the medium that they regard as 
the leading foreign broadcaster in their country, their consumption of its products 
and their perception of its coverage of their country—sometimes with admiration, 
sometimes with suspicion, but mostly with passion—was also briefly discussed 







The methodological endeavour of this study is primarily grounded in the 
qualitative research tradition, but without neglecting the essential ingredients of 
the quantitative approach, as it also utilizes massive quantitative data derived from 
a positivist research culture. Qualitative methods were used to obtain the primary 
data that was amply supplemented by statistical data originally drawn from large 
scale surveys. It is a unique approach designed to meet the novelty of this 
research, which is focused on unveiling in detail the relationship between the BBC 
World Service and its audiences in Northern Nigeria. Specifically, focus group 
discussions, in-depth individual interviews, qualitative content analysis and 
documentary research techniques were employed for the study. Statistical data 
drawn from large scale BBC audience surveys were amply used to complement 
the primary data obtained through the qualitative research tools. This chapter 
unpacks the methodological strategies employed for this study, the justification for 
applying them, the sampling procedure used, the areas covered by the study, the 
background of the participants drawn, the nature of the data generated, the ethical 
issues involved, the problems encountered, and how they were resolved. 
 
The methods and the justifications  
Addressing the question of methodological framework is essential in any research 
effort and the choice of specific methods to operationalise it requires careful and 
intense scrutiny. It becomes even more intense when the issue involves 
researching audiences because various studies of the same subject, using different 
methods tend to produce different, sometimes contradictory, results. Poor selection 
of research techniques—or misapplication of even the correct ones—could yield 
distorted outcomes. Perhaps nowhere is the need to carefully distinguish the divide 
between the quantitative techniques and qualitative approach and strike a right 
cord is as significant as it is in studies that involve media audiences. Using 
detailed ethnographic approach (Ang, 1996; Spitulnik, 2000), for example, may 
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give one a clear picture of a specific audience response to a specific media text; 
but it could hardly provide opportunities of making accurate generalisations about 
media effects or influence (Burton, 2005; Morley, 2006). Conversely, a macro-
audience study with strong bias on quantitative techniques may fail to offer 
accurate insights into specific audience behaviour towards specific media content 
(Burton, 2005).  
 
This suggests the need for using mixed-method approach, combining both the 
quantitative and qualitative instruments to get both the broad and deep insights 
into the audiences‘ behaviour (Barker, 2006). But even this would not necessarily 
guarantee adequacy nor would it always be feasible. In any case, Hoijer (1990, 
p.32) has warned that a ‗single study cannot grasp the dynamics and all the 
complexities of the reception of mass media products‘. And Morrison (1998, 
p.155) was quick to stress that ‗a single method cannot either‘. What is imperative, 
Hoijer (1990, p.32) insists, is ‗to choose a perspective and be aware of that choice 
and its underlying assumptions‘. Essentially, Silverman (2000) argues, the choice 
of research methods should be determined by the objectives of the study. In this 
regard, Michelle‘s (2007) advocacy for the adoption of ‗consolidated model‘ in 
reception research is justifiable. The consolidated model, she explains, facilitates 
systematic investigation into how audiences‘ interpretations are ‗shaped by social 
group memberships, cultural competencies, and discursive affiliations‘ (Michelle, 
2007, p.181). It is this model that was liberally applied here to investigate the 
reception aspects of the research. But since this study also sought to examine the 
production side and the nature of the media content itself, the methodological 
endeavour was equally expanded to incorporate them.  
 
Taking all these into consideration, therefore, this study employed a multi-method 
approach to fully explore the intricacies of the BBC‘s engagement with its 
Northern Nigerian audiences: from the production processes, through the content 
produced, to their actual consumption, and in some cases re-production. Individual 
in-depth interviews, documentary research (in the libraries and archives and 
online) and qualitative content analysis were used to interrogate the production 
side and analyse the content produced. Focus group discussions, individual in-
depth interviews and documentary research were employed to generate data from 
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the reception side and gain insights into the audiences‘ engagement with 
international media. All these techniques are, of course, qualitative in nature; but 
they are complemented by a generous use of statistics obtained from BBC‘s large 
scale surveys that supply important quantitative details and useful demographic 
features of its Northern Nigerian audiences. The BBC does carry regular 
quantitative surveys of its audiences in Nigeria that unveil the audience figures, 
their demographic features, their preferences in terms of programming and 
transmission time, and the station‘s performance in comparison to both the local 
and international competitors. This study has accessed and analysed such surveys 
covering nearly one decade, with specific emphasis on those conducted in the 
years 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10. Other materials accessed from the 
corporation and analysed for this study are its official publications, specimen of 
the programmes for the Hausa Service audiences, press releases and online 
contents.  
 
The interrogation of the production side was primarily done through the qualitative 
research approach. Face-to-face in-depth interview method was used to obtain data 
from BBC executives, producers and reporters. The interviews were conducted 
with the BBC‘s executive editor for African region (in London), BBC Abuja 
bureau editor (in Abuja, Nigeria), a BBC World Service correspondent who 
covered Nigeria for years and is now a producer in the World Service newsroom at 
Bush House (in London), a former BBC Hausa Service senior producer who had 
also worked as senior reporter for the station from Nigeria (in Abuja), and a senior 
Hausa Service correspondent who had worked as a producer at the Bush House (in 
London). The interviews were conducted between April 2009 and March 2010 in 
London for those based at the BBC World Service headquarters and in Abuja for 
those working (and the former staff who had worked) for the Hausa Service in 
Nigeria. The length of each of the recorded individual interviews ranges from 13 
minutes to about 30 minutes (in all cases the stay with the interviewees lasted 
much longer than the period spent for recording the interview; two of them—with 
the executive editor of African region and former World Service correspondent—
lasted for over an hour each). All the interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed 
and analysed. Brief follow-up telephone interviews were conducted again in 
October 2010 with the executive editor, the former senior producer and the senior 
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correspondent/producer to further confirm the original views they had expressed in 
the earlier interviews, and to strengthen the internal validity of the study.  
 
The viability of in-depth interview method was well-acknowledged by many 
media researchers and scholars (Priest, 1996; Berger, 1998; Gunter, 2000; 
Wimmer and Dominick, 2003). It generated ‗a great deal of detailed information‘ 
(Berger, 1998, p.57) required for this study. It particularly enabled me to ask 
follow up questions to get clarifications and sometimes obtain ‗unexpected 
information‘ (Berger, 1988, p.57; Priest, 1996) that I might never have gotten 
through a questionnaire survey technique. Although the method may have its 
deficiencies in terms of being time-consuming, limited to smaller samples and 
harder to analyse, it has the merits of facilitating rapport, enhancing ‗greater 
flexibility of coverage‘ and allowing ‗the interview to go into novel areas, 
and…produce richer data‘ (Smith and Osborn, 2003, p.57). That was exactly what 
it did for this research. 
 
The BBC‘s personnel interviewed have deep knowledge of the workings of the 
BBC World Service, particularly BBC Hausa Service—the key arm of the 
corporation targeting Northern Nigerians. They have collectively garnered massive 
experience totalling about 60 years of working for the organisation. Among them, 
the one with the least number of years in the BBC, the Abuja bureau editor, has 
put in three years working for the corporation, but had earlier spent about two 
decades working for foreign and local radio stations in Nigeria. The former World 
Service correspondent who was at the time of the interview a producer at the 
World Service newsroom has put in over six years in the service. The former 
senior producer had worked for the Hausa Service and African Service for about 
13 years, starting as a stringer in Nigeria to producer in London and later acting 
Abuja bureau editor before resigning as senior producer/senior reporter to take up 
a senior managerial role in a Nigerian newspaper organisation. The senior 
correspondent has spent nearly 18 years working for the Hausa Service and 
African Service first as a stringer in Nigeria then as a producer in London, Abuja 
bureau editor in Nigeria and senior correspondent. The executive editor of African 
region had by the time of the interview already put in over 20 years working for 
the World Service, starting as a producer in the Hausa Service, then senior 
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producer and later head of the Hausa Service before becoming executive editor 
African region overseeing all the services targeting sub-Saharan Africa. Together 
they provided valuable data required to fully examine the production side of the 
media involved. 
 
A further interrogation of the production side was achieved by examining BBC‘s 
official publications (year books, annual reports and in-house newspapers), annual 
audience surveys, online content and press releases—in addition to several books, 
journals, articles and reports written about the corporation. The bibliography 
section contains the list of the publications consulted. The BBC‘s annual audience 
surveys in Nigeria for nearly one decade were accessed, but it was the ones from 
the year 2004 to the year 2010 that were found to be up-to-date and very relevant 
for this study. And among them, it was those for the years 2006/07, 2007/08, 
2008/09 and 2009/10 that were selected and extensively analysed (see ‗Contents 
and Quantification‘ chapter). The statistical details and other quantitative data 
obtained from those surveys were generously used in this study to redress its 
quantitative deficiencies and strengthen the quality of its findings. The annual 
surveys‘ data actually proved very useful in examining both the production and 
reception aspects covered by the study.  
 
Qualitative content analysis of a selection of transmitted BBC Hausa Service 
programmes was also undertaken to critically examine the materials being 
produced and transmitted for Hausa-speaking audiences. Three different 
programmes, transmitted in three different years (2008, 2009 and 2010), were 
obtained from the sound archives of the BBC Hausa Service, transcribed, 
translated into English language and analysed. The first programme was aired in 
the afternoon of 6 October 2008 (Hausa, 2008, see Appendix I) while the second 
and the third were transmitted in the afternoon of 14 October 2009 (Hausa, 2009) 
and in the evening of 14 July 2010 (Hausa, 2010) respectively. These, as would be 
explained later, did not constitute a full representative sample of BBC Hausa 
Service programmes, though. They were essentially picked to provide a general 
idea of the format and content of the programmes. Qualitative content analysis 
technique was used to examine them and establish the nature and pattern of the 
content, and to get a glimpse of the execution of the editorial policies of the 
 159 
producing organisation. Although content analysis has lost the kind of prominence 
it got during the Second World War when it was often being used as a stand-alone 
quantitative research method to explore the intent of media content and its effects 
on audiences (Gunter, 2000; Wimmer and Dominick, 2003), it is still a very useful 
tool in media research, especially when used as a qualitative method, as was done 
here. The technique is also criticised as being prone to bias and as ‗a secondary 
instrument for recording social reality‘ (Gunter, 2000, p.58); but combining it with 
other methods—again as was done here—has reduced such deficiencies.   
 
Some have argued that content analysis tended to be more objective when used as 
a quantitative, rather than as a qualitative, method (Gunter, 2000, p.60); but 
Krippendorff (2004) has dismissed ‗the validity and usefulness‘ of making such 
distinction. ‗Ultimately, all reading of texts is qualitative, even when certain 
characteristics of a text are later converted into numbers‘ (p.16). Essentially, as a 
research tool, ‗content analysis is an empirically grounded method, exploratory in 
process, and predictive or inferential in intent‘ (Krippendorff, 2004, p.xvii, 
emphasis original). It is a ‗technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use‘ (p.18). It is the 
attempt to make such valid inferences on the policies and motives of the producers 
and even possible impact on the audiences (Gunter, 2000) that motivated the 
application of this method here. In this respect, it has enabled this study to unveil 
the pattern and particularities of BBC Hausa Service content and provide some 
insights into the objectives and ideological orientation of the organisation and their 
engagement with the audiences (part of the content was from interactive 
programming).  
  
On the reception side, two different tools were primarily used to generate data 
from audiences in Northern Nigeria: face-to-face individual in-depth interview and 
focus group methods. This was in addition to the secondary data obtained from the 
BBC‘s annual surveys on Nigerian audiences and the inferences made from 
content analysis, as explained above. First, the face-to-face in-depth interviews 
were conducted with respondents drawn from three cities in three different 
geopolitical regions that made up Northern Nigeria: (1) Yola in the Northeast, (2) 
Kano in Northwest and (3) Abuja in North-central zones. These were ten 
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respondents, male and female (though the male size is larger, eight of them, which 
in a way reflects the BBC audiences‘ make-up in the region), aged 25 to 70, and 
with varied backgrounds and experiences. They comprised of a local newspaper 
publisher, a petty trader, a television producer, a female school administrator, a 
factory worker, a university lecturer, an ex-trade unionist, a one-time female 
newspaper editor, a postgraduate student and an ex-soldier-cum-parliamentarian. 
Each of them was interviewed at length (ranging from approximately 12-minute to 
25-minute recorded interview per respondent) at different locations: their places of 
relaxation, places of work or at home (each was given the right to choose a place 
they felt they could freely express their views unencumbered by any restraining 
factor; and they did so). Eight of them who are fluent in English language were 
interviewed in English, the remaining two—the petty trader and the factory 
worker—were interviewed in Hausa language. All the interviews were tape-
recorded (the Hausa ones translated into English) and transcribed for analysis. 
They produced the ‗Results and Analysis I‘ chapter. The shortcomings and 
benefits of using in-depth interview method have been well explained above; it 
can only be reiterated here that the technique has indeed enabled this researcher to 
obtain rich and qualitative data that provides deep insights into the patterns and 
trends of Northern Nigerians‘ interactions with international media. 
 
Focusing on focus groups 
Focus group technique is the major instrument used to gather data for this research 
because of the vital role it plays in audience studies (Morley, 1980; Merton, 1987; 
Priest, 1996; Morrison 1998; Gunter, 2000; Greenbaum, 2000)—and as such it is 
given a special focus here. The merits of employing this method have been well 
laid out. First, as Priest (1996, p.109) notes, ‗focus group is better than individual 
depth interview because the participants react to one another as well as to the 
interviewer‘. This provides what both Morrison (1998) and Greenbaum (2000) call 
‗group dynamics‘ that enables the researcher to generate rich material. ‗It is the 
dynamic exchange between the individuals in the group that gives focus groups 
their special characteristic and strength as a research method‘ (Morrison, 1998, 
p.168). The ‗one-on-one‘ scenario of the individual interview method, Priest 
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(1996) maintains, puts the interviewer as superior to the interviewee while focus 
group gives the participants a much more relaxed atmosphere.   
 
The superiority of this technique over what Morley (1980) calls ‗fixed-choice 
questionnaires‘ that separate ‗content from the form‘ is well documented, ‗for it is 
not simply the ―substance‖ of the answer which is important, it is also the form of 
its expression which constitutes its meaning‘ (p.31). Focus group is equally seen 
as less expensive than large scale survey, and the insights of the people who 
participated are immediately made available (Berger, 1998). Besides, Morrison 
(1998) argues that ‗the freedom of participants to construct their own meanings is‘ 
an additional strength of the focus group method over survey research (p.179). 
Similarly, Greenbaum (2000) notes that group interactions allow participants who 
share opposing points to, with the encouragement of the moderator, try and 
convince one another of the viability of their viewpoints. ‗As a result of this 
process, the richness of the information generated in the session can be 
dramatically improved as each side draws on more reasons for its view‘ 
(Greenbaum, 2000, p.11).  
 
Gunter (2000) has spoken of attempts to promote focus group ‗as a solution to the 
constrained artificial question and answer format of the structured, questionnaire-
driven interview‘ since it allows ‗natural conversation‘; but careful scrutiny 
‗reveals that it is just as controlled in many respects as is a laboratory experiment‘ 
(p.278). And, of course, it is also wrong to equate focus group with ethnography—
as some researchers erroneously do—because it is not (Morrison, 1998; Barker, 
2006); but it is an approach capable of furnishing a researcher with group feelings, 
nuances and lived experiences. David Morley, famous for his use of focus groups 
in audience studies (Morley, 1980, 1986), has, as noted earlier, argued that the 
technique ‗treats the audience as a set of cultural groupings rather than as a mass 
of individuals or as a set of rigid socio-demographic categories‘ (Morley, 1980, 
p.163). Agreed that he has warned 20 years later that over-reliance on focus 
groups for all sorts of audience research could be counter-productive, but that does 
not remove the efficacy of the technique when applied appropriately. 
‗Ethnography is excellent for some purposes but for others it is not suitable,‘ he 
also cautions. ‗In some statistics will help‘ (Morley, 2006, pp.106-107). He is 
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right: the statistics accessed from BBC‘s audience surveys, as stated earlier, 
proved very helpful for this research.  
 
There is also the concern raised by the very person generally believed to have 
founded the focus group method, Robert Merton—though Kitzinger (1995) has 
said it was invented by Emory Bogardus—about the danger of using focus group 
as a stand-alone technique, instead of complementing it with, or subordinating it 
to, other methods (Merton‘s letter to Morrison on 18 April 1995, cited in 
Morrison, 1998, p. xiii). Morrison was particularly keen on stressing this issue, 
criticising audience researchers, such as Morley, who used focus group as a stand-
alone method. ‗Its founders insisted that it was only truly valuable when combined 
with other methods‘ (Morrison, 1998, p.134). However, Lunt and Livingstone 
(1996) insist that even as a stand-alone technique, the method provides rich and 
valid data in qualitative research, arguing that many researchers ‗would challenge 
Merton‘s relegation of the focus groups method to a secondary position relative to 
surveys and experiments‘ (p.89). Still, the idea of combining focus group with 
other methods has the potential of maximising the validity and reliability of 
research findings (Gillham, 2000)—and that was what prompted this study to 
combine it with the other methods (individual interview, content analysis, 
documentary research) stated above. Morley (1980) himself admitted that he 
would have combined it with individual interviews, had resources allowed him 
‗the luxury of both‘ (p.33). This, of course, did not diminish the fact that even as a 
stand-alone method focus group has its peculiar utilities in unveiling the mindsets 
of the participants. And, as Kitzinger (1995) observes, the ‗method is particularly 
useful for exploring people‘s knowledge and experiences and can be used to 
examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that 
way‘. This is why it emerged as the most significant method employed for this 
research.  
 
Focus group interviews were exclusively done to generate data from selected 
audiences in different parts of Northern Nigeria to reflect the geographical 
diversity of the region and the plurality of the participants‘ backgrounds. A total of 
six focus groups‘ interviews were conducted in the three geopolitical zones of the 
region—in addition to the two pilot focus groups conducted to prepare the ground 
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and to get a guide for the main ones. The six focus groups were conducted 
between December 2009 and March 2011 in the three zones: Yola city and Njoboli 
village both in Adamawa State (Northeast zone), Katsina city in Katsina State 
(Northwest zone), and Abuja city and Gwagwalada town both part of the Federal 
Capital Territory (North-central zone). Apart from the diversity in the 
geographical locations of the groups, each group has its unique characteristics in 
terms of social strata and professional and occupational backgrounds of its 
members (see Appendix III).   
 
It is important to make clarifications here on the approach employed to categorise 
the groups in different classes. It was a rough categorisation guided by insights 
from previous studies on social stratification in Nigeria. Because of the series of 
changes the Nigerian society has been witnessing right from pre-colonial through 
colonial to postcolonial periods and because of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
nature of the country, social stratification system is a complicated and contested 
issue in Nigeria (Smith, 1959, 1991; Smythe, 1958). Smith (1959, 1991) did much 
work on Nigeria and noted that the Hausa Muslims had an organised complex 
stratified society. Smythe (1958) studied the stratification system in Nigeria during 
the dying days of colonialism and identified five different classes (the high public 
officers, the professionals, the business class, the minor white collar workers and 
the labouring class) that he equated with five corresponding classes—the upper 
class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class and lower class—
respectively in the United States. He did not put ‗the beggars, those without visible 
means of support (and) the habitually unemployed‘ (p.171) into any category, 
though. Perhaps the most recent relevant work on the subject was the one done by 
the Nigeria‘s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2007 in which it gave a broad 
poverty classification and middle class categorisation. The first broad 
categorisation produced three groups: the core poor, the moderately poor and the 
non-poor (NBS, 2007, p.13). It essentially used economic factors, primarily 
expenditure criterion, to make the categorisation. It identified five different classes 
in the country: the lower class, the lower-middle class, the upper-middle class, the 
lower-upper class and the upper-upper class (p.14). This study drew useful insights 
from all the three studies, particularly the last one, to give a rough categorisation 
of the focus groups here. 
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Each of the six focus groups was placed in an approximate class or category based 
on the socio-economic, educational, occupational and professional backgrounds of 
the majority of its members. The first focus group, which was organised in Yola, 
was mainly composed of people who could be roughly described as members of 
the urban lower middle class. The second Yola group comprised mainly of 
members of the urban working class. The Njoboli group was mainly composed of 
villagers who live on subsistence farming and petty trading—it is categorised here 
as the peasant group. The first Abuja group was made up of professional 
journalists who have vast experience working for media in Nigeria. Their 
educational and professional backgrounds as well as their apparent comfortable 
incomes and lifestyles gave them a conventional middle class status. The second 
Abuja group was that of Abuja University‘s students who were categorised as 
youth group; they were pursuing their undergraduate studies in the university. The 
Katsina group could be classified as political class who were exposed to local 
politics and holding leadership positions in the local community. Their income is 
apparently higher than that of a typical Nigerian middle class, though their 
educational level is not above that of the conventional middle class in Nigeria. 
 
The common denominator linking all the groups is that they are predominantly 
Hausa-speaking Muslim Northern Nigerians (though many of them are not native 
Hausa speakers). They are also regular audiences of international media—ranging 
from those who only access the international media through short-wave radio sets 
(they are the majority) to those who mainly access them through satellite 
television and Internet. The average size of the groups was six people and the 
length of recorded interview per group was approximately 40 minutes (the actual 
time spent with each group averages over one hour). The interviews with four of 
the groups were conducted in Hausa language while the remaining two—with the 
professional journalists and students—were conducted in English language. All 
were tape-recorded, (translated into English, for the Hausa ones), transcribed and 
analysed, using Vicsek‘s (2007) scheme of focus groups analysis. The data 




Sampling and selection 
The key procedure applied in selecting the subjects for data generation for this 
study was purposeful sampling. Since it was neither feasible nor necessary to 
reach all the media audiences of a big area—as Mano (2004, p.78) argues in his 
Radio Zimbabwe listeners‘ case—the sensible thing to do was to get a sample of 
the audiences and generate the data from them. That was what was done here in 
the selection of participants (though not fully representative samples) from among 
the BBC audiences in Northern Nigeria, who constitute the population in the 
reception aspect covered by the study. The concept of sampling appropriated here 
was that of Mason (1996, p.83) which was described as a procedure of identifying, 
choosing and gaining ‗access to relevant units‘ that supplied data for this research. 
Purposeful sampling is the most appropriate in this case because the reception side 
covered by the study specifically requires audiences of international media, 
particularly the BBC; and this procedure helps greatly in weeding out irrelevant 
participants. All necessary caution and care were taken to ensure that relevant 
participants were selected to get appropriate data from them. This is because, as 
Morrison (1998) warns, ‗no amount of cleverness will overcome the faults 
structured into the base material by a poor sample‘ (p.197). The warning was taken 
seriously here.  
 
All the participants were selected from the audiences of international media in the 
three geopolitical zones of Northern Nigeria. As clearly explained in the 
‗Historical Context‘ chapter, Northern Nigeria is a vast region dominated by 
Hausa-speaking Muslims. There are Christian and other non-Muslim minorities, 
mostly found in the southern part of the region; and the number of ethnic groups in 
the region is estimated to be well over 250. Islam is clearly the main religion and 
Hausa language largely serves as the lingua franca. Once run under colonial 
administration and during the First Republic as a single region, Northern Nigeria 
had undergone several administrative and political changes that now see it as 
having 19 states as well as the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, out of the current 
36-state structure that made up Nigeria. For administrative and political 
consideration, Northern Nigeria was structured into three geopolitical zones: 
Northwest, Northeast and North-central. These structures serve as the guides for 
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the selection of places and participants in the conduct of this research (see the map 
below). Different groups of international media audiences were drawn from each 
of these three geopolitical zones. Separate respondents were selected for individual 




Map of Nigeria showing the places where focus group and individual interviews with the 
audiences were conducted (Abuja, Gwagwalada, Kano, Katsina, Njoboli and Yola). The red line 
demarcates Northern Nigeria from Southern Nigeria, as they were in the early colonial period, 
before the adoption of the 36-state structure along with the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. 
 
Figure 5.1 Online source of the map: Nonlypictures.blogspot.com.  
Available from: <http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://2.bp.blogspot.com> [Accessed 16 January 2011]. 
 
 
The sampling and selection of units for the study were not restricted to the 
reception side alone; they were extended to the content and production side too. 
Here too, since it was unrealistic and unnecessary to study all the production units 
and all the contents of BBC‘s broadcasts to Northern Nigeria, relevant units were 
carefully selected for the study. On the content side, the BBC Hausa Service 
broadcasts, being the most focused on Northern Nigerian audiences, were regarded 
as the most appropriate. From these, the broadcasts within the past three years—
2008, 2009 and 2010—were considered to take care of both the recent and not too 
recent products of the broadcaster. After this identification, it was then decided 
that one transmitted programme should be selected from each of the three years. A 
random sampling procedure was used to select them from the BBC Hausa Service 
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sound archives. This was done with the assistance of the BBC Hausa Service‘s 
head and two producers at the Bush House in London.  
 
The three transmitted programmes selected are as follows: (1) the afternoon 
programme of 6 October 2008, (2) the afternoon programme of 14 October 2009, 
and (3) the evening programme of 14 July 2010. They, of course, did not 
constitute the full representative samples of all the BBC Hausa Service 
programmes. They were essentially selected to provide examples of the form and 
content of the Hausa Service programmes, to get a glimpse of how the 
programmes were, what the nature of their content was, what were the patterns of 
their production and presentation and whether they conformed to the editorial 
policies and objectives of the producing organisation. After their careful selection, 
they were transcribed, translated into English language and analysed (they 
constitute the first part of the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter). And, as 
already seen in the preceding chapter (BBC and Northern Nigerians), two 
important bits of BBC‘s coverage of Nigeria that sparked controversies in the 
country—The Yar‘adua Interview by the World Service (both in Hausa and 
English) which was aired on 12 January 2010 and Welcome to Lagos run by BBC2 






 of April 2010 (BBC2, 2010)—had been 
discussed as part of that chapter. 
 
Other selections that were also done here relate to the periods covered by the 
BBC‘s annual audience surveys in Nigeria; and the participants picked for the 
study of the production side. These, though, were based more on availability than 
on any systematic sampling procedure. The BBC annual survey reports this 
researcher was able to access ranged from the surveys‘ brief summaries for the 
years 1996/97, 2002/03 and 2003/04 to the reports of the surveys for the years 
2004/05, 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10. This was facilitated by the help 
of the executive editor of BBC‘s African region and the BBC‘s marketing, 
communications and audiences‘ department. Useful data from all of them were 
utilised in this research; but it was the surveys for the years 2006/07, 2007/08, 
2008/09 and 2009/2010 that were specifically selected and extensively analysed to 
get the full picture of the composition of the BBC‘s audiences in Nigeria, their 
demographic features, their programming preferences and their assessment of the 
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station in comparison to its local and global competitors (it forms the second part 
of the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter).  
 
The selection of the subjects for the study of production side was essentially based 
on expertise and availability. Based on the researcher‘s personal experience, 
having worked for the BBC World Service (particularly the Hausa Service), it was 
easy to know that the BBC executives, editors, producers and reporters are 
generally very busy people with little time to spare for other people‘s work. For 
this reason, and the fact that some staff might be unwilling to talk, it was clear 
from the onset that it would be difficult to get many of them to talk. This 
necessitated the need to identify those of them who had expertise on the subject 
for this research and target them for interviews. Experience of working for the 
corporation and contacts with the staff helped in identifying the persons with 
enormous expertise on the subject matter. They were, as stated earlier, the 
executive editor of the African region at the Bush House in London, the Abuja 
bureau editor (in Abuja office, Nigeria), the former World Service correspondent 
in Nigeria who became producer in the World Service newsroom at the Bush 
House in London, the former senior producer/senior reporter who left to become a 
senior manager of a Nigerian newspaper company, and the senior correspondent 
for the Hausa Service and African Service who had also worked as a producer in 
London. They were all contacted individually, and each of them graciously agreed 
to grant a face-to-face interview to the researcher at their convenient times. The 
data generated from the interviews conducted with these personnel, as stated 
earlier, proved very valuable in the examination of the production side. It 
produced the ‗Results and Analysis II‘ chapter. 
 
Focusing on the Northeast 
The interrogation of the reception side constituted the key part of this research, 
and the methodological and sampling endeavours devoted to it were equally great. 
As stated above, Northern Nigeria was structured into three geopolitical zones: 
Northwest, Northeast and North-central. This geopolitical division guided the 
selection of places for the conduct of this research. The Northeast zone, to start 
with, is dominated by Muslims, although it has a large Christian and other non-
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Muslim peoples, and has a large number of ethnic minorities. The dominant ethnic 
groups here include Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri, with the Hausa language being the 
lingua franca across the zone. It has six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno (of the 
famous Kanem-Bornu Kingdom, see ‗Historical Context‘ chapter), Gombe, Taraba 
and Yobe. This zone was considered very important and was given considerable 
attention in this research because the BBC‘s annual surveys show that the BBC 
has huge audiences here, and their number has been rising even at the time when 
the audience figures in other zones were declining (BBC World Service, 2007; 
BBC Global News, 2009, 2010). For instance, the 2008/09 survey notes that BBC 
listening has witnessed ‗small increases in the North Central and North East 
regions‘ (BBC Global News, 2009); and the following year‘s survey reveals that, 
even though audiences have particularly decreased in Northwest and North-central 
regions, ‗listening has increased in the North East‘ region (BBC Global News, 
2010).  
  
These put the Northeast as a region with a favourable BBC reception, and 
deserving of this research‘s attention. Within the region Adamawa State was 
picked as the right place for the study. It was selected for ease of access to the 
audiences (mainly because the researcher had familiarity with the area, having 
worked there as a journalist), for its centrality in the region and for the 
composition of its peoples (it has a large Muslim population—mostly Fulani—and 
several ethnic minorities; and both the Christian population and the Muslims 
generally live peacefully with each other here). The researcher‘s wide contact with 
its peoples and good knowledge of the area also minimised the difficulties of 
getting the respondents and in organising the individual interviews and focus 
group discussions.  
 
The state capital, Yola, a drab dusty city founded in the nineteenth century, is the 
place where many subjects for the interviews were selected. Established by a 
famous Islamic scholar, Modibbo Adama, who had handled the far-eastern portion 
of the nineteenth century djihad spearheaded by Usman dan Fodio that led to the 
establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate (see ‗Historical Context‘ chapter), Yola was 
the headquarters of the old Adamawa Emirate which covered substantial parts of 
north-eastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon (Abba, 2003; Njeuma, 1978). The 
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Fulani-dominated Adamawa Emirate was founded at the beginning of nineteenth 
century but was overrun in 1901 when the British in Nigeria and the Germans in 
Cameroon deposed its rulers after brutal military campaigns (Njeuma, 1978). The 
British part remains in Nigeria and constitutes parts of present-day Adamawa and 
Taraba states while the German part (which eventually ended in French hands 
after Germany‘s defeat in the two world wars) is now in the present-day Cameroon 
Republic (Njeuma, 1978). 
 
Yola might have lost its prestige as the headquarters of the largest emirate of the 
Sokoto Caliphate, but at least it is still the capital of Adamawa State. It currently 
boasts of many educational institutions, including the Federal University of 
Technology and American University of Nigeria (which offers American-style 
university education), and several small-scale industries and businesses. It is the 
city where participants for two separate focus groups and individual interviews for 
this study were selected. Before even the participants were sampled, though, the 
first pilot study (a pilot focus group) was conducted in the city as a trial to test how 
the focus group interviews would likely be. In this respect ten BBC listeners were 
randomly selected and invited for a group interview at Yola Press Centre in the 
centre of the city on Saturday afternoon, 13 June 2009. Five of them turned up 
about 30 minutes into the appointed time; and another two came in some 15 
minutes later (keeping to time is not a well-known part of Nigerian culture). The 
other three did not show up and did not send any excuse. But the seven available, 
all men aged 31 to 49, constituted a good number. The researcher ordered for soft 
drinks for them from the Press Centre‘s canteen, and the discussion commenced in 
a lively fashion. That was how the first pilot focus group interview was conducted 
and the discussion lasted for about one hour. Another pilot focus group was 
conducted in Katsina for the same purpose. They both provided a good guide on 
how the subsequent focus groups for the main study were eventually conducted. 
 
Side-by-side with the planning and organisation of the focus groups, individual 
interviews with the audiences were also being planned in Yola and other places 
identified for them (more on this later). The individual interviews were easier to 
plan and conduct; and no pilot was conducted ahead of them as the researcher‘s 
journalistic skills and background provided adequate guarantee of carrying them 
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smoothly. The respondents were selected through purposeful sampling procedure. 
It was decided that they should all be listeners of global broadcasters, particularly 
the BBC; should come from different professional or occupational backgrounds; 
and should be of varying age and gender (though insisting on getting female 
respondents was not really productive as cultural barrier here did not encourage 
women to participate in this kind of session with a man; and, in any case, BBC‘s 
audience surveys indicate that the audiences tend to be predominantly male). Still, 
efforts to include women were pursued with some little success. The individual 
interview part was the first to be conducted; and four respondents were selected in 
Yola. They are: the publisher of a local newspaper, the female school 
administrator, the former soldier-cum-parliamentarian and the television producer. 
Each of them was interviewed at length (average of 13 to 25 minutes of recorded 
interview per person) at their convenient places and times. The publisher was 
interviewed in his office in the afternoon, the female school administrator at her 
home in the afternoon, the former soldier-cum-parliamentarian in his party‘s office 
in the afternoon, and the television producer at the Yola Press Centre in the 
morning. 
 
Yola Group I: the lower middle class 
Planning, organising and conducting the focus groups were far trickier, despite the 
pilot study done to prepare grounds for them. It would have been easier, for 
instance, if one were to do just focus groups with students or trade union members 
or farmers‘ group, as the experience would show here (more on this later). But 
doing it based on social class membership and residency of a place and interest in 
global media products was a huge task. First it required great efforts to identify a 
group that has strong homogeneity, whose members are audiences of international 
media and who are also ready and willing to meet at the same time for a panel 
discussion with the researcher. It took a long time and constant contacts with 
people in different parts of the city before the researcher managed to figure out 
how this could be done.  
 
The first focus group was planned and organised with the help of two contacts 
who happened to be regular listeners of the BBC. They suggested several names of 
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persons they considered to be within their social status—roughly lower middle 
class—and who they believed were consumers of international media. Among the 
names suggested, 15 persons were contacted and requested for focus group 
discussion. Four of them turned down the request politely, two would not give 
firm commitment and nine accepted to attend. The first suggested schedule for the 
meeting, Saturday, 19 December 2009, failed to work, as most participants called 
to say it would not be convenient for them. The researcher had thought that 
weekend could be the most convenient time since some of them might have work 
commitments on working days, but it turned out that weekend was not convenient 
for them. Most of them were not conventional city professionals or civil servants 
who operate on eight-to-four (it is not five-to-nine here) work schedule; they are 
mainly independent small scale entrepreneurs who have greater control of their 
time. Through liaising with them we worked out a generally convenient schedule 
of Tuesday afternoon of 22 December 2009 (it was to be between 12 noon and 
1:30pm, which did not interfere with their early afternoon prayer time of 1:30 to 
2:00pm). One of the early contacts provided his spacious office for us in the centre 
of the city to hold the discussion. Of the nine persons who pledged to participate, 
only six came within the agreed time; two sent excuses and one came when we 
had just finished the discussion.  
 
The six persons (five male and a female, and aged 33 to 60) who participated in 
the first main focus group discussion are as follows: a mason who runs a small 
construction business, a female restaurant owner, an owner of a small tailoring 
enterprise, a politician who is also the local chairman of retirees‘ union, a 
businessman who owns a shop in the city and a small scale businessman who is 
also a director of an Islamic movement Izala in the city. Izala is the short name of 
an Islamic sect Jama‘atul Izalatul Bid‘a Wa Iqamatul Sunnah (approximately 
‗Movement for the Eradication of Un-Islamic Norms and Establishment of 
Righteous Practices‘)—though it began as a radical group, it is now largely a 
moderate Sunni Muslim group in Nigeria but with a significant dose of Saudi-
based Wahhabi ideology (Loimeier, 1997). All the six participants are regular 
listeners of international media, have good Islamic education and most of them 
have above secondary school level of Western education. Although they have 
varied business and occupational backgrounds, they are roughly within the same 
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economic and social status here. Their group could be categorised broadly as an 
urban lower middle class group. Other common traits noted about them in the 
process of discussion were that they hold similar political view—roughly centre-
left political ideology, with all of them being opposed to the current ruling 
political party in Nigeria, the People‘s Democratic Party (PDP)—and they appear 
to be keen observers of events both locally and around the world. 
 
The discussion opened with informal introductions, greetings and exchange of 
banters among the participants who had previously known one another—all of 
which lasted for about 30 minutes. Then the actual interview followed in a frank 
and open session, with participants expressing their views clearly (and sometimes 
passionately). It was done in Hausa language to avoid any encumbrance resulting 
from language deficiency. There were debates and disagreements among them 
over some issues, most of which they eventually arrived at a common position 
after long arguments—although the director of the Islamic sect and the mason 
tended to hold contrary views on few issues and appeared to steer others towards 
their respective positions (the director, for instance, strongly considered BBC to be 
biased against Islam while the mason viewed it largely as an objective 
international media). The researcher moderated and recorded the discussion. The 
recorded time of the main interview was about 43 minutes. The participants 
demanded no payment for their participation. They turned down the offer for soft 
drinks; they did not even drink water. They said they were happy they had 
participated in the discussion; and that, they said, was enough compensation for 
their time and lost earnings. This group, the urban lower middle class, was for easy 
reference named Yola Group I. 
 
Yola Group II: the working class 
The second focus group discussion was planned and organised through similar 
strategy. Two contacts, considered of working class background and who were 
regular listeners of BBC (apparently most adults in Yola do listen to BBC or other 
international broadcasters), were requested to help in contacting friends and 
acquaintances with similar background and who also accessed international media. 
They mentioned several names and 11 of them were contacted and invited for 
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panel discussion. Incidentally, in this case too, six of them turned up for the 
discussion, scheduled for 5:00pm on Monday, 11 January 2010. The time was 
negotiated with them: they did not want morning and afternoon because they were 
at work at those times; and they did not want weekends because they usually used 
them to attend to other pressing issues or for resting. The fixed time of 5:00pm, 
they felt, was perfect for them; they would come to the discussion directly from 
their work places, after which they would go home. It did not also interfere with 
their early and late afternoon prayer times as well as the evening and night prayer 
times. The chosen venue was a small open shed in the inner city where few of 
them usually sit and relax after working hours. When the researcher arrived there 
around 4:45pm, there were already five people sitting there, two of them were 
among the invited participants who live near the place. By 5:20pm six of the 
invited participants were at the venue, and when it became clear that the rest 
would not be able to come (four of them had sent excuses, one did not), the 
discussion commenced after preliminary introductions and exchanges of greetings. 
 
The six participants (all male, aged 27 to 56) comprised of a primary school 
teacher, an electricity worker, a panel beater, a motorcycle mechanic, a student-
teacher, and an aide to the state governor who was given the job mainly as a plan 
to integrate in government a member of the working class rather than as a measure 
of his skills or political influence (his salary is also within that of the working class 
category). The group as a whole, although with membership of varied 
occupational backgrounds, could be described as having a common social and 
economic standard of the working class. They are all Muslims and do listen to 
international radio stations, particularly the BBC and VOA. Unlike the Yola lower 
middle class group (which generally held a left-leaning political view), this group, 
although of working class status, ironically, tended to share a right-of-the-centre 
political persuasion, and was supportive of the ruling party. The presence of the 
governor‘s aide might have encouraged that, but he had in no way attempted to 
exert his views on others during the discussion. So their political leaning was most 
likely their self-chosen ideological tendency. 
 
The whole discussion, conducted in Hausa language to give the participants 
chance to express themselves very well, was open and frank. There were 
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passionate arguments and strong views expressed, but there were no attempts by 
any of the participants to dominate the discussion or to impose their opinions on 
others. Incidentally, despite the wide age gap, say between the 56-year-old and the 
27-year-old, and the established culture of deference (by the young to older 
persons) known among Hausa-Fulani people, the discussion was quite smooth 
with each participant putting out their arguments forcefully, unhindered by 
contrary views expressed by older participants. They all did it without any show of 
disrespect or contempt for one another‘s views. The participants here too did not 
demand payment for their efforts; no soft drink, not even water, was offered to 
anyone. Nearly one-and-a-half hours were spent at the venue (including the 
waiting time) but the actual time of the recorded interview was 31 minutes. Since 
the venue was an open place where people usually sit and relax, there were about 
seven other people watching us as we conducted the discussion. They were not 
interfering, though. Similarly, some passers-by regularly did stand and watch the 
session before walking away. They too did not interfere. The only interferences 
were the noises of moving motorcycles and bicycles that passed the venue while 
the discussion was being conducted.  
 
Njoboli Group: the peasant group 
The last focus group discussion conducted in the Northeast zone took place in 
Njoboli village in eastern part of Adamawa State. Njoboli is a large village some 
30-minute drive from Yola (it used to take longer before a new road was 
constructed in the last decade to link it to the city). It is a farming community with 
predominantly Muslim peasants and petty traders. Located not very far away from 
Nigeria‘s eastern border with Cameroon Republic, Njoboli is typical of a Nigerian 
village settlement, though it has amenities such as electricity supply, schools and a 
road which many villages lack. The people live in houses that are surrounded by 
their farms and cattle and sheep and other livestock. The place was chosen in an 
effort to get some insights into the peasants‘ interactions with international 
broadcasters. Easy access to the village and availability of a contact person who 
was familiar with the area and had friends there who could facilitate a group 
interview prompted the selection of this place.  
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The contact assisted first by linking the researcher with his friend who lives in the 
village, and second by agreeing to be part of the planning and organising of the 
session. Together the details of how to identify prospective participants, reach out 
to them, and invite them for group interviews were worked out. The Njoboli 
resident, a middle-aged farmer with apparent middle level income (by the village‘s 
standard), did the leg work in the village; received regular instructions on what he 
should be doing; contacted prospective participants; and kept us informed of the 
progress being made. When it became clear that all the preliminary works had 
been done and the participants were ready for the discussion, an agreed time and 
date were fixed. On Sunday morning, 27 February 2011, the Njoboli focus group 
discussion was conducted. It was held under a big tree in front of the house of the 
Njoboli resident who had helped enormously in organising it. All the participants 
and the moderator sat on two wide mats spread under the tree and talked.  
 
The number of persons invited was ten, but eight of them showed up; and among 
the eight, two persons declined to participate, saying they did not know what to 
really say about their experiences in engaging with the media. Efforts to persuade 
them to participate failed. However, as we were about to begin, three other people, 
who were not among those invited, came and joined the group at their own 
volition. One of them said he would like to participate in the discussion and his 
request was granted. In the middle of the discussion, two other uninvited persons 
came and sat down in the group; one of them said he would like to partake; he too 
was allowed to do so. In the end, there were eight participants—all males, aged 25 
to 53. They comprised of a farmer-shop keeper, a farmer-student, a farmer-petty 
trader, a herdsman, a farmer-teacher, a farmer-cattle herder, a farmer-day labourer 
and a farmer-tailor. 
 
They are predominantly peasant farmers; but since crop cultivation here is 
seasonal (usually from May to November when rain-fed farming is feasible), they 
complement their farming endeavours with other sources of income. Almost all of 
them keep livestock. Many of them have some knowledge of Islamic education 
and few of them have secondary school level of Western education (the teacher 
has college education). They are listeners of international broadcasters; and they 
appear to have greater knowledge of happenings around the world than initially 
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assumed. They all expressed their views freely in Hausa language, with the 
researcher just moderating and recording the discussion. Over one hour was spent 
with them; but the length of the recorded interview was about 48 minutes. They 
neither demanded nor were they offered payment for their participation in the 
discussion. Even the Njoboli resident who did quite a significant work in 
organising the session did not receive anything for his contributions. The only 
thing some of the participants requested for at the end of the session was that they 
be offered lift in our vehicle to drop them at their houses—which was done gladly 
for them. 
 
Focusing on the Northwest 
The Northwest region is the most populated of all Nigeria‘s geopolitical zones, 
according to the Nigerian Population Commission (FGN, 2007; INEC, 2011). It is 
the main home base of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, though there are indigenous 
ethnic minorities here too. It is the most predominantly Islamic region of the entire 
country, though there are Christians and other non-Muslim groups too. The zone is 
made up of Jigawa, Kaduna (the political capital of the old Northern Region), 
Kano (Northern Nigeria‘s biggest commercial centre), Katsina (one of Nigeria‘s 
earliest learning centres), Kebbi, Sokoto (the seat of Sokoto Caliphate, see 
‗Historical Context‘ chapter) and Zamfara states. The Northwest has always been 
a key target area for the BBC Hausa Service, and has been a big supplier of 
audiences. The latest BBC audience survey, though, indicates a decline of 
audience figures in the zone (BBC Global News, 2010). The 2009/10 survey notes 
that for that year in Nigeria generally the Hausa Service ‗audiences have fallen‘ 
and ‗the decrease is particularly evident in the North West and Central regions‘ of 
the country. ‗The main reasons given by Hausa speakers for listening less 
frequently are poor reception quality, lack of time to listen and using alternative 
sources‘ (BBC Global News, 2010).  
 
Still, the Northwest is probably the most vital area for the BBC Hausa Service 
operations because of the magnitude of its geopolitical and historical significance 
to the station as seen from the nature of its composition noted above. After all, the 
battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslims is one of the major concerns of 
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many international broadcasters now (Thussu, 2005, 2006; Pinkerton and Dodds, 
2009). Getting a glimpse of the BBC and other international broadcasters‘ 
audiences in the region was, therefore, important for this study. The limited 
resources and scope of this research would not allow the generation of huge data 
from large samples covering the entire zone. As such a decision was made to get 
some audiences from Kano and Katsina to generate data that could provide some 
insights into their interactions with global media. It was resolved that lengthy face-
to-face individual interviews with some selected Kanawa (Kano people) and a 
focus group with Katsinawa (Katsina people) would help in meeting this need.  
 
The Kanawa identified for the individual interviews are as fellows: a university 
lecturer, a former female newspaper editor and a factory worker. They are all 
regular consumers of international media, and they provided detailed information 
on their interactions with, and thoughts about, the international media. Kano, the 
most prosperous city of the Sokoto Caliphate, has a long history of vigorous 
intellectual, industrial and commercial activities, and boasts of the largest urban 
centre and highest population figures in Northern Nigeria (Ado-Kurawa, 2004). 
Metropolitan Kano consists of eight local government areas and the 2006 census 
shows that it had at that time a population of over 2.8 million (FGN, 2007). Kano 
State as a whole, of which Kano city serves as capital, had a population figure of 
over 9.4 million then, according to the 2006 census figures (FGN, 2007), making it 
the state with the highest population in Nigeria. So the people interviewed did not, 
by any stretch of imagination, constitute a representative sample of Kano‘s 
international media audiences. They just gave a glimpse of what was obtainable 
with regard to a few of such audiences. The main consolation, though, was that 
this research (as reflected in the ‗Literature Review‘ and ‗Historical Context‘ 
chapters) has made copious references to a significant academic work done by 
Brian Larkin (2008) on Kano people‘s engagement with the media.  
 
Katsina Group: the local politicians 
Katsina city is just 170 kilometres away from Kano and is one of the biggest and 
oldest cities closest to Nigeria‘s northern border with Niger Republic. Previously a 
city-state, it was probably founded in the tenth or twelfth century (Palmer, 
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1926)—‗there is much less information on the early history of Katsina‘ (Adamu, 
1984, p.273). It has been a well-established centre of Islamic education since the 
fourteenth century (Palmer, 1926; Adamu, 1984) and was one of the early trade 
routes linking North African merchants with West Africans (Palmer, 1926). It had 
bitter rivalry with Kano, though, over the control of the trans-Saharan commerce 
for two centuries (Fisher, 1975). ‗Early in the seventeenth century, two Kano 
Sarkis (kings) died on campaigns against Katsina,‘ noted Fisher (1975, p.117). 
‗Both Sarki Kutumbi of Kano and his son Al Haji were killed in battle by the 
Katsinawa, after which a treaty of peace was made between Kano and Katsina,‘ 
wrote Herbert Richmond Palmer (1926, p.226) who had served as British colonial 
resident for Katsina, Kano and Bornu Provinces. The war between Kano and 
Katsina, both under the leadership of Muslim kings, apparently ended when they 
were confronted by the threat of invading non-Muslim armies of Kwararrafa who 
actually invaded Kano and moved east to besiege the then powerful Muslim 
kingdom of Bornu until they ‗were driven back‘ by its ruler Mai Ali Umarmi ‗and 
apparently severely defeated around 1680‘ (Palmer, 1926, p.226).  
 
So Katsina had quite a long history of politics, war, commerce and learning long 
before the advent of colonialism at the beginning of the twentieth century. During 
the colonial administration too Katsina was among the earliest places in the North 
to get Western type of schools. Northern Nigeria‘s first colonial education officer 
Hans Vischer in 1912 opened a formal Western school in the city and established 
in 1923 Katsina Teachers‘ Training College (Stewart, 1986) where a significant 
number of early Nigerian leaders, including its first prime minister Tafawa Balewa 
and Northern Nigeria‘s premier Ahmadu Bello, were trained. Katsina State itself 
produced many prominent Nigerian scholars and leaders, including former head of 
state General Muhammadu Buhari who later became Nigeria‘s opposition leader, 
former president Umaru Yar‘adua and his brother General Shehu Yar‘adua, who 
was the deputy of the former Nigeria‘s military leader Olusegun Obasanjo in the 
1970s. Currently, the state capital has many higher educational institutions, 
including Umaru Yar‘adua University and Katsina University. It terms of 
composition, Katsina is a classic Hausa-Fulani state, almost entirely Islamic (non-
Muslims are mainly migrants), and Hausa is the native language.  
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The historical and geopolitical importance of the city as well as the background 
and composition of its population, being the natural target of the BBC Hausa 
Service and many other international Hausa language broadcasters, made Katsina 
a natural choice for focus group discussion. Familiarity with the city, being the 
birth place of the researcher, and massive contacts with the people—despite long 
absence—made it quite easy to plan and hold a focus group discussion in the city. 
Personal friends and acquaintances were first contacted on telephones to make 
contact with local community leaders and sound the idea of their possible 
participation in a panel discussion. Elderly community leaders did not give 
positive response but middle-aged elected politicians and local officials were 
somewhat enthusiastic. Ten of them were contacted, seven agreed, and five turned 
up for the discussion.  
 
A venue was suggested by one of the participants, the secretary of Katsina Local 
Government Council, who along with the other participants felt that it was 
convenient for all of them to be there early evening. It was a construction site 
where some of them were building new houses, in a newly-provided site near the 
highbrow Government Reservation Area (GRA), the neighbourhood of the rich 
and influential people in the city. GRA quarters, which exist in almost all Nigerian 
towns and cities where colonial administrators had lived, were colonial creations 
meant to separate the British colonial administrators and their staff from the 
natives (Larkin, 2008). These were areas demarcated far away from the original 
towns and cities where the natives lived; it was in those reserved areas that the 
houses of the colonial officers and their staff were built; and they lived there 
during the colonial administration. After independence, however, the local 
administrators who replaced the colonial officials moved to those places. Many 
rich and influential locals too bought plots of land and built houses and moved to 
those areas. In the case of Katsina, though, there are still many rich and influential 
people who still live in the old city (as has also been the case in many other cities 
in Northern Nigeria). Some of them own residences in both the highbrow 
neighbourhood of GRA and in the old city. 
 
The venue for our discussion was in the area that is part of the extension of the 
GRA; and the participants were among a growing number of ‗young‘ politicians in 
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the city whose prosperity was reflected by the new houses they were erecting. We 
met in the early evening of Tuesday, 22 February 2011, at the construction site. 
New roads were being built and their houses were near completion. We gathered 
in one of the uncompleted buildings, owned by one of the participants. The five 
participants were all male, aged 34 to 50, and apparently comfortable with their 
positions as local officials in the city. They comprised of the secretary of Katsina 
Local Government Council, its supervisory councillor in charge of education and 
social services, supervisory councillor in charge of agriculture, one elected 
councillor, and a former bank worker-turned-politician. They all have at least 
college-level education, have wide access to a variety of international media 
products and were well exposed to local politics, which was not surprising, 
considering the fact that they are career politicians. 
 
The discussion was held openly and freely, unhindered by any form of 
interference. The participants were very familiar with one another, and none of 
them attempted to force his views on others. There were some divergence of views 
on some issues at the beginning but gradually their views began to converge as 
each participant brought forward his arguments. The whole discussion was 
conducted in Hausa language. The researcher served as the moderator while at the 
same time tape-recording the session. The recorded length of the discussion was 
33 minutes. The time spent with them was well over one hour, though. There was 
obviously no demand for payment for participation in the discussion; and given 
their comfortable social status, no offer of drinks was made to any of them, 
knowing fully well that it would be turned down. 
 
Focusing on North-central zone 
The North-central zone presents a different scenario from both the Northwest and 
Northeast regions‘ in multiple ways. The historical background of the region, the 
composition of its population and the reports of BBC‘s audience surveys about the 
station‘s audiences in the region collectively provided a picture of quite a complex 
region. The states of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau as well as 
the Nigeria‘s capital Abuja made up the region; but the difference with the other 
regions is better viewed from a wider perspective. While the Northwest and to a 
 182 
large extent the Northeast have predominant Hausa-Fulani Muslim population, the 
North-central could more appropriately be described as the region of Northern 
Nigeria‘s ethnic minorities—some of whom are majority in their respective states, 
such as the Tiv in Benue State, the Nupe in Niger State and the Igala in Kogi State. 
The dominance of Islam is also an area of contestation in this region. It may be 
obtainable in states like Niger, Kwara, Nasarawa, the Federal Capital Territory 
Abuja and perhaps Kogi; but Plateau and Benue are predominantly Christian 
states. And most people in Kwara and part of Kogi (the Okun people) have greater 
linguistic attachment with their Yoruba kinsmen in the Southwest than with the 
Hausa-speaking people of the Northwest, even though they largely share Islamic 
affinity with the latter. 
 
In terms of trends regarding BBC audience figures in the region, the situation is 
equally fluid. The 2008/09 survey indicates that the BBC audiences in the region 
have increased slightly but the following year‘s survey shows that BBC listening 
has decreased significantly in the region (BBC Global News, 2009, 2010). 
Similarly, while the Northwest and Northeast were clearly identified with strong 
BBC Hausa audiences, the North-central zone was identified with both Hausa and 
English audiences (BBC Global News, 2009). This could be understood from the 
background of the strong presence of both Hausa-speaking people and non-Hausa 
speakers in the region. As a whole the North-central region presents a combination 
of complexity and dynamism deserving of careful examination. Gauging global 
broadcasters‘ audiences‘ perspectives in the region became imperative for this 
study. To do this effectively, it was decided that both individual interviews and 
focus group discussions should be conducted in the region. The obvious location is 
the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, for its centrality (in the region and for the 
whole country), its accommodation of diverse groups (both those within and those 
outside the region) and its accessibility (by air and by road). The researcher‘s 
familiarity with the city, having served as his former working place, and the 
availability of contacts to help in picking out participants were additional benefits.  
 
The Federal Capital Territory is a fairly new creation that came into being after the 
federal military administration of General Murtala Mohammed realised in the mid-
1970s that Lagos was too congested to remain as Nigeria‘s federal capital. They 
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also apparently wanted a central and fairly neutral place that was not dominated by 
any major ethnic group to serve as a unifying city for the country, hence Abuja‘s 
eventual appellation as ―Centre of Unity‖ (Ogbogbo, 2005). They set up Justice 
Akinola Aguda Committee which in 1976 identified the most central place in 
Nigeria that was lightly occupied by indigenous Gwari (Gbagyi), Gwandara and 
Bassa peoples (many of whom have now relocated to the outskirts of the city) and 
suggested it as the best location for a new capital (Ogbogbo, 2005; FCT, 2010).  
 
Historically, the old Abuja was founded by the Hausa ruling dynasty of Zaria in 
the fifteenth century but it did not fall under Sokoto Caliphate after the nineteenth 
century djihad (as the other Hausa-controlled territories did), though it did fall 
under its ‗political suzerainty‘ during colonialism due to the indirect rule system 
(Ogbogbo, 2005). Similarly, Ogbogbo (2005) noted, although Abuja‘s original 
‗inhabitants were predominantly practitioners of African traditional religion, a 
good number of them later embraced Islam and Christianity, during the colonial 
era‘. As a centrally-located and sparsely occupied territory, Abuja became 
attractive to Justice Aguda‘s committee. So when the committee completed their 
study, they recommended that Abuja become Nigeria‘s new capital. It was built as 
such, and by December 1991 some federal establishments, including the 
Presidency, have already relocated to the new city.  
 
Many more government establishments relocated later, and new ones were also 
established. Diplomatic missions and embassies, big international and local 
business concerns, small scale enterprises and local shops have all found 
themselves in the new capital. The headquarters of the West African regional 
grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the 
regional office of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
are also located there. With all these, come hundreds of thousands of people who 
are trooping and settling down in the city. ‗Twice the size of Lagos, Abuja was 
planned to accommodate a population of 3.1 million people when fully developed‘ 
(Ogbogbo, 2005). It may soon exceed this target, though. Already, the 2006 census 
figures put its population at over 1.4 million (FGN, 2007). With an annual rate of 
population growth in some parts of the city put at about 20 per cent, Abuja is the 
fastest expanding city in Nigeria, recording the highest rate of population growth 
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in the country (FGN, 2007; INEC, 2011). Of course, it is not only the people in the 
North-central region, or people in Northern Nigeria alone, that troop to Abuja 
(though they might be the largest group, given the proximity and affinity factors); 
people from all parts of the country are moving and settling in the city.  
 
This is a problem both for the city‘s administrators and for anyone doing a 
research that involves the city. Abuja‘s administrators would be dealing with the 
nightmare of planning for such a rapidly rising population and provisions of 
amenities for them while a researcher would have to contend with sampling 
trouble. The decision on who to pick among the residents of the city and interview 
to generate data that could give insights on the people‘s engagement with 
international media became problematic for this researcher. The realistic way to 
handle it, given the limited resources, was to seek for long-term residents who 
have been in the city for at least five years or who have long familiarity with the 
city and who are regular listeners of international broadcasters, particularly the 
BBC World Service, and generate the data from them. These criteria were used in 
selecting participants for both the individual interviews and focus group 
discussions. 
 
The individual interviews, being the easier bit, were the first to be planned and 
carried out. Three persons with varied experiences and backgrounds were selected 
for lengthy face-to-face interviews. They are: a post-graduate student, a veteran 
trade unionist and a petty trader. They were interviewed separately on different 
days and at the locations of their choice: the graduate student on Monday 
afternoon, 14 September 2009, at Abuja Press Centre; the veteran trade unionist on 
Tuesday afternoon, 15 September 2009, at the office of his friend; and the petty 
trader on Saturday night, 19 September 2009, at the home of his friend. The length 
of time spent with each of them was about one hour each; but the length of the 
recorded interview averaged 14 minutes per respondent: graduate student (13 
minutes), trade unionist (15 minutes) and petty trader (14 minutes). They all 
responded to all the questions put to them and expressed their views quite clearly. 
The veteran trade unionist and graduate student were interviewed in English while 
the trader was interviewed in Hausa language which was later translated by the 
researcher. They were all transcribed and analysed along with the other individual 
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interviews that collectively provided the data for the ‗Results and Analysis I‘ 
chapter. 
 
Abuja Group I: journalists (the middle class) 
The first focus group discussion planned and carried out in Abuja for this study 
was with professional journalists who are not only heavy consumers of 
international media products but also professional users of them and producers of 
local media goods. Abuja, being Nigeria‘s political capital hosting the Presidency 
and the National Assembly and all the highest echelon of the Judiciary, is the 
centre of intense media coverage. The coverage intensifies with the gradual rise of 
activities in the private sector and international presence and other related matters 
noted earlier about the city. The number of journalists and media outlets (both 
those based in the city and those with headquarters elsewhere but set up offices 
here) is growing rapidly. Getting a lot of journalists to interview would not be 
difficult. The trouble, though, was that some of them would not fit into the criteria 
designed to select participants for this research. The main criteria set for picking 
participants within this region were, therefore, applied in selecting the journalist 
respondents, too. They have to be long-term resident of Abuja and consumers of 
international media goods, particularly the BBC World Service‘s products, in 
addition to being journalists.  
 
These criteria were met by many journalists in the city and about eleven of them 
were identified and requested for participation in focus group interview. They 
were all willing to partake but three of them could not spare time for it, while two 
others who initially agreed had to back out at the last-minute because of some 
emergency assignments they had to do. The remaining six were, however, ready 
for it; and we met at the line editors‘ room of the Media Trust‘s head office in 
Jabi, one of Abuja‘s suburbs, for the session. They comprise of a deputy daily 
newspaper editor who is also a former editor of a weekly publication, a political 
editor, a sports‘ editor, a business editor, a deputy news editor and a deputy 
political editor. They are well educated—each has at least a university degree—
and have long experience in the profession (an average of ten years‘ journalism 
practice). With their educational and professional backgrounds and apparent 
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comfortable income (as stated earlier), the members of this group appeared to have 
a conventional middle class status by Nigerian or even universal standard.  
 
They seemed to be well aware of what was required in focus group discussion, and 
there was no need to spend time for lengthy introductions and exchanges of 
greetings as witnessed in the previous panel discussions with other groups. 
Members of this group were very busy people, and some of them were working on 
their laptops and BlackBerry phones for the short moment spent waiting for the 
last participant to join the team. As soon as the nature and objectives of the 
research as well as the confidentiality aspects and general requirements were 
explained to them, the session began. It was a very vigorous and open debate, with 
each participant putting out his viewpoint in clear terms. The session was held in 
the afternoon of Thursday, 10 February 2011, in English language. The time spent 
was about one hour, with the actual recorded time of the interview being a little 
over 40 minutes.  
 
Abuja Group II: the university students 
The second focus group discussion done in Abuja was the one organised with the 
undergraduate students of Abuja University. The university is not located in the 
centre of the city (though it has an outreach centre and offices there); its campuses 
(both the temporary and permanent ones) are located in a nearby town, 
Gwagwalada, about one hour drive from Abuja, on the way to Kogi State capital, 
Lokoja, the town hosting the confluence of Nigeria‘s two biggest rivers, River 
Benue and River Niger. Driving from Abuja to Gwagwalada is quite difficult 
nowadays because the major road linking the two places is also the road to the 
city‘s airport, Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, which has been undergoing 
reconstruction work for several months now. There were heavy traffics and road 
diversions and reckless driving along the road. It took more than two hours of 
difficult driving from Abuja to reach Gwagwalada, and the delay nearly killed the 
planned focus group with the students. 
 
The discussion was planned some eight months earlier. It started with the help of a 
lecturer in the university who introduced the researcher to the president of the 
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national association of political science students of the institution in February 
2010. The researcher maintained contact with the president and sought his 
assistance for a focus group interview with undergraduate students, briefing him 
on the kind of participants required. The president started working on that, but the 
university was closed for holiday before he managed to finish. When the school 
resumed and the president was ready to proceed with the planning for the session, 
the researcher was not in Nigeria at that time. By the time the researcher returned, 
the president, who was a final year student when the discussion began, has already 
completed his studies and left the university. Luckily, however, his successor was 
his friend and he introduced the researcher to him. 
 
It was with the new president, a tall gentleman in his 20s, that the plan for the 
focus group proceeded, still with some assistance of the former president. They 
remained in touch with the researcher, providing updates on the progress of the 
plan and the potential participants contacted. When it became clear that every 
thing was in place for the session to hold, a tentative date, Saturday, 19 March 
2011, was suggested as a possible day; but the former president said the students 
were not likely to sacrifice their weekend for any panel session. The new president 
was left to negotiate with the other potential participants to work out the best date. 
They resolved for Monday afternoon (1:00pm), 28 March 2011, at a club opposite 
the temporary campus of the university in the centre of Gwagwalada town. 
Thinking that the drive from Abuja to Gwagwalada was just one hour, as it used to 
be, the researcher left the city at 11:45am. The congested traffics and diversions 
pushed it to over two-hour drive. He did not reach the venue until 2:00pm, and by 
then most of the invited participants had already left. Through mobile phone 
conversation with the president while on the way, the researcher had already 
known that he was too late. The 1:00pm appointment they gave was based on their 
lectures‘ schedule which gave them one hour break within which they had hoped 
to attend the panel session and resume classes at 2:00pm.  
 
By the time the researcher arrived, only the president and one other student were 
still waiting at the venue. There was virtually nothing to do but to wait for others 
to finish their classes and be persuaded to participate in the session. The president 
disclosed that some of the students were not actually attending a scheduled lecture; 
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they were attending a special lecture organised by their lecturer who had defaulted 
in the previous scheduled lectures and now wanted to cover for the lost session. He 
said that since it was not a normal lecture session, some of them had told him that 
when I arrived he should inform them so that they could come out for the focus 
group discussion. But I told him that I would be the last person to encourage that. 
We waited for them until they finished around 3:30pm before the session began. 
The researcher ordered soft drinks and snacks at the club‘s canteen for them and 
opened the session. There were ten students—nine males and a female—most in 
their 20s and two in their early 30s. They were all undergraduate students in their 
final year, except one who was a year behind. Just as the discussion began, one of 
the students excused himself saying he had an urgent matter to attend to. Some of 
the participants frowned at him (apparently feeling bad that he took the drinks and 
snacks without partaking in the discussion), but the researcher quickly told them 
that there was no compulsion in participation.  
 
The remaining nine students participated in the discussion, and most of them 
spoke passionately to express their views. Only two of them—the female (who left 
before the completion of the session) and one other student—spoke in less 
passionate way, though they too spoke clearly with conviction on what they 
believe in. The discussion was done in English language. The venue was very 
noisy, with very loud sound coming from a huge power generating set supplying 
power to the club (electricity supply was very poor in Nigeria) and a small noisy 
market nearby adding to the problem. Other students too were coming and going 
out of the venue, but they refrained from interfering in our discussion. With the 
exception of the noisy interference, the session was very lively, lasting longer than 
any of the other sessions, mainly because of the number of participants (which was 
the largest of all the other discussions) and also because of the students‘ apparent 
tendency to put out lengthy arguments in defence of their positions. Apart from the 
one-and-a-half hours spent waiting for the other participants to return, the time 
spent with them was about one hour, 35 minutes. The time spent recording the 





The methodological approach employed for this research tried to conform to all 
the ethical principles required for a research of this nature. All the participants and 
contacts involved in this research were adequately and clearly informed of the 
nature of the research and its aims and objectives. They were all treated openly 
and politely in a fair and even-handed manner. The respondents were given 
complete assurance of confidentiality in all the views they expressed. There were 
some who clearly said that they were not worried about confidentially and that 
their names and other details could be included. These were some of the people 
whose details were slightly mentioned in some cases. But as a whole there was a 
deliberate effort to keep all the respondents‘ details in confidence. Any 
qualification given to any respondent must be in a situation where it was believed 
that a mention of such person‘s post could add to the quality of the data used, and 
it was done with the consent of the information‘s provider. Names of respondents 
were kept out to avoid exact identification and to reinforce the confidentiality 
principle.  
 
On the personal level, the researcher‘s journalistic background has been both a 
help and a hindrance for this research in different ways. As someone who had 
worked for both the print and broadcast media, the knowledge of the operations of 
media and production processes must have sharpened my skills in interrogating the 
nature and workings of such processes and how they played out in audiences‘ 
interactions with their products. However, such prior knowledge might have 
equally put me in a disadvantaged position of taking things for granted or of being 
so much involved as to compromise the detachment expected of a professional 
researcher. I was very conscious of both and tried to avoid them. Of greater 
concern, though, was even my background as someone who has been working for 
the BBC World Service mostly on freelance basis on-and-off for about one-and-a-
half decades; and on how independent I could be in researching such organisation. 
I was very conscious of this too, and tried hard to put a clear demarcation between 
my professional background and my academic research. The fact that the research 
was not funded by the organisation or any other organ with corporate interest in its 
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outcome made it to be even freer from any pressure that could compromise its 
standard. 
 
The background of working for the BBC has actually been helpful in facilitating 
access to the people in the organisation that would have otherwise been very 
difficult to reach; just as it has been in providing the knowledge of some workings 
of the organisation that someone without such experience might not have known. 
The experience has also guided the search for appropriate persons to contact for 
relevant information used in the research. It has equally been useful in giving the 
skills for observing trends and putting them in proper context; but I refrained from 
including observation as part of the methodology employed here because I did not 
employ any systematic observation strategy in the study. Personal reflection had 
been helpful too, but this too has not been systematically applied here.  
 
However, one drawback where my relationship with the BBC tried to affect this 
research was noticed during few of the interviews with the audiences in Nigeria. 
This was in the case of those audiences who recognised me as someone who has 
worked for the BBC and tried to answer questions in a way that they felt might 
please me. In a sense this created the danger of ‗experimenter demand‘ (Morrison, 
1998, p.185). I was acutely aware of this danger, and where I sensed it I took time 
and care from the beginning of the interviews to make it clear that the research 
was purely academic and had nothing to do with my work experience or with the 
BBC as an organisation. Similarly, in my questioning strategy I tried vigorously to 
show absolute detachment with whatever view any respondent was expressing, 
thus providing a real conducive atmosphere for them to freely voice their genuine 
views on any issue raised.  
 
Summary 
The methodological approach applied in drawing the primary data for this research 
was qualitative in nature. This was, however, amply complemented with statistical 
data drawn from large scale audience surveys done from a positivist research 
tradition. It was a unique approach adopted here successfully to maximise the 
benefits of the two traditions and minimise their shortcomings. Focus group 
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method has proved very useful in generating qualitative data from the audiences 
on the field, and so has individual interview technique in eliciting responses from 
both the media products‘ producers and consumers, which provided valuable 
insights into the interactions of the two sides. Qualitative content analysis and 
documentary research strategies have further strengthened the methodological 
efforts to enhance the quality of this research. This chapter has also unveiled the 
mainly purposeful sampling procedure adopted here in selecting the participants, 
their compositions and backgrounds, and the nature and quality of the data 
generated from them. The areas covered by the research and its scope—ranging 
from the interrogation of the production side both in Britain and Nigeria and the 
nature of the content being produced to the examination of their impact on their 
consumers in Nigeria—were equally laid out here. The locations where audiences 
were selected and studied—ranging from the sleepy city of Yola and the peasants‘ 
abode of Njoboli both in Northeastern Nigeria to the ancient city of Katsina in the 
Northwest and the rising Nigeria‘s capital of Abuja and the neighbouring 
provincial university town of Gwagwalada both in North-central region—were all 
revealed here, together with their brief backgrounds. The ethical issues concerned 
with this research, along with the pitfalls of the interrupting factors and how they 
were promptly addressed, were also not left out. All these were to ensure that all 
issues related to the methodological realm were clearly brought out and resolved 





Contents and Quantification 
 
Introduction 
In the competitive world of international communications and changing 
geopolitics, global broadcasters are not merely interested in reaching transnational 
audiences; they are primarily interested in influencing their attitudes and 
behaviours. The broadcasters‘ potent means of doing this are their products. 
Programming is one of the key factors that distinguish one broadcaster from the 
other: it is their respective selling point, their instrument of retaining and 
expanding their audience shares, and their strongest weapon of persuasion. The 
BBC World Service has distinguished itself—and often wants to be referred to—
as an ‗impartial‘ provider of international news and analysis. It does not only 
cover and distribute news on a global scale, but it also ‗tailors‘ its programmes and 
services to meet the specific needs of various regions (BBC, 2008). It is within this 
framework that the BBC Hausa Service was conceived, and is being operated, to 
deliver services to the Hausa-speaking region of Africa, with Nigeria providing the 
largest number of the audiences. The World Service also assesses its reach, its 
performance and its reputation in the region through regular audience surveys. 
This chapter, apart from providing an overview of the guiding principles and 
structural framework that generally guide content selection and programme-
making, equally contains content analysis of selected BBC Hausa Service 
programmes transmitted for its audiences. It also analyses BBC‘s quantitative 
surveys in Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the results obtained in the past four 
consecutive years, unveiling the BBC‘s audience figures and performance in the 
country, the audiences‘ demographics, their programming preferences and their 
assessments of the competing broadcasters. 
 
Focusing on contents 
As would be expected of a leading international broadcaster keen on keeping tabs 
on global news agenda, the nature of the daily content of the BBC World Service 
is generally shaped by the daily happenings around the world. The main 
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programming structures are determined by the BBC‘s aims and objectives, and 
guided by the BBC Editorial Guidelines—a book that contains every thing from 
procedures for content selection to guides on handling difficult subjects and 
coverage of sensitive events. It is usually reviewed and updated every five years to 
accommodate socio-political and technological changes and to meet the changing 
needs of BBC journalism. The latest one, released in October 2010, which 
accommodates changes brought in by advancement in delivery technologies, was 
an update from the preceding one, released in June 2005—itself a product of 
another review, significantly influenced by the editorial crisis that emanated from 
the 2003/04 BBC-Blair Government‘s dispute over the coverage of Iraqi War, as it 
was released after the Gilligan-Kelly Affair (Thompson, 2005; Pinkerton and 
Dodds, 2009). Changing times, political environment and managerial structure of 
the corporation also determine the content of the editorial guidelines and the 
nature of its approving body. The 2005 edition, for instance, says: ‗The guidelines 
are approved by the Board of Governors and are kept under constant review by the 
BBC‘s Editorial Policy team, who also develop other editorial policy‘ (BBC 
Guidelines, 2005, p.10). But the 2010 guidelines were ‗written by the BBC 
Executive and approved by the BBC Trust‘ (BBC Guidelines, 2010) to reflect the 
fact that the BBC Trust is now the governing body of the corporation.   
 
Essentially, the guidelines are drawn in accordance with the BBC‘s aims and 
objectives, and they in turn serve as a guide to achieving them. This forms the 
circle within which programmes and services are produced and distributed. The 
BBC World Service and its constituent language services operate within this 
framework. Top on the BBC World Service‘s aims, as indicated earlier, are:  
 ‗To be the world‘s best-known and most-respected voice in international 
news, thereby bringing benefit to the UK, the BBC and to audiences 
around the world   
 To provide the most trusted, relevant and high-quality international news in 
the world and an indispensable service of independent analysis and 
explanation…  
 To connect and engage audiences by facilitating an informed and 
intelligent dialogue – a global conversation – which transcends 
international borders and cultural divides…‘ (BBC, 2008).  
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The first two aims clearly deal with programming on international news and 
current affairs, and are operationalised in terms of gathering and transmission of 
news, interviews, analyses, features and related matters. The third aim relates to 
what they call ‗global debate‘ that is being realised through interactive 
programmes, particularly those broadly branded as ‗Have Your Say‘ which is run 
by almost all the services (BBC, 2008). It is called ‗World Have Your Say‘ in the 
main BBC World Service English programming, ‗Africa Have Your Say‘ in the 
African Service, ‗Ra‘ayi Riga‘ in the Hausa Service, and so on. The BBC calls 
content coming from this and other interactive programmes ‗user-generated 
content‘ since it comes from forums in which the audiences participate in 
‗multimedia debate and discussion‘ on topical issues, with a BBC presenter 
serving as a moderator of the debate (BBC, 2008; BBC, 2010a). But some 
researchers see such programmes as the BBC‘s strategy of achieving the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office‘s ‗digital diplomacy initiatives‘ (Sreberny et al., 
2010b, p.280; Hill and Alshaer, 2010). 
 
Whether the emphasis is on the user-generated or BBC-generated content and 
whatever their ideological intentions are, the combined volume of content the 
BBC delivers to Nigerians on daily basis is enormous. It comes from its various 
services and through different distribution technologies accessible to Nigerians: on 
radio, on television and online. The global World Service English programme on 
radio is available for 19 hours daily; and for 24 hours on television and online 
(BBC World Service, 2008; BBC Global News, 2010)—it is the same content for 
the rest of the global audiences. The online content is delivered through the ‗multi-
media site bbc.co.uk‘ which ‗is updated 24x7 and covers international news and 
in-depth analysis plus all programmes in audio online‘ (BBC Global News, 2010). 
The African English programming, with special focus on African continent, is 
approximately five hours a day that comes in the forms of Network Africa, World 
Today, Focus on Africa, Africa Have Your Say and Fast Track programmes (BBC 
World Service, 2008; BBC Global News, 2010).  
 
The service that most intensely targets Nigerians is the BBC Hausa Service, with 
its four daily transmissions delivered on short-wave radio and satellite audio 
channel [the previous live news broadcast through FM partner station Ray Power 
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Radio, as noted earlier, was banned by the Nigerian government (BBC World 
Service, 2007)]. The Hausa Service content can also be accessed ‗24x7 online‘ at 
its multimedia site bbchausa.com and has additional hand-held mobile offerings 
(Tangaza, 2010). The formal schedules of the four daily Hausa radio transmissions 
are as follows: 
 Morning transmission, Shirin Safe, 0530-0600 GMT (6:30-7:00 am in Nigeria) 
 Late morning transmission, Shirin Hantsi, 0630-0700 GMT 
 Afternoon transmission, Shirin Rana, 1400-1430 GMT (1345-1415 until 2011) 
 Evening transmission, Shirin Yamma, 1930-2000 GMT. 
 
The standard format for each of these programmes, as the content analysis below 
will show, is set in such a way that the main news headlines come first, followed 
by the ‗core‘ and ‗regional‘ news bulletins and then the full news reports (usually 
starting with the top international news or Nigerian news report, if it is adjudged to 
be of global significance), interviews and analyses. This is the standard format for 
weekday programmes. There is a slight variation for weekend programmes, such 
that the news headlines and core and regional news bulletins are followed by one 
or two full news report and then talks or listeners‘ letters or entertainment 
segment. A special sports‘ broadcast is also aired on Saturdays, usually focusing 
on English premiership matches; it was added just as the Shirin Rana (afternoon 
transmission) which used to be aired at 1345 GMT was shifted to 1400 GMT 
(Tangaza, 2010). The full news reports, interviews and analyses are arranged in 
order of their significance—news worthiness, timeliness, relevance to target 
audiences—and are usually followed with relevant listeners‘ text messages. The 
core news bulletins are the top international news stories that make the main 
headlines in the global BBC English offering (taken directly from the main news 
basket in the World Service‘s central newsroom and translated for Hausa listeners) 
while the regional news bulletins are those about West Africa in particular and 
Africa in general (that also undergo similar process as the core news bulletins). 
Other items accorded importance in the Hausa Service programming are news 
about Britain, stories about the Muslim and Arab world, news about the 
developing countries that Hausa listeners can easily relate to, and reports on 
health, education and other developmental issues. They are drawn from the World 
Service‘s newsroom or from other regional services, and translated by the Hausa 
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Service staff both at the Bush House in London and BBC‘s Abuja bureau in 
Nigeria. News reports, features and analyses from Nigeria, Niger, Ghana and 
Cameroon where the Hausa Service has resident reporters are often original sent in 
by the reporters. They are edited by the producers or editors and arranged along 
with other reports and transmitted to the listeners.  
 
To clearly illustrate the nature of the form and content of the BBC Hausa Service 
programme, three different programmes, transmitted in three different years (2008, 
2009 and 2010), were randomly selected and analysed here. They were taken from 
the sound archives of the Hausa Service‘s transmitted programmes, listened to, 
transcribed, translated into English language and analysed. The first programme 
was transmitted in the afternoon of 6 October 2008 (Hausa, 2008) (see Appendix 
I); the second was transmitted in the afternoon of 14 October 2009 (Hausa, 2009); 
and the third in the evening of 14 July 2010 (Hausa, 2010). As clearly explained in 
the preceding ‗Methodology‘ chapter, these selected programmes are not by any 
stretch of imagination a representative sample of the BBC Hausa Service 
programmes that have continuously been transmitted for over half a century. They 
were primarily selected to illustrate the nature of the form and content of the 
Hausa Service programmes so as to get some insights into the station‘s 
programming structure, the arrangement of the contents, the patterns of their 
production and presentation and how they conform to the editorial policies and 
guidelines as well as the aims and objectives of the producing organisation. The 
form is identified in the kind of language and style used in the programmes and the 
way the items of the programmes were arranged and presented. The contents are 
analysed on the basis of the nature of the stories handled, the areas covered, the 
kind of emphasis given and the perspective taken as well as their conformity—or 
lack of it—to the BBC World Service‘s objectives and BBC‘s editorial guidelines. 
It is a qualitative content analysis presented under the following headings: ‗Dose 
of international news and current affairs‘; ‗A Western perspective?‘; ‗From local 





Dose of international news and current affairs 
To start with the form, each of the three selected programmes is 30-minute long; is 
based on the Hausa Service‘s in-house standard format; follows identical technical 
procedure; and is presented in a simple broadcast language. Standard format here 
means editorial stratification of the programme, starting it, in this instance, with 
the news headlines and news menu (the most exciting news or clips of the 
programme), followed by core news bulletins and then full reports and interviews 
or analysis (see Appendix I). It is based on the BBC Hausa Service template 
designed by the station for the producers and presenters of its programmes to 
follow. It is sometimes modified or slightly altered as situation warrants, say, in 
the case of blanket coverage of big breaking news. In these three programmes, 
though, the standard format was strictly adhered to. The technical procedure, on its 
part, refers to the studio-enhanced strategies of demarcating different segments of 
a programme with assigned signature tunes signifying the opening of the 
programme, the news headline space, the starting and ending of news bulletins, the 
middle of the programme, the sports segment (for those with sports), and the 
completion of the programme. It was followed to the letter in each of these three 
transmitted programmes. In both editorial and technical spheres all the three 
programmes therefore follow the same template provided by the BBC Hausa 
Service. 
 
The variation is, of course, in the contents because each of the programmes 
contains the reports of the happenings at its particular time on the specific areas 
and subjects it treated. This is clear right from the news headlines down to the 
final item in the programmes. The 6 October 2008 programme has four headlines 
with one menu clip in the middle as follows:  
 The global financial markets have slumped today, despite efforts by world 
leaders at the weekend to bolster financial institutions. 
 In Accra, Ghana‘s capital city, some influential Nigerian and Ghanaian 
businessmen are holding a meeting. What do they want to achieve? 
  Our hope is that the leaders of these two countries (Ghana and Nigeria) would              
agree to implement whatever is discussed and agreed upon (at this meeting). 
 And in Niger Republic, the government has announced next year‘s budget. 
 You would also hear that a conference has begun in Abuja aimed at 
boosting Northern Nigeria‘s economy.  
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The 14 October 2009 programme has five headlines with one menu clip tucked 
deep inside: 
 The BBC has learnt that President Obama‘s government had informed 
Britain that it would soon release details on its planned military surge in 
Afghanistan. 
 The European Union has said that the Guinean military leader should be 
prosecuted over human rights abuses. 
 Bauchi State government in Nigeria has sacked 40 government officials. 
      Stay tuned to find out why. 
 We will also hear the outcome of the talks between African 
parliamentarians and authorities in Niger Republic (over the political 
stalemate in that country) 
 They are our brothers and elders in West Africa who came here to know what is 
happening. We have explained things to them and they are satisfied. 
 The Ghanaian government has distanced itself from a report on the sale of 
the country‘s communications company (to a British firm Vodafone). 
 
The 14 July 2010 programme has four headlines with one menu clip in the middle:  
  
 The Iranian authorities have said that the country‘s nuclear scientist who 
disappeared in the United States is now on his way back home. 
 More than ten Francophone countries from Africa are attending the 
anniversary of Bastille Revolution in Paris. How do commentators view 
African leaders‘ attendance of this anniversary? 
 France wants to show to the world that it still commands respect among its 
former colonies and that it has the influence of a former colonial master. 
 The Director General of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organisation, Jacques Diouf, has visited Nigeria; we will hear what he 
goes there to do. 
 We will also hear what effort the Cameroonian anti-graft agency is putting 
in fighting corruption in the country‘s health sector. 
  
As clearly seen above, the contents are obviously different; but the formats are 
identical. The way and manner the news headlines and menus in all the three 
programmes were organised and presented are virtually the same, the language in 
all the programmes is simple and the structure of the line up of the stories is 
similar. At the top of all the headlines in all the three programmes is the leading 
international story in the BBC at that particular time: the slump of global financial 
markets (for the 6 October 2008 programme); the Obama troop surge (14 October 
2009); and the Iranian nuclear scientist‘s return (14 July 2010). These are most 
likely the lead stories for all the other services in the World Service at those times. 
The Hausa Service led with them in line with the World Service‘s objective of 
wanting to be the leading provider of global news. The leading international 
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stories were followed by important stories linked to Africa: the European Union‘s 
call for Guinean military leader Moussa Dadis Kamara‘s prosecution on alleged 
human rights abuses; the Francophone African leaders‘ attendance of France‘s 
Bastille Day anniversary—the 14 July French National Celebration marking the 
storming of Bastille Prison and the beginning of the eighteenth century French 
Revolution (Lusebrink and Reichardt, 1997); the Senegal-born UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation chief Jacques Diouf‘s visit to Nigeria; and the 
controversy over the sale of Ghana‘s national telecommunications company to 
British firm Vodafone. Coming along with them were the West African regional 
stories (the Nigerian-Ghanaian businessmen‘s summit in Accra and the West 
African parliamentarians‘ meeting with Niger Republic‘s politicians over the 
country‘s political crisis, sparked off by the then President Mamadou Tandja‘s 
decision to extend his tenure in office) and the local stories on Nigeria, Niger and 
Cameroon—a sort of glocalisation (Robertson, 1992) strategy in the news line up. 
 
After the news headlines, the next segment in each of the three programmes 
belongs to news bulletins, arranged in order of their perceived global importance, 
news worthiness, strength, timeliness and significance to the target audiences. The 
6 October 2008 programme contains five bulletins—four central core news and 
one African-related bulletin. They are as follows: the sharp fall of stock market 
prices in Europe and Asia; the planned meeting of European finance ministers to 
discuss the global financial crisis; the unprecedented $5.2 billion loss suffered by a 
leading Chinese insurance firm; Pope Benedict‘s reaction to international financial 
crisis; and the call by the prosecutor of International Criminal Court for a renewed 
effort to arrest Ugandan rebel leader Joseph Koni over his soldiers‘ attack in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The 14 October 2009 programme too contains 
five news bulletins—four central core news and one on Nigeria—arranged as 
follows: the Obama troop surge in Afghanistan; the Afghan foreign minister‘s call 
for more recruitment and training of Afghan soldiers; US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton‘s comments on her visit to Moscow to rally support for sanction 
against Iran; US State Department‘s call for Guinean military leader to resign (it 
was joined with the story of EU‘s call for his prosecution); and the abrogation of a 
law in Nigeria that barred hospitals from treating accident victims without police 
report. In the same fashion with the two previous programmes, five news 
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bulletins—this time all central core, but one with strong link to Africa—were put 
in the 14 July 2010 programme. They are as follows: Iran‘s announcement that its 
nuclear scientist, reported to have disappeared last year in US, was now on his 
way back to Tehran; Israel‘s blocking of the latest attempt by rights activists to 
ship aid to Gaza; a violent attack on two offices of the intelligence service in 
southern Yemen by suspected Al-Qaeda militants; NATO‘s confirmation of the 
killing of three of its soldiers and five civilians in an attack in Kandahar in 
Afghanistan; and Bastille Day celebration in Paris with Francophone African 
leaders in attendance. 
 
The news bulletins combined with the headlines took the first six minutes of each 
30-minute programme. They set the tone for, and give a clear picture of, the entire 
programme. The full news reports and interviews that constitute the bulk of the 
programmes are mainly the elaboration of the news contained in the headline and 
bulletin segments, plus two or three others on subjects that were not judged to be 
strong enough to feature in either. In the 6 October 2008 programme, those 
additional items are: the report on Commonwealth communications conference in 
Nigeria‘s capital Abuja; the World Teachers‘ Day celebration (Nigeria‘s ceremony 
covered); and the European Union‘s opening of its first immigration centre outside 
Europe, in the Malian capital Bamako to curtail illegal immigration of West 
Africans to Europe. The additional full news reports in the 14 October 2009 
programme are: the anti-fake drugs campaign in Niger Republic; the report on 
global hunger index; and sport news mainly about European club players and 
qualification for football world cup in South Africa. For the 14 July 2010 
programme, the additional reports are on the Nigerian national oil firm‘s debt 
denial and the controversy over road construction contract in the Northern 
Nigeria‘s city of Kano by a Chinese company. 
 
Despite the time differences—the one-year gap that separates each programme 
from the preceding one or the two-year space between the first and the last 
programmes—and the various changes that occurred in between them in the 
rapidly changing world and the variations of the stories they contain, all the three 
programmes present the sameness paradigm: the identical technical procedure and 
standard format that comply with the BBC Hausa Service template as stated 
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above. Crucially, all the three programmes were made up of hard news focusing 
on international, African and West African affairs, full of politics and economics. 
Overall, from the headlines through the bulletins down to the full reports, these 
programmes have provided a general picture of the daily diet of news and current 
affairs that the BBC Hausa Service serves to its audiences. 
 
A Western perspective? 
A key binding thread that seems to run through all the three selected programmes 
is the perspective from which the main stories were treated and the prominence 
accorded them. All the leading news stories and even the other central core news 
in all the programmes are stories of great relevance to the West and therefore 
privileging a Western viewpoint. They are, of course, important to non-Westerners 
as well, especially those in the regions directly affected by the events being 
reported; but they do hold a greater significance in the Western world. The report 
on the global financial markets‘ slump, the European finance ministers‘ meeting 
over it and the other related stories that dominated the 6 October 2008 programme 
did have international significance, but that significance was of greater resonance 
in the West than it was, for instance, in Africa. Similarly, the stories that received 
highest prominence in the 14 October 2009 programme—the Obama troop surge 
in Afghanistan, Clinton‘s campaign for sanctions against Iran and even the US-EU 
pressure for resignation, and prosecution, of Guinean leader over human right 
abuses (to stress the moral concern of the West while African leaders were largely 
silent)—were more significant from the Western point of view and to those 
directly affected (Afghans, Iranians and Guineans) than to those in other areas. 
The same can be said of the stories that dominated the 14 July 2010 programme—
the Iranian nuclear scientist‘s return to Tehran from US; the violent attack on two 
intelligence offices in southern Yemen by suspected Al-Qaeda militants; the 
NATO‘s confirmation of killing of three of its soldiers and five civilians in 
Afghanistan; and the Bastille Day celebration in Paris with Francophone African 
leaders in attendance. They are generally stories that are directly linked to the 
West—even those with strong regional appeals do have some links with the West. 
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Similarly, stories that may have some potentials of being promotional of Western 
opponents tend to be treated with some cautions. The Iranian scientist‘s return, for 
instance, was of propaganda value to Iran; but it was treated in a way that probably 
denied it that value. This is how it was reported: 
Iran has said that one of its nuclear scientists is on his way back to Tehran after 
his disappearance in the United States a year ago. Its foreign ministry said 
Shahram Amiri will fly back en route Qatar, and is expected to arrive in Tehran 
on Thursday. Iran had said Shahram Amiri was kidnapped by Americans; and the 
foreign ministry said it would seek for compensation. The United States (however) 
said that he had defected to US of his own volition and that he was free to return 
home at anytime. US State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley said America is 
not in the business of kidnapping people: ―Ah, he is here of his own volition and 
he has chosen to return to Iran of his own volition. This is how we run our affairs 
here in the United States. We didn‘t kidnap him and bring him here and prevent 
him from returning to Iran,‖ he said. The Iranians have said that they had assured 
Amiri of his safety and well being.  
 
The BBC here used its conventional style to treat this story—as it generally treats 
news stories—by ensuring that the elements of impartiality and balance were 
maintained. But in the process of doing that, it has also checked the propaganda 
edge Iran could have gained from the story, and perhaps even handed it over to the 
Americans. By balancing the story with the American side (supported with a 
sound bite from the US official in the 55-second bulletin), the BBC has effectively 
denied Iran the propaganda benefit of the story and even put the listeners in doubt 
of what really was the truth about the matter. One can, of course, argue that in the 
shadowy world of espionage and psychological warfare, separating facts from 
fictions is always a difficult task; and that the best the media can do (if they are not 
willing to devote resources and uncover the truth for the public) is to, at least, 
reflect all sides of the story—which in this case the BBC has attempted to do. But 
then, even at that, the media‘s orientation often determines which side receives a 
more favourable representation. 
 
Generally, the BBC does attempt to adhere to its key editorial value of 
‗impartiality‘ (BBC Guidelines, 2005, 2010)—a situation that has in turn helped it 
to gain audiences‘ trust. But this does not change the fact that it is a Western 
cultural institution with Western values and orientation that are bound to be 
reflected in its products. As Hill and Alshaer (2010) observe, the BBC‘s claimed 
impartiality was equally open to questions. ‗What the corporation‘s claims seek to 
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ignore or obfuscate is that, whilst the BBC may avoid making explicit 
identifications with the actors in the stories it covers, there is no ―neutral‖ 
language or standpoint that exists beyond the politico-ideological, and that can be 
employed in reporting the news‘ (Hill and Alshaer, 2010, p.155). Price et al. 
(2008) had been cited earlier as arguing that all global media organisations ‗are in 
some measure missionaries of ideological and cultural hegemony‘ (p.153). The 
BBC is not really an exception.  
 
Philo and Berry‘s (2004) study of the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
by British television channels—BBC and ITN—reveals, for instance, how 
established institutional structures, political and corporate pressures and structural 
imbalance ensured that the Israeli perspective got an upper hand in the coverage. 
They show how the news stories, in terms of their depth and substance, the 
sequence and prominence and the language used and angle taken, were routinely 
tilted in favour of Israel. The structure of the news operations and the slick Israeli 
public relations machine and lobbyists, in contrast to the weakened Palestinians‘ 
position, have all guaranteed that Israel got ‗preferential treatment‘ in the British 
television‘s coverage of the crisis (Philo and Berry, 2004, p. 199). Although 
Brennan (2005) has criticised their findings as being coloured by alleged political 
bias, Shaoul (2004) argues that the work has unpacked massive evidence to expose 
‗dishonest media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict‘ (p.21). 
 
The revelation of the dominance of Israeli perspective in the news coverage does 
not only show how the supposedly unbiased media could serve entrenched 
interests, but it also reinforces the dominant ideology‘s version of media role. It 
has been a long-held view of the hegemony theorists of various hues (Gramsci, 
1971; Althusser, 1971; Hall, 1980) that the media are ideological apparatuses that 
reinforce the views of the dominant class. Hall (1980) considers broadcasting 
organisations and their news departments as extensions of the mode of production 
of the society in which they operate. He asserts that from the institutional 
foundation of the media to the socialisation and orientation of the journalists the 
dominant ideology—although not always unchallenged—does pervade. The 
process of converting ‗a raw historical event‘ into a story is ‗not a random 
moment‘, it is an organised process pursued by the institutional structure of 
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broadcasting in accordance with societal codes and conventions (Hall, 1980). 
Furthermore, he argues, even the idea of balancing stories in reality serves 
hegemonic interest by ‗not overtly‘ biasing the operation of the broadcasting 
organisations and thus making them to be more credible. Although Altheide 
(1984) has challenged the hegemonists‘ claim about the extent to which ideology 
and control of economic interests pervade the media institutions and their news 
production processes, he has conceded that editorial pressures do sometimes come 
to bear on news production and that ‗virtually all mass media researchers 
acknowledge the economic context and rationale for modern news organisations‘ 
(p.478). So both the theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that media 
products do reflect the cultural values of their producing organisations. 
 
Seen from this context, the reflection of a Western perspective in the BBC Hausa 
Service products is not accidental; it emanates from the wider socio-economic and 
political structure within which the World Service operates, and made imperative 
by the social reality of news production and distribution. As a constituent part of 
the BBC World Service, the BBC Hausa Service, as stated earlier, draws the bulk 
of its materials from the World Service‘s central pool, and the original materials it 
produces equally have to reflect the values of the controlling corporation. The core 
Hausa Service news bulletins and reports are essentially the products of the World 
Service newsroom. All the lead stories and the central core news bulletins as well 
as some of the full reports contained in all the three selected programmes 
illustrated above, for example, were materials taken directly from the main English 
World Service newsroom filed by the World Service correspondents. They were 
translated into Hausa language by the Hausa Service staff and transmitted to the 
listeners. In the treatment of the stories, the BBC‘s editorial guidelines 
emphasising accuracy, impartiality, fairness and so on (BBC Guidelines, 2005, 
2010) are generally followed. This does help remove some inaccuracies and 
obvious bias, but it does not obliterate the inherent tone of a Western 





From local to global perspective 
The BBC World Service considers itself to be a truly international broadcaster that 
treats events from an international, rather than from a narrow Western or even 
narrower British, perspective. Its former director, Nigel Chapman, highlighted this 
claim publicly during the launching of the BBC Arabic Television in 2008 when 
he tried to differentiate it from other Western channels. He said: ‗In the case of Al-
Hurra, it‘s an American perspective… In the case of France 24, it‘s a French 
perspective. In the case of BBC Arabic Television, it‘s an international 
perspective‘ (Pfaffner, 2008). This is meant to strengthen the impartiality claim, 
build global credibility and provide an enduring structure of plausibility among the 
diverse services tailored for diverse regions around the world. It is, as noted 
earlier, a claim that may not be wholly sustainable; but it is one that tends to give 
the World Service an edge over other international competitors whose method of 
programme-making and strategy of hiding their ideological persuasions may not 
be as subtle.  
 
It is also useful for practical operation and sustainability of the language services. 
It would do the World Service no good, for instance, to insist that its Hausa 
Service reporter in Kano must become a carbon copy of its English service 
Washington correspondent. But it would make a great sense to provide a refresher 
journalism course and BBC Editorial Guidelines (both of which could help in 
inculcating some basic ideological viewpoint) to the Kano reporter and ask 
him/her to report local events in the Northern Nigeria‘s city in a way that would be 
intelligible to both local and international audiences. This in reality is the usual 
practice and it is apparently an effective way of handling local stories in the 
language services. The original local news reports sent to the services retain local 
flavour and at the same time integrate elements that make them meaningful to 
wider audiences—that is, apart from meeting the conventional news elements of 
newness, unusualness, timeliness and so on. They are sometimes linked to 
international events (some of them Western) or are regionally-related or have 
universal appeal or have significant relevance or impact to the target audiences; or 
have a combination of two or more of these elements.  
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The original news reports filed by the Hausa Service reporters from Nigeria, Niger 
Republic, Ghana and Cameroon Republic often meet these criteria, as can be seen 
in the three selected programmes. The 6 October 2008 programme, to start with, 
contains five of such original reports; and each can be linked to one or more of 
these criteria. They are: the conference to boost Northern Nigeria‘s economy, 
chaired by United Nations‘ official Ibrahim Gambari, who hails from the region 
(local relevance); the meeting between Nigerian and Ghanaian business tycoons 
on regional investments (regional importance); the Niger Republic‘s bumper 
budget (relevance—and unusualness, given the fact that they appear to have a 
relatively healthy economy at the time of global financial crisis, though this 
perspective was not  highlighted); the Commonwealth communications conference 
(relevance and colonial link); and the World Teachers‘ Day celebration in Nigeria 
(linked to international event). The original news reports contained in the 14 
October 2009 programme are: the talks between West African parliamentarians 
and politicians in Niger Republic over the country‘s political stalemate (regional 
importance and local impact); the anti-fake drugs campaign in Niger Republic, 
based on regional initiative (regional link and universal appeal among developing 
countries); the abrogation of the Nigerian law barring hospitals from treating 
accident victims without police report (local impact); and the sacking of 40 
government officials in the Nigerian state of Bauchi (local relevance). For the 14 
July 2010 programme, the original reports are: the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation chief‘s visit to Nigeria (linked to a global body and potential impact); 
Nigerian national oil firm‘s debt denial (local and international relevance); the 
attendance of Francophone African leaders to France‘s Bastille Day celebration 
(link with the West); the Chinese firm-Kano road contract controversy (link with 
an international firm, local relevance, and perhaps even geopolitics—it was not 
raised in the report, though); and the anti-graft campaign in Cameroon (local 
relevance and universal appeal). This has generally been the style, and with it a 
clear pattern of linking local events to regional or global issues has been 





The integration of interactivity 
Interactivity is currently one of the most significant areas of interest in the BBC 
World Service‘s programming. First, because it is probably the most effective way 
of achieving the corporation‘s key objective of encouraging ‗global conversation‘ 
(BBC, 2008)—and of attaining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office‘s ‗digital 
diplomacy initiatives‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010b, p.280; Hill and Alshaer, 2010). 
Second, because it is not only a brilliant means of engaging the audiences by 
allowing them to participate in the programme, but it is also a creative way of 
breaking the monotony of dishing out daily dose of hard news and current affairs 
programmes to a public that is increasingly becoming weary of digesting such 
materials. And third, because it is a clever strategy of employing the new 
communications technologies to create a greater atmosphere of trust by making the 
audiences to feel that they themselves create the content—with the BBC, at least 
on the surface, being merely a platform, an impartial disinterested umpire—and 
therefore less likely to be seen as part of the corporation‘s political agenda, and 
more likely to exert subtle influence (Hill and Alshaer, 2010). These, among other 
factors, guarantee the viability of interactivity. And the World Service, as noted 
earlier, dedicates for it special programmes, such as the ‗World Have Your Say‘, 
‗Africa Have Your Say‘, ‗Ra‘ayi Riga‘ for the Hausa Service, ‗Point of Debate‘ 
for the BBC Arabic Television, and so on. Long before these special programmes 
were dedicated to audiences‘ participation, however, interactivity was already 
being integrated in some regular news programmes where relevant audiences‘ 
comments were aired in between news reports. This makes even the regular 
programmes somewhat participatory, less monotonous, more conversational and 
probably more attractive to a wide range of audiences. 
 
The Hausa Service‘s ‗Ra‘ayi Riga‘ was introduced in April 2010 as ‗a forum for a 
global conversation between Hausa-speakers, wherever they are, with 
contributions from grassroots listeners, opinion leaders, policy makers and 
experts‘ (BBC, 2010a). It is aired in the evenings of Fridays immediately after the 
news; and is intended to bring listeners to the ‗centre-stage, giving them the 
opportunity to both set the agenda and voice their views‘ (BBC, 2010a). For each 
programme a theme is selected and announced by the service two days in advance; 
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a panel of discussants (representing different shades of opinions) is then formed 
(other participants outside the panel are also allowed to partake); and a presenter 
moderates the live debate of the discussants and participants who make their 
contributions via telephone calls, text messages, Facebook, Twitter and other 
devices made available by the new communications technologies. Quite a variety 
of topics, ranging from cultural issues and health matters to national politics and 
international affairs, are discussed. Among those so far debated include: ‗Illegal 
Abortion‘, ‗Referendum on Niger‘s New Constitution‘, ‗The Prospect of 
Eradicating Malaria in Five Years‘, ‗Nigeria‘s 50th Independence Anniversary‘, 
‗Causes of Rising Cases of Divorce in Hausa land‘, and ‗The Implications of 
British 2010 Elections on African Continent‘. It is often a robust debate with 
Hausa speakers from different parts of the world putting in their contributions. The 
audiences do indeed produce the content, but it is the BBC that determines its 
nature and form. It selects the topic, shapes the direction of the debate, decides the 
length of time each contributor gets, and influences which contribution receives 
greater or more favourable attention—and which does not. 
  
The special interactive programme, as stated above, is not the only form of 
participation in the BBC Hausa Service programmes. The service has, since the 
popularization of Short Messaging Services (SMS), been integrating interactivity 
in its programmes—this was apart from the old system of reading listeners‘ letters 
as part of the old feedback mechanism. The existing integrated interactivity—
mainly involving reading listeners‘ text messages—differs from the special weekly 
interactive programme of Fridays in the sense that it is not the entire programme 
that is dedicated to it—it is like an addendum to regular programmes. It is shorter, 
reactive and more controlled. But it is more frequent and cumulative since it is 
integrated in virtually each of the four regular daily programmes of the station. 
Essentially, it is a system whereby text messages are sent by listeners either in 
reaction to news items (that were read in the earlier programmes or being read 
live—some text messages are sent during a live programme) or just a general 
comment on any topic, and are placed and read in-between news reports or 
towards the end of the programme. To use the three selected programmes for 
illustration, one can see clearly how the text messages were integrated in—or, in 
rare occasions, completely left out of—a programme. They were, for instance, 
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moderately integrated in the 6 October 2008 programme and amply used in the 14 
July 2010 programme, but not included in the 14 October 2009 programme, 
probably because the programme was filled up with so many news items that there 
was no space for text messages.  
 
The 6 October 2008 programme provides an example of a moderate integration of 
interactivity. The first two text messages inserted were relevant to the leading 
news report in the programme—the slump of global financial markets—and so at 
the end of the report, they were presented as follows:  
In his message to us, Hassan Alhaji Dauda, Mai Kanti Inusari, says, ―I salute 
members of the Congress in America for resolving to help revive their country‘s 
economy.‖  
However, Sulaiman Babban Rimi, Kagarko, in Kaduna State, Nigeria, says, 
―America and Europe, it is your capitalist system that has thrown you into the 
situation you find yourselves in now‖.  
 
Here the text messages serve both as accompanying comments to the leading news 
report and as a demarcation between that report (stock markets‘ sharp fall) and the 
next, which is the report on Northern Nigeria‘s economic conference. It too was 
followed by two relevant text messages that the presenter put out as follows:  
And now here are some of your messages: ―May Allah make the conference on the 
economy of Northern Nigeria currently taking place become useful to all states of 
the country‖. This was from Saidu Abbas Dansadau, Zamfara State, Nigeria. 
―Northerners, we should have determination and contentment so as to be self-
sufficient in economic and social matters,‖ says Sa‘ad Garba Kagarko.    
  
In total four text messages were integrated in this programme; and they were 
linked to relevant news reports. This is a standard BBC Hausa Service programme 
with few text messages inserted in-between few reports to enrich them and add 
elements of audience participation in the programme. 
 
The 14 July 2010 programme, however, contains a wider integrated interactivity 
that was handled in a slightly different manner, although the first insert followed 
the same pattern of linking a text message to a relevant news report. It came after 
the news report on the visit to Nigeria by the Managing Director of the UN Food 
and Agriculture Organisation Jacques Diouf where he spoke of the need for more 
investments in agriculture to tackle food shortage in poor nations. The text 
message that follows was presented in this way: 
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―May God end the poverty bedevilling Nigeria,‖ says a message sent by 
Babangida Chairman Kakabori, Hadejia, Jigawa State. 
 
This was followed by a short announcement by the presenter, imploring the 
listeners to send more text messages through the BBC Hausa Service‘s text phone 
number: +447786202009. More similar announcements came later in the 
programme, but these times urging the listeners to participate in the next ‗Ra‘ayi 
Riga‘ programme or visit BBCHausa Facebook and bbchausa.com websites. All 
these are part of the strategy of encouraging interactivity and audiences‘ 
participation in the Hausa Service‘s programmes both on radio and online.  
The next news report, Nigeria‘s national oil firm‘s debt denial, too, attracted text 
messages as follows:  
―Oh, NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation): where have you been 
putting all the monies? Justice or probe can only take place on the Day of 
Judgment,‖ a message from Suleiman Musa Yaro Borgu. 
―EFCC (Nigeria‘s anti-graft agency): where are you when the underhand deal 
was taking place?‖ a message from Isa Suleiman Gashua. 
 
Usually, running stories, like this one, tend to attract text messages that are in sync 
with them because the listeners had heard an earlier report and responded to it, and 
the comments are now put out along with the latest report. In the case of this story, 
there was an earlier report that claimed that the oil firm was insolvent; but the 
company‘s spokesman refuted the claim (which is the focus of this particular news 
report). The listeners‘ comments were reactions to the earlier report; but they 
remained relevant and were put after this report, especially as the spokesman‘s 
denial probably did not provide a convincing rebuttal of the earlier claim of 
insolvency that was actually made by a junior finance minister. Even the title the 
Hausa Service gave the news report—‗NNPC Insolvency Controversy‘—suggests 
that the last might not have been heard of the story. 
 
A similar pattern of linking text messages to news report was maintained in the 
case of the comment that followed the report on Francophone African leaders‘ 
attendance of France‘s Bastille Day celebration in Paris: 
―The Francophone African leaders‘ attendance of the 14 July National Day 
ceremony in France is a new form of colonialism,‖ says a message from Muntari 
Isuhu Al-Mustafa, Niamey, Niger.  
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This was the last text message inserted in-between news reports, but it was not the 
last in the programme. Many more were used before ending the programme, 
although they have no link to any specific report contained in the programme. The 
way they were used shows that it is not only text messages related to news report 
that get integrated in the programmes; even general comments or advice to the 
public or government or specific groups are considered, as shown in the following 
text messages: 
―My advice to Nigerian Muslims and Christians is that they should live peacefully 
because it is said that living in peace is more worthy than living like the royalty,‖ 
says Kabiru Abubakar Bulanyaki, Shagari Local Government Area (Sokoto, 
Nigeria). 
―(Ethno-religious) crisis is rampant in Nigeria. Fellow Nigerian brothers, we 
should please be tolerant and live peacefully with one another,‖ a message from 
Engineer Ado Kafinta, Mando, Kaduna. 
―The people of Wukari (in Taraba State): please, be patient and seek to live in 
peace,‖ says Abubakar Alamai, Husara, Nigeria. 
―The authorities in Nigeria should please provide jobs to the youths because it is 
poverty that leads to the internal crisis that some unpatriotic people link to 
religion,‖ says Abdulkarim from Benin, Edo State. 
―Nigerian female football team: you should provide succour to Nigerians since the 
male team has failed (to do so at the last World Cup competition in South 
Africa),‖ a message from Attahiru Hashim, Garin-Yerima, Taraba, Nigeria. 
 
The generous use of text messages seen in this programme illustrates the extent to 
which interactivity can be integrated in the BBC Hausa Service‘s regular 
programmes. All these text messages were deliberately quoted here verbatim, and 
the way they were used clearly explained, to illustrate important points. First, the 
approach reveals the nature of interactivity that takes place and the kind of content 
the listeners produce, which in turn provides some insights into their worldview. 
Second, it is also to show that the provision of interactivity is perhaps the only 
opening that enables one programme to be quite different from another, despite the 
standard BBC Hausa Service template that seeks to impose sameness paradigm for 
all programmes. Consider, for example, the 14 October 2009 programme which 
contains no single text message and the 14 July 2010 programme which airs nine 
text messages and a series of announcements encouraging further audience 
participation. The difference can be quite significant. Third, the provision for 
interactivity is a great leeway handed over to the producer to have some relative 
control of the programme‘s content and to manage transmission time more 
effectively. The inclusion of five consecutive text messages towards the end of the 
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14 July 2010 programme, for instance, might have been partly informed by time 
consideration. The available space may be too short for a full news report and too 
much for the closing signature tune: putting text messages in this case achieves the 
benefits of greater audience participation and smooth completion of the 
programme‘s transmission.  
 
Overall, the three transmitted programmes have clearly illustrated the nature of the 
form and content of the BBC Hausa Service programmes and how they fit into the 
general framework of the BBC World Service, conforming to the BBC‘s editorial 
guidelines and fitting into the World Service‘s role of providing international news 
service and enhancing British public diplomacy. They provide a glimpse on the 
kind of technical and professional procedures being employed in the production 
and presentation of the programmes. They also offer an idea on the nature of 
contents being produced, the editorial and geopolitical and other considerations 
affecting their placements and the reflection of the centre-periphery (Galtung, 
1971) structure in their arrangement. Significantly, they equally reveal how daily 
programmes try to achieve the aims and objectives of the corporation by providing 
international news and analysis, offering forum for debate and engaging audiences 
for dialogue across cultural and ideological divides.  
 
Quantification of audiences 
‗Audiences are at the heart of everything we do‘ is the opening sentence of the 
2010 BBC Editorial Guidelines (BBC Guidelines, 2010, p.3). All broadcasters are, 
of course, interested in audiences because they constitute the reason for their 
existence. Many broadcasters do not only produce contents for audiences, but they 
also conduct research on the audiences to at least know who they are and what 
they want. The BBC is one of the leading media that are best known for showing 
interest in audience research. Ironically, in its early days, the BBC had resisted the 
idea of engaging in audience research. Its first and perhaps most influential 
director general, John Reith, rejected the idea and apparently saw no relevance of 
audience insights in programme making. He assumed that the corporation was best 
suited to decide for the audiences what they need without their inputs, arguing that 
few people ‗know what they want and very few what they need‘ (cited in Briggs, 
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1985, p.55). Another executive of the corporation at that time, Hilda Matheson, the 
first head of the Talks Department, concurred, insisting that ‗broadcasting is not 
mass projection, though it seems to be so, it is an individual intimate business‘ 
(cited in Seaton, 1997c, p.152). Seaton observes that ‗Reith‘s objection to 
audience research‘ was ‗based on the principle of cultural homogeneity‘ which he 
would have loved to see in Britain. ‗He did not want to know popular preference, 
because of the danger that programme organizers pander to it‘ (Seaton, 1997c, 
p.152).  
 
However, before his departure, Reith had to come to terms with reality: he allowed 
the establishment of audience research unit ‗in the domestic part of the BBC in 
1936 when Robert Silvey was recruited to begin more reliable ways of assessing 
audience behaviour and opinion than had been relied on hitherto‘ (Mytton, 1993, 
p.2). Twenty-seven years later, in 1963, Silvey went on to stress the significance 
of audience involvement in broadcasting, stating that ‗the impact of broadcasting, 
and hence its power, is not to be gauged simply by examining what it brings to 
people. It depends as much on what people bring to broadcasting‘ (cited in Briggs, 
1985, p. ix). Since its first experience with audience research, the corporation has 
never looked back. By 1974 the BBC‘s domestic broadcasting research department 
had already begun to produce an Annual Review of Research Findings ‗about 
television and radio audiences in the United Kingdom‘ (Mytton, 1993, p.2). This 
was facilitated by the fact that, as a public service broadcaster, established by a 
Royal Charter, the BBC was required to respect public opinion and to prove that 
its services are beneficial to the people, former Head of BBC Audience Research 
Graham Mytton notes, adding: ‗Audience research is an important part of its 
public accountability‘ (p.2). 
 
However, this effort was not being extended to the external services in the early 
days; they were relying on feedback from listeners‘ letters and information from 
monitors of short-wave signals and from ‗military intelligence and captured 
soldiers of the Axis powers‘ during the Second World War (Mytton, 1993, p.2). 
The problem, though, was that feedback received ‗from listeners or viewers in the 
form of letters, phone calls or other contacts are notoriously unreliable indicators,‘ 
Mytton notes. ‗The only reliable way to establish the size, nature, behaviour and 
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other aspects of audiences is to carry out systematic surveys among target 
populations‘ (p.3). So the BBC‘s external services began to organise surveys 
during the war; and carried them out successfully in Sweden and United States, 
obtaining results that showed ‗significant levels of listening to the BBC‘ (Mytton, 
1993, p.2). In 1944 the first measure of BBC audiences in India was also obtained 
in a random survey conducted in Bombay. Since then the frequency of BBC‘s 
international audience surveys has been increasing and the scope widening. In 
1992 alone, for instance, it conducted surveys in over 30 countries (Mytton, 1993). 
Countries with large BBC audiences such as Nigeria receive greater attention than 
others, with some of them being included annually in the corporation‘s global 
audience research. For a long time now the BBC World Service has been 
commissioning audience surveys on its Nigerian audiences every year. 
 
BBC’s quantification of Nigerian audiences 
It is through the regular surveys that the BBC identifies not only the demographic 
makeup of its audiences and their programming preferences and consumption 
pattern in Nigeria, but also the level of media penetration and the general media 
landscape in the country. They also generate data for it to assess its own 
performance and those of its partners and competitors. A range of annual surveys 
successively conducted in nearly one decade reveals in progressive fashion 
important up-to-date data that provides insights into all these areas and many 
more. Salient aspects of some of these surveys are highlighted and analysed here, 
with specific emphasis on the results of surveys released in the last four years: 
2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10. The pattern indicates that the surveys are 
usually conducted in the last quarter of the year, using face-to-face interview 
method with adults aged 15 and above, on an average sample size of 3,200, and 
released within six to nine months of the completion of the fieldwork. 
 
The BBC‘s research specifications for those four years show that the results 
released in March 2007 came out of the fieldwork done from 27 November 2006 
to 15 December 2006, using face-to-face interviews with 3,264 respondents of the 
estimated Nigeria‘s adult population of 76.1 million (BBC World Service, 2007). 
The 2008 results emanated from the fieldwork conducted from 24 October 2007 to 
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10 December 2007, using face-to-face interviews with 3,278 respondents of the 
estimated Nigeria‘s adult population of 77 million (BBC World Service, 2008). 
The results released in May 2009 were based on the fieldwork conducted from 28 
October 2008 to 21 November 2008, using face-to-face interview method on a 
sample size of 2,387 of the estimated adult population of 65.4 million—the North-
west population was excluded because of the inconsistency of sample compared 
with the 2007 data (BBC Global News, 2009). The results released in June 2010 
came out of the fieldwork carried out from 30 September 2009 to 22 October 
2009, using face-to-face interview method on a sample size of 3,262 in the 
estimated adult population of 80 million (BBC Global News, 2010). 
 
Audience demographics 
The results of the regular surveys are usually accompanied with a brief 
background on Nigeria, giving a short description of the ethnic composition or 
prevailing political or socio-economic situation of the country at the time of the 
survey in question. They also reveal some demographic characteristics of the BBC 
audiences, their geographical backgrounds and the BBC services they prefer—all 
these are updated in each new survey. These are extracts taken from the surveys‘ 
reports of the following years:  
 
2004/05 
Nigeria is a diverse country composed of more than 250 ethnic groups. 
English, Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba and Fulani are the main languages spoken… 
BBC serves two distinct markets – Hausa speakers who tend to live in the 
North of the country and English speakers who tend to live in the South 




The English and Hausa audiences tend to be mutually exclusive; with only 
5% of the BBC‘s weekly audience listening in both languages. The Hausa 
audience is predominantly Muslim…and tend to live in rural areas in the 
North East and North West. The English audience is predominantly 
Christian…fairly evenly split between urban and rural areas and 
primarily live in the South Eastern, Southern and North Central regions. 
Overall the BBC WS (World Service) weekly audience remains skewed 





Nigeria is an ethnically and religiously diverse country, consisting of 36 
states. English is the official language, Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa are also 
widespread… Launch of Shirin Hantsi (0730 Hausa programme) is a 
success – attracts 11.6m listeners weekly, making it the second most 
listened to BBC Hausa programme (just behind Shirin Safe which is 
broadcast at 0630). The programme is mainly reaching existing listeners 
– tend to be male, educated up to primary school level and aged in mid 
30s (BBC World Service, 2008).  
 
2008/09 
Nigeria is Africa‘s most populous country and the leading oil producer on 
the continent. However, few Nigerians, including those in oil-producing 
areas, have benefited from the oil wealth and more than half the 
population lives in poverty… Nigeria is an ethnically and religiously 
diverse country, consisting of 36 states… Thousands have died over the 
past few years in communal rivalry and there is continuing tension 
between the Islamic north and the Christian and animist south… Umaru 
Yar‘adua of the ruling People‘s Democratic Party (PDP) won the 
presidency following the April 2007 elections which were condemned by 
local and foreign observers, who alleged widespread vote-rigging (BBC 
Global News, 2009).   
 
2009/10 
The most populous country in Africa and one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world, Nigeria is located in western Africa on the Gulf of 
Guinea. Although the three largest ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and 
Igbo) contribute the majority of the population, it is home to more than 
250 of such groups, each with a distinct linguistic and cultural heritage. 
Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as president when his predecessor, 
Umaru Yar‘adua, died after a long period of illness in May 2010... As the 
eighth largest international exporter of petroleum, oil dominates both the 
economics and politics of the country – evident most recently in ongoing 
ethnic violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta. There are hopes, however, that 
a recent amnesty for militants will reduce hostilities in the region (BBC 
Global News, 2010). 
 
Reading them together as a whole makes it repetitive (because the report of each 
year is meant to stand on its own); yet each report adds something that 
complements the others. Putting them together presents a picture of a multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious country of 36 states with its predominantly Islamic North and 
mainly Christian South and three major languages of Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo. 
Although it has a less stable political system and is troubled by ethno-religious 
rivalry, the reports further show, it has huge human capital and economic 
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potentials. They also consistently reveal that the Hausa audiences are 
predominantly Muslim Northern Nigerians while the English listeners are mainly 
Christians who tend to live in the southern part of the country. Both audiences are 
overwhelmingly male in their 30s, and that the English listeners tend to live more 
in urban areas than the Hausa listeners. It is a general description, but it does give 
a little background of the country and useful demographics of the audiences to 
help understand the other data generated by the surveys.  
 
Audience figures and trends 
In the last decade the regular surveys reveal important patterns and key trends with 
regard to the size and spread of BBC audiences in Nigeria. They have shown that 
within the last ten years the BBC‘s weekly audience figure in Nigeria averages 
over 20 million; that Nigeria comes top as the BBC‘s largest market in Africa, or 
the BBC‘s largest English market in the world (audiences for both radio and 
television programmes in English), or the BBC‘s largest radio market in the world 
(combined radio audiences in English and Hausa languages). These are what the 
surveys‘ reports say concerning the audience figures and trends: 
 
2003/04 
The World Service audience has remained fairly stable since the mid 90s, 
31% listen weekly in any language (32% listened weekly in 2002). 
Listening is highest for Hausa, though English also picks up substantial 
audiences… The BBC is the leading international broadcaster in both 
languages and despite the fall in English listening, Nigeria is still by far 
the BBC‘s largest English market, accounting for more than one in five 
listeners globally. Nigeria is the BBC‘s largest market in Africa with 21.7 
million adults listening weekly (BBC World Service, 2004). 
 
2006/07 
BBC WS has maintained its weekly reach with 32% of Nigerians listening 
weekly, approx 24.7 million listeners. This follows strong growth (from) 
2005-06… Hausa audiences have increased, with 27% of adults listening 
weekly (up from 24% in 2005). This growth may be partially attributable 
to ‗Shirin Hantsi‘, a new morning programme, which launched during 
fieldwork (Dec 1st 2006). English listening has fallen and has returned to 
2004 levels, after a small increase in 2005; 7% listen weekly, compared to 
10% in 2005 and 7% in 2004. There has been a big shift in the frequency 





BBC audience estimate has increased since 2006 from 24.7 to 25.8 million 
adults listening weekly – just over a third (34%) of the population 
listening weekly… The BBC‘s strength continues to lie in the Hausa 
market in the Northern parts of the country, with this accounting for 
almost three-quarters of weekly reach (BBC World Service, 2008). 
 
2008/09 
Total weekly audience for BBC in Nigeria is 26 million adults. Radio 
audience is 24.4 million: 5.9m in English (-2.1m) and 19.7m in Hausa 
(+800k). TV audience is 4.9m (-1.0m) and online audience is 69,000 
(+26k)... Almost two thirds of listening to the BBC is in Hausa, with 13% 
of Nigerians listening weekly. This is up slightly on last year, due to small 
increases in the North Central and North East regions… Nigeria is the 
BBC World Service‘s largest radio market (24.4m people listening 
weekly) – Tanzania is the next largest African market (11.7m) (see the 
diagram below). It (Nigeria) has lost its crown as the WS‘s (World 
Service‘s) leading English market for the first time in more than 10 years 
– USA is now the largest English market with 6m listening weekly (100k 
ahead of Nigeria where 5.9m listen weekly) (BBC Global News, 2009).  
 
 











                       Figure 6.1 Source: BBC GND/Ipsos MORI (2009) 
 
As can be seen above in Figure 6.1 showing ten largest consumers of BBC radio 
products, in terms of weekly percentages and number of listeners in millions, 
Nigeria comes top with 24.4 million listeners followed by India with nearly 20 
million listeners. Although Afghanistan and Tanzania have the highest percentages 
of their adult population listening, they fell below Nigeria in terms of the number 
of listeners because Nigeria has much higher population figure than each of them.  
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2009/10 
Nigeria is the BBC World Service‘s largest radio market (21.5m people 
listening weekly) and the Global News Division‘s second largest market 
(24.1m) behind the  
USA (35.3m). It has regained its crown as the WS‘s leading English 
market with 7.7m people listening in English weekly, overtaking the USA 
(6.6m) (BBC Global News, 2010). 
 
So in terms of audience figures and trends, going through the statistics for these 
five different years shown above, it is clear that the BBC performed best in 
Nigeria in the year 2007/08 with a weekly radio audience figure of 25.8 million—
perhaps the fact that the fieldwork was done during the Nigeria‘s election year 
2007 has helped shore up the audience figures. This was followed by those of the 
year earlier (2006/07) with a figure of 24.7 million, then 2008/09 with 24.4 million 
(when added with its online and TV audiences, the 2008/09 figure rises to 26 
million) and then way back to 2003/04 with 21.7 million. The worst is the result of 
the most recent survey, 2009/10, with 21.5 million listeners. Even when it is 
combined with the television and online audiences, as the new system under the 
newly-named Global News Division does, the weekly audience figure stands at 
24.5 million, far below the peak radio audience alone of the year 2007/08 (25.8 
million). The explanation provided by the 2009/10 report is that the BBC 
audiences decline due to a reported drop in listening to Hausa Service. It says: 
‗The main reasons given by Hausa speakers for listening less frequently are poor 
reception quality, lack of time to listen and using alternative sources – of which 
State radio and Freedom FM were the main sources switched to‘ (BBC Global 
News, 2010). The report also notes that the online and television audience figures 
are now increasing: ‗TV audience is 5.7m (+0.8m) and online audience is 88,000 
(+19k)‘. The Hausa online figure has actually risen to 1.2 million by April 2010 
(Tangaza, 2010)—the survey‘s figures were recorded during the fieldwork in 
September/October 2009.  
 
The rise in online audiences could be a consolation for the BBC and an 
encouraging sign for its multimedia initiatives. However, the reasons given for the 
fall of Hausa audiences—poor reception quality, lack of time to listen, and a shift 
to local alternative sources—represent obvious worries for the BBC. It is even 
more worrying when it is viewed from the fact that Hausa listeners constitute two-
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thirds of the entire BBC‘s audiences in Nigeria as revealed by the surveys. The 
poor reception quality has been a recurring issue since 2003/04 when the 
government banned local broadcasters from transmitting live news broadcasts 
from foreign stations; and the BBC has been complaining about it since then (BBC 
World Service, 2004). And though it might have been affecting audience figures 
(as the BBC says), it has not stopped the rises recorded in the years 2006/07 and 
2007/08 (as the above figures reveal). So the poor reception quality argument has 
not adequately explained the sharp decline of the 2009/10 figures because in 
reality since the ban, and frankly even before it, the audiences have mainly been 
accessing BBC through the same delivery means, short-wave radio [71 per cent 
even in pre-ban period (BBC World Service, 2004)], with probably an improved 
reception now since the short-wave technology too has been improving, even if 
marginally. There is also an added factor of the Nigerian audiences in border 
towns accessing FM quality BBC broadcasts from the BBC‘s partner stations in 
neighbouring countries, as the recent surveys reveal (BBC Global News, 2009, 
2010). The poor reception quality argument is therefore unsustainable. Accessing 
good alternative content in good quality from local FM stations sounds like a 
better explanation. Perhaps the local competitors are doing better now because of 
the gradual liberalisation of the broadcast industry in the country, improved 
investment and better contents or perhaps the BBC‘s programming quality has 
declined. These are viable areas for both administrative and intellectual inquiries 
in the coming years.  
 
Media penetration 
The BBC surveys also supply useful data on media penetration and spread in 
Nigeria, and provide trends on the utilization of distribution technologies and their 
potential impact on the pattern of media consumption. Statistics contained in the 
following five different surveys reveals the dominance of radio as the most 
accessible distribution technology to most Nigerians and the biggest source of 
news and information for them. But as years move on, the surveys also indicate a 
gradual reduction of radio‘s dominance as the television—terrestrial, cable and 
satellite—gains strength. Then comes the Internet which is now spreading in the 
country, with over 28 per cent of the population gaining access, according to the 
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latest figures from the Internet World Stats (2011)—up from the 20 per cent 
recorded in the BBC‘s 2009/10 survey (BBC Global News, 2010). But the most 
dramatic of all is the case of mobile telephony, which perhaps because of its 
multiple utility, ease of use and portability has become the fastest spreading 
technology in the country, turning Nigeria into the fastest growing mobile market 
in the world (Okonji, 2009)—and the biggest mobile market in Africa, having 
overtaken South Africa, as the latest of these surveys show. Despite the decline of 
its dominance, though, radio maintains its relevance as all the surveys reveal: 
 
2004/05 
Radio remains dominant and is listened to by 82% of adults weekly, whilst 
TV is viewed by 48%... Radio is the most used source for news and 
information. More than half of all Nigerians access the radio daily for 
news, compared to 26% daily for TV, 3% daily for newspapers and 1% 
daily using the Internet. International radio stations (are) accessed by 
12% daily (BBC World Service, 2005).  
 
2006/07 
Radio has traditionally been the dominant medium in Nigeria but due to 
an increase in TV access, the gap between radio and TV consumption has 
been closing in the past couple of years. There has been a small increase 
in weekly radio reach (78% - 81% since 2005/06) but a large increase in 
weekly TV reach (from 52% - 65% since 2005/06). There are three main 
peaks in radio listening: 06-0900, 14-1630 and 20-2130 (local time).  On 
a typical day, almost half of all Nigerians listen in the morning, and just 
over a third in the afternoon and evening periods… The TV audience 
reaches its peak in the evening between 8-10pm, when around a fifth 
watch, with the largest audience at 9pm (BBC World Service, 2007). 
                                                              
















































































The graph (figure 6.2) clearly shows that listening to radio is highest in the 
morning while watching television is highest in the evening. Radio has a 
distinguished advantage of having three different peaks: morning, followed by 
evening, and then late afternoon. 
 
2007/08 
Radio continues to dominate the market (82% listen weekly), though TV is 
gradually closing the gap (weekly viewing up from 65% in 2006 to 68% in 
2007) and does dominate in Lagos and parts of the South… Cable and 
satellite penetration has grown, with 10% of households owning receivers 
(7% in 2006). LG Electronics (an electrical goods firm) has concluded 
plans to introduce the first television with menu functions in Hausa, Igbo 
and Yoruba. Mobile phone ownership continues to grow from 36% in 
2006 to 50% in 2007. In Lagos mobile ownership has risen from 78% to 
89% of adults. Weekly readership of newspapers/magazines has risen 
significantly year-on-year, now at 17% (compared to 13% in 2006) (BBC 
World Service, 2008).  
 
2008/09 
Radio still dominant: 64% of adults listen to the radio daily compared to 
59% viewing TV. However the gap is close and TV is dominant in the 
evenings. The vast majority of those who listen to the radio listen at home 
(95%), but substantial groups also listen in public (17%), at work (12%) 
or in the car (12%); with 13% of Nigerians listening via a mobile phone, 
particularly in Lagos where almost one quarter (23%) have listened in 
this way. A quarter of adults have access to a cable or satellite dish, with 
11% able to access these services at home. 17% of adults have access to 
the Internet, though just 3% have access at home. Consequently, usage is 
low, with only 5% going online weekly… Nigeria has recently overtaken 
South Africa to become Africa‘s largest telecom market. 70% have access 
to a mobile phone and 12% to an iPod/MP3 player… Mobiles used widely 
for media consumption. Amongst those who have access to a mobile 
phone, 14% have received text alerts from a subscription service in the 
past four weeks (BBC Global News, 2009). 
 
2009/10 
Radio is the most popular media in Nigeria with 79% listening weekly. 
Two thirds are weekly television viewers. There are big differences in TV 
viewing by area, with weekly audiences highest in the (commercial) 
capital, Lagos (96% weekly), and lowest in the rural North West (42%). 
Just over a quarter of Nigerians have access to cable and satellite, but 
less than half of these (12%) have access in their household… Almost a 
fifth of Nigerians have access to the Internet, though only 5% go online 
weekly. Just under 3% have Internet access at home, though in Lagos this 
is higher (8%). High speed Internet access anywhere is low; at just below 
3%... 14% of Nigerians listen to the radio on their mobile weekly with 
around half (53%) of these users aged 15-24 (BBC Global News, 2010). 
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Radio‘s resilience resonates throughout these reports; and its position has, in some 
instances, an inverse relationship with that of television, in others, a 
complementary one. Radio, as the extracts show, began on a very high point with 
82 per cent of the adult population listening to it in 2004/05 when television 
viewing was 48 per cent; then it was unclear whether it was down or up in 2008/09 
(the figures provided for that year was for daily consumption, which was 64 per 
cent with television‘s 59 per cent, not weekly consumption used in the other 
years); it declined slowly to 79 per cent in 2009/10 when television received an 
estimated 66 per cent. The other period they both witnessed a rise was in 2007/08 
when radio recorded 82 per cent and television 68 per cent. Cable and satellite 
penetration has also been increasing with the latest record showing that over a 
quarter of Nigerians now have access to them; household ownership of cable and 
satellite has jumped from 7 per cent in 2006 to 12 per cent in 2009/10. The print 
media, newspapers and magazines, also witnessed a rise, from a figure of 3 per 
cent daily in 2004/05 to 17 per cent weekly in 2007/08. They were not included in 
the subsequent surveys.  
 
As for the new media, the Internet appears to be rising steadily, though the surveys 
do not stick to one standard form of measurement. It shows a figure of 1 per cent 
of Nigerians using Internet daily in 2004/05, and then switches to weekly measure 
saying 5 per cent of them use it weekly in 2009/10, the same year when over a 
fifth of the country‘s population have access to it. There is no record of those who 
use their handheld mobile telephones to access the Internet. The real phenomenal 
rise is that of mobile phone ownership in the country, jumping from 22 per cent in 
2005 to 70 per cent in 2008/09, a period of less than four years. A further 
significance of this is in its linkage to media consumption, with 2009/10 survey 
revealing that 14 per cent of Nigerians listen to radio on their mobile phones 
weekly, more than half of them youth. This is an important new development that 
may require further exploration. 
 
Comparing with competitors 
The surveys are not restricted to audience demographics, media penetration and 
BBC audience figures; they also gather data on the performance of other media, 
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both local and international, BBC‘s rivals and partners. The BBC, as noted earlier, 
has been in partnership with local private radio station Ray Power since the end of 
1990s, originally transmitting news and other BBC contents on its local FM 
stations; but when the live news ban was imposed, the partnership was restricted to 
transmission of non-news materials only. Similarly, in November 2010, the BBC 
entered into another partnership with a Kano-based local private broadcaster, 
Freedom Radio, for transmission of non-news contents (Martin, 2010). It is not 
listed here as a BBC partner station in any of the surveys since the surveys were 
conducted before the new agreement.  
 
The surveys categorise the local broadcasters into three different groups: (a) the 
state government-controlled broadcasters (each of the 36 state governments has its 
own broadcaster) collectively called state radio and television; (b) the federal-
controlled broadcasters—Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) and 
Nigerian Television Authority (NTA)—with their national headquarters and zonal 
offices and local stations in the states; and (c) the private radio and television 
stations. With a possible exception of the NTA and FRCN, none of these stations 
is seen as being in direct competition for audiences with the BBC, though their 
performance tends to affect the audience share of the BBC—and collectively the 
state radio stations in particular constitute a formidable force. The BBC‘s 
recognised rivals, though, are the fellow international media, particularly the VOA 
and Radio Deutsche Welle for radio audiences and the CNN for television 
audiences—Al-Jazeera was still not being seen as a major competitor, and was 
only included in one survey (2008/09) when its influence began to emerge. The 
surveys reflect the audience shares of both the local and competing international 
broadcasters, as the following synopses from the last four surveys show: 
 
2006/07 
Weekly reach for Ray Power (the BBC‘s partner station) has increased 
from 11% listening weekly in 2005 to 20% in 2006. However, claimed 
listening to the BBC via Ray Power has remained fairly stable, with 7% of 
weekly English listeners tuning in on Ray Power (was 6% in 2005)... 
Local state radio continues to attract the largest audiences. However, no 
single station attracts as many weekly listeners as the foreign stations. 
FRCN (Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria) stations have experienced a 
surge in listening over the past year. Freedom Radio is regarded as the 
opposition‘s answer to the government-owned FRCN and is listened to by 
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9% of adults weekly... Overall reach of international radio stations 
remains relatively unchanged, though VOA has suffered a fall in English 
listening and DW (Deutsche Welle) has experienced an increase in Hausa 
listening… The most watched national TV channel is NTA, with a weekly 




Local state radio continues to dominate listening. However, in Lagos, 
where there are a variety of stations available, state radio performs 
poorly (9% weekly) – a fall of 26 percentage points since 2006…  A new 
FM was launched in March 2008 by FRCN to serve its Hausa audience in 
Kaduna, but FRCN insist SW (Short-wave) and MW (Medium-wave) are 
their priority. VOA is the BBC‘s closest international competitor, (19% 
listening weekly) followed by DW (14% weekly) – both have seen their 
audiences remain fairly static and are someway behind the BBC in terms 












Figure 6.3 Source: BBCWS/Ipsos MORI (2008)  
 
Figure 6.3 above shows the five most listened to radio stations in Nigeria, both the 
local and foreign stations, for the years 2006 and 2007. Local State Radio is the 
collection of all the radio stations owned by 36 state governments in the country. It 
is not just a single radio station; it is a combination of at least 36 stations. 
 
2008/09 
Television in Nigeria is dominated by the Nigerian Television Authority 
(69% watch at least weekly)... As with radio, the market is more 
competitive in Lagos and NTA trails behind AIT, Galaxy TV, Silverbird 
TV and TVC continental in the city… BBC World News presents a strong 
challenge to CNN International, with 6% of the population watching BBC 
World News on a weekly basis compared to 8% watching CNN weekly. 
 
   
Top five most listened to radio stations in Nigeria 
                              
                           2007            2006   
  
Local State Radio            66% 69% 
 BBC            34% 32% 
 FRCN            22% 22% 
 Ray Power        23% 20%  
 VOA            19% 19%  
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Other international channels are less popular, with 2% or less watching 
each of Al Jazeera, Sky News, Euronews, Voice of America, or Deutsche 
Welle TV. The figures for Al Jazeera English are surprisingly low 
considering the emphasis they have put on covering news from Africa 
(BBC Global News, 2009). 
 
2009/10 
Local state radio continues to dominate listening – all 36 states offer their 
own stations and over half of the population (53%) tune in weekly. Cool 
FM is growing in popularity and has overtaken Ray Power in Lagos to 
become the leading private station in the city, though Ray Power is the 
most listened to private station nationally… VOA is the closest competitor 
to the BBC with 16% listening weekly. The gap between VOA and DW 
(Deutsche Welle) has narrowed in the past year, though both BBC and 
VOA have seen a fall in listening – both broadcast in Hausa…  Ray Power 
is the BBC‘s main partner in Nigeria, and is carrying non-news 
programmes only (due to the government ban). Ray Power is listened to 
by 23% of adults weekly – accounts for a fifth of weekly English listeners. 
In some parts of Northern Nigeria the BBC can be heard on partners 
based in Niger. In total 6% of weekly Hausa listeners tune in via a partner 
(BBC Global News, 2010). 
 
As can be seen, the state radio stations, because of the sheer size of their number 
(at least 36) and the intensity of their local coverage, have consistently come top 
nationally as a collective entity—Lagos being the only exception because the state 
radio faces competition from many private broadcasters in the city. Federal Radio 
Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) is the leading national radio broadcaster followed 
by the private radio station Ray Power. BBC consistently maintains its position as 
the leading international broadcaster followed by the VOA and Radio Deutsche 
Welle. Radio France International which began Hausa language transmission in 
2007 (Sennitt, 2007) has not been included in any of the surveys. The federal 
government-controlled NTA (Nigerian Television Authority) is the leading 
television broadcaster nationally, followed by the privately-owned AIT (African 
International Television). The CNN is the leading global television broadcaster but 
is being challenged by the BBC World News; they are marginally followed by Al-
Jazeera (the finding of this study, though, indicates that Al-Jazeera is gaining 
more ground now), Sky News and others.  
 
All the international radio broadcasters rely heavily on short-wave for delivery to 
Nigerian audiences. The BBC, as noted earlier, has complained that, with the 
Nigerian government‘s refusal to allow it to broadcast news on local FM stations, 
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an estimated 87 per cent of Hausa (and 62 per cent of English) listeners tune in on 
short-wave. ‗A small number of people are listening to FM relay (3% of listeners) 
and around a fifth of adults are listening via a partner station,‘ it says. ‗A lot of FM 
listening comes from over the border, with people listening via stations (in the 
neighbouring) Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger‘ (BBC Global News, 2009). 
 
Programming preferences 
Another significant feature of the BBC audience surveys in Nigeria is the section 
dealing with audiences‘ interests (or lack of them) in different BBC‘s 
programmes. What sort of media products do Nigerians consume and what are 
they likely to want to consume are also looked into. They essentially gather data 
on the programming needs of the audiences to see whether the BBC is meeting 
those needs. They measure the popularity of programmes and the loyalty of 
audiences to the BBC brand. The changing patterns of their interests in different 
programmes can be noted from the findings of the surveys over the years. The 
following are synopses taken from the last four surveys: 
 
2006/07 
For the majority of Nigerians, regular news consumption is important. 
Two thirds access news at least once a day, almost 60% of whom tune in 
2-3 times during a day. Nigerians are primarily interested in domestic 
news, followed by international news and then regional. Interest in 
regional and international affairs has been on the rise during the past 
year… English and Hausa listeners differ in the reasons they listen to 
radio. Both groups are interested in politics, but Hausa listeners tend to 
be more interested in social topics, whereas English listeners are more 
interested in entertainment, sport and education… Weekend Network 
Africa is attracting a younger and less male dominated audience than 
other news programmes. The recently launched English news programme 
and Africa Have Your Say are both doing well in attracting younger and 
female listeners (BBC World Service, 2007). 
 
2007/08 
BBC election coverage picked up large audiences (elections took place in 
Nigeria in April 2007). Around a quarter of adults turned to the BBC for 
coverage of their national elections. NTA (Nigerian state TV) was seen to 
provide the best coverage of the election, with the BBC doing well and 
ranked third (rated particularly highly by Hausa audiences)… Loyalty 
towards the BBC is strong in Nigeria. Over 70% of listeners are 
advocates of the station – listen monthly, agree they would continue to 
listen in the future and would recommend the station to others. Hausa 
speakers listen to BBC more frequently than they used to. This may be a 
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result of the launch of Shirin Hantsi (new morning programme)… World 
Today and Network Africa reach the largest audiences. The World Today 
is listened to by 3% of adults weekly (7% in South-South) and Network by 
2% weekly (4% in South-South) (BBC World Service, 2008). 
 
2008/09 
Strong appetite for news consumption: more than two thirds of Nigerians 
access news and current affairs daily. More than half extremely interested 
and a further 44% of adults very or fairly interested in national news. 
There is also a sustained interest in news about the wider world, with 23% 
extremely interested in international news and 22% in African news… 
Shirin Safe (early morning programme at 0630) leading Hausa 
programme…is listened to by 62% of BBC Hausa listeners weekly. Shirin 
Yamma (evening programme) is the second most listened to programme, 
followed closely by Shirin Hantsi (morning programme at 0730) and 
Shirin Rana (afternoon programme). There is a high degree of overlap 
with almost a third of listeners tuning in to all (the) 4 programmes. 
Network Africa most popular WS (World Service) English programme: 
Network is listened to by 22% of listeners weekly. Africa Have Your Say 
(18%), Focus (15%), Fast Track (14%) and World Today (13%) are all 
popular too (BBC Global News, 2009). 
 
2009/10 
There is very little overlap between English and Hausa listening with only 
11% of the BBC‘s weekly audience listening in both languages. News 
plays an integral role in Nigerian society, with 69% of adults following it 
daily. Interest in domestic news is near universal, with 95% of adults 
interested (45% extremely interested). A significant number also look 
beyond domestic news to regional, African or international affairs (19% 
extremely interested in each)... Loyalty to the BBC remains strong: 
Advocacy to the BBC has waned slightly over the past year, but remains 
high, with 86% of audience members (radio, TV or online) agreeing that 
they will continue to use the BBC (was 92% in 2008) and 85% saying they 
would recommend the BBC (was 90% in 2008) (BBC Global News, 
2010). 
 
The common finding of these surveys is the Nigerians‘ high news consumption. 
They have interest in domestic, regional, continental and international news. This 
has perhaps helped to sustain their interest in the BBC and other international 
media that focus on news and current affairs. Among the BBC services, the Hausa 
Service, being the most specialised on Nigeria, attracts the most attention and 
strongest interest; followed by Africa English programmes: Network Africa, 
interactive programme Africa Have Your Say and Focus on Africa. Within the 
Hausa Service, the early morning programme Shirin Safe (06:30am Nigerian time) 
tends to be the most popular, followed by evening programme Shirin Yamma 
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(20:30pm). There is strong loyalty to BBC brand with the surveys showing that 
most of the audiences intend to continue to consume its products and would 
recommend same for others, even though the advocacy appears to be in decline. 
 
Performance ratings 
Among the most important areas the surveys devote much attention to are the 
aspects of reputation and performance of the media. Data is gathered for the 
assessment of BBC‘s reputation and measurement of its performance in 
comparison with its major competitors. The key attributes the surveys often 
attempt to measure are the audiences‘ perceptions of BBC‘s trustworthiness, 
objectivity and relevance in comparison with those of the main domestic and 
international broadcasters. This is derived from the data gathered from audiences 
who use all the media in question and assess them in respect of those attributes. 
The surveys reveal the assessments, and often accompany them with diagrams to 
give graphic representation of each broadcaster‘s ratings. These are the detailed 
findings of the different surveys of the last four years: 
 
2006/07 
The BBC WS continues to have a strong brand image in Nigeria, and is 
seen as the most trusted and objective news source in the country. 
However, the BBC is struggling with regards to relevance, which has been 
falling for the last few years (74% of listeners thought the BBC was 
relevant in 2003, compared to 64% in 2005 and 56% now in 2006). A 
limited presence on FM, due to the ban of live news by foreign stations on 
Nigerian FMs, may have contributed to this fall in perceived relevance. 
Amongst the other international broadcasters CNN is performing well and 
has strengthened its image over the past year in terms of trust and 
relevance. VOA and DW (Deutsche Welle) have remained at similar 
levels. FRCN is the only domestic radio station to show an increase in its 
rating for objectivity and more importantly trust, the attribute considered 
most important for a news provider by Nigerians. Local State Radio may 
have maintained its weekly reach, but the number of people rating its 
image positively is in decline – the largest fall being on its perceived 
relevance. Should this decline be sustained long term it may negatively 
impact on listening. NTA (Nigerian Television Authority) has strengthened 
its image over the past year on all attributes and is seen as the most 
relevant news source in the country. NTA has benefited from increased 
access to TV and has been undergoing a network expansion programme, 
which has improved coverage and reception quality of the channel across 




Ratings of major foreign and local stations in Nigeria for the year 
2006 on attributes of trust, objectivity and relevance 
 
A source you can trust             Provide objective news                 Provide news that is relevant to me 
 





















Base: those who have ever listened/watched each provider 
 
Figure 6.4 Source: BBC WS/Ipsos MORI (2007) 
 
2007/08 
The BBC has retained its position as the leading international news brand 
in Nigeria and also remains the most trusted and objective news source in 
the country. Ratings for trust, objectivity and relevance have been fairly 
static for the BBC over the past year… Reputation ratings for all three 
measures are a lot more positive amongst Hausa listeners than English 
listeners. This reflects the highly competitive nature of the English radio 
market and the challenge BBC WS faces for English where programmes 
are aimed at a number of countries. Amongst the other international 
broadcasters, VOA and DW ((Deutsche Welle) have made significant 
improvements in trust and relevance ratings, though perceived objectivity 
has stayed about the same. CNN conversely has suffered a fall on all 
reputation ratings. State radio stations (FRCN and Local State Radio) 
have seen little change in the way they are perceived, whilst Ray Power 
(the only commercial FM tracked and BBC partner station) has seen its 
ratings improve, especially for trust, NTA (Nigerian Television Authority) 






















































Ratings of the major foreign and local stations in Nigeria for the 
year 2007  
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Base: those who have ever listened/watched each provider 
Figure 6.5 Source: BBC WS/Ipsos MORI (2008) 
 
2008/09 
As in 2007, trust is the most important aspect of news programming. 
Other important attributes for news providers are to be easy to 
understand, provide news that is relevant and to provide high quality 
news. The BBC continues to have a strong brand image in Nigeria, and is 
seen as the most trusted news source in the country. It is also rated highly 
for objectivity and relevance. The BBC, along with most other 
international broadcasters, has seen its ratings fall since 2007. VOA 
suffered the biggest drop, followed by DW (Deutsche Welle), with CNN 
the only international station to strengthen its reputation (for trust, 
objectivity and relevance). The improvements for CNN may be linked to 
the US elections and a feel good factor towards the US; however, this 
does not seem to have benefited VOA as well. Government-owned NTA is 
seen as the most objective and relevant broadcaster in Nigeria, with local 
state radio also rated highly. All the state-owned stations have 
strengthened their reputations over the past year, with Ray Power the only 





















































Audiences’ trust on foreign and local stations in the year 2008 
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  Figure 6.6 Source: BBC GND/Ipsos MORI (2009) 




Due to tight government control of news Nigerians tend to have little trust 
in national broadcasters. More than half of those spoken to agreed with 
the statement ―I trust foreign broadcast stations significantly more than 
broadcasters from my own country‖. Less than a quarter disagreed. The 
BBC benefits from the high level of trust and reliability that Nigerians 
have placed on external news sources and has a strong brand image. The 
BBC was rated top for most of the attributes asked about; the only 
exceptions were ease of understanding and relevance, which NTA came 
top for. The BBC‘s closest international competitor is CNN, followed by 
Deutsche Welle, Voice of America then Al Jazeera. NTA is the most highly 
thought of domestic source, followed by state radio, AIT, FRCN and Ray 








Ratings on trust attribute in the year 2009 
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        Figure 6.7 Source: BBC GND/Ipsos MORI (2010) 
 
In all the surveys the BBC comes top on trust and objectivity attributes. The only 
attribute it has not taken the top position for is that of relevance for which it plays 
a second fiddle to the federal government-owned television network NTA in 2006 
(as figure 6.4 reveals) and to state radio collectively in 2007 (as figure 6.5 shows). 
Compared with its international rivals, the BBC performs better than all of them in 
all the ratings in all the surveys. The surprising challenge, though, is coming from 
the CNN which, the surveys show, has been getting appreciable improvement on 
its ratings. The suggested explanation of ‗feel good factor towards the US‘—
perhaps due to the clear sign that the first African-American, Barack Obama, was 
about to be elected US president (the survey was conducted during the 
elections)—may hold, but, as the report was quick to note, such feeling was not 
extended to the VOA whose rating actually dropped that year to 31 per cent from 
the previous year‘s 47 per cent. In reality the CNN ratings have been relatively 
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good even before the 2008 US presidential election, as the 2006 rating too place it 
as second only to BBC among the global broadcasters. Al-Jazeera‘s poor showing 
on trust attribute (coming fifth with 33 per cent in the 2009 survey) may be 
explained by the fact that the survey was done before the station gains much 
ground in the country; and that it was a nationwide survey, covering both northern 
and southern parts of the country. Al-Jazeera‘s popularity is high among Muslim 
Northern Nigerians ostensibly due to its association with the Muslim and Arab 
world. The fieldwork for this study which was done in Northern Nigeria, for 
instance, reveals that its rating on trust is high among the respondents. The general 
trust rating for the local broadcasters is not really as bad as the comment quoted in 
the 2009/10 survey suggests, which says: ‗More than half of those spoken to 
agreed with the statement ―I trust foreign broadcast stations significantly more 
than broadcasters from my own country‖‘. The overall rating on the trust attribute 
shows that the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) is second only to the BBC, 
but ahead of all the other foreign stations in all the surveys on that attribute.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the guiding principles and structural 
framework that shaped the BBC World Service‘s programme-making endeavours; 
unveiled the nature of the Hausa Service‘s contents; and analysed a selection of 
these over a three-year period. It has also highlighted the World Service‘s 
measurement and assessment strategies and unpacked its level of performance and 
reputation vis-à-vis those of its key rivals, based on its own surveys in Nigeria. 
Data from these surveys, which are based on large samples and done by reputable 
agencies, complements this study as a whole. Vital statistics from the surveys 
gives us useful insights into the nature of audiences‘ demographics and their 
programming preferences, the level of the stations‘ reach and ratings, the changing 
dynamics of delivery technologies, and the emerging trends of the complex 
exchanges between the media and their audiences. The whole idea is to get a well-
grounded background of this relationship and on the Nigeria‘s media landscape 
and the general operating environment where all these are being played out. This 








This chapter presents the first of three sets of findings produced from the primary 
data obtained in the fieldwork conducted for this study. It specifically contains the 
results and analysis of the empirical data obtained through in-depth interviews 
with individual audiences of international media drawn from the Northern 
Nigerian cities of Abuja, Kano and Yola. The other two sets of findings, generated 
from in-depth interviews with the production side (the BBC personnel in London 
and Abuja) and from focus group interviews with audiences in Northern Nigeria, 
are presented and analysed in the subsequent chapters. The focus of this particular 
chapter is on the individual audiences‘ consumption of news and current affairs 
programmes of global broadcasters, particularly the BBC World Service; the 
pattern and impact of their engagement with the broadcasters; their conception of 
the West and its media and their perceptions of BBC‘s coverage of Nigeria, Africa 
and Muslim world. Some strands of conceptual and theoretical postulations 
emanating from the findings, such as the phenomenon of selective believability 
and the contradiction of credibility without acceptability, are also outlined here. 
The respondents have an urban background, with well above average educational 
level, and so the findings should be seen in that light.  
 
Consumption of international media 
Consumption of foreign media texts is a common phenomenon among Northern 
Nigerians. Many international radio broadcasters are aware of this situation and 
have long established Hausa language services to target these audiences (Fardon 
and Furniss, 2000). The BBC World Service, Voice of America (VOA), 
Germany‘s Radio Deutsche Welle, Radio France International (RFI), Radio 
Moscow [until 1990s (Jaggar, 2001)],  Radio China International, Cairo Radio, 
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and even Libya‘s Jamahiriya 
Broadcasting Corporation (LJBC) all have Hausa language services. Northern 
Nigerian audiences access a range of these radio broadcasters as well as many 
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international television stations that transmit in English language such as the BBC 
World News, US Cable News Network (CNN), Rupert Murdoch‘s Sky News, 
France 24, Qatar‘s Al-Jazeera and Iran‘s Press TV channels. All the respondents 
confirmed that they do access a variety of international media; and many are 
regular listeners of international broadcasters, particularly the BBC, as clearly 
shown by the following responses: 
I can consider myself as a very regular listener of the BBC in that, at least 
in a week, I listen to BBC every morning for five out of seven days. I do 
listen to CNN; I do listen to Al-Jazeera, Sky News and Radio France 
International (Graduate student). 
 
I listen to many broadcast stations: BBC, Voice of America and France 
(Radio France International) and (local) stations here in Nigeria (Petty 
trader). 
 
I listen to Voice of America and BBC, but more frequently the BBC, and 
virtually every morning I do listen to it (Female school administrator). 
 
Ah, actually most of the time, whether at home or anywhere, I listen to 
BBC, I watch BBC World (News) and at weekends and Mondays I follow 
BBC sports from Network Africa and Fast Track… I watch Al-Jazeera, I 
watch CNN, I watch Deutsche Welle television, I listen to Radio France 
International even before they had Hausa service and now that they have 
Hausa service I listen to (them); I listen to Voice of America, both the 
VOA English and Hausa services, and Deutsche Welle and Radio China, 
their Hausa programmes (Ex-soldier-cum-parliamentarian). 
 
 
Many tend to listen to as many global broadcasters as they could have access to, 
often on daily basis and usually in the morning. This is consistent with the findings 
of the BBC‘s surveys (BBC World Service, 2007, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 
2010), analysed in the preceding chapter, that show that Nigerians consume a 
variety of foreign media products and that the morning period serves as the peak 
time for radio listening. ‗On a typical day, almost half of all Nigerians listen (to 
radio) in the morning, and just over a third in the afternoon and evening periods‘ 
(BBC World Service, 2007). The convenience of using radio and its simplicity and 
cost effectiveness seem to make it a ready instrument for such utilisation. The 
relevance of radio in the lives of Africans has been well explained in previous 
studies (Spitulnik, 2000; Mano, 2004; Larkin, 2008) and empirical evidence from 
this study has not only reinforced those findings but also provided additional 
insights into Africans‘ engagement with the radio (more on this in the ‗Results and 
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Analysis III‘ chapter). Both radio and television appear to be the key instruments 
through which the respondents regularly interact with a variety of international 
media. However, from their responses, both above and the subsequent ones, it is 
clear that although they listen to many international radio broadcasters, it is the 
BBC that they listen to most frequently: 
Personally, as someone who respects news, I would say I listen to almost 
all those I have access to. Normally, when I wake up in the morning I go 
for the Hausa service of the BBC, say around 6:30am, before I go to (BBC 
Network) Africa that comes my way. I then go to Deutsche Welle and 
others.  
Most frequently? 
I would say is the BBC because at this age when there is no constant 
power supply, with just N20 (about eight pence) batteries I get access to 
the BBC throughout the day (Television producer). 
 
Always every morning I wake up I try to listen to (the BBC Hausa 
Service) (Local newspaper publisher). 
 
I listen to BBC, Voice of America and the Hausa service of Radio China. 
For television I watch Al-Jazeera, France 24 and CNN. 
Most frequently? 
Honestly, for television I watch Al-Jazeera most and for radio I mostly 
listen to the BBC… I do also access them on the Internet in my (mobile 
phone) handset because sometimes when you are not at home you do 
access it from your handset to get the main headlines (Factory worker). 
 
 
The predominance of radio and television as the delivery technologies for these 
audiences is clear, but the new platforms too, Internet and mobile telephony, have 
their potentials, as the last response indicates. The BBC‘s surveys (BBC Global 
News, 2009, 2010) have revealed the rapid spread of the Internet and mobile 
telephony in Nigeria and how they are emerging as platforms for accessing media 
products. The BBC‘s 2009/10 survey puts Internet penetration in Nigeria at about 
20 per cent, which has already risen to 28 per cent (Internet World Stats, 2011), 
and mobile phone ownership at 70 per cent (BBC Global News, 2009); and that 14 
per cent of ‗Nigerians listen to the radio on their mobile weekly‘ (BBC Global 
News, 2010). The new platforms are indeed becoming significant among Nigerian 
audiences; and it is this awareness that, for instance, made the BBC to devote 
resources for its ‗multimedia strategy‘ (Hiller, 2010a, p.2). The use of multiple 
platform and the interactions with a variety of media have shown a picture of the 
way the audiences‘ engage with international media. Further responses from the 
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audiences reveal additional data that helps produce the full picture of the pattern— 
the cultural factor. For some of the audiences listening to international radio 
broadcasts has become a habit inherited from parents and developed into a sort of 
culture being passed from one generation to the other. They grew up observing 
their parents listening to international radio stations, particularly the BBC Hausa 
Service, and automatically took after them—as the following responses from a 
university lecturer and a former newspaper editor reveal: 
First of all, we listen to BBC because it has been a tradition from our 
great-grandfathers; we inherited it, it is like a norm when you are growing 
up in the North (Northern Nigeria). You have your father who is always 
listening to the BBC Hausa Service to keep abreast with world affairs and 
internal political and social happenings in the environment. So we grew up 
to listen and to discuss with our parents… Later on other channels started 
coming up to challenge the BBC and compete. This is why we have 
variety of alternatives (University lecturer). 
  
I was virtually brought up in a BBC (listening) family. My father, that‘s 
the first thing he listens to every morning after morning prayer; so we kind 
of grew up, of course, when my mother began to join, that means the two 
of them would listen in the morning, sometimes in the afternoon… So 
really, the BBC is the one I have the most access to, and because of this 
historical connection, as an adult now and a mother myself, I listen to it 
often (Female ex-editor of Hausa newspaper). 
 
 
This radio listening ‗tradition‘ they both tried to stress was equally noticed by 
Abdulkadir (2000) in his study of Hausa radio culture in Nigeria. His conclusion 
was that majority of Hausa-speaking Northern Nigerians do not only regard radio 
listening as ‗a habit‘, but they also ‗see it as a Hausa cultural value‘ (Abdulkadir, 
2000, p.130). This explains the popularity of international radio broadcasters 
among these audiences and the high consumption of their products. The BBC‘s 
historical link to them, being the one that started broadcasting to the region in the 
1930s (Briggs, 1985; Larkin, 2008) and maintains closer relationship with them 
since then (Gumel, 2007), gave it an edge over the others. Overall, all the above 
responses put together reveal a pattern of international media consumption that is 
characterised by regular interactions with a variety of media through multiple 
platforms, predominantly radio and television, and enhanced by a culture of 
interaction developed from a desire of wanting to know the happenings around the 
world.  
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Perceptions of BBC‘s credibility 
One of the most crucial elements in media-audience relationship is the issue of 
credibility or trustworthiness of the media. The level of audiences‘ perception of 
media credibility determines to a large extent the level of impact or influence that 
media may have in their lives (Rampal and Adams, 1990). The credibility question 
is even more crucial to audiences in regard to the consumption of news and current 
affairs programmes. And since the respondents here have indicated that they do 
engage with the BBC more than they do with any other international media, it is 
significant to find out their assessment of its credibility or trustworthiness. The 
bulk of the responses reveal that their perception of the BBC‘s credibility is very 
high. All but one of the respondents rated BBC as the most credible and 
trustworthy international broadcaster that serves as a benchmark against which the 
authenticity of other broadcasters‘ news reports are often adjudged. They used 
different criteria to advance their respective reasons for giving such high rating to 
the broadcaster.  
 
The following respondents used what they see as BBC‘s accuracy, independence 
and impartiality as well as the timeliness and depth of its coverage of events as 
their criteria for rating it very high. They were responding to the question: ―Which 
of the global broadcasters do you think is the most credible?‖ 
The BBC, of course. 
Why? 
Well, their news has been genuine. And they give us first hand 
information (Female school administrator). 
 
I tend to look at the BBC as the most credible medium in terms of the 
BBC‘s editorial policy of getting all sides of the news… After listening to 
all international broadcasters, the stamp of credibility will come from the 
BBC (Graduate student). 
 
I take whatever they say in the BBC as the truth because I have been 
monitoring. Most of the time, they would send a reporter down to the 
smallest village in a community to go and talk to them... So with that, I 
think we develop confidence in BBC (Ex-soldier-cum-parliamentarian). 
 
Truly, I think, I trust the BBC most because we believe that it is not 




Well, the BBC comes first… The most reliable station is the BBC. I say 
this with authority because most of the time when you ask somebody the 
source of his news, if and when he tells you in the North, it‘s that he heard 
it over the BBC; just be assured that it is authentic (University lecturer). 
 
 
The respondents‘ use of words such as ‗genuine‘, ‗reliable‘ and ‗authentic‘ and 
phrases such as ‗getting all sides‘ and ‗not censored‘ conveyed the level of their 
positive assessment. The key attributes of accuracy, independence, impartiality 
and timeliness and depth of coverage that they associate the BBC with are 
consistent with some of the broadcaster‘s own editorial values (BBC Guidelines, 
2010) and they are essentially the instruments that build the credibility of any 
media (Rampal and Adams, 1990). For some of the respondents, though, the issue 
of credibility and trustworthiness is a philosophical question that is better judged 
in relation to each station‘s specific coverage of events and ideological orientation. 
Although they still awarded a high credibility rating for the BBC using even some 
of the attributes listed above, they avoided giving a blanket endorsement: 
Ah, trust, that‘s a tricky word. As a journalist myself when you say trust, I 
think, I will hinge every broadcaster to the philosophy of its organisation. 
Like the Hausa BBC is Hausa centric, sort of, for Hausa listeners across 
West Africa. But the English service, say for instance Focus on Africa and 
Network Africa, they are broader because they go for the whole continent. 
In that wise I think the BBC Hausa Service influences my decision more 
(Television producer). 
  
Honestly, I do believe some news reports I get from the BBC and the rest 
of them. At times I do believe about 70 per cent of the news report I get; 
and at times below this (Petty trader). 
 
First is the BBC, among the radio stations. For the television it is Al-
Jazeera, that‘s the station that carries accurate reports. You see them 
broadcast stories even about Nigeria that we here do not get locally, that‘s 
why we trust them (Factory worker). 
 
 
Their caution, notwithstanding, they did give BBC high credibility rating. The 
television producer gave it to BBC Hausa Service in particular, the petty trader to 
BBC as a whole and the factory worker to BBC and Al-Jazeera for radio and 
television respectively. They are more or less within the category of the other 
respondents before them. However, the sole respondent who did not rate the BBC 
as the most credible international media, a trade unionist, feels that Radio France 
International‘s liberal reporting style earned her that accolade: 
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Well, right now I trust Radio France International the most. 
What about the BBC? 
They are very good, but as at now, ironically, (it is) Radio France 
International. You know the French people have always been ‗I don‘t 
care‘—so they don‘t care even with their news, they go into details. As at 
now I listen to France International and they do a very good job more than 
the BBC in analysing issues; they are very liberal (Trade unionist). 
 
So another perspective on assessing media credibility has now been added by this 
respondent. His key reason for giving Radio France International high credibility 
rating is his perception of its liberalism: ‗they are very liberal‘. He feels that their 
‗I don‘t care‘ attitude makes them to reveal every thing to the audiences without 
perhaps incorporating any ideological agenda into it: ‗they don‘t care…they go 
into details‘. The feeling that he is allowed to get full details of the happenings 
earns them his trust. His perception, however, contrasts sharply with that of the 
former BBC World Service director Nigel Chapman who sees France 24 television 
channel (Radio France International‘s affiliate) as representing ‗a French 
perspective‘ (Pfaffner, 2008)—in an open attempt to challenge a competitor. 
  
Putting this aside, the overwhelming positive credibility rating the respondents 
generally gave to the BBC has in a way confirmed the results of the previous BBC 
audience surveys in Nigeria that consistently reveal such perception for the station 
(BBC World Service, 2007, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010). For instance, 
the BBC‘s 2008/09 survey says:  ‗The BBC continues to have a strong brand 
image in Nigeria, and is seen as the most trusted news source in the country‘. A 
previous study in Asia (Rampal and Adams, 1990) also pointed to the positive 
credibility rating of the station and concluded that such positive perception 
enhanced the broadcaster‘s effectiveness in its public diplomacy role. The findings 
here are therefore consistent with what was revealed both in Nigeria and 
elsewhere. The key difference, however, is that the findings here do not stop at the 
rating exercise alone; they go further to provide full insight into the audiences‘ 
perception of the international media, what they really think about them and why 
they think the way they do. This is why the study succeeded in equally unveiling 




Influence in understanding international affairs 
High consumption of BBC‘s products and positive perception of the station‘s 
credibility would presumably enhance its effectiveness in influencing its 
audiences. BBC World Service‘s programming for Northern Nigerian audiences, 
and indeed for all transnational audiences, is dominated by international news and 
current affairs—even its coverage of local events in Nigeria, as the analysis in the 
preceding chapter reveals, is usually done from an international perspective. So 
how effective is the broadcaster in influencing Northern Nigerians‘ comprehension 
of international news and current affairs? It is virtually impossible to measure with 
exactness the level of such effectiveness because the audiences do also engage 
with other international media and even more significantly because the existence 
of intervening variables makes assessment of media impact very difficult 
(Klapper, 1960; Liebes and Katz, 1993; Liu and Johnson, 2011). Still, since the 
respondents have confirmed both high consumption of BBC products and good 
credibility rating for the station, it is important to find out directly from them how 
much influence they think it exerts in their comprehension of international affairs. 
Their responses reveal that the broadcaster has great influence in such respect. 
Almost all the respondents regard the BBC as their major source of global news, 
and believe that it does help them greatly to comprehend international affairs. For 
some, though, the BBC has enhanced their understanding of international affairs in 
more profound way than it does for others, as shown by the following responses: 
Well, actually I cannot quantify it (the BBC‘s influence) because I can say 
80-90 per cent of what I know internationally, I know it through the BBC. 
When you say you visit, visit actually, you can visit some places, you 
cannot visit the whole world in your lifetime. But at least if you monitor 
very rich credible radio station like the BBC, you would know a lot of 
things, you would know a lot of places, and you would even learn some 
languages in the BBC. Definitely, I don‘t think BBC is comparable to any 
other broadcast station (Ex-soldier-cum-parliamentarian). 
 
I get up-to-date information from the BBC as far as it relates to 
international affairs. I would like to give an example: the BBC influences 
my view and perception in relation to probably events that are happening 
in Iran, events that have been happening in (the) Republic of North Korea. 
Now, my views and perception and even my outlook on these two 
countries have been largely shaped by the news…that I get from the BBC 
(Graduate student).  
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Yes, (the BBC) does (influence my understanding of international affairs) 
because if I listen to it, I learn more about things I didn‘t know before, 
news and current affairs, especially the happenings in the Western world 
(Petty trader). 
 
Indeed, it does, because they do not just broadcast news, they also do 
analysis on issues and features on health and education, and provide other 
useful information (Factory worker).  
 
I say I am an ardent listener of the BBC… I am in Nigeria, I have never 
been to Cuba, I should not know anything about (the US detention facility 
in) Guantanamo (Bay), but everything I have heard from the BBC about 
Guantanamo is exactly how it is (Television producer). 
 
 
It is clear from these responses that the BBC has indeed been effective in 
enhancing these audiences‘ comprehension of happenings in many countries 
around the world, in providing them with useful information on health and 
education and even in enhancing language learning. Whether they are talking 
about getting ‗80-90 per cent‘ of international news from the station or admitting 
its role in shaping their perception of Iran and North Korea or crediting it with 
providing information about the Western world and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba or 
praising it for offering ‗analysis of issues‘ and ‗features on health and education‘, 
the respondents are all revealing the kind of influence the BBC wields on their 
lives. For others, though, the BBC‘s influence on their comprehension of 
international affairs is measured with some caution. Although they regard the BBC 
as a key provider of international news and analysis, they believe that other factors 
or sources of news equally play important part in their comprehension of global 
affairs. They tend to look for news from many sources and make critical judgment 
on them—as their responses indicate: 
Yes, BBC does (influence my comprehension of international affairs), but 
it gives me a mind to think in my own way because when you listen to 
BBC you hear the same story, and you listen to Radio France 
International, which I usually listen to, you hear the same story but taken 
from a different angle. So you begin to wonder; you have to do your own 
independent judgment (Trade unionist). 
 
BBC is not the only source of my information, I have other sources, but it 
has really helped in trying to give me more confidence. Sometimes I 
compare what I read to what is being aired in BBC and I find out that it is 
almost what comes out of the BBC Hausa Service (that) is really very 
reliable and…trustworthy. So it really assists me (Local newspaper 
publisher). 
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As an academic I verify news; I don‘t only listen to the BBC, I go to the 
website, I browse, I download very critical issues, I analyse them and then 
I listen to other radio stations that might give me similar news in another 
version with some other additions or subtractions (University lecturer). 
 
 
As can be seen from their narratives, the trade unionist was cautious in his 
assessment and would not give too much credit to the BBC for influencing his 
grasp of global affairs (he apparently believes that Radio France International does 
more for him), the local publisher gave much of the credit to the BBC Hausa 
Service, and the lecturer to both the BBC and other media. Despite their caution 
and despite the critical tone of their responses, they all indicate that the BBC does 
exert influence in their lives—though not as much as the other respondents 
perceive it to be doing. Collectively, they all point to a wide range of influence 
that goes beyond aiding comprehension of news and current affairs to other 
aspects of people‘s everyday life. Overall, this finding indicates the broadcaster‘s 
effectiveness in playing the dual role of providing news service and promoting 
British public diplomacy as others (Rampal and Adams, 1990; Nye, 2004a; 
Sreberny et al., 2010b) have noted, for as would also be seen in the subsequent 
chapters even merely associating Britain with the positive perception of BBC as a 
credible broadcaster brings benefits to the country (FCO, 2005), let alone when it 
plays a role in shaping its audiences‘ comprehension of international affairs. 
 
Perceptions of the West 
The respondents‘ high consumption of international media products, mainly from 
the BBC, and their admission that the broadcaster has greatly influenced their 
understanding of international affairs confirm their consumption of Western 
cultural goods. Does this automatically translate into positive perceptions of the 
West, particularly Britain and the United States? The data gathered does not 
produce a categorical answer of ‗yes or no‘, but it does reveal that on balance the 
respondents‘ perception of the West is generally negative. Ambivalence may be 
applicable in some respect, but closer examination of the content and tone of the 
responses suggest that the majority of the respondents have negative perceptions 
of the West. There is a tendency among many of them to project a picture of 
ambivalence, marked by ―I-like-them-but‖ responses, but the responses still reveal 
more of negative, rather than positive, perceptions. They also tend to give lengthy 
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explanations to defend their respective positions, perhaps because of the 
complexity associated with cultural encounter or perhaps because this is an issue 
with a very wide grey area and sometimes with emotions attach to it. The 
following responses provide examples of both the tendency to offer lengthy 
explanations and to be ambivalent, even though on balance they do reveal negative 
perceptions of the West: 
I do like some things about the West, but I also dislike some of the things 
they do… The things I like about them relate to the issue of good 
governance: for example, I like the way their leaders resign when they 
make mistakes. I appreciate the fact that when you are found wanting or 
there is evidence against you, you resign. I respect them for that… But I 
detest some of the things they do…like what is happening in Iraq and 
what is happening in Afghanistan. These things really make me to detest 
them because of the way people are being molested. What I like about 
them is the issue of raising awareness about human rights…but at the 
same time I dislike them for violating the same human rights of others… 
What they say contradicts what they do (Petty trader). 
 
Britain makes its case selectively. It treats different countries in different 
ways; it treats, for instance, Uganda differently when Uganda commits a 
crime; and then treats a place like Gambia differently when Gambia 
commits a crime... I don‘t think Britain treats Africa as a whole with the 
same glove… 
But what is your opinion on how they treat African countries in different 
ways? 
I don‘t like the way they handle them because it is the system of divide 
and rule. By giving different favours to different countries, it will be very 
difficult for African countries to bring their forces together to have one 
voice on certain things (Television producer). 
 
Actually, you‘d like some (Western policies)…democracy and good 
governance… Definitely, I so much like the way they (Britain and United 
States) do one two three things, but not entirely what they do. We must 
like one or two things because we have to say the truth—at times they are 
good. But when the leader (of another country) is against their interests, 
definitely, no matter how democratically he comes in, they would tend to 
hate him. Definitely, that is what they do; they go to any length and make 
sure that they remove him from office… 
You think there is double standard in their policies? 
Most of the times, but they try as much as possible to hide that double 
standard. They only try to export one two three things that you believe, 




These responses highlight the dilemma of adjudging any entity that possesses 
more than one side. The respondents tried to make assessment of what they regard 
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to be both the positive and negative sides of the West before showing where their 
loyalty belongs. The positive perception was shown in the way they associated the 
West with ‗good governance‘, ‗human rights‘ and ‗democracy‘. The negative view 
was revealed when they linked the West with ‗double standard‘, ‗divide and rule‘ 
and ruthlessness. It is a contradictory assessment reflecting the contradictions of 
global politics itself. Perhaps their high consumption of Western cultural goods 
has influenced them to view the West in positive way by associating it with those 
positive attributes. However, reports of West‘s involvements in military invasions, 
regime changes and subversions of some non-Western governments swayed them 
to a negative view. This probably explains why they went to some length to 
consider both sides before delivering their verdict. Some respondents, however, 
have less difficulty in passing judgment. This comment by a graduate student 
clearly expresses positive perception of the West, although it equally reveals that 
his view might have been influenced by exposure to positive media portrayal of 
the West: 
The news that I get actually is that everything is almost near perfect in the 
West in terms of their politics. For instance, you can hardly hear anything 
in relation to corruption, although recently we hear the issue of corruption 
in the British Parliament. But you hardly get to hear those ones in the 
Western media and invariably it shapes your perception in relation to 
events and in relation to the West. It shapes your perception for you to 
think that everything is almost near perfect in the West… 
Does the regular listening of the BBC help to make you have favourable 
perception of British foreign policy? 
The good thing about the BBC is that whenever they are broadcasting 
news in relation to British foreign policies, especially policies that relate 
to Africa, they tend to give you a fair and balanced view of the foreign 
policies. And, of course, I tend to appreciate the way they present the 
foreign policies in a way that we tend to accept it that, of course, they 




It is a positive perception apparently aided by his consumption of media content 
portraying the West in a positive light, as he explains. His case reflects a classic 
case of ‗preferred‘ reading of media text (Hall, 1980), decoding the Western 
media‘s messages in accordance with the way the producers encoded them. Unlike 
the respondents before him (particularly the petty trader and the ex-soldier) who 
exhibited a case of ‗negotiated‘ reading of the text, the graduate student accepted 
the dominant meaning encoded in the message. As discussed in the ‗Literature 
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Review‘ chapter, Stuart Hall (1980) has in his encoding/decoding model proposed 
three different readings of media messages by audiences—preferred, negotiated 
and oppositional readings—to reflect the audiences‘ acceptance, negotiation with, 
or rejection of the producers‘ intended meanings of the messages. The instances 
cited above show both the case of preferred reading and that of negotiated reading. 
A case of oppositional reading too has been identified here as some respondents 
have expressed views that show a clear negative perception of the West. They see 
both the West and the alleged Western media‘s positive portrayal of the West as 
part of a continuous domination of the developing countries by the rich 
industrialised nations. They tend to blame the West for the misfortunes of the 
developing countries or for the alleged unfair treatment of Muslim nations. Most 
of the respondents who hold these views speak with passion and give lengthy 
explanations to support their arguments: 
Well, one thing that I know is that I have read much about history and I 
know how the West has been quite very unfair in trade, in investment, in 
colonialism. Colonisers: how they left us in the dark, how they left us in 
want, in poverty, in misery, and we are grappling today with leadership 
tussle, leadership struggle, and any negative news that comes, comes from 
us—no positive news comes from us. So the media is dominated by the 
West. Having colonised us and raped the countries of Africa, Latin 
America, the Caribbean and Asia, they gave us nothing... We are 
dominated technologically, we are dominated by the media, the Western 
media; we are dominated by the Western power, we are dominated by the 
World Bank, the IMF… And then collaborators within us that have other 
leaders outside that want us to be more backward than forward. So we find 
tremendous resources and amount of money going out of Africa and not 
developing Africa but still developing Europe (University lecturer). 
 
 
The lecturer used both the past and the present to provide justification for his 
negative views on the West, beginning with its historical role in colonialism and 
the consequences of it to the current trade and investment relations that he 
considers unfair. He also touched on institutional structures such as World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as technological and media 
structures, all of which he feels confer advantages on the West and help perpetuate 
the unfair relationship. It is clearly a negative perception with no attempt to find 
any positive aspect of the relationship. The following lengthy comment from a 
former editor also reveals negative perception of the West, though from a different 
perspective: 
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[T]here was a time when we unquestionably thought that Britain was on 
our side… As our former colonial masters, we have this affinity. But I 
think the (first) Gulf War was the first defining moment when we began to 
question what we were hearing on the BBC. And you know people were 
quite unhappy with the way, for instance, the BBC tried to first of all 
justify the gang up against Saddam Hussein, even though we‘re all aware 
that Saddam started it all by invading Kuwait... And then when it became 
a matter of all these people ganging up against Saddam, when we thought 
he was fighting a super power, Saddam became like a Muslim hero at that 
time. I remember many children born at that time, for his standing up to 
the US, they were named Saddam… So, I think, that was like a defining 
moment because truly that was when we began to see the BBC as partisan 
and in some ways even anti-Muslims or anti-Arabs; we‘re not too happy 
with the way they ganged up with the US, and they‘re all for the Gulf 
invasion, regardless of the laws (Female ex-editor of Hausa newspaper). 
 
 
A historical perspective was used here too but not in the way it was played in the 
earlier response. The former editor, unlike the lecturer, is not so keen on passing 
blame on colonialism; she feels that the colonial link with Britain should have 
actually made Britain to be on the side of its former colonies. Though not 
condoning colonialism, she apparently believes that it should have been 
transformed into an instrument that would help to build a better relationship 
between the former imperial power and its former colonies; but, in her view, it did 
not turn out to be that way. And that is one of the key sources of her dismay. This 
was worsened by what she saw as the West‘s interference in the Muslim world. 
‗The defining moment,‘ in her opinion, was the first Gulf war in the early 1990s 
when the US-led coalition forces ejected Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq out of Kuwait. 
Here too, though she was not in support of Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait, she was 
clearly opposed to the ‗gang up‘ against the Iraqi leader, even condemning the 
BBC for trying to justify it. So the blame is not just on the West, it is extended to 
its media too—as the following comment from the local publisher equally reveals: 
I think, truly, while they (Western media) try to be credible, they are 
trying to make the entire people of Northern Nigeria or Nigeria or here in 
Africa to believe in Western programmes… People should look at 
America and Britain as countries that decide for us... But if you look at 
their programmes in the news items, you‘d realise that it is not always true 
because for one, as a Muslim, I really believe that they have some 
sentiments, because it is not only the BBC that I listen to. I listen to it 
regularly but I listen to other international stations too… Sometimes I get 
more annoyed if I listen to some of these policies because instead of 
making me happy, I feel it annoys me… I only listen to hear their own 
side of the story that I cannot be allowed to hear from this (local media‘s) 
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perspective. But truly it has not influenced me so as to love Britain so 
dearly. This is their news items, they are doing this; I should like them for 




All the last three lengthy responses show a clear case of oppositional reading of 
media messages (Hall, 1980). Clearly, high consumption of Western media has not 
endeared the West to these audiences. On the contrary, it produces backlash 
effects (Morgan, 1990) or what Klapper (1960, p.13) calls ‗boomerang effects‘, as 
the audiences perceive the West negatively, accusing it of short-changing the less-
developed world. The responses are lengthy and clear enough to adequately 
explain what the respondents exactly mean, and it is evident from them that the 
university lecturer‘s argument falls within the context of imperialism and centre-
periphery theories (Galtung, 1971; Wellhofer, 1989), the female ex-editor‘s focus 
is on the West‘s alleged antagonism to Muslims and the Arab world and the local 
publisher stands somewhere in-between them, expressing views that have a tinge 
of both African and Islamic sentiments.  The respondents also tend to equate the 
West with Britain and United States—in fact, not only these respondents but most 
of the respondents in this research usually mean Britain and United States when 
they use the term ‗West‘ and vice versa, which is actually a common practice in 
Nigeria, emanating perhaps primarily from the country‘s colonial, commercial and 
linguistic ties with these two countries.   
 
Perceptions of BBC‘s coverage of Nigeria 
The best known function of the BBC World Service is provision of international 
news and analysis. Transnational audiences primarily turn to it for this service. 
Nigerians are not exception, and they mostly turn to it both for international news 
and for news about their country—and for other services as well. Most of the 
respondents in this study do not only regard the BBC as their main source of 
international news and current affairs, but they also see it as a source of news in 
Nigeria mainly because of its wide coverage of events in the country. Their 
perception of BBC‘s coverage of Nigeria is generally positive—part of this was 
already shown above in their comments under the themes of international media 
consumption and BBC credibility rating. Many Nigerians tend to use BBC as a 
yardstick against which they measure the performance of local broadcasters—not 
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in terms of resources or quality of staffing and programming or handling of global 
news and so on, but in terms of treatment of Nigerian stories. The respondents 
rated BBC high on the basis of what they see as its in-depth coverage of Nigeria, 
timeliness and accuracy of its news content, its ability to cover politically-sensitive 
stories that many local broadcasters (predominantly-controlled by the government) 
avoid and its perceived impartiality in covering such stories. The following 
comment by a television producer attempts to capture some of the listed attributes: 
Anytime (you) listen to the BBC, you are sure to hear something from 
close home than, say, even a radio station within the country. Like for 
instance now, if there is a scandal in the federal government, we first hear 
it in the BBC. On the NTA network, you won‘t see it, you‘ll never see it at 
all—sometimes, you‘ll see it next week. But most of the times, at the time 
it happened or shortly after, you get it in the BBC (Television producer). 
 
 
The attempt to make comparative assessment comes out boldly: he tried to 
highlight how far the BBC could go to get a local story that a local radio station 
has not picked, how free the BBC is to cover a federal government scandal that the 
government-owned Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) could not cover and how 
timely the BBC‘s coverage of stories could be. He used BBC as a benchmark to 
measure the performance of local broadcasters in covering Nigeria, having 
adjudged the station to have performed well. Other responses too portray positive 
perception of the station—this one in particular speaks glowingly of its coverage 
of both Africa and Nigeria: 
I tend to listen to BBC Hausa Service. I know there is an African service, 
and I often heard people quote what they heard on the World Service. But 
truly I‘m more of a Hausa Service listener, and as the result I know that 
they tend to cover Africa very well and Nigeria excellently well (Female 
ex-editor of Hausa newspaper).  
 
 
So, despite this respondent‘s earlier misgivings about BBC‘s coverage of the Gulf 
war (as noted earlier), she feels its coverage of Nigeria is excellent. She is 
particularly emphatic on the Hausa Service which she listens regularly. This view 
is reinforced by a similar one from another female listener in this comment: 
To a quite extent, because of their Hausa service, I think, virtually 
everybody in Nigeria tunes in to his radio to listen to them. So, I think, 




The underlining message in both comments is that they feel that not just they 
themselves as individual listeners but others too must have felt comfortable with 
the BBC‘s coverage of Nigeria as revealed by the positive comments the former 
editor said she heard from others and by the way the school administrator saw 
people tuning in to listen to the station. But there are others who are slightly more 
cautious. The local publisher does share with the other respondents the positive 
view about the BBC‘s coverage of Nigeria, but he notes that it does so from its 
own perspective: 
I have confidence and I listen more to BBC because I trust them… They 
would tell you what you‘re supposed to know from their own perspective, 
although here locally…they are not allowed to be aired. It is censored 
there too, but at a very minimal level (Local newspaper publisher). 
 
 
Looking at all the comments it is clear that the respondents‘ satisfaction with the 
BBC‘s performance in Nigeria is not in doubt. Even the last comment that raises 
the issue of the broadcaster giving reports from its own perspective and of being 
censored does still stress that it at least offers more open coverage than the local 
stations which may not even be allowed to broadcast some stories. This is not to 
say that Nigerians are comfortable with the way BBC covers each and every story 
in their country—far from it. As seen in the Welcome to Lagos episode cited in 
‗The BBC and Northern Nigerians‘ chapter, the broadcast of that programme by 
BBC2 in April 2010 (BBC2, 2010) provoked outrage among many Nigerians. So 
there are cases of discomfort, but the responses here are on the general coverage. 
The respondents‘ satisfaction with the BBC is on its cumulative coverage of 
Nigeria in general. Overall, their assessment is consistent with the results of 
BBC‘s audience surveys (BBC World Service, 2007, 2008; BBC Global News, 
2009, 2010) that show Nigerians‘ high rating of its performance in their country. 
And this was mainly facilitated by their satisfaction of the local coverage. 
‗Research shows that for many people a major reason for listening to foreign 
broadcasts is to obtain news, especially locally relevant news, not otherwise 
obtainable‘ (Mytton and Forrester, 1988, p. 477). Although much has changed 
since the 1988 research was conducted and many local broadcasters (particularly 
the private stations), in fairness to them, do now cover areas that they could not 
previously cover and the new media reports all sorts of stories now, the 
significance of BBC‘s coverage of local stories is still high in Nigeria. It is the 
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measure of such significance that both the BBC and some Nigerians claim that the 
impact of the World Service in Nigeria could be compared to that of a national 
radio (Aitken, 2007; Muhammad, 2010).  
 
Perceptions of BBC‘s coverage of Muslim world and Africa 
Of all the themes discussed, the issue of BBC‘s coverage of Islamic world and 
Muslim-related affairs seemed to have provoked the greatest passion from almost 
all the respondents. Islam, as discussed in the ‗Historical Context‘ chapter, plays 
significant roles not just in the religious but also in the political, social and cultural 
lives of Muslim Northern Nigerians whose Islamic identity also seems to invoke 
their interests in happenings across the Muslim world. Incidentally, the 
international media too are awash with stories and issues related to Muslims and 
Islamic world. Finding out the audiences‘ position on the BBC‘s coverage of the 
matter is essential for this research. The respondents were passionate on the 
subject and keen to express their views on it. The majority believe that the BBC‘s 
coverage of Islamic world is very negative (a hint of that has already emerged 
from some of their responses above). Similarly, some of the respondents also feel 
that the BBC‘s coverage of Africa is also negative, though not as negative as they 
see with regard to its coverage of Muslims and Islam-related issues. The central 
focus of their argument is that the West is antagonistic to Islam and that the 
Western media, including the BBC, are toeing the same line, portraying Muslim 
nations negatively to justify actions taken against them. The respondents, being 
Muslims themselves, gave it a ―we-versus-them‖ perspective—as the following 
comments show: 
Well, you see, their true belief is that Islam is (an) aggressive religion. 
We‘re always fighting and fighting and fighting (Trade unionist). 
 
[T]he Gulf war was the first thing that made us feel like the Western world 
was capable of being brutal against Muslim countries, and not caring 
about, you know, casualties and stuff… It was not like before when once 
you said the BBC, that‘s the ultimate authority. You know, with time, the 
people of Northern Nigeria have begun to question the BBC‘s objectivity, 
of course, as regards to Islam and our relationship with the West (Female 
ex-editor of Hausa newspaper). 
 
From the content and tone of their comments, it is clear that both of them situate 
themselves as being at the receiving end of what they see as unfair treatment of 
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Muslims by the West and its media. The use of ―we‖ and ―our‖ signifies their 
sense of involvement and victimhood. The trade unionist is concerned with the 
portrayal of Islam as an ‗aggressive religion‘ while the former editor talks about 
the West‘s brutality ‗against Muslim countries‘ and the BBC‘s lack of ‗objectivity‘ 
in reporting it. Both of them share a pessimistic view of BBC‘s coverage of the 
Muslim world—just as the following respondents too: 
To a large extent I don‘t think they are fair to the Muslim world… (The 
BBC is) not very accurate (in its coverage of Islam)… There was a 
case…it‘s the Muslim community which Britain was trying to blame, and 
they were trying to cover it up (Female school administrator). 
 
Well, one thing I must tell you is that the coverage has been negative, and 
without sentiment I would say so. Number one, it has not been well-
researched. Every issue is supposed to be researched by investigative 
journalism and much resources and personnel need to be trained to 
understand the genesis of a problem… Every issue is unique in itself, for 
example, religious riot in the North during the Second Republic (in 
Nigeria) is quite distinct in its origin, in its genesis, in its consequence 
with what happened with the Boko Haram (see the introduction of 
‗Historical Context‘ chapter) (University lecturer).  
 
 
Although the instances they tried to cite were different, their focus was to illustrate 
alleged unfair coverage of Muslim-related issues. Their reading of the BBC texts, 
like that of the two respondents before them, is oppositional (Hall, 1980). They 
simply rejected the content of BBC‘s coverage of the particular issues involved 
and apparently did not even bother to negotiate for a middle ground meaning. This 
tends to happen when audiences are confronted with media messages that are not 
congenial with their dominant belief (Klapper, 1960). Considering the significant 
roles Islam plays in the lives of these respondents, negative stories about Muslims 
or Islam-related matters may not be compatible with their prevailing views, and so 
they tend to reject them. In a way it is part of the difficult relationship between the 
West and Islam and the wider complexity of cultural encounter. This comment by 
the former parliamentarian provides an insight into this complexity: 
Well, actually, I have problem naturally with the West because of their 
religious understanding. Ah, they don‘t understand what Islam is. For us 
in Northern Nigeria, I can say majority of us are Muslims, and whatever 
touches on religion definitely touches us deep inside. And for them, they 
are ignorant of that because…they don‘t consider religion as anything. But 
here, without religion, you are nothing—that‘s our belief and that‘s how it 
is. So the only problem we have with them (is) when they just say 
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anything…against my religion. If not, we don‘t have problem with them. 
Most of the things we do here in Nigeria, we copy from them; they 




For him the West‘s inability or unwillingness to comprehend the feelings of 
Muslims is the source of the difficulties in the relationship. The West may not 
consider religion significant, but for him and Muslim Northern Nigerians it is. And 
that, in his view, is the parting point; and it comes into fore if the West does 
anything against his religion. Otherwise, he says, ‗we don‘t have problem with 
them…they brought us up…though we know they have their interests‘. It is a clear 
example of the complexity associated with cultural encounters. However, unlike 
the other respondents before him who show a clear oppositional reading of 
Western media text, his appears to be more of a negotiated reading (Hall, 1980). 
He considered their side and tried to reconcile it with his. The other respondents 
before him did not do that. But there is also a dominant reading from at least one 
respondent (the factory worker) who feels that the BBC‘s main focus is on 
enlightening people and that it has been covering Muslims and Islam-related 
matters accurately and fairly: 
In my understanding, honestly, the BBC concentrates in enlightening 
people. They do not hide things; they do not show religious bias…they 
balance their reports. My belief is that they do not show religious 
preference (Factory worker). 
 
 
Other respondents, however, raised the issue of alleged negative depiction of the 
less-developed world, particularly Africa, and positive portrayal of the West. Their 
argument is that there is a structural imbalance created by the West to present 
itself in a positive light and others negatively; and that all the Western media, 
including the BBC, are guilty of this. They describe it from what they regard as the 
existence of an unfair information flow model: 
There is a one-sided flow of information: good is from the West, bad is 
from the developing world. You can hardly hear anything coming from 
Africa except that of conflict, except that of war, except that of coups, 
except that of corruption… Certainly, 95 per cent of what they do is to 
portray the West in a positive light. I don‘t know whether there is certain 
information they are supplementing or they are suppressing, but from the 
news we get, 95 per cent of the news is the positive portrayal of the West 
(Graduate student). 
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Truly speaking, I think, over 60 or 70 per cent of their programme are 
based on their policies... They would tell you what you‘re supposed to 
know from their own perspective (Local newspaper publisher). 
 
 
Both the graduate student and the local publisher are united in this case: they share 
the view that the West uses its control of information flow for its own benefits. 
They even tried to quantify the extent to which they think the West is taking 
advantage of such control. They may not have provided scientific evidence to back 
any of the claims, but the way they put them reveal an attempt to emphasise the 
magnitude of the problem. Their argument goes beyond the issue of alleged 
negative or positive portrayal of one side or the other and raises a more serious 
question of alleged suppression of truth. ‗I don‘t know whether there is certain 
information they are supplementing or they are suppressing,‘ says the graduate 
student to highlight that concern. Like the case of alleged unfair coverage of 
Muslims and Islamic world which most of the respondents show stronger worries 
about, the alleged poor depiction of Africa too shows a picture of oppositional 
reading of Western media texts (Hall, 1980). Both cases reveal the audiences‘ 
negative perceptions of BBC‘s coverage of those areas. 
 
Credibility and selective believability 
The responses so far seen and analysed above have revealed significant 
contradictions: high consumption of BBC‘s products and positive perception of its 
credibility on one hand, and overwhelming belief that it gives positive spin on the 
West and negative portrayal of Islam and Africa on the other. Similarly, despite 
the unanimity among all the respondents that the BBC and the rest of the 
international media do aid their comprehension of international affairs, many of 
them show strong negative perceptions of the West—notwithstanding the alleged 
positive portrayal of the West by the Western media, including the BBC. Do the 
respondents realise the contradictions produced by their responses? Apparently, 
the majority do—and their explanations could be summed up in the following 
words: credibility does not automatically translate into believability. Although 
they view the BBC as the most credible broadcaster, they still select which aspects 
of its broadcasts to believe. In any case, they do not extend the credibility rating to 
its coverage of Muslims and Islam-related affairs. And since they perceive the 
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BBC‘s coverage of such issues to be negative, they tend to reject them and 
apparently resist its possible influence in shaping their views on such matters. The 
following comments reveal how they resist its influence when they suspect 
motives in its messages: 
Since I have known the United States and Britain and other parts of the 
world well, whenever I hear BBC I feel like they are just propagating their 
masters‘ voice because I have already made up my mind by knowing 
them. So I get hardened on issues—certain issues whatever they tell me, I 
never believe them (Trade unionist). 
 
Regular listening (of the BBC) does not change my views on anything, 
unless I see practically that what I know before is now different. 
Whenever I see in practical terms something that is different from what I 
thought of it, I change my view to reflect the reality… Am, at anytime I 
listen to radio and hear about British policies or actions, I listen to them, 
but they don‘t change my ideology or stand on them (Petty trader). 
 
As seen from these two comments, audiences may use their existing knowledge to 
assess media messages and decide to accept, reject or recast them to fit into their 
own views. The trade unionist, for instance, has already built strong defences 
against those BBC messages that may attempt to promote British or American 
interests, and so it may not be able to influence him in that respect. He made this 
clear when he said: on ‗certain issues whatever they tell me, I never believe them‘. 
The petty trader would listen to them, but they would not make him change his 
‗ideology or stand‘, unless he sees practically that what he knows ‗before is now 
different‘. The two scenarios reflect Klapper‘s (1960) conception of how 
audiences‘ predispositions influence their perception of media messages. His 
argument that the phenomena of ‗selective exposure…selective perception, and 
selective retention‘ do play a role in audiences‘ consumption of media (Klapper, 
1980, p.19) are quite relevant here; and selective perception in particular appears 
to offer an explanation for this particular case. But the concept of selective 
perception alone does not explain fully the contradiction of positive credibility 
rating of a medium and rejection of its messages. A clearer explanation appears to 
emanate from the audiences themselves—as the following comment reveals: 
There is a difference between being credible and being able to influence 
my decisions. You see, Britain is the greatest ally of the United States 
and…when it comes to the conflict in the Middle East, they already have a 
stand. They have perceived these people as militants; they look at 
Muslims from a particular perspective. I look at Islam as a peaceful 
religion; they look at Islam as a kind of religion that propagates fights, 
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terrorism and what have you. So these are clearly distinct; so anytime they 
mention Muslims, I know where to draw my own line. But I know for sure 




The local publisher‘s argument here is that credibility does not always lead to 
believability—and this is the general feeling among almost all the respondents. 
The fact that they see BBC as a credible medium does not mean that they would 
believe all its messages. They still examine them before deciding to select those 
that are in tandem with their existing beliefs and reject the dissonant ones, or 
interpret them in their own way (Klapper, 1960). There are undoubtedly elements 
of selective perception in this scenario. But other elements such as cultural, 
ideological and religious factors are equally involved here too. They are quite 
glaring from the respondent‘s statement: ‗I look at Islam as a peaceful religion; 
they look at Islam as a kind of religion that propagates…terrorism‘. These are 
indeed opposing viewpoints, and these differences do play out in the interactions 
between them, for as Liebes and Katz (1993, p.x) argue, media consumption ‗is an 
interaction between the culture of the viewer and the culture of the producer‘. The 
cultural and ideological gulf that exists between them tends to put a wedge 
between the producer‘s intended meaning of media content and the meaning the 
consumer gives it. It is an additional characteristic of transnational audiences‘ 
consumption of media that adds to its complexity. This complexity—and the fact 
that the media landscape itself has changed quite significantly—renders some of 
the existing concepts incapable of explaining some of the tendencies these 
audiences exhibit. What is emerging from them appears to be more than selective 
perception; it is selective believability (more on this in chapters IX and X). The 
huge ideological, religious and cultural differences between Muslim Northern 
Nigerians and the West tend to widen the gap between the intended meanings and 
the audiences‘ readings of Western media texts. This, of course, does not stop 
them from consuming and comprehending Western cultural goods. They do, as 
their responses clearly show. The major area of contention often arises when they 
are confronted with messages that challenge their prevailing views. And this is the 
situation that renders even the BBC‘s credibility credentials incapable of 
enhancing its influence.   
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Summary 
The findings have clearly confirmed that there is a high consumption of 
international media texts, particularly the BBC Hausa Service products, by 
Northern Nigerian audiences. They reveal the pattern—and passion—of their 
consumption of these media and its apparent impact on their perceptions of global 
affairs. Although the audiences mostly access the BBC Hausa Service, they also 
access other services of the BBC in English (the main World Service, BBC World 
News, Network Africa, Focus on Africa and Fast Track) on radio, on television 
and online—and several other international media. The audiences regard BBC as 
the major provider of international news and analysis (an important provider of 
Nigerian news as well) that aid their comprehension of international affairs. They 
rated BBC as the most credible and trustworthy international broadcaster because 
of what they see as the accuracy, timeliness, depth and impartiality of its coverage 
of global and national news stories. However, their general perception of the West 
is negative, despite the positive portrayal of the West by the Western media. 
Similarly, despite their high rating of the BBC, they view the broadcaster as being 
unfair to Muslims and Africans because of what they believe to be its negative 
portrayal of Islamic world—and to a lesser degree of Africa. The defining moment 
of their suspicion of BBC‘s alleged unfairness to the Muslim world appears to 
have begun from its earlier coverage of the conflicts in the Middle East, with one 
of the older respondents even making references to its alleged unfair coverage of 
the first Gulf war. These perceptions seem to create their suspicion and mistrust of 
BBC‘s coverage of Muslims and Islam-related issues. They tend to reject such 
reports and resist BBC‘s possible influence in shaping their views on such matters. 
The respondents are mainly middle-aged Muslim men (only two are women), 
reflecting, in a way, the predominance of male audience as demographic features 
of the BBC listeners in Northern Nigeria also show (BBC World Service, 2007, 
2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010). It is also worth re-stating here that they are 
entirely urban audiences who have well above average educational level—much 
higher than that of the general population which includes huge rural dwellers. This 
shortcoming is, however, addressed in chapter IX which presents the focus group 
discussions‘ results obtained from more participants who possess all the key 
demographic characteristics of the BBC audiences in Northern Nigeria. 
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VIII  




The production and distribution of media products naturally precede their 
reception. The old one-way flow model wrongly placed reception at the terminal 
end of the media production-consumption pact; but, as has long been established 
now, the media-audience relationship is a far more complex process of continuous 
interactions between producers and consumers. The evolution and refinement of 
various feedback mechanisms and the emergence and popularity of interactive 
programming, facilitated by new communications technologies, have redefined 
both the production and reception of media products. The kind of transformation 
taking place in the sector is so great that the dividing lines between the two is 
becoming blurred, particularly with the growing popularity of the user-generated 
contents (discussed in detail in the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter above). 
However, this ongoing transformation has not yet altered the fundamental 
structure that makes the production side the main determinant of what goes down 
to the reception side. This role guarantees its viability in reception studies. To 
clearly comprehend the dynamics of media reception, therefore, it is imperative to 
get some insights into the processes and procedures of content production and the 
roles of those responsible for them.  
 
This chapter attempts to do that. Using empirical data obtained through face-to-
face in-depth interviews with BBC‘s managerial and production personnel, it 
teases out the nature and dynamics of media production. It specifically looks at the 
processes and procedures involved in the selection and production of contents for 
the BBC Hausa Service audiences. It also unpacks the pattern and dynamics of the 
relationship between BBC managers, producers and reporters; the BBC‘s 
engagement with new communications technologies; the shift to interactive 
programming; the relationship with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the 
treatment of audiences‘ complaints; and the BBC personnel‘s perceptions of the 
corporation‘s impact in Northern Nigeria. Those interviewed are the BBC‘s 
executive editor for African region, the Abuja bureau editor, the erstwhile main 
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BBC World Service correspondent in Nigeria who is now a producer in the 
corporation‘s newsroom in London, one of the BBC Hausa Service‘s senior 
correspondents in Nigeria who was previously a producer in London, and a former 
senior reporter who was also a senior producer of the Hausa Service. Together 
they provide useful insights into the media production side to help fully 
understand the nature of its relationship with the reception side. 
 
Content selection 
The focal point in the media-audience relation is the content the media produce for 
audiences‘ consumption. Content production is the primary concern of all media 
practitioners, from reporters and producers to editors and managers; and enormous 
energy, time and material resources are devoted to such venture. The BBC, as 
noted in the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter, has a well-organised system 
that guides and shapes its content production. Programmes are made in line with 
the aims and objectives of the corporation; and the BBC Editorial Guidelines 
provides guides for programme making, right from content selection to its 
processing and presentation to the audiences. Despite this, though, individual 
initiatives do also come into play, for as the BBC‘s Director General Mark 
Thompson says in the introduction to the 2005 BBC Editorial Guidelines, it is 
essential that programme makers use their ‗own best judgement‘ in handling 
difficult situations. ‗No set of rules or guidelines can ever replace the need for 
producers, editors and managers to use the wisdom that comes from experience, 
commonsense and a clear set of editorial and ethical values when confronted with 
difficult editorial challenges‘ (BBC Guidelines, 2005, p.2). This highlights the 
important roles of managers, editors and producers—and how their experience and 
wisdom come into play—in content production. The BBC personnel themselves 
narrate, in the extracts below, how the combination of the editorial guidelines, 
personal judgements and changing circumstances come into play in the selection 
and production of BBC contents for its Nigerian audiences. A senior BBC Hausa 
Service correspondent who has also worked as producer at its head office in 
London outlines the framework that guides the selection of contents for Hausa 
Service programmes: 
[T]he BBC has a set of rules as regards to programmes. The aim is always 
to be fair, to be objective and unbiased. 
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Do you have any instructions from the top on what kind of materials to 
broadcast to your audiences in Northern Nigeria? 
Well, except for news—there are core news items that are in the system 
(the main news pool in the BBC World Service newsroom)—they have to 
fall according to the standard of the World Service, whether Northern 
Nigeria, Southern Nigeria, Africa or elsewhere—it‘s got to be the same 
standard. But for reports, they come from the area that is your target, and 
in this case, having worked for the Hausa Service in Northern Nigeria, that 
is our target area. Yes, we do get news reports from reporters who are in 
Northern Nigeria, and every time the instruction is that these reports must 
be as factual as possible. And they must be objective; they must be 
balanced; nobody tells you to publish or report a particular thing that suits 
his or her interest from the top (Senior correspondent/producer). 
 
 
This is typical of the responses from the BBC personnel interviewed. It shows that 
the BBC‘s objectives and editorial guidelines offer the basic framework that 
guides programme making, and that the World Service newsroom provides the 
language services—the Hausa Service inclusive—with the core news bulletins that 
they broadcast to their audiences, as earlier explained in the ‗Contents and 
Quantification‘ chapter. The language services then source other stories from their 
target areas which should also meet the BBC‘s editorial standard. By this 
respondent‘s assessment, the BBC‘s editorial value of impartiality is emphasised 
as the reporters are told to ensure that their reports are accurate, objective and 
balanced. There is also the issue of editorial independence given to the reporters 
on the field to report what they see, without interference from the top, as long as 
they abide by the editorial guidelines. This issue of relative editorial independence 
for both the reporter and producer was made clearer by the following responses 
from both the World Service correspondent/producer and former senior reporter-
cum-producer:  
I don‘t think there is much (interference), for myself there is no superior 
editorial judgment about what I cover or not; it‘s very much left to me as a 
bureau chief in Lagos to decide what is valid or what is not (World Service 
correspondent). 
 
It (content) is largely determined by the producer. You know, in the BBC 
system there are a number of (editorial) meetings in each department that 
sort of discuss the main story being offered by the correspondents from 
the various parts of the world that particular service is covering. It is at 
that meeting that a decision is made as to which of the story offers that 




The last comment contains additional element that also plays a role in content 
selection: editorial meetings. Here the producer, editor, presenter and others 
involved in programme-making would meet and discuss the various stories offered 
by the local reporters from the target areas among which they select the ones that 
would be included in the programme, with the producer playing a key role in the 
selection of the stories. These are daily production level decisions taken by each 
language service ahead of the programmes to be produced in the day. At the higher 
policy making level still, equally in consideration of the BBC objectives and 
editorial guidelines, long-term decisions are taken as to which broad areas to focus 
on and which global issues to be given greater coverage. This deals with long-term 
general issues, not specific stories covered over a short period of time. It gives 
direction on the areas of coverage and the overall method of treatment of the broad 
areas identified. The following comment from the BBC‘s executive editor for 
African region reveals how the broad editorial issues are decided at the top level 
and why the focus is now shifting to much wider areas: 
I know for a fact that in the past international broadcasters like the BBC 
were focusing more on issues like tragedies, disasters, coups, natural 
disasters and upheavals and scandals and so on and so on. But now for the 
past years we have been trying to widen the agenda in the sense that there 
is now actually no no-go area for us. We do programmes on health, for 
example, we do sports, we do arts, we do business and we do interactivity, 
of course… We make local issues relevant and put local issues in the 
context of what is happening around the world. And we make global 




This adds yet another layer to the series of layers surrounding content 
consideration. It is a confirmation of the deliberate and conscious effort involved 
in making editorial policies that offer guides on the broad subjects to be 
considered for coverage. There is, as this response shows, a deliberate decision by 
the BBC to widen the areas of coverage for the African audiences; and to put local 
issues in international context and make global issues comprehensible to the target 
audiences. The executive editor even went on to give specific example (too 
lengthy to be quoted verbatim) of how the BBC tried to make its coverage of the 
global financial meltdown understandable and relevant to BBC Hausa Service 
audiences by linking what has been happening in the local Nigeria‘s economy to 
the events in the international financial markets, and vice-versa. This is in concert 
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with the BBC‘s editorial approach of giving international perspective to local 
events, as discussed in the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter. Overall, the 
responses have highlighted the complexity of content selection and production in 
the BBC Hausa Service. They have clearly shown that, from its selection and 
processing to its presentation and delivery to the audiences, media content 
production, as Hall (1980) argues, is not a random process. It is a well-organised 
systematic process that involves different layers of personnel making conscious 
and deliberate decisions guided by a well-thought out framework and established 
rules and regulations.   
 
Shift to interactivity 
The deliberate decision of the BBC‘s management and editorial policy makers to 
widen its areas of coverage, as explained earlier by the executive editor for 
African region, has increased the variety of its contents. Programmes on health, 
sports, arts and business and so on are clear evidence of the increase in the variety 
of the contents. But none of them nowadays gets as much attention as interactivity, 
which has now become a key area of programming in the corporation. 
Interactivity, as noted earlier, has the multiple benefits of directly engaging the 
audiences, generating content from them, infusing variety in programmes, 
providing instant feedback and exerting subtle influence on the audiences. As the 
2005 BBC Editorial Guidelines too notes: ‗Interactivity allows our audiences to 
engage with us in many different ways, from choosing which game to watch at 
Wimbledon and voting for a Personality of the Year, to taking part in our 
competitions and contributing to radio phone-ins‘ (p.138). According to the 
guidelines, the editorial principles of interactivity are, among others, to ensure that 
it ‗adds public value and enhances our output in a way which fits our public 
service remit‘, and significantly too it should have ‗a clear editorial purpose‘ (BBC 
Guidelines, 2005, p.138). The corporation therefore has a well-defined procedure 
and purposes of pursuing interactive programming. The new delivery technologies 
have enhanced the strategy, and the corporation appears keen in exploring their 
potentials to extract maximum benefits from the new approach. In the following 
comments, both the executive editor for African region and BBC Abuja bureau 
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editor explain how the BBC has been integrating greater interactivity in its 
programming and how this is widening its engagement with audiences: 
In terms of engagement, the only sort of engagement we used to have was 
actually in the form of listeners‘ question-and-answer slots; and there 
wasn‘t anything like ‗Have Your Say‘ (the special interactive programme) 
with people setting the agenda. Whereas now, even in language services, 
say in Hausa or Kiswahili or in Somali, you find out that our listeners now 
tend to react almost instantly. Sometimes while programmes are on air 
listeners are able to give feedback. And in fact, some services do have 
their own Facebook so that listeners who have access to the Internet can 
actually talk about all sort of issues, including those that are not on news 
and current affairs programmes (Executive editor, African region). 
 
Officially, we come to realise that the audiences are trying now to sort of 
drive the BBC agenda on a daily basis because to a greater extent some of 
our…outputs come from user-generated contents. This we establish 
through bringing radio closer to the people. Remember the Hausa Service 
undertook a village road show last year (2009), and with that we 
cultivated a number of listeners and they keep calling even at odd hours of 
the day, contributing stories or ideas… You find out that the amount of 
text messages, that is SMS, and the request you get from people who say 
they want to be on air to say something…is just growing by the day 
(Abuja bureau editor). 
  
The notion of audiences themselves—and not the BBC—setting the agenda, 
emphasised in these responses, is the official line of the corporation to stress its 
off-hand no-interest attitude in order to establish the aura of an impartial platform 
that merely conveys audiences‘ worldviews. This makes the audiences less 
suspicious of the intent of the contents (after all it is ostensibly their products not 
BBC‘s), and therefore more likely to be influenced by them. In reality, though, 
what is presented as user-generated content has in it many trappings of the BBC. 
As noted earlier in the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter, it is the BBC that 
selects the topic for discussion (though there are instances when even the topics 
are suggested by the audiences), decides the trend of the debate, and shapes its 
outcome. But even more significantly, the idea of expanding interactive 
programming in the World Service is essentially to achieve the BBC‘s ‗global 
conversation‘ objective (BBC, 2008) which is linked to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office‘s ‗digital diplomacy initiatives‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010b, 
p.280; Hill and Alshaer, 2010). The argument is that mediating the ‗global debate‘ 
(BBC, 2008) may generate the outcome that the corporation and its funding body 
desire. 
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Engagement with new distribution technologies 
The driving engines of interactive programming are the new communications 
technologies that allow instant communications in digital quality through several 
easily accessible devices. The Internet and mobile telephony have enabled people 
living in some of the remotest parts of the world to link up with the media located 
in the most cosmopolitan regions of the world and air their views. ‗With cable and 
satellite have come the fierce engine of multichannel competition and the rise of 
niche audiences,‘ Price et al. (2008, p.156) note. ‗With the Internet and broadband 
has come the culture of interaction and user-originated content‘. But even more 
than these, the new communications technologies have facilitated the distribution 
of media contents to areas never envisaged before and transformed the mode of 
media consumption among diverse audiences. The BBC has always been quick in 
recognising the potentials of new technologies and in deploying them for its 
services. It is in line with this tradition that the corporation effectively engages 
these technologies to enhance its engagement with its audiences in delivering its 
products to them, in receiving feedback from them, and in enhancing its own 
efficiencies—as revealed by its own personnel. This comment from African 
region‘s executive editor illustrates the kind of changes BBC‘s engagement with 
new technologies is bringing:   
In the past we used to wait for our reporters to send in their scripts or 
cassette which you know would have to take sometimes a week before it 
arrived here for us to use... But now with very good (Internet) connectivity 
and telephone lines—and in fact mobile phones in particular—you find 
that we put out the very latest as quickly and as regularly as we could 
(Executive editor, African region). 
 
 
In this instance he outlined the nature of changes communications technologies 
have brought in speeding up the process of sending reports by the BBC language 
services‘ reporters from their regional bases to the metropolitan headquarters of 
the corporation. A report that can take a week to reach London from Nigeria, for 
instance—and risk becoming stale—can now be sent instantly. This has not only 
saved time and energy; it has also brought efficiency to both the reporters‘ work 
and the corporation‘s performance. In the subsequent explanation below, he has 
highlighted how the Internet was originally seen as a threat to the old broadcast 
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media before it was harnessed and turned into another platform for the delivery of 
BBC products: 
[T]he Internet (was) certainly a threat to radio and television because if 
you have a platform where you could go any minute, anytime, anywhere, 
and access almost everything, anything you want, then, of course, the 
possibility of people in the target areas to make an appointment to wait 
until a certain time to listen to a 30-minute or one-hour programme is 
under intense pressure… (But now with adoption of new technologies), I 
think, the Hausa Service would go from strength to strength because we 
try to be as close to the audiences as possible. We try to adapt to changing 
media environment by introducing new things and making sure that we 
don‘t miss out on any platform (Executive editor, African region). 
 
 
From being a threat to becoming an opportunity, the Internet is turned into an 
additional platform for the BBC Hausa Service which traditionally transmits its 
programmes at fixed times to radio listeners in the target areas. Now, in addition to 
the four fixed transmissions (in the morning, afternoon and evening), it streams its 
content in the Internet which is accessible to audiences anytime anywhere—where 
Internet connectivity exists. The listeners need not to make appointments at the 
fixed transmission times to tune in to the station and listen to the programmes; 
they can access them on the Internet at their convenient time. And it is not only the 
audio contents that they can get from the BBC Hausa website (bbchausa.com); 
they can also access the text, the pictorial and sometimes video contents—in 
addition to the opportunity offered for them to air their own views (Tangaza, 2009, 
2010). This has not only enhanced delivery, it has also facilitated interactivity, as 
stated earlier. The harnessing of social networking sites, such as Facebook and 
Twitter, has widened the interactivity and made both delivery and instant feedback 
possible, which have in turn brought improvement in broadcasting, as noted in this 
comment by the senior correspondent/producer: 
Well, I think (the new technologies) have (enhanced broadcasting)… In 
the past you (were) just making programmes, airing them, sometimes you 
(didn‘t) even know who listened. But here you get a feedback, people 
telling you the inputs; they react to what you do; even if you don‘t see 
them or feel them, at least you read what they say. So this will encourage 
you to improve on what you are doing (Senior correspondent/producer).  
 
The integration of the new media into the services of the old media, as these 
responses indicate, has been transforming the pattern of broadcasting and media-
audience relationship. As Price et al. (2008) argue, ‗new technologies means far 
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more than reaching more people, reaching faster, penetrating through greater 
barriers…new technologies beget a new media environment‘ (p.156). The 
convergence allowed by both the Internet and mobile telephony, for instance, has 
brought many changes in the BBC Hausa Service‘s broadcasting, and in its 
engagement with the audiences—as the Abuja bureau editor explains in detail: 
Although (the integration of new media) is new with the Hausa Service 
now, compared to other services of the BBC, you find that the Hausa 
Service gets more hits every day than most of the websites across the 
BBC. There is…the BBC Hausa Facebook (through which) we send out a 
particular burning or topical issue online, and the amount of response and 
the debate among people who visit that site is just interesting… Now the 
BBC has started getting content on to mobile phones, podcast and stuff 
like that. And this which started a few weeks ago (in 2010) is generating a 
lot of interest. A lot of people are coming in and saying, look, this is a new 
development. I had one listener with an old telephone handset (who came) 
and said: ‗Look, you guys said I can get whatever I want with this, show 
me how I can get such content‘. I told him no, look, your telephone is not 
a web-enabled phone, so you can‘t get it on this. Believe me, the next day, 
the man came back with a web-enabled phone and asked me to show him 
how to do it (Abuja bureau editor). 
 
 
Delivering Hausa Service contents through various platforms—on radio, online 
and on phone—and interacting with the audiences through these platforms as well 
as getting them absorbed in debates and discussions through both the radio 
interactive programmes and social media indicate the station‘s determination to 
widen its reach and increase its audiences. Harnessing different platforms ensures 
that it does not miss out on any useful platform. For instance, the distribution of 
contents through mobile telephony, as the head of Hausa Service notes (Tangaza, 
2009), holds great potentials in Nigeria which in 2009 had been identified as the 
fastest growing mobile phone market in the world, with over 70 million 
subscribers and an annual growth of 8.5 million subscribers (Okonji, 2009).  
 
Recent BBC surveys indicate that accessing the BBC contents through mobile 
phone, especially by youths in Nigeria, is on the increase (BBC Global News, 
2010), confirming the BBC management‘s ‗wisdom‘ of employing ‗multimedia 
strategy‘ in content delivery and in engagement with the audiences (Hiller, 2010a, 
p.2). ‗The invocation of new technologies,‘ Price et al. (2008) observe, ‗is an 
obvious and appealing call to modernize, to come to grips with necessities and 
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opportunities‘ (p.150). Media institutions, they further argue, do adjust to 
accommodate new distribution technologies—and the BBC tends to be ahead of 
many in doing this, as this study reveals. 
  
Perceptions on BBC‘s public diplomacy role 
International broadcasting has always been linked to public diplomacy (Browne, 
1982) and the BBC World Service, being funded by the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, is liable to being associated with British public diplomacy. 
Effective from 2014, though, the funding will come from the BBC licence fees; 
but the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will still maintain its role of deciding 
the target areas and the language services to be run by the World Service 
(Robinson and Sweney, 2010). How the planned change will play out is a subject 
for future studies, but the existing relationship of the two bodies has for long been 
subjected to academic and diplomatic scrutiny. As cited earlier, Sreberny et al. 
(2010b) have argued that the BBC and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
have a complex engagement, ranging from a ‗tighter relationship of propagandistic 
direction‘ to ‗looser relationship of mutual understanding as to the BBC‘s role as 
―public diplomat‖‘ (p.279). Similarly, in the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter 
this study has analysed how the BBC World Service‘s institutional structure and 
editorial framework mould it into an organ that both provides international news 
service and promotes British public diplomacy. 
 
The classification in the 2004 Spending Review of the BBC World Service as a 
‗partner‘ in British public diplomacy by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
was a major turning point in the relationship between the two establishments 
(FCO, 2005; Sreberny et al., 2010b). The reinforcement of that position by the 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in 2011 (FACOM, 2011) 
describing the corporation as an important ‗soft power‘ resource for Britain 
strengthens the claim of its public diplomacy role. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, though, has always been quick to emphasise that the 
editorial independence of the corporation, guaranteed by the Royal Charter, guards 
against outside interference in the BBC‘s operations. The corporation, which 
prides itself as a provider of impartial international news and analysis, resents 
being described as an instrument of British public diplomacy. But beyond these 
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arguments, how does this complex relationship play out in the actual BBC 
functionality as seen by its managerial and production personnel? The following 
conversation with the BBC‘s executive editor for African region provides some 
insights into the personnel‘s perspective on that relationship: 
Who decides what BBC broadcasts?  
Well, as you know, we are a public service broadcaster, the BBC World 
Service, and we are paid for by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
through grant-in-aid. They decide what languages or target areas we 
should be covering, but they have no say in the contents and contributors 
of any given programme in any given language service or target area. 
Don’t you think that they, being the financiers of the entire organisation, 
would that not affect the contents the organisation produces? 
No, as long as you are transparent, you‘re straight and you say exactly 
what you stand for and you stick to what you stand for, I don‘t think the 
BBC has at any given time wavered on (its) core values: impartiality, 
independence, (providing) balanced and credible information free from 
any interference. 
So you don’t think that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office interferes in 
the actual running and production of broadcast materials. 
No, I have been here with the BBC for more than 20 years and I cannot 
recall any instance where FCO actually asked us to cover this or not to 
cover that (Executive editor, African region). 
 
From his comments, it appears that the interference is at the policy level not at the 
operational level which is left for the managerial and operational staff to handle in 
accordance with the corporation‘s guidelines. The claim of operational non-
interference is further reinforced by the following comment from World Service 
correspondent who cited his experience as a correspondent in Lagos: 
Virtually no interference at all from the Foreign Office or the High 
Commission (in Nigeria); I mean, the extent of our conversation with the 
High Commission tended to be in confirming certain events in relations to 
British nationals, say someone got kidnapped, then we can call them up to 
say ‗can you confirm‘, that sort of thing (World Service correspondent). 
 
So in his own case neither the Foreign and Commonwealth Office nor the British 
High Commission in Nigeria tried to interfere in his work. Direct interference in 
daily editorial decisions and day-to-day running of the BBC World Service would 
have created major frictions between the two, as the case of Suez Canal crisis 
(Browne, 1982; Goodwin, 2005), for instance, revealed. However, this does not 
mean that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office does not exert significant 
influence on the World Service. After all, as the executive editor admits, it is 
responsible for the funding of the organisation and selection of language services 
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and of the target areas. Many argue that this is enough to make the World Service 
look like, and actually act as, a British ‗public diplomat‘ (Sreberny et al. 2010b, 
p.279). Among those working for the corporation on the field, the suggestion that 
the World Service is an instrument of British public diplomacy generates mixed 
reactions: 
Before I joined the BBC such rumour has been going round and I 
happened to be one of those who believed in it (but) throughout my stay in 
the BBC at no point was I given specific instruction as to pursue either 
British foreign policy or to portray Britain in a particular light. I have not 
gotten such instructions (Senior correspondent/producer).  
 
I think sometimes one gets the feeling that maybe there is some kind of 
agenda, let‘s say in the coverage of Zimbabwe. That is where you can say 
that the BBC is going out of its way, the way it was covering Zimbabwe. 
To be honest, as someone who had worked in the BBC, I tend to ask 
myself ‗why are they going to the extent they are going and asking 
questions which they aren‘t asking about other countries which may be in 
similar situation?‘ But, apart from those cases, I think, on a general note I 
would say that the BBC is trying to be an alternative voice for people—
especially for the World Service—in societies where there is maybe no 




The perception of non-interference in the daily editorial decisions reduces the 
chance of some of the producers themselves perceiving the BBC as a British 
‗public diplomat‘, but it does not remove entirely the feeling that it is one. Its 
aggressive coverage of Zimbabwe, as cited by the former senior producer, may not 
be the result of any direct instruction from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
to do so, but it may be seen as such, or at the corporation‘s own volition in 
solidarity with the British policy towards the southern African nation. The 
broadcaster‘s public diplomacy function is not just restricted to a positive portrayal 
of the owner-country and its friends, and denunciation of its opponents; it extends 
to the audiences‘ perception of the media itself. The perception of the BBC as a 
credible broadcaster itself is of immense benefit to the British public diplomacy 
efforts, as Lord Carter Public Diplomacy Review Team notes (FCO, 2005). But 
this could sometimes be eroded when people come face-to-face with the reality of 
relating with Britain—something that tends to be problematic for the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, as the World Service correspondent notes: 
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Well, I think, that is the main interesting problem for Foreign Office 
because a lot of Nigerians‘ encounter with official Britain—their first 
encounter is trying to get a visa, and that is never a pleasant experience for 
a Nigerian. So they may listen to the BBC and expect liberal, relatively 
liberal open-minded persons, quite interested in local culture in Nigeria… 
[T]hen they come across people at the British embassy, stamping and 
rejecting visas. I think that‘s the first divergence; and I think the 
divergence happens more the more they interact with Britain proper, if 
you like. Ah, but at least people have a better impression of Britain and so 
on because of the BBC; it is the British Broadcasting Corporation and 




In essence, as this perspective reveals, the effectiveness of using media for public 
diplomacy lies in matching words with action. Nigerian audiences‘ perception of 
BBC as a credible medium and a liberal institution—which is a positive image for 
Britain—makes them to expect liberal behaviours from Britain in an actual 
encounter; and when that does not happen, they feel disappointed. Similarly, if the 
BBC portrays Britain in a positive light, that image would stick as long as what is 
said is backed by concrete evidence. But it would disappear when facts present the 
opposite. Words not matched with deeds, as his comment indicates, may have only 
ephemeral effects.  
 
The general consensus among the respondents suggests that the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office does not interfere in the day-to-day running of the BBC 
World Service—something that they feel guarantees the service‘s editorial 
independence. This, however, does not mean that the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office does not influence the production of the BBC goods; it does as seen in its 
roles as the funding body, as the decider of which language services to operate and 
target areas to focus on, and perhaps even through some conscious or unconscious 
efforts by managers to try to reflect the prevailing views of the funding body and 
so on. The open non-interference policy is clearly beneficial to the two bodies. It 
even enhances the corporation‘s effectiveness in playing the public diplomacy role 
because, as the last respondent suggests, even the mere perception of BBC as a 




Of manager-producer-reporter relationship 
The complex relationship between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the 
World Service, as noted above, ensures that the former still exerts its influence on 
the latter without overt interference in its operations. There were, of course, cases 
of conflicts and disagreements as noted earlier, but the relationship has been more 
of ‗mutual understanding‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010b, p.279) rather than of continuous 
dispute. If this is what marked the relationship between the two establishments, 
then it is important here to also examine whether such kind of atmosphere is 
equally extended to the relationship between the BBC managers on one hand, and 
its reporters and programme producers on the other hand. This is because the 
dynamics of the internal relationship within an organisation tends to have some 
effects on its output. 
 
As discussed in the ‗Contents and Quantification‘ chapter, programme making in 
the BBC is guided by the stated objectives of the corporation, its editorial policies 
and guidelines and the programme templates designed by its various services. 
These elements also serve as the main guides in the relationship between the 
management and staff of the corporation. But stated objectives, written editorial 
policies and guidelines and programme templates apart, how much influence do 
managers exert in programme making? On the surface, the managers do not seem 
to interfere in what the producers and reporters do, but on deeper reflection it 
emerges that they do influence their work, though not in a direct way. This 
comment from World Service correspondent offers insights into what goes on: 
In terms of the actual editorial content, I don‘t think there was any dictate 
from anyone on how and what should or shouldn‘t be covered. I think they 
didn‘t really know what was going on in Nigeria so they couldn‘t really 
influence it one way or the other. I mean, other than coming from a much 
more slightly lower level—programme editors and so on—saying we 
would like to have more of this or that, or we liked this thing you did… 
That is the only sort of interference you had. It wasn‘t really interference, 
I mean, we‘re talking just about cooperation and collaboration, saying 
you‘ve worked really well or we‘ve got a sequence coming up, you know, 
economy coming up, we would like to have much more voices from 
Nigeria of so-so things. And that‘s just an editorial collaboration on a day-
to-day basis (World Service correspondent). 
 
He prefers to call it ‗editorial collaboration‘ rather than subtle influence or 
interference because the relationship is such that the atmosphere creates a sense of 
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collaboration between the reporters and their editors or managers, not a feeling of 
receiving direct orders or military-like commands on what to do or not to do. It is 
this feeling of non-interference, of relative freedom to do what you think is right, 
that gives reporters and producers the sense of independence. This makes them to 
feel that they are in charge of their work and in control of their products; and even 
when something comes from the top it is not seen as a top-down order that must be 
obeyed, but as a wise counsel from above that follows a request from below. It is 
that sort of feeling that marks the reaction of the next respondent when asked: ‗Do 
you think that there is any pressure from the top in the BBC on how to select 
materials for broadcast?‘ 
Well, even if there is, it is not obvious. It is not made open at least for the 
producer, or the editor or reporter. These things are not things that are 
written in black-and-white, that this is what you should do and these are 
things that you should not do. What is specific is that: don‘t be biased and 
don‘t report things you are not sure about. When you‘re in doubt, make 
contact. If you‘re a producer or you‘re a reporter, if in doubt on 
something, contact your editor; and if the editor is in doubt, he will relate 




The chain-of-command structure of the relationship is raised in the senior 
correspondent‘s response, and it does play a role both in the written and the un-
written rules of engagement in the corporation. If a reporter or producer is unsure 
about an issue, they should contact their editor; ‗and if the editor is in doubt, he 
will relate with the top‘. It is a clear structure that forms part of the framework of 
the relationship. One other significant thing also raised here is the issue of 
‗instructions‘ given on the kind of behaviours expected from different categories 
of staff. It is this issue of clear instructions of what the BBC personnel are 
expected to do that the managers tend to stress when explaining the nature of both 
their engagement with external bodies and their relationship with producers and 
reporters—as the executive editor explains: 
It is quite clear for any person working for the BBC that our core values 
are there to be implemented, to be adhered to. And any new person would 
have to live with that. We have what we call producers‘ guidelines, we 
have our editorial standard, we do our own reviews, (and) we think of 




Although the editorial guidelines, the bureaucratic structure of the organisation 
and other administrative instruments clearly spell out the chain of command and 
other basic structures of the manager-producer-reporter relationship, the apparent 
atmosphere of relative freedom creates a sense of independence among the 
producers and reporters. Sometimes the reporters on the field tend to feel even 
much freer to carry out their work than those who had risen to higher posts at the 
headquarters. The relative independence accorded the reporters tends to encourage 
creativity, they note, while suppressing such independence tends to negatively 
affect the quality of their reports. This is disclosed by the former senior reporter, 
who had worked for the Hausa Service for about 13 years, when asked: ‗What was 
your relationship with the BBC management, have they been giving you 
instructions on what kind of material you should select for the audiences?‘ 
Not exactly; I think, if I may start from when I was a stringer, actually 
what I love for that period was that I really was determining the kind of 
story I was doing and usually my producers agreed to what I presented. 
There were occasions when they would tell me probably go for this, this is 
also important or this is the big story of the day. But lots of time I 
happened to be on top of the big story of the day, and I‘d do it for them. 
But later I did notice that the BBC was sort of changing, that is, the guy 
sitting in London, very removed from the reality of the story down here, 
sometimes dictate to the reporter who is on the beat which story to do and 
which story not to do, sometimes. And that tends to affect the quality of 




From editorial collaboration to dictating what stories to do or not to do, the 
manager-producer-reporter relationship in the BBC World Service—as the range 
of responses show—is complex and dynamic. The written rules and guidelines are 
not the only determining factors of this relationship, personal touch and changing 
circumstances also come into play. While the World Service correspondent 
emphasised the collaborative nature of the relationship (which the other 
respondents did also admit in varying degrees), the senior correspondent appeared 
to stress the chain-of-command aspect of the engagement; but the former senior 
reporter did raise the issue of dictatorial tendency—sometimes—‗that tends to 
affect the quality‘ of the products. Perhaps their respective backgrounds and the 
pattern of their engagement with their managers all play a role in moulding their 
perceptions of the relationship. The first respondent, being a full-time World 
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Service correspondent well-integrated into the BBC system and sent from London 
to cover Nigeria for the service, might have internalised the corporation‘s editorial 
policies and processes better and be offered a freer hand to operate. The former 
senior reporter, who began the job first as a stringer for the Hausa Service playing 
a marginal role, equally got a freer hand to operate; but as his role grew bigger and 
perhaps under an apparently changing management style, he noticed a creeping 
dictatorial tendency with ‗the guy sitting in London‘ dictating what should—and 
what should not—be reported. In-between these two extremes lies the response of 
the senior correspondent (who has been working for the BBC Hausa Service for 
about 18 years both in London as a producer and in Nigeria as a senior 
correspondent) which offers a moderate position that suggests that interference or 
non-interference depends on the prevailing situation, since the personal touch of 
the relationship is ‗not written in black-and-white‘. This says much on how open 
to the vagaries of changing circumstances the relationship between the managers 
and other personnel of the corporation could be. The producers and reporters could 
have as much free-hand as they wish, provided they abide by the set editorial 
guidelines and policies (as the executive editor insists), while the managers and 
editors could be as intrusive as circumstances may allow to the extent of dictating 
what stories the reporters should—or should not—cover (as the former senior 
reporter maintained). So in reality, the manager-producer-reporter relationship in 
terms of content selection and production is complex and dynamic; and it is 
affected both by the set editorial guidelines and administrative policies of the 
corporation and by the personal dispositions of the personnel involved. 
 
Treating audiences‘ complaints 
Media-audience engagement is an activity facilitated by media production and 
distribution technologies. The ongoing changes and advancement in these 
technologies, as repeatedly stated, have made such engagement more of a two-way 
process; with the media simultaneously distributing content and receiving 
feedback while the audiences being both receivers and producers of media content. 
This has apparently strengthened the relationship and reduced areas of frictions 
and misunderstanding. Instant feedback mechanisms enable the media to get 
audiences‘ complaints and redress them, while interactivity offers audiences 
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opportunity to produce their own content and even have some insights into the 
media production processes. All these, however, do not bring to an end some 
audiences‘ feeling of alleged media misrepresentation and misreporting of events. 
The domestic audiences often have readily available avenues—apart from the 
channels provided by the offending media—to table their complaints and seek 
redress. Media regulatory bodies and ombudsman in different countries take 
charge of this role and protect audiences‘ interests.  
 
The transnational audiences, however, do not have such luxuries. They have, of 
course, the power to boycott the media that offend them; but they have little or no 
power to punish the media that they think misrepresent them or portray them in a 
negative light. The Northern Nigerian audiences, in the previous chapter, do 
complain of BBC‘s negative portrayal of Islam and of Africa. Such complaints do 
sometimes reach the station through its feedback mechanisms: interactive 
programmes, listeners‘ letters and formal letters of complaints. BBC journalists on 
the field do also learn about such complaints through interpersonal interactions 
with the audiences in Northern Nigeria. Media organisations that are keen on 
maintaining the loyalty of their audiences tend to device a way of knowing their 
grievances and addressing them. The BBC has devised its own system for that. 
How does this play out in the BBC‘s relations with its Northern Nigerian 
audiences? The following responses generated from the question ‗What would you 
say on the audiences‘ complaint that the BBC has been unfair in its coverage of 
Africa and of Islam?‘ offer some insights: 
Well, we really get such complaints from the audience, especially people 
from different parts of Nigeria. But in Northern Nigeria I can tell you that, 
despite the fact that BBC stands in the middle in broadcasting religion, 
culture and whatever, you find that there is little doubt as to the credibility 
of the BBC. However, allegations or accusations we get most times is 
more like we, the BBC, are pursuing a Western agenda. But then, they 
come to realise that sometimes or most of the times that, look, even if a 
story affects the BBC or the prime minister of Britain, the BBC would 
simply go ahead and say it (Abuja bureau editor).  
 
Well, if such belief is there, it is there because people are not opportune to 
have access to the way and manner Western media operate. The BBC 
operates a very open policy to the best of my knowledge within the limit 
of my understanding of the system. Ah, they try to be objective, to be fair 
and to portray things in their true nature, unlike what‘s obtained in Africa 
or in some parts of Africa where dictatorship is the norm (and where) 
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reports or news are censored; they‘re doctored to suite the interest of the 
government in power. Now, if you do anything to the contrary, people say 
‗you‘re agent of the West; you‘re an agent of Britain or you‘re this or that‘ 
(Senior correspondent/producer). 
 
Both the bureau chief and the senior correspondent did admit that there are such 
complaints from some of the audiences, and that they arise because of the 
audiences‘ conception of the BBC as a Western medium. However, both are 
defensive, arguing that the complaints are unfounded and that the BBC does try to 
maintain its credibility by being accurate and impartial. The senior correspondent 
added another perspective to the issue: audiences‘ experience with their domestic 
media colours their conception of the BBC. Because of their experience with the 
government-controlled domestic media that tend to parrot only government‘s 
views, according to this perspective, the audiences automatically assume that the 
BBC World Service, as a government-funded outlet, also does the same. It is a 
perspective the World Service correspondent also stresses, with even an additional 
twist to it: 
I think there is another interesting thing that people do see, those who 
know (that the BBC) is government-funded have two different views, I 
mean, you do meet Nigerians who say ‗well you‘re just a government 
stooge‘, because they can‘t believe—because of the nature of state-funded 
radio in parts of Africa and particularly in Nigeria—they can‘t believe that 
the BBC is not just voicing the views of the British government; and there 
is an expectation that we are, well (laugh), exactly that: a state radio 
station in some ways… But I think there are those who thought the BBC is 
just part of another Western media outlet; they only report the bad news 
about Africa (World Service correspondent). 
 
 
All the above respondents, having worked—or are still working—in Nigeria and 
having had direct personal interactions with some of the audiences in the field, 
were able to gather those views and perspectives directly from the audiences. 
There is uniformity in their observation of the audiences‘ conception of BBC as a 
Western media outlet that pursues ‗Western agenda‘. However, the managers at 
the headquarters, who do not have as much direct interactions with the audiences 
as those in the field, tend to have a slightly different perspective of what the 
audiences feel. They do, of course, get the audiences‘ complaints through the 
formal feedback mechanisms of interactivity, listeners‘ letters and complaints‘ 
letters, and sometimes even through visits to Nigeria where they do meet with 
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some audiences; but they do not have the kind of direct interpersonal interactions 
those in the field have with the audiences. And as such their perspective seems to 
differ from that of those in the field. They do not want to place emphasis on the 
audiences‘ complaints—even though they admit that they do exist—but tend to be 
more defensive by stressing the efforts made to ensure that there would be no 
grounds for such complaints. The following conversation with the executive editor 
for African region illustrates this perspective: 
What would you say on the audiences’ complaint that the BBC has been unfair 
in its coverage of Africa and of Islam?’  
Well, probably people are thinking of many, many years ago. And you 
know stigma is a very difficult thing to erase. But all I can say is let 
people judge us by what we do now or the efforts we have been (putting) 
to try and widen the agenda. And, in fact, if something is happening to 
Muslims all over the world, the Hausa Service will be there definitely to 
cover it and they are not going to shy away from covering difficult stories. 
What we offer here is not just breaking news and reflecting Africa to the 
world and the world to Africa, but trying to analyse, ah, put things in 
context and then let listeners or online users make up their minds. 
So you don’t think there was unfairness in the coverage of Africa or Islamic 
world by the BBC? 
Certainly not, because whenever we get serious complaint, for example, 
about some of the things you mentioned, we are bound, as editorial 
leaders, to investigate to find out exactly what happened and then we 
would get back to anyone who complained to say ‗look, this is the 
outcome of our investigation. If you are not happy, this is where you need 
to go and appeal‘. And we have been doing this for many years (Executive 
editor, African region). 
 
 
As can be seen, the executive editor‘s emphasis here is on both the ‗widening‘ of 
the BBC agenda to provide a variety of content that could help reduce audiences‘ 
complaints and the effectiveness of the mechanism of receiving and addressing the 
complaints. The issue of an established mechanism of receiving and treating 
complaints—and its apparent operational success for ‗many years‘—were also 
brought to the fore here. The respondent‘s administrative background and 
familiarity with the formal complaints‘ channels and processes seem to have 
prompted the emphasis on the bureaucratic approach to the issue. The BBC‘s 
formal complaint and redress system is well stated in its editorial guidelines. ‗Our 
commitment to our audiences is to ensure that complaints and enquiries are dealt 
with quickly, courteously and with respect,‘ the corporation states (BBC 
Guidelines, 2005, p.159). It publishes online complaints received and actions 
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taken to redress them. Complaints could be lodged with the department that 
produces the offending content or sent to the BBC information unit. If the 
complainants are dissatisfied, it says, they can appeal to ‗Editorial Complaints 
Unit to investigate the issue independently‘ (BBC Guidelines, 2005, p.159). 
Further appeals could reach up to the Governors‘ Programme Complaints 
Committee, which is the highest adjudication body in the corporation; and if a 
serious complaint is upheld, ‗an apology or correction from the BBC may be 
published online or on air‘ (p.159).  
 
The complaint-and-redress system, though, appears to be tailored towards dealing 
with complaints from individuals on specific—often domestic—programmes. 
Although it is open to treating even complaints from groups and communities 
against international programmes in the World Service, it is hard to see how the 
allegations of persistent negative portrayal of Islam and Africa raised by Northern 
Nigerian audiences, for example, could be addressed through this programme-
specific-individual-oriented system. The best approach in handling this is perhaps 
through the feedback mechanisms employed by the corporation that help it to 
notice persistent complaints and readjust programmes to meet audiences‘ 
aspirations and expectations, as the executive editor himself notes. The 
corporation does stress it too: ‗Audience feedback is invaluable to us and helps to 
improve programme quality‘ (Editorial Guidelines, 2005, p.159). It is apparently 
more through this approach that the corporation manages to gauge the feelings of 
its audiences and strive to address some of their concerns, if not for anything, at 
least to maintain their loyalty. The persistence of the complaints, as seen in the 
preceding chapter, however, suggests that the approach has not been as effective 
as the corporation would have wanted it to be.  
 
Perceived influence on audiences 
Assessing media influence, as noted earlier, is a subject of intense controversy; 
and both producers and consumers of media content do have their respective 
perspectives on this issue. The literature review section of this study which deals 
with the issue extensively shows that even in the early studies the diversity of 
media influence theories ranges from the media effects model (Adorno and 
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Horkheimer, 1944/1979) that stresses the potency of media to the gratifications 
theory (Blumler and Katz, 1974) that emphasises what audiences do with the 
media rather than what it does to them. The limited effects theories, as advanced 
by Klapper (1960), and the issue of what Sonia Livingstone (2007, p.1) calls 
‗active and interpretative audiences‘ and their ability to interpret media texts in 
their own terms (Liebes, 2005), and the contention of how much power they have 
to do so (Morley, 2006; Fiske, 1987; Ang, 1996) have all been dealt with clearly in 
the review of the literature. The empirical evidence emerging from this study 
indicates that the consensus among the audiences is that the media does influence 
their perceptions of events. The BBC audiences in Northern Nigeria (as discussed 
in the preceding chapter and will be seen in the subsequent one) believe that the 
BBC does influence their comprehension of international affairs, although they say 
it does not change their long-held beliefs. The BBC itself tends to be cautious 
about the subject, preferring instead to talk of ‗impact‘ in terms of audience 
figures, programmes‘ popularity and performance index obtained from audience 
surveys. The BBC‘s previous surveys, analysed in the ‗Contents and 
Quantification‘ chapter above, deal with this extensively. But then, do the BBC 
personnel believe that the broadcaster exerts significant influence on its Northern 
Nigerian audiences?  
I have no doubt (that it does)—not influence but impact I would say—
because of the history of the BBC Hausa Service. And the fact that there is 
a very strong oral culture in Nigeria, particularly in Northern Nigeria, 
because I know many people, including myself when I was growing up in 
our family where our parents used to listen to Hausa Service and we did 
actually join them in listening, so BBC Hausa Service has been part and 
parcel of the Hausa culture, not only in Nigeria actually but across 
countries where there are significant numbers of Hausa communities. And 
so definitely the level of current affairs, in terms of knowing what is going 
on in the world and who is doing what and when, you know; diplomatic 
development, you know, political development, economic affairs, sporting 
activities and so on and so on. The Hausas, I think, are in a very good 
position of hearing, or at least updating on, what is going on around the 
world, definitely, more than people who rely only on local radio wherever 
they are (Executive editor, African region). 
 
 
As a member of the management team and in line with the BBC‘s preferred term, 
the executive editor believes that the corporation has ‗impact‘ on Northern 
Nigerian audiences. The BBC Hausa Service, in his view, has now become ‗part 
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and parcel of the Hausa culture‘; and its Hausa audiences are likely to be more 
informed about international affairs, and about diplomatic, political and economic 
developments and even sporting activities around the world than those relying 
only on local radio stations. A combination of BBC‘s long presence in the region 
and the people‘s oral tradition help in securing this ‗impact‘. Similarly, the Abuja 
bureau chief too believes that the BBC wields influence on its Northern Nigerian 
audiences:  
[T]here‘s a survey conducted a few years ago which shows that Nigerians, 
especially Northern Nigerians, believe what comes from the BBC (more) 
than what they hear from their leaders. The relationship between the 
audience and the BBC in particular has been so good because of: one, the 
medium has proved itself to be reliable, very accurate and non-
speculative, so people can pin their hope and can bet their last kobo on 
every single story that comes out of the BBC, believing that it is the truth 
and nothing but the truth. This has helped in sort of deepening the 
confidence of the local people, I mean people in Northern Nigeria, in the 
BBC and what it does (Abuja bureau editor). 
 
 
The BBC‘s ability to influence its audiences was, according to Abuja editor, 
derived from the reputation it built as a ‗reliable, very accurate and non-
speculative medium‘. This made the audiences to believe its stories and deepen 
their confidence in it, he feels. If people trust the BBC more than they trust their 
leaders, as he says one survey has claimed, than it is obvious that the influence it 
exerts on them can be quite significant. The senior correspondent too shares some 
of the above views with even stronger passion, providing explanations of when the 
influence could be great and when certain factors could hinder it, as revealed in the 
following conversation: 
Do you think that listening to the BBC influences people’s opinion about 
certain events?  
Of course, it does; it does, of course. And I believe that is one of the 
objectives of the BBC: to mould opinion or to mould minds or to colonise 
the minds of the listeners. Of course, when you listen to the BBC and you 
compare it—not because I work for the BBC—if you listen to the BBC 
and listen to other media channels the difference is quite clear. I feel the 
BBC is the peak of broadcasting; journalism at its peak… So listening to 
the BBC is definitely likely to mould or influence your thinking and acting 
and reasoning. 
But the fact that Northern Nigerians listen to it and still seem to be generally 
anti-West, don’t you think that in this respect it has failed to achieve such 
objectives? 
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Well, you see, people‘s opinions, especially when it comes to religion, 
there are cases of extremism, where people are fanatical. So, ah, if you are 
fanatical or you‘re totally completely supportive of a particular goal, 
whatever any medium would do to influence or change your mind about 
that is not likely to have any effect… Not that the BBC has failed, it is just 
that there is no way the BBC can influence them to change their thinking, 




Despite its perceived potency to mould the ‗thinking and (action) and reasoning‘ 
of its audiences, the BBC, even the senior correspondent agrees, has limitations 
when faced with people‘s faith. Media‘s influence becomes insignificant when 
confronted with long-held views (Klapper, 1960). The senior correspondent argues 
that people who hold extreme views or who have fanatical beliefs in their religion 
could not be persuaded by media to change such views. He is actually restating 
what has been said before. ‗In matters of the most profound importance to the 
individual—say, religion—I doubt that…anyone else could sway a single soul a 
single inch,‘ declares former New York Herald Tribune television critic John 
Crosby (cited in Klapper, 1960, p.44). The evidence from this study (see chapters 
VII and IX) shows that audiences do not even have to hold extreme views or 
fanatical beliefs before resisting the influence of media on issues that do not 
conform with their prevailing views: they simply reject media content that 
contradicts their religious beliefs. This is not different from what was obtained 
elsewhere. Sreberny (2000) argues that, although exposure to transnational media 
tends to affect leisure patterns, it does not lead to change of beliefs. The senior 
correspondent, though, was quick to note that the BBC has not totally failed in this 
respect since its objective was not to change its audiences‘ religious beliefs, but ‗to 
mould‘ their opinions and ‗minds‘ about worldly things, which in his view it has 
been succeeding in doing. It is not just influence in general terms that the BBC 
personnel believe the broadcaster exerts on its audiences; some of them feel that it 
does specifically influence audiences‘ perceptions of Britain. This view emerges in 
response to the question: ‗Do you think the BBC‘s broadcast to Nigeria has any 
influence in terms of enhancing favourable perception of Britain in Nigeria?‘ 
I think it does, certainly; I mean, the people do generally listen. I think the 
BBC, particularly on its legacy during the military days and even in the 
early days of (former President Olusegun) Obasanjo (regime), is seen as 
the voice you can rely on and trust to get things right. This is the Hausa 
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Service in particular, and to an extent the English service and Focus on 
Africa were seen as being honest and telling the truth. If people associate 
the honesty, the independence and integrity of the BBC as being British, 
then that is something to be welcomed, if you‘re British. And certainly, I 
mean, Nigerians know about Britain anyway…you know, when you say 
the BBC, people know what it means. And it has got respect and that can 
only benefit Britain as a whole (World Service correspondent). 
 
 
Apparently well versed in assessing the BBC‘s public diplomacy role, the World 
Service correspondent is convinced of its effectiveness in playing that role. Not 
just in its ability to portray Britain in a favourable light but also in presenting itself 
as an honest and independent medium whose mere association with Britain alone 
generates goodwill for the country, the BBC does indeed serve as a British public 
diplomat (Sreberny et al., 2010b). The respondent‘s position as a World Service 
correspondent, with apparent in-depth knowledge of the inner workings of the 
corporation and of its roles, makes this assessment relevant here. It reflects the 
expectations the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has of the BBC when it 
places it, along with the British Council, under the public diplomacy category in 
the 2004 Spending Review Settlement (FCO, 2005). Lord Carter Public 
Diplomacy Review Team, as stated earlier, stresses that too when it speaks of the 
‗benefits‘ Britain gets from the ‗valuable role‘ the two institutions play (FCO, 
2005, p.4). The positive global image of the BBC, the team reiterates almost in the 
same term as the last respondent, is an asset for Britain. ‗Public diplomacy is 
arguably not the primary objective of the World Service,‘ the team says, ‗but it is 
inevitable that in providing an internationally renowned and highly valued service 
that there will be positive public diplomacy gains for the country associated with 
that brand‘ (FCO, 2005, p.25). In essence, even by attaining its primary objective 
of providing international news and analysis, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office reckons, the BBC World Service would be achieving its secondary 
objective of promoting British public diplomacy. And since the respondents feel 
that it does this—along with expanding its audiences‘ knowledge of international 
affairs and influencing their views on global issues and so on—then it clearly has 





This chapter attempts to provide a full picture of the dynamics and complexity of 
media content production from the perspective of the BBC World Service 
personnel. From managers and editors and producers at its headquarters in London 
and Abuja bureau in Nigeria to reporters on the field in Nigeria, the contents‘ 
producers offered their perspectives on wide-ranging issues—content selection, 
interactive programming, engagement with new communications technologies, 
relations with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, relations among staff, 
treatment of audiences‘ complaints and the corporation‘s impact on its Northern 
Nigerian audiences. Although their number is small, the personnel were carefully 
selected to represent various angles of the production process. Significantly, they 
were also well-placed to offer authoritative assessments of the subject, and the 
interviews were in-depth and rigorous enough to probe all the key areas of 
contention and to generate relevant information.  
 
They reveal that content selection in the BBC World Service is a rigorous and 
complex issue that is guided by the corporation‘s objectives, editorial policy and 
guidelines as well as the personal inputs of the reporters, producers, editors and 
managers. It is a well-organised systematic process that involves different layers 
of personnel making conscious and deliberate decisions guided by a well-thought 
out framework and established rules and regulations of the corporation. The 
personnel also believe that the BBC made a conscious decision to introduce, and 
focus much attention to, interactive programming to derive the benefits such an 
approach could offer. They feel that interactive programming enables the 
corporation to engage more effectively with its audiences, generate content from 
them, infuse variety in the programmes and get instant feedback from them to 
improve the quality of its programmes. Interactive programming, they all agree, is 
being driven by new technologies, which they say the BBC has quickly recognised 
and deftly deployed for its services. New technologies have not only enhanced 
BBC‘s engagement with audiences, both in delivering its products to them and in 
receiving feedback from them, but they have also brought corporate efficiency and 
efficiencies among its personnel. 
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The general feeling among the BBC‘s personnel is that the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, despite being the funding body of the World Service and 
the main determinant of which language services to operate and which target areas 
to focus on, does not interfere in the daily editorial decisions and day-to-day 
running of the organisation—something that they believe guarantees the service‘s 
editorial independence. This, however, does not mean that the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office does not influence the production of the BBC goods. Being 
the funding body and decider of language services and target areas is enough 
influence to point to the management which areas of coverage to focus on. 
Similarly, it appears, the open non-interference policy is beneficial to both the 
World Service and its paymasters. It enhances the corporation‘s effectiveness in 
playing the role the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wishes it to play since 
even the mere perception of BBC as a credible organisation is of benefit to British 
public diplomacy, as they too observe. This chapter also reveals that the 
relationship between the BBC managers, editors, producers and reporters is 
complex but dynamic in terms of their respective roles in the various processes of 
content production and presentation. It is a relationship influenced both by the 
formally-defined rules set in the editorial guidelines and administrative policies of 

















 Results and Analysis III 
  (Focus Groups) 
 
Introduction 
This is the final results and analysis chapter and it is produced from the largest 
chunk of the primary data gathered from transnational audiences during the 
fieldwork in Nigeria. It reveals the pattern and consequences of Northern 
Nigerians‘ consumption of international media within the context of the cultural, 
socio-psychological, ideological and other extra-communication factors that affect 
media-audience relationship. The data was obtained through focus group 
interviews conducted in all the three geopolitical zones of Northern Nigeria: 
Northeast, Northwest and North-central. As explained in the ‗Methodology‘ 
chapter, the groups engaged range from peasants in the remote village of Njoboli 
close to the Nigeria‘s eastern border with Cameroon Republic and urban lower 
middle class and working class in the city of Yola to local officials in the ancient 
but now modernising city of Katsina near Nigeria‘s northern border with Niger 
Republic, students in the university town of Gwagwalada and experienced 
journalists in the booming city of Abuja, Nigeria‘s political capital, located in the 
central region of the country.  
 
The samples reflect the demographic features of the BBC audiences in Northern 
Nigeria, as revealed by its previous surveys (BBC Global News, 2009, 2010),  
comprising both rural and urban populations from a wide range of socio-economic 
settings and age groups as well as different occupational and professional 
backgrounds. There is a preponderance of middle-aged male participants, though, 
(which to some extent also reflects the demographic characteristics of BBC 
audiences in the region)—and so the results should be seen from that perspective. 
This chapter specifically reveals the patterns and particularities of the consumption 
of international media products by these groups; their perceptions of international 
media; their conception of the West; and the apparent mediating roles their 
cultural, religious, ideological, professional, personal and socio-economic 
backgrounds play in their international media consumption. 
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Yola Group I  
The lower middle class: consumption amid contestation 
This was the first of the main focus group discussions done for this study. It was 
conducted in the northeastern city of Yola with a group of mainly independent 
small scale entrepreneurs whose socio-economic background was roughly 
adjudged to be that of the urban lower middle class. The group is made up of six 
persons (five males and a female, aged 33-60) who are regular consumers of 
international media, have good Islamic education and most of them have above 
secondary school level of Western education. They comprise of a small-scale 
businessman who is also a local director of the Islamic sect Izala group (see 
‗Methodology‘ chapter), a mason who runs a small construction firm, a female 
restaurant owner, a tailoring business owner, a politician who is also the local 
chairman of retirees‘ union and a businessman who owns a shop in the city. They 
apparently share middle of the left political ideology, supported opposition parties 
and tend to be critical of Nigeria‘s government.  
 
The pattern of consumption of international media products is generally the same 
among all members of this group. They all listen to the Hausa services of the BBC, 
Voice of America (VOA), Germany‘s Radio Deutsche Welle and Radio France 
International (RFI). Most of them also watch global television broadcasters CNN, 
BBC World News and Al-Jazeera. But it is the BBC products that they said they 
consume mostly and trust the most. The following response reflects the general 
view of the group: 
The radio stations I listen to are the BBC, America (VOA), Germany 
(Deutsche Welle) and France (RFI). But the one I enjoy most is the BBC 
because if I spend a day without listening to the BBC, I feel 
uncomfortable. This is why wherever I am—either in a vehicle or 
walking—I have my radio set, day and night, so as to monitor the BBC. I 
don‘t want to get the news from a second-hand source; I prefer to get it 
directly from the BBC because whatever happens around the world and in 




Although the rest of them did not say they moved around with their radio sets ‗day 
and night‘ like the shop owner, they did share similar commitment to international 
media consumption and significantly in giving preference to the BBC, in trusting 
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its products and in using it as the benchmark against which the credibility of other 
news sources were assessed—as the response of another participant to the fellow-
up question shows:  
…When you listen to BBC reports, do you believe them? 
Very well, because even if I listen to other radio stations and get reports 
from them, I still wait to hear what the BBC would say. If its report differs 
with that of the other stations, I won‘t believe the other stations‘ report 
until it is confirmed by the BBC—that is the final. Once I listen to the 
BBC, it removes my doubts (Tailoring business owner). 
 
 
Their views correspond with those generally expressed by other consumers of 
international broadcast media products reflected in the results obtained from the 
individual interviews contained in the ‗Results and Analysis I‘ chapter—both of 
which confirm the results of the BBC‘s audience surveys in Nigeria that reveal 
that the Nigerian audiences consistently rate the station as the most credible 
broadcaster (BBC World Service, 2005, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 2010). 
Similarly, this group‘s focus on the radio as one of its two key platforms of 
accessing international media goods has great significance here too, with all the 
members clearly stating their reliance on the radio to source for news and 
information. They do use television and marginally newspapers too, but it is the 
radio that takes the prime position.  
 
The use of radio is wide spread in Yola, and many adults, like the shop owner, use 
it ‗day and night‘. Their emphasis on its utility does not contradict the BBC‘s 
audience surveys that reiterate its dominance in Nigeria‘s media landscape. ‗Radio 
remains dominant and is listened to by 82% of adults weekly, whilst TV is viewed 
by 48%,‘ says the 2004/05 survey report. ‗Radio is the most used source for news 
and information‘ (BBC World Service, 2005). Even five years later the reduction 
in the percentage of people listening to radio was not really significant. ‗Radio is 
the most popular media in Nigeria with 79% listening weekly,‘ according to the 
2009/10 survey report (BBC Global News, 2010). Radio‘s portability, ease of use, 
affordability and availability make it a preferred option for most Nigerians, as it 
has also been for many others in several African countries. ‗In Zambia, the 
consumption of radio includes the culturally-specific ways that people attune 
themselves to (or attenuate themselves from) the radio machine, its technology, its 
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portability, its commodity status and the fact that it produces unique sounds which 
can travel through communities‘ (Spitulnik, 2000, p.160). And in Zambia‘s 
neighbour Zimbabwe, Mano (2004, p.2) notes, ‗radio appears to have an 
unrivalled status as the country‘s ―true‖ mass medium‘.  
 
The style and the level of global media consumption among the members of Yola 
urban lower middle class group are also virtually uniform. There is near unanimity 
as regards the way they listen to radio and watch television, the sameness of the 
broadcasters they access, the one they prefer and trust most, the main timing of 
their engagements with them (usually mornings and evenings) and the regularity 
of such engagements. What is in contention, though, is the nature of their 
perceptions of such media‘s role and the nature of the apparent impact the 
consumption of their products might have had on them. It is the lack of uniformity 
in these areas that reveals the split within the group. The two most elderly persons 
in the group, who appeared to have held passionate views on the respective 
positions they held, led each of the two ―camps‖ that emerged—one seeing the 
BBC as a Western propaganda tool and the other seeing it as an impartial 
international broadcaster—although after passionate debate there appears to be a 
sort of convergence of opinions between the two camps in which they seem to 
agree that the broadcaster plays dual though contradictory roles: as a propagandist 
and as an unbiased broadcaster, a position that corresponds with many others‘ 
(Rampal and Adams, 1990; Nye, 2004a; Sreberny et al., 2010a, 2010b). The 
propaganda-tool argument was spearheaded by the director of the Islamic sect 
Izala, a small scale businessman whose fiery statements during the discussion 
tended to reveal more of his religious conviction than the diplomatic tones of his 
business skills. His main argument against the BBC is based on what he sees as its 
unfairness to Muslims and Islamic world: 
When America invaded Iraq, the first news report I got was from the 
BBC. I recorded it, it was the sound of gunfire only—whoever listens to it 
would hear the gunfire. The problem with the BBC is that it would never 
report something positive that happened. All the reports from Nigeria, 
Ghana, Cameroon and all the reporters here in Nigeria do not report 
something positive about Islam. They won‘t report that today Muslims 




His perception of BBC‘s bias against his religion, he says, made him sceptical 
about its credibility on matters relating to Islam and Muslims, though he still 
believes BBC‘s reports on those issues that are unrelated to his religion: 
 If BBC reports a thing that is unrelated to my religion, I make use of it. 
But things concerning my religion I don‘t because my religion has its own 
scripture and it is necessary to believe what the scripture says. Foreign 
propaganda will not help me. In this respect I won‘t believe BBC… I 
reject anything that contradicts my religious belief (Director Izala sect). 
 
 
Here he is not just subordinating the BBC to the superior position of the religious 
scriptures, he is clearly dismissing the BBC as a foreign propagandist injurious to 
his religious persuasion—although he did not deny the station‘s utility in reporting 
worldly affairs. In his camp was the restaurant owner, a local politician in the city, 
who is the only woman in the group: 
Oh, yes, those issues that do not contradict your religion, if they (BBC) 
report it—and you have confirmation that it indeed happened—you 
believe them. But any thing that affects your religion—if they report 
things contrary to your belief, you have to check with your religious book. 
But if it is something about worldly affairs—if BBC reports it, that is it, 




Further reinforcements of their views came from two other members of the group, 
thereby making their position more dominant in the group. Their reference points, 
like those obtained in the individual interviews contained in the ‗Results and 
Analysis I‘ chapter, are the Western media‘s coverage of American-led invasion of 
Iraq and the coverage of the West‘s war on terror:  
Things like America‘s invasion of Iraq, you would find that the reports are 
contradictory. The contradiction is especially because it is the issue of 
Islam (Tailoring business owner). 
 
Well, in my understanding, I think they exaggerate things when it comes 
to Islam because some of the terror attacks (being reported), the Muslims 
would not carry out such attacks… I think there are fabrications…because 
they are dealing with Islamic nations (Shop owner). 
 
 
Here they are not just accusing the BBC—and indeed other Western media—of 
being unfair to Muslims and Islam, and questioning its credibility, they are 
accusing it of fabrications perhaps to perform its ‗propaganda‘ role. Their 
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accusations of ‗fabrications‘ and ‗contradiction‘ in BBC‘s reports concerning 
Islam, though, may appear to have exposed contradiction in their position too. 
They are the same people who were earlier rating the BBC as the most credible 
broadcaster, and are now accusing it of fabrications. Their defence is that in 
reporting issues unrelated to Muslims and Islam, the station is the most credible 
broadcaster—and they believe what it reports on such issues. In reporting Muslims 
and Islam, however, it is not a credible medium—and so they do not believe its 
reports on them. In this respect it is not only their rejection of those BBC‘s reports 
that do not conform to their prevailing religious or ideological views that come 
into light, but it is also the issue of selective perception and the mediating role 
being played by their religion/ideology and culture in prompting the selectivity.  
 
This camp‘s position represents the dominant view in the group; but it was not 
unchallenged. Spearheading the challenge is the mason who regarded BBC as an 
unbiased international broadcaster that was not really out to demonise Muslims 
and Islam: 
Religiously, it is said that ―seeing is believing‖… And as regards to the 
BBC, it is hard to get reports that are in conflict with the truth, though 
people have different ways of understanding things. Someone will listen 
to a report but will not understand what is said… In the media, if it is a 
cleric that says something, you can‘t reject it since he would be quoting 
what God has said and what the prophet has said. You would accept them. 
In that respect, the BBC too has said the truth, so it should be trying on 
that. Not just here in Nigeria and Northern Nigeria but the whole world is 
proud of the BBC, especially we, Northern Nigerians, because the people 
we hear talking are Northerners, Muslims, who would not do things that 
will offend Islam (Mason). 
 
The mason is not only expressing his opposition to the group‘s dominant view that 
dismisses BBC as a propaganda tool; he is also defending the station and blaming 
its critics for their inability to comprehend its reports. ‗Someone will listen to a 
report but will not understand what is said‘. He has opened his argument with a 
religious saying that has wide resonance among Hausa speakers who even have a 
proverb for it ―Gani ya kori ji‖ (seeing is believing) to present the view that the 
BBC‘s reports are hardly ‗in conflict with the truth‘. His further explanations were 
that the BBC does also offer clerics chance to state their religion‘s position, and 
even more significantly the BBC reporters themselves, at least the Hausa Service 
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reporters, are mainly ‗Northerners, Muslims, who would not do things that will 
offend Islam‘. In this respect the BBC‘s use of diasporic capital (Sreberny et al., 
2010a, 2010b) and glocalisation strategy (Robertson, 1992) have both worked well 
for the station‘s credibility. The mason also took up the Izala sect director on the 
allegation that the BBC did not report positive works being undertaken by 
religious groups: 
On the issue of religion that my elder brother has raised, here I am not 
challenging him, but I would defend the BBC. It is the fault of the 
religious leaders if their positive work is not reported because if they 
invite the BBC to cover their activities, the BBC would do so (Mason). 
 
In the mason‘s camp is the local chairman of retirees‘ union who was so 
vehemently opposed to the Izala director‘s view about the BBC that he nearly 
personalised the issue and described the director as a city cleric whom he 
insinuated should not be regarded as a credible cleric: 
If the BBC wants to get honest views about religion, it should go to 
traditional clerics who stay in the village and talk to them. But city clerics 
are fake (Chairman of retirees‘ union). 
 
 
He too restated the ―seeing-is-believing‖ argument about the BBC reporting things 
based on facts, blaming those he regards as non-transparent Nigerian leaders for 
attempting to suppress the station‘s effort to expose their wrong deeds:  
On what the BBC reports, quite all right, anytime I listen to any media, I 
won‘t be satisfied until I listen to the BBC because they report the truth. 
They go to every corner and report what they see; but our leaders do not 
like it, particularly in Nigeria. Nigerian leaders do not like to see a 
journalist exposing what they do…because they want to suppress the 
masses (Chairman of retirees‘ union). 
 
His criticism of Nigerian leaders was unanimously endorsed by all the members of 
the group (who nodded their heads in unison); but his total endorsement of all 
BBC‘s reports was only shared by the mason with whom he held a minority view 
in the group. Their minority view did not withstand the pressure from the majority 
of the members; it gave in before the end of the session because after a long debate 
in the group, they (mason and retirees‘ chairman) too came to the conclusion that 
it was not all the BBC‘s reports that were accurate but that some of them were 
tilted to defend Western interests. The other group too did soften their original 
hard stand against the BBC to reflect this position. It is a convergence of opinions 
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of the members of the group and of the two original opposing views that had split 
the group into two camps. The view expressed below by the mason, leader of the 
BBC-as-unbiased-broadcaster camp, illustrates not only the climb down of his 
camp, but it also reflects the view of the other camp too after they had tuned down 
their rhetoric: 
The BBC‘s reports about happenings in the West: you can reject some and 
accept some. Sometimes they do things to impress; sometimes they do it 
for the benefit of humanity, sometimes for their personal interests. So we 
weigh up things to find out which ones did they do for the benefit of the 
humanity, and which ones do they do for their own interests? Those that 
they do for humanity we accept them, the ones they do to deceive people, 
we listen to them, but reject them (Mason). 
 
With the moderation of his original view, the mason came to a new conclusion that 
not all BBC reports should be accepted hook, line and sinker: ‗we weigh up things 
to find out which ones did they do for the benefit of the humanity, and which ones 
did they do for their own interests?‘ Those done for ‗humanity‘ would be accepted 
while the ones considered deceptive would be rejected. It was a major shift of his 
camp‘s position, and it was the foundation upon which the whole group arrived at 
a sort of consensus, now that his camp had agreed that not all BBC‘s reports were 
trustworthy and that some of them were put out ‗to deceive people‘. The principle 
of selective believability, noted among the other members of the group and in the 
individual interviews revealed in the preceding ‗Results and Analysis I‘ chapter, 
becomes applicable here too.  
 
Significant too was the emergence of the practical workings of group dynamics in 
focus group discussion. Morrison (1998) has identified group dynamics as the key 
ingredient that particularly distinguishes focus group from other research methods. 
‗It is the dynamic exchange between the individuals in the group that gives focus 
groups their special characteristic and strength as a research method‘ (Morrison, 
1998, p.168). Such dynamism was clearly exhibited in this group, as indeed in the 
other groups subsequently discussed here—though neither in such a graphic 
manner nor in such detail. The healthy group discussion held by these participants 
fits well into Greenbaum‘s (2000) conception of the ideal focus group atmosphere 
that encourages participants ‗who share one point of view to try to convince those 
who have the opposing perspective, and vice versa‘ (p.11). The way the members 
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of this group that first began their discussion with a solidly united voice, then split 
into two camps with two opposing views critical of each other before finally 
reuniting to come out with a sort of consensus on the main issue of their 
divergence—all within a space of less than one hour—confirms the viability of 
focus group as a very effective audience research method.  
 
Yola Group II  
The working class: global media as repositories of knowledge 
The second focus group in Yola is made up of six participants (all male, aged 27-
56) whose educational, occupational and general socio-economic status fall within 
the circle of the working class category. They comprise of a primary school 
teacher, an electricity worker, a panel beater, a motorcycle mechanic, a student-
teacher and an aide to the state governor whose qualification for the job emanated 
from his working class status rather than any professional skills or political 
influence (and his salary was also within that range). Their working class status 
notwithstanding, this group members appear to hold conservative right-of-the-
centre political view—unlike the left-leaning Yola lower middle class group—and 
are supportive of the ruling party (a position unconnected with the governor‘s aide 
presence in the session). The discussion, conducted in the inner city of Jimeta-
Yola where all of them live, was held on 11 January 2010, barely two weeks after 
the alleged attempted bombing of an American airline by a young Nigerian, Umar 
Faruk Mutallab, on Christmas Eve (Childress, 2009). Expectedly, some of the 
respondents made reference to this incident during the session.  
 
The pattern of their consumption of international media products is somehow 
similar to that of the members of Yola Group I (the lower middle class group), 
except that most members of the working class group appear to have a lower level 
of access to global television broadcasters such as CNN, BBC World News and 
Al-Jazeera than that of the lower middle class group, thus missing part of that 
exposure (two members of the working class group, though, have much familiarity 
with both the BBC World News and Al-Jazeera television channels). Generally, 
the Yola Group II members mainly consume the products of international radio 
broadcasters BBC, Voice of America, Radio Deutsche Welle and Radio France 
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International, all of which broadcast in both Hausa and English languages. They 
listen to them day and night, but mostly in the morning before leaving home for 
work and in the night when they return home, and sometimes in the afternoon at 
their places of work. The more ardent listeners among them said that they move 
about with their radio sets all the time—consistent with the assertion of Piepe et al. 
(1978) that members of the working class tend to be high consumers of broadcast 
products. But perhaps the most remarkable part of this group‘s engagement with 
the international radio broadcasters is their perception of them as not just sources 
of news and information and entertainment, but as repositories of knowledge. The 
following comment captures it well:  
Actually, I am a very keen radio listener; I would like to even show you 
that where I‘m sitting now I‘m holding a radio set (he brandished it). I 
listen to international broadcasters serially. After listening to Germany 
(Radio Deutsche Welle), I listen to the BBC, I listen to America (Voice of 
America), I listen to France (Radio France International). I don‘t leave out 
any one because I already believe that it is through the international media 
that we get accurate and timely reports—as soon as things happen we get 
the reports. Radio to me is more than an object of entertainment; it is a 
school. This radio (brandishing his radio set again) is my library; it is my 
record keeper; it is like half of my brain (Governor‘s aide). 
 
 
The group nodded in agreement with his statement. It was a resounding 
reinforcement of radio‘s utility argument, as already noted with the earlier group 
and as espoused by some of the works cited in the literature review section of this 
study (Hendy, 2000; Spitulnik, 2000; Mano, 2004; Larkin, 2008). Clearly, for this 
participant radio ‗is more than an object of entertainment; it is a school‘, a library, 
a record keeper and half of his brain—and so he needs to keep it with him 
constantly for constant consultation. Other members of the group did not come to 
the discussion with their radio sets; but they did not object to his description of its 
utility. And when their turn to speak came, some of them went on to specifically 
mention the BBC as the international broadcaster that played the strongest role in 
making radio this important to them. The youngest member of the group, a 
student-teacher, puts it this way: 
Sometimes what I get from the BBC is like what I get from school. That is 
a progress for me, and a progress for a teacher is a progress for the nation. 





This positive perception of the international media, particularly the BBC, helps 
enhance their credibility among these people. Consistent with what was noted in 
the previous group and BBC audience surveys (BBC World Service, 2007, 2008; 
BBC Global News, 2009, 2010), members of this group too find BBC‘s reports to 
be accurate and credible. They indicate that those are among the reasons why they 
believe them, as this electricity worker stresses:  
Yes, I do believe them. My reason for doing so is that in most cases a 
BBC reporter reports exactly what he sees; there is no question of 
exaggeration (Electricity worker). 
 
The BBC‘s vast network of reporters—perhaps the most effective of all 
international broadcasters—and the corporation‘s ability to draw them together 
and ‗leverage‘ them for its different services (Price et al., 2008; Horrocks, 2009) 
present a picture of a broadcaster whose reporters are everywhere reporting events 
as they happen. It had a lasting impression on this participant and persuaded him 
to accept the accuracy of its reports because ‗a BBC reporter reports exactly what 
he sees; there is no question of exaggeration‘. The perception of international 
broadcasters‘ credibility made the audiences to be more reliant on them—to the 
detriment of the local media:  
Honestly, whatever I hear in this country, I regard it as a rumour as long 
as I do not hear it from the international media because in many cases I 
would hear reports that something happened, but I won‘t believe them 
until I listen to the BBC or America (VOA) or the rest of the international 
media (Panel beater). 
 
They (international broadcasters) are good because some of the things that 
are happening in Africa which we don‘t know and those that we know, 
which we don‘t get from local radio stations, we get them from there 
(Motorcycle mechanic).  
 
The audiences‘ reliance on the international broadcasters for credible news stories 
and information creates the possibility of these media to have impact and perhaps 
significant influence on the lives of these audiences—and they said so, particularly 
in regard to the BBC, which they said has indeed been influencing their lives: 
Yes, honestly, it does because when I get additional information from the 
BBC on something I previously know little about I do gradually moderate 
my opinion about it based on the new knowledge I get from the BBC 




His comment does not only try to indicate the kind of influence the BBC might 
have on his person, it also hints on the kind of power the media could have on an 
individual—a tilt towards the media effects thesis (Adorno and Horkheimer, 
1979/1944). The respondent was not only stressing the fact that he did believe 
BBC reports, but he was also stating clearly that the station did indeed make him 
change his mind because of ‗the new knowledge‘ it offered him. Looking at his 
claim on the surface would resurrect the ‗powerful‘ media theory noted above. 
However, deep into the session, something came up (from the same man) that 
seriously challenged this conception. It was on the debate among the participants 
on whether the BBC was fair in its coverage of Muslims and Islam—of which the 
majority in the group said it had not been fair. He was among them. The issue the 
group members here cited—as did other respondents before—was the American 
and British involvements in Iraqi war; and this is his lengthy comment: 
Well, definitely there is a problem on America and Britain. America has 
arrogated to herself all things. And I would explain that there are things 
that the BBC doesn‘t report fully. I say this because during the Iraqi war, 
it would report things, but we would find out that the reports from other 
media were more comprehensive than theirs. This is why we said BBC 
under reports things. For example, when we watched Al-Jazeera, we 
would find out that what (the BBC) reported was inadequate, and found 
out that Al-Jazeera—we watched it on TV—did far better than the BBC. 
Like in the case of reporting death figures, if (former Iraqi leader) Saddam 
(Hussein‘s) troops killed many, and America killed too, the BBC would 
not report that of Saddam well; why? ... I was annoyed. At that time I 
stopped listening to it completely because it annoyed me on anything that 
affected Muslims. By God, whenever I listened to them saying Saddam 
did this and did that, I got annoyed. I would say why wouldn‘t they report 
his side fairly? At that time I reduced listening to the BBC and shifted to 
Al-Jazeera. 
Between Al-Jazeera and the BBC, which one do you trust more? 
On issues that relate to Islam, I trust Al-Jazeera more; but on those issues 
which are not related to Islam, I trust the BBC more (Primary school 
teacher). 
 
What a radical shift one could make: the same man who had, just a few minutes 
earlier, revealed that he trusted the BBC so much it even influenced his change of 
attitude, has now said that he became so annoyed with its reporting of Iraq that he 
at a time even ‗stopped listening to it completely‘ or ‗reduced listening to (it) and 
shifted to Al-Jazeera‘. His case, though, is not exceptional; it is typical of those 
who find themselves in a similar situation. It in a way reflects the case of selective 
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exposure (Klapper, 1960)—people deliberately avoiding unpleasant messages 
(more on this in the next chapter)—and also re-echoes the case of people who had 
trust in a particular medium and later withdrew the trust when they found out that 
its reports now challenge their long held views or beliefs, as seen in the ‗Results 
and Analysis I‘ chapter of this study. And it is this scenario, among others, that 
cautions against a quick rush to judgment on the supposed power of the media.  
 
The media do indeed have the power to produce and present their products; but the 
power of selecting, processing and interpreting the products belongs to the 
audiences (Morley, 1980; Liebes, 2005; Livingstone, 2007). It may not be as 
strong as the ‗enduring structural or institutional‘ power of the media as Ang 
(1996, p.139) and Morley (2006) and even Fiske (1987) note, but it is their power. 
Ang has argued that it ‗is the power not to change or overturn imposed structures, 
but to negotiate the potentially oppressive effects of those structures where they 
cannot be overthrown, where they have to be lived with‘ (p.8). However, as the 
case of this participant indicates, the audiences‘ power goes beyond this range; 
they do possess the power to switch to another medium—although, of course, they 
still have to negotiate how to handle the effects of the new medium too. Still, it is 
because of the audiences‘ power to change medium that Paddy Scannell (1996) 
argues that the power here, ‗in the first and last instance‘, rests more with the 
audiences than with the media. ‗If listeners and viewers don‘t like what they find 
they can simply switch over or switch off‘ (Scannell, 1996, p.12). The school 
teacher did the former: he switched over to Al-Jazeera. But because the case is 
even more complicated than simply ‗switching over or switching off‘, a different 
scenario emerges. The school teacher decided to retain both stations—and many 
more—and selects from each of them which aspects of the products to believe and 
which ones to reject. It is a classic case of selective believability (more on this too 
in the next chapter). 
 
Not unlike what was obtained in the previous group, there is no dispute among the 
members of this group with regard to the uniformity in the pattern of their 
consumption of international media products; the area of contention is in the 
nature of their perception of the West (America and Britain in particular), the 
West‘s attitudes towards Muslims and Islamic world, and the BBC‘s coverage of 
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them. The overwhelming views in the group, after a thorough debate, are that the 
West is not fair to the Islamic world; and that the BBC‘s coverage of Muslims and 
Islam-related issues is negative. The following comments reveal their feelings: 
Ah, honestly, the things they (America and Britain) do are good in some 
cases, but some are bad. Their relationship with Islam is not good. They 
suppress Islam far more than imagined. This is why we Muslims dislike 
them; they suppress us; they are not fair to us (Motorcycle mechanic). 
 
Well, America causes problems for the world as a whole on one particular 
thing: their policy on Israel-Palestinians‘ relations. The world is as much 
as possible trying to ensure peaceful co-existence; but if America doesn‘t 
change her foreign policies on Israel-Palestinians‘ relations, there would 
never be peace because it is obvious that America backs Israel to 
humiliate Palestinian Muslims. And wherever you humiliate a single 
Muslim, you humiliate the whole Muslims, be it in Palestine or 
Afghanistan or in Koma (a remote tiny village on Adamawa‘s high hills in 
Nigeria) (Governor‘s aide). 
 
It was within this part of the discussion that the issue of Umar Faruk Mutallab, the 
young Nigerian suspected of attempting to bomb US airline on the 2009 Christmas 
Eve, came up. None of the participants expressed any support for him, but they 
said that the US—or its media—was using his case to demonise Muslims: 
Honestly, America, in our view as Muslims, is not fair to us because when 
one man commits certain offence, even if he is not a Muslim or (he is) 
merely a nominal Muslim, they would twist it and link it to good Muslims. 
Take the example of the case of this boy (Umar Farouk Mutallab) who is 
alleged to have put a bomb in an American plane. I saw on CNN the 
background they put to his picture; it was an Islamic flag with the Islamic 
inscription ―There is no God but Allah‖. It is possible that that boy didn‘t 
even have adequate knowledge of Islam, but they picked him and linked 
him with it, saying that Nigeria is becoming a terrorists‘ country… This is 
why I think that America is not good (Panel beater). 
 
These were the tones and trends of their comments expressing discomfort towards 
what they perceive to be the West‘s, or specifically America‘s, attitude towards 
Muslims and the Islamic world. They tend to view the whole situation broadly in 
Huntington‘s concept of clash of civilizations, with the West battling to impose its 
will on the Muslims; and the counter ‗rejection of Western culture‘ by the 
Muslims (Huntington, 1996, p.110). The West, as one of them put it, suppresses 
‗Islam far more than imagined‘. They cited series of instances, whether it was the 
invasion of Iraq or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the war on terror or the 
specific case of the Nigerian terrorist suspect in the last example, to back their 
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arguments of the West‘s alleged unfairness to the Muslims and Islamic world. This 
is the dominant view in the group.  
 
There is a lone opposition voice, though. One of the group members, the 
electricity worker, had throughout the discussion been expressing views in strong 
support of the West, America and Britain specifically, and the way the Western 
media, particularly the BBC, report events. Even on the issue of war on terror and 
its coverage—both of which the majority of the group members express strong 
reservations on—this participant backs the West. He is clearly supportive of 
America on its decision to launch the war, and of the BBC on its coverage of it: 
First, those who commit terrorism in the name of Islam are not doing it for 
the religion because there is no religion that instructs you to go and kill a 
human being. So those who claim to be fighting in the name of religion 
are not telling the truth, they are fighting for their own interest. The way 
the BBC does its reports is accurate; I support them 100 per cent 
(Electricity worker). 
 
For him the blame should go to the suspected terrorists not to the US in particular, 
or the West in general, which he feels was merely reacting to the alleged terrorists‘ 
action; and not to the BBC which he believes was reporting the events accurately. 
He maintained his pro-West position throughout the session without any of the 
discussants showing any contempt for it. He too did not express any disrespect 
towards theirs. As in the previous group, here too it was a passionate but healthy 
debate with people expressing opposing views but maintaining mutual respect for 
one another. And as stated in the ‗Methodology‘ chapter, despite the wide age gap 
among the members of this group—the eldest was approximately 56 and the 
youngest about 27—and the well-known culture of deference (by the young 
towards older persons) among Hausa-Fulani people, the discussion was quite 
smooth with each participant putting out their arguments forcefully, unhindered by 
contrary views expressed by older participants. No one attempted to dominate the 
discussion and none tried to impose his views on others. Again, here too, as in the 
previous group, the dynamism of the focus group (Morrison, 1998; Greenbaum, 




Njoboli Group  
The peasant group: consumption with conviction 
The Njoboli focus group is a peasant farmers‘ group with all its members living in 
the Fulani Muslim-dominated village of Njoboli near Nigeria‘s eastern border with 
Cameroon Republic. Rain-fed farming and animal rearing are their main sources 
of livelihood, but since crop cultivation is seasonal in this area (usually from May 
to November), they do complement their income with other trades. There are eight 
participants in this group—all male, aged 25 to 53—comprising of a farmer-shop 
keeper, a farmer-student, a farmer-petty trader, a herdsman, a farmer-teacher, a 
farmer-cattle herder, a farmer-day labourer and a farmer-tailor. The majority have 
some knowledge of Islamic education and three of them possess secondary school 
level of Western education (the farmer-teacher has college education). They are all 
listeners of international radio broadcasters, and majority of them turn out to have 
a greater knowledge of happenings around the world than initially assumed, 
apparently because of their regular interactions with international broadcasters. 
The discussion took place on 27 February 2011 amid growing uprisings in many 
Arab nations; and the discussants, without any prompting from the moderator, did 
make references to them in expressing their views. The session was held in front 
of the house of the person who assisted in organising it at the centre of the village 
(see ‗Methodology‘ chapter). 
 
The pattern of consumption of international media products by these peasants 
appears to be markedly different from that of the city dwellers highlighted in the 
last two group discussions. While the peasants rely exclusively on radio for 
international media consumption, the city dwelling groups do complement theirs 
with international television consumption, with the lower middle class group 
having higher level of it than the working class group. For this peasant group the 
radio is virtually the sole source of international media products (two members did 
mention television in passing but not really as a significant source of international 
broadcasts to them). Even the farmer-teacher who appears to be the most ardent 
consumer of international media goods among them relies solely on radio. ‗I do 
not use any platform other than the radio,‘ he said. And no member of this group 
has ever accessed media products from the Internet, with one of them stating 
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clearly that this was ‗because honestly we have no Internet here; and I do not go 
out and spend my time to look for Internet to search for BBC‘ (herdsman). The 
statistics and the existing infrastructural reality in the country do not dispute their 
remarks. First, although Internet penetration is increasing rapidly in Nigeria, it has 
not gone far enough to reach many remote areas. According to the BBC 2009/10 
survey, about ‗a fifth of Nigerians have access to the Internet, though only 5% go 
online weekly (and less than) 3% have Internet access at home‘ (BBC Global 
News, 2010)—the general access figure, though, has since risen from the 20 per 
cent in that survey to 28 per cent (Internet World Stats, 2011). Similarly, lack of 
regular supply of electricity and inadequate income to afford power-generating 
sets mean that access to television is severally limited even to the most prosperous 
of rural dwellers; and non-existence of Internet connection in remote areas means 
a complete lack of access to the Internet service. The residents of Njoboli village, 
almost like the people of Ait Nuh in rural Morocco described by Tarik Sabry in his 
Cultural Encounters in the Arab World (2010), lack most of the ‗new technologies 
of comfort‘ (p.119), and have to make do with what is available to them. 
 
Radio is one of the few technological devices available to Njoboli dwellers; and 
through it they consume—mainly in the mornings, but also in the afternoons and 
evenings—a variety of products from a range of international broadcasters, with 
the BBC (as in the case of the two groups discussed earlier) getting the priority. 
Ironically, although members of this group (like the city dwelling lower middle 
class group) tend to be critical of Nigeria‘s ruling elite, they seem to (unlike the 
other groups) hold positive views about the West and its media—as was the case 
with many young Ait Nuhians in rural Morocco (Sabry, 2010). One other thing 
noted about Njoboli dwellers is that, although they are not Islamist by orientation, 
they tend to begin their statements with the Islamic way of greeting: Salamu 
alaikum (Peace be upon you)—as a conventional Hausa-Fulani Muslims‘ way of 
salutation and showing respect to one another rather than as a marker of 
ideological persuasion. Some members of the other groups too do use it 
frequently, though not as frequently as the Njoboli peasants.  
 
Despite relying virtually on a single platform for access to international media, the 
Njoboli group members show remarkable ability to express their views about 
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international affairs. Apparently, because of their positive perception of the West 
and because they rely heavily on international radio broadcasters for news and a 
variety of other things, they tend to attribute wide range of functions to these 
media. None of them describes this in as graphic detail as the farmer-teacher who 
appears to be the most eloquent of them all:  
Peace be upon you, I do listen to many international broadcasters: BBC, 
Germany (Radio Deutsche Welle), France (Radio France International) 
and America (Voice of America); I do listen to them all, including Libyan 
Radio (Libyan Jamahiriya Broadcasting Corporation, LJBC) and Cairo 
Radio. Listening to them has helped me; it gives me a lot of things; it 
shows me how to secure my rights from the government, how to deal with 
other people; it enlightens me of other religions and where they have 
strongholds. This is why I listen to radio daily. I learn from them that 
some governments are fairer than others. Like here in Nigeria, if the 
government has been listening to what we, the masses, have been saying 
or what we want them to do and they are doing them, then nothing would 
have gone bad. What is happening in the country now is regrettable. But if 
they do not change—I am not the only one listening to the radio, many 
people do—if they (Nigerian leaders) do not take measures to redress 
things, what is happening in the Arab world may happen in Nigeria too 
(Farmer-teacher). 
 
The international broadcasters are seen here as far more than purveyors of news 
and information; they are equally regarded as agents of enlightenment for people 
to know what transpires among other peoples and to know their rights, and as 
instruments of mobilisation of public opinions. They are also expected to be seen 
by governments as the tools of gauging people‘s feelings to help provide good 
governance. For this respondent what he views as the absence of good governance 
in Nigeria is the consequence of the government‘s refusal to listen to people‘s 
concerns and effect changes—a similar situation that he feels has led to the 
uprisings in the Arab world which he predicts ‗may happen in Nigeria too‘, if its 
leaders ‗do not change‘ their attitude. In his perception, the media are so powerful 
that they are capable of mobilising people to effect major changes. When asked 
whether it was solely the media influence that led to the changes taking place in 
the Arab world or it was the people‘s own decision to effect the changes, 
regardless of media‘s influence, his answer is as follows:  
It is the result of the two factors: the media had helped them—some of 
them were enlightened by the media to know their rights; and as the result 
of that, they came out and demanded for their rights from their 
governments. Some understood the issue on their own and realised that 
they needed to liberate themselves. So they teamed up with those that 
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were enlightened by the media and campaigned for their rights; and the 
international community supported them; and they succeeded. In Egypt 
they deposed Hosni Mubarak, in Tunisia Ben Ali had gone, in Algeria 
they want (Abdelaziz) Bouteflika to go, and in Libya they are fighting 
(Farmer-teacher). 
 
From this response it is clear that the farmer-teacher is familiar with international 
current affairs; and his belief on the potency of the media is also glaring. It is a 
belief shared by the other members of the group, who seem to have also agreed 
that the media should serve as the voice of the people. It is perhaps because 
members of this group have so much cherished the idea of allowing people to air 
their views for the government to act on them that even their choice of favourite 
programmes illustrates this sentiment. The most popular programme among them 
is the BBC Hausa Service‘s interactive programme ‗Ra‘ayi Riga‘ (Have Your 
Say), the variant of the main BBC‘s ‗World Have Your Say‘, in which listeners 
are given a chance to air their views on selected subjects of interest. Every 
member of this group mentioned this programme, which is transmitted every 
Friday evening by the BBC Hausa Service (see ‗Integration of interactivity‘ 
section of the ‗Content and Quantification‘ chapter), as one of his favourite 
programmes—often along with listeners‘ letters programme, another interactive 
programme of the station. The following response gives a general view of the 
programmes they enjoy: 
The morning and afternoon programmes (of the BBC Hausa Service); we 
listen also to Ra‘ayi Riga (Have Your Say) and listeners‘ letters 
programmes… These enlighten us about what is going on in the world and 
shape our views about the world; how our governments run their affairs, 
how we would realise our rights and so on (Farmer-shop keeper). 
 
This group, more than any other group mentioned above or to be mentioned 
below, expresses greater trust in the reports of international broadcasters, 
particularly the BBC‘s. Almost all its members, without any significant 
reservation, say they do trust the BBC and regard its reports as credible, devoid of 
falsehood or deliberate exaggeration: 
As the other speakers say, I do trust the BBC, not only BBC but 
journalists in general. A journalist goes to difficult places, even in war 
zones, to get stories, so I wouldn‘t say they exaggerate because they 
sacrifice their lives to get the stories. Although there are conventions that 
say journalists should not be killed even in war zones, in some places we 
do hear reports of molestation of journalists. They do really suffer. So I 
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wouldn‘t say they tell lies. The reports I hear from the BBC or Voice of 
America, I feel as if I was in the place where the events were happening 
(Herdsman).  
 
I do not doubt all the reports I get from the BBC. Whatever I hear from 
them I trust it. Why? Because there is no media organisation that explains 
to us the way things are as the BBC does (Farmer-student).  
 
I would not say they exaggerate their reports because a journalist can go to 
any place and get his reports… They go to different parts of the world and 
report things (Farmer-petty trader). 
 
For this group the BBC is an impartial international broadcaster reporting news 
and analysis and offering a platform for people to air their views without any 
ideological connotation. Their favourite interactive programme ‗Have Your Say‘, 
they feel, has no ideological motive beyond that of giving the listeners the 
opportunity to express their opinions. This short conversation with the farmer/day-
labourer gives a hint of that feeling: 
What do you think of Ra’ayi Riga (Have Your Say); is it the genuine views of 
the listeners or the views of the station? 
It is the listeners‘ views; I believe it is wholly true because before any 
view is aired the person‘s name is mentioned. 
So you believe that it is truly the real views of the listeners that are presented to 
the public; they are not altered or manipulated to reflect a pre-determined 
position of the station? 
Well, the journalists do what they are there to do; they do not manipulate 
the interviewees‘ views (Farmer-day labourer). 
 
The day labourer suspects no manipulation or any ideological motive in running 
‗Have Your Say‘ programme in BBC Hausa Service: it is a neutral platform 
offered to listeners to express their views, he believes. His view runs counter to 
Hill and Alshaer‘s (2010) argument that asserts that the BBC‘s interactive 
programming has ideological motives, and that it (at least the BBC Arabic TV‘s 
one) ‗encouraged the form of questioning and debate (that) accords with the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office‘s public diplomacy objectives‘ (p.152). The 
day labourer has not seen such motives in the BBC Hausa Service‘s Ra‘ayi Riga 
perhaps due to limited exposure to variety of sources of information or constraints 
of critical faculty or due to other factors. Similarly, unlike any other group, the 
peasant group does not view the BBC as being deliberately unfair to Muslims or 
Islamic world. They do not feel that there is any ulterior motive in setting up 
 306 
international broadcasters. They believe that the West set up their international 
broadcasters for altruistic reasons—as this comment reveals: 
They are doing it for the benefit of the countries around the world, not 
because of the owner countries; because the wind of change is blowing 
now and democracy is popular anywhere in the world. Everywhere in the 
world people want democracy; not repressive regimes. This is why the 
reports we get from the media enlighten us on many things (Farmer-
teacher). 
 
With each comment coming from them, members of this group express views that 
clearly show their positive conception of the West and positive perception of its 
media. The last comment probably offers the best possible description the owners 
of the international broadcasters in the West would have loved to hear. ‗They are 
doing it for the benefit of the countries around the world‘; not for their own 
interests—as the two previous groups have maintained (and as the subsequent ones 
would insist). To give it a theoretical perspective, this group‘s consumption of 
international media texts presents a case of ‗preferred reading‘ (Hall, 1980). The 
intended meaning of the products‘ producers is what they seem to take—in 
conformity with Hall‘s encoding/decoding model which, as discussed in the 
preceding chapters, also speaks of ‗negotiated‘ and ‗oppositional‘ readings of 
media texts to indicate the nature of audiences‘ interactions with them. Since they 
appear to have accepted the producers‘ intended meanings of the texts, the Njoboli 
peasants‘ prevailing ‗decoding practices‘ (Morley, 1980) reveal preferred reading 
of the texts. There is no case of oppositional reading here; there is—as would be 
seen shortly—a certain level of negotiated reading in some respects; but the 
prevailing position tilts heavily on the side of the preferred reading (Hall, 1980). 
The dominant ideology theory (Gramsci, 1971; Althusser, 1971) appears to hold 
sway here, though with some elements of modification.  
 
The case of negotiated reading observed here is in the few cases where they 
express some discomfort over the BBC‘s handling of reports about the 
Muslim-Christian conflict in the central Nigerian city of Jos where persistent 
sectarian violence claimed several lives. It was when making reference to the 
Jos conflict‘s reporting that some of the respondents mentioned the word 
‗doubts‘ about BBC‘s reports: 
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Well, I do have some doubts on some reports because the programme 
presenters themselves do sometimes say ‗perhaps‘ to indicate lack of 
certainty. This shows us that they too have not confirmed those reports. 
This does happen. We do enjoy what they tell us. If not for them, we 
would not have gotten reports of what is happening in Jos (Farmer-shop 
keeper).  
 
The amount of care taken by this participant to explain the circumstances of the 
‗doubts‘ gives a hint of the complex processes that goes through the listener‘s 
mind in negotiating the meanings of such kind of media texts. He was careful to 
state that indeed he did doubt some reports because the BBC presenters too did 
‗say ―perhaps‖ to indicate lack of certainty‘; but at the same time he showered 
praise on the media. ‗We do enjoy what they tell us. If not for them, we would not 
have gotten reports of what is happening in Jos‘. It is a similar pattern adopted in 
the following comment: 
There is no report that I really trust like that of the BBC. If you really 
want to get accurate report, listen to the BBC; it is the ultimate in the 
world. One thing I don‘t like, though, is the report about the killing of 
Muslims…in Jos (Farmer-tailor).  
 
The tailor is not blaming the BBC on the way it carries its reports; he is even 
praising the station. His dislike was on ‗the report about the killing of Muslims‘. 
He is apparently blaming the people who did the killing, not really the media that 
reported the killing; although in a way he had also wished that it had not brought 
the sad news to him. He did not say that openly, though. It was the subsequent 
respondent who came out openly to blame the BBC for its handling of the reports 
about the conflict. His concern is that when an incident of killing takes place, the 
station would be keen to report it; but, he alleges, it would not follow up the story 
to its logical conclusion:  
Well, they do work; but there is lack of fairness of a sort. Just like they 
report the beginning of the incident, they should follow up and investigate 
how the suspects are prosecuted and what happens to them. For those of 
us in a village we would like to know what happens to the suspects 
(Farmer-cattle herder). 
 
In his opinion, after the station reports an incident of the killing of Muslims (or 
perhaps any other killing), it is mandatory for it to follow up the story and tell its 
listeners what happens next: who are the suspects and how are they punished. 
Failing to do so, in his view, amounts to ‗lack of fairness‘. It is essentially on Jos 
conflict issue alone that the members of this group raise question about the BBC‘s 
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reporting style, not on the overall handling of reports about Muslims and Islamic 
world—on which the two previous groups and the respondents in the ‗Results and 
Analysis I‘ chapter clearly accused the BBC of being unfair. For the Njoboli 
group it was only on the Jos issue that the question of lack of fairness was raised; 
even on that they did not pursue it vigorously. It is in this case that the concept of 
‗negotiated reading‘ (Hall, 1980) appears applicable. The Njoboli BBC listeners 
were apparently not comfortable with the reports on Jos conflict, but they had 
neither rejected them totally nor had they accepted them wholesale. They 
struggled with the texts, and perhaps with other competing forces in their minds, 
to negotiate and make ‗sense‘ of what they heard from the broadcaster (Hall in 
Morley, 1986, p.8).  
 
Katsina Group  
The local politicians: strong exposure and high selectivity 
This group is mainly a collection of local council officials in Katsina city, the 
capital of Katsina State, which is located less than one-hour drive to Nigeria‘s 
northern border with Niger Republic. It is the smallest of all groups: containing 
only five persons compared to the largest group that has nine members. The 
participants are all male, aged 34-50, and seem to be enjoying their new socio-
economic status as emerging local officials in the city. They comprise of the 
secretary of Katsina local government council, its supervisory councillor in charge 
of education and social services, supervisory councillor in charge of agriculture, an 
elected councillor and a former bank worker-turned-politician. They all have at 
least a college level Western education, are well versed in Islamic education and 
well exposed to local politics. They are among the ‗young‘ politicians in the city 
whose prosperity is reflected by the new houses they are erecting in the new-rich 
neighbourhood, which is an extension of the highbrow Government Reservation 
Area (GRA) in the suburb of the city, where the discussion was held.   
 
Their international media consumption pattern differs from any of the three groups 
discussed earlier. They have the highest exposure to international television 
broadcasts among all the groups, perhaps due to their comfortable level of income 
that affords them the opportunity to own satellite television and electric power-
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generating sets to maintain them. Although access to satellite television is 
expanding in Nigeria, many Nigerians cannot afford it. The BBC‘s 2009/10 
audience survey reveals that ‗over a quarter of Nigerians have access to cable and 
satellite (television), but less than half of these (12%) have access in their 
household‘ (BBC Global News, 2010). Members of this group are among the 12 
per cent with access at home. Like all the three previous groups, they do also listen 
to the Hausa language international radio broadcasters, particularly the BBC 
Hausa Service; but from the discussion it is clear that they pay more attention to 
the English-language global television broadcasts than to the Hausa language ones. 
Morning listening of radio and evening watching of television were regularly 
stated in the discussion, confirming BBC audience surveys‘ findings on such 
pattern (BBC World Service, 2007). The Hausa language international radio 
broadcasters BBC, Voice of America and Radio France International as well as the 
television broadcasters BBC World News and Al-Jazeera are the stations 
frequently mentioned in the discussion: 
I do listen to many international broadcast media. First, it depends on 
time: I listen to BBC in the morning and the Voice of America, also in the 
morning; I also listen to the France‘s radio station (Radio France 
International)…all these are Hausa language broadcasters. For television 
stations, I watch Al-Jazeera, BBC World and an Italian television station 
RAI (Radiotelevisione Italiana)... All the television programmes I watch 
are broadcast in English language (Local council secretary). 
 
I pay more attention to English language broadcasters because in many 
cases I do not have time in the morning to listen to Hausa language 
broadcasts, so I listen to English broadcast in the evenings. I pay more 
attention to the BBC World to know about international affairs (Bank 
worker-turned-politician). 
 
I listen to the BBC and VOA on the radio. On television, I watch BBC 
World and Al-Jazeera (Supervisory councillor for education). 
 
The concentration on television instead of radio (though the radio too has not been 
discarded) and the apparent preference to English language programmes ahead of 
the Hausa programming reveal not only a major media consumption variation 
between this group and the others, but they also give a hint of socio-economic 
status as a factor in media consumption. Although neither the sample used here 
nor the one used in any of the groups is large enough to provide grounds for any 
definite claim, a pattern is emerging here that indicates that socio-economic 
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variable is possibly a strong factor in global media consumption pattern among 
Northern Nigerians. High income, urban residency and choice of lifestyle afford 
this group—and to some extent the Yola lower middle class group—adequate 
access to global television broadcasters and differentiate their media consumption 
from that of Njoboli peasants who lack such luxuries. One other remarkable thing 
here is that the high television consumption noted with the Katsina group contrast 
sharply with Piepe et al.‘s (1978) findings that reveal low consumption of 
television products by the middle class.  
 
Again, the difference between Katsina group and the others is not limited to media 
consumption alone; it extends to the aspects of perception of media influence, 
conception of the West and its media and the impact they feel such media have on 
their lives. Even the rating of the BBC as the most credible and most influential 
international media almost unanimously agreed by all the three previous groups 
does not receive the same level of unanimity and depth of endorsement by the 
members of this group. The majority do regard the BBC as the most credible 
broadcaster; but some of them feel that Al-Jazeera is also one of the most 
influential and credible broadcasters: 
In my opinion, Al-Jazeera is now one of the most influential television 
stations that play an important role in the world, especially in political and 
social lives around the world. This is one of the things I think people have 
now turned their attention to, considering the contributions this station has 
been giving. Of course, radio has greater penetration; people have more 
access to it, with N10 you can buy a battery and listen to your radio; and it 
is not everyone that has access to Al-Jazeera. But for those who watch 
television, Al-Jazeera is among the leading stations that bring news of the 
events happening around the world (Supervisory councillor for 
education). 
 
He did not categorically say that Al-Jazeera was better than BBC, but it is clear 
that he has a great reverence for Al-Jazeera and the ‗contributions‘ it is making to 
‗political and social lives around the world‘. His comment captures what most 
members in the group apparently believe. The next respondent is more specific in 
his rating of the two stations: 
[W]hen it comes to general news, I consider BBC more credible… In 
terms of the Arab world, because Al-Jazeera is closer to them, their 
reports would be more credible and more important (Supervisory 
councillor for agriculture). 
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This respondent used proximity and perhaps specialisation factors to support his 
assessment of the two broadcasters. It is a similar logic some respondents have 
offered to explain similar arguments. Within this group, the only respondent who 
offers clear support for the BBC in this respect is the one who, from the very 
beginning of the session, had said that it was the BBC that he accessed most of the 
time; and midway into the session he did not hide his feeling about how much he 
trusts the station: 
I don‘t believe what I get from other media until I confirm it by listening 
to the BBC. It is the station I trust most. It is their reporters who would go 
to places and get stories; some of them are my Hausa-speaking brothers, 
who would go and get the stories, facts about the European nations, and 
broadcast to us; so I must trust them because they would not go and do 
things contrary to what they are supposed to do (Bank worker-turned-
politician). 
 
The BBC‘s glocalisation strategy (Robertson, 1992) and use of diasporic capital 
(Sreberny et al., 2010a, 2010b), as observed in the case of another participant 
(mason) in the Yola lower middle-class group, have served it well here too. The 
ex-bank worker, like the mason, feels that his ‗Hausa-speaking brothers‘ who 
gather stories and ‗facts about the European nations‘ and broadcast in BBC Hausa 
Service would not be part of any scheme to manipulate facts and misinform the 
audiences; and as such their reports are credible and the station trustworthy. But 
even from him the trust for the BBC is not in absolute terms; it is only within the 
premise of comparing it with other broadcasters. In the overall categorisation, he 
agrees with the other members of the group that all international broadcasters are 
organs of propaganda—though he feels that they were more so before than they 
are now:   
I used to hold that view (that international broadcasters are propaganda 
organs), but recently things have been happening in the world that make 
me think that even if they do carry propaganda, it is not as much as we 
thought… So even if they do spread propaganda—I used to think that they 
did; I thought that 80 per cent of their news stories were propaganda for 
the advancement of their nations‘ interests—but I later realise that even if 
there is propaganda, 60 per cent of what they broadcast is the truth (Bank 
worker-turned-politician). 
 
Although he went to the extent of assigning percentages of the level of propaganda 
he feels they peddle, his view within the group is apparently moderate. The 
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strongest proponent of the media-as-propaganda-organs claim is the council‘s 
secretary who puts out a lengthy argument in support of his position:  
Any media organisation is essentially a propaganda organ; you would find 
them defending certain interests which certain part of the world believes 
in. For example, during the World War I and II international broadcasters 
sprung up in the world not for anything but to challenge Hitler‘s move and 
Stalin‘s and others like Mussolini‘s… The media organisations I had 
earlier mentioned such as Al-Jazeera and BBC World and Hausa service 
broadcasters—all of them—have now concentrated in spreading 
propaganda about democracy. The problem is that they look at democracy 
in Western perspective. What I mean here, for example, is that there was 
once a democratic election in Algeria, and at the time it was conducted—
since democracy is said to be the decision of the majority—and when the 
international media, including the BBC and others, realised that the 
Islamist party FIS (Front Islamique du Salut ―Islamic Salvation Front‖) 
was about to form a government, a government based on democratic 
election they talk about; but because of the ideological position of the FIS 
party was Islamist in nature, they blatantly turned the propaganda against 
them (Local council secretary). 
 
This participant is keen to use historical events and instances to drive home his 
argument that the international broadcasters are essentially organs of propaganda. 
He combined both the First and Second World Wars (though the names he 
mentioned were actually those of the key figures in the Second World War in 
particular) to cite as the events that gave impetus for the rise of international media 
and their propaganda role. The circumstances prompting them to play the 
propaganda role, he notes, are not limited to those of war; but to any interests of 
the owner countries, which he feels is now the propagation of Western democracy. 
This is why, he notes, the Algerian Islamists‘ brand of democracy was rejected by 
the Western media in favour of the Western brand of democracy. In a sense he—
and generally the members of his group—argue that the international broadcasters 
are agent of ideological warfare. It is a view that is not far away from Price et al.‘s 
(2008) statement that all global media organisations ‗are in some measure 
missionaries of ideological and cultural hegemony‘ (p.153). It is a position that 
appears to fall in line with Gramsci‘s (1971) hegemony thesis and Althusser‘s 
(1971) concept of media as ‗ideological state apparatuses‘ (p.143), and equally 
corresponds to Herman and Chomsky‘s (1994) propaganda model.  
 
However, although the members of this group express their conception of media in 
the context the media hegemony and dominant ideology theorists (Gramsci, 1971; 
 313 
Althusser, 1971; Hall, 1980) explain them, they do not ‗decode‘ global media texts 
(Morley, 1980) in the context the cultural or media imperialism theorists (Schiller, 
1969; Boyd-Barrett, 1977) have assumed. Selectivity is clearly evident in their 
media ‗decoding practices‘ (Morley, 1980, p.29). Apparently, the suspicion the 
group members have of media‘s propaganda intention makes them to be selective 
in their consumption of media texts, regardless of the high credibility rating they 
give to both the BBC and Al-Jazeera. They clearly state their selectivity in their 
reading of media texts as the following comment shows: 
I honestly select what to believe because there is no radio or television 
station that has no agenda and I know that all of them are built based upon 
their interests. Although there are claims of independence by British and 
American media, they have their limits… So I assure you that we are 
selective, to avoid becoming victims of their propaganda. Of course, yes, 
they do try and bring things that, because of the nature of African leaders, 
our media would not broadcast... But the media in America or Britain or 
Al-Jazeera would come and broadcast things that happen here. This helps 
a lot (Supervisory councillor for education). 
 
 
The concept of selectivity in the context it appears in respect of these 
participants—as indeed with the previous ones—does not seem to be a simple and 
straightforward activity; it is a complex audience activity influenced by layers of 
extraneous factors. In the comment above, for instance, the participant said that the 
realisation that the media have their own ideological agenda make them 
(audiences) to be selective in the consumption of media products ‗to avoid 
becoming victims of their propaganda‘. But the comments by other participants 
below reveal that their selectivity is far beyond these reasons alone; it is also 
guided by personal and religious and ideological factors. The following comment 
outlines the religious-cum-ideological factors: 
For the followers of Islam they have their doctrine that guides their lives; 
and whatever Muslims listen to they would judge it based on Islamic 
injunctions to see if it is righteous or not… This is why a Muslim or the 
Muslim nations are admonished to stand firm on their religious tenets and 
judge things based on them; and take those that are righteous and reject 
those that are not (Elected councillor). 
 
For this respondent the religious-cum-ideological factors play a primary role in the 
selection of which media content to believe, and it is most likely that such content 
that runs counter to his religious doctrine would not get a space in his mind. He, 
like many participants in the Yola lower-middle class group too, would listen to it 
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and then reject it. The fact that he introduced the issue of righteousness into the 
discussion reveals the extent to which he could go to stress the level of his 
selectivity. The following participant also insists on the issue of selectivity, and 
indicates that he would reject those media messages that he considers harmful to 
him or to his religious belief: 
Surely, if one radio station broadcasts something, another broadcasts its 
own, and you listen to them all, you can manage to get what you can pick, 
where the propaganda was not too much, and make your judgement; and 
take the ones that would not be too harmful to you…  I listen to many 
stations so that I would be able to balance whatever I get from each of 
them. Each has provided its side. This station broadcasts its propaganda, 
that station broadcasts hers; France has hers, Germany has her own, BBC, 
owned by Britain, which runs a parliamentary democracy, does hers. So 
from these you listen to them all and pick the ones among them and form 




So clearly, selectivity is a complex endeavour; not only is it undertaken within a 
single medium, but it is also done across a range of media to select different bits 
and ‗balance‘ the overall contents selected. Previous audience studies (Klapper, 
1960; Piepe et al., 1978; Morley, 1980) have noted the issue of selective 
perception among media audiences and offered their perspectives; but none of 
them has revealed as much dynamism connected with this concept as is emerging 
here. For instance, as noted in the literature review, Piepe, Crouch and Emerson 
(1978) have argued that the middle class consumption of media is characterised by 
‗selective perception‘ while that of the working class is marked by ‗blanket 
perception‘ (p.46). But Morley (1980) has dismissed this as ‗too crude‘ and 
maintained that his own Nationwide research ‗shows plenty of examples of 
selective perception, rejection of dissonant messages and a distinctively cognitive 
orientation to the medium on the part of working class groups, with an equally 
complex set of responses and interpretations on the part of the middle class 
groups‘ (p.29). The empirical evidence provided in this research is significantly in 
agreement with Morley‘s (1980) findings that ‗selective perception‘ and ‗rejection 
of dissonant messages‘ are applicable to different classes with their ‗equally 
complex set of responses and interpretations‘. What the emerging evidence here 
further shows, however, is that the complexity involved is actually far beyond 
even the one described by Morley; it shows that extraneous factors such as 
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religious, ideological and cultural orientations play significant role in determining 
selectivity; and that it occurs not just within a single programme but both within a 
medium and across a range of media.  
 
Abuja Group I (journalists) 
The middle class: heavy consumption with subtle resistance  
This group is made up entirely of professional journalists who are all based in the 
Nigeria‘s federal capital, Abuja. They are six in number, all male, comprised of a 
deputy daily newspaper editor, a political editor, a sports editor, a business editor, 
a deputy news editor and a deputy political editor. They are well-educated and 
have extensive experience in journalism (ten years of practice is the average in the 
group). Their educational and professional backgrounds and general socio-
economic status place them in the conventional middle class category. They are 
busy professionals who seem to be juggling between working on their laptops and 
BlackBerry sets and trying to beat production deadlines or attend to appointments. 
The discussion was held in the line editors‘ office of the Media Trust Limited, one 
of Nigeria‘s fast expanding media organisations, at its headquarters in Abuja. 
 
The members of this group are heavy consumers of international media goods, 
professional users of them and producers of local media products. They are 
obviously media savvy and could easily be distinguished from the other groups 
because of those factors. The media consumption pattern of this group is like no 
other among the entire focus groups. To start with, they regularly access a wider 
range of international media products than any of the other groups does. From the 
discussion with them it emerged that the international media they regularly access 
range from the English and Hausa services of BBC, VOA, Radio Deutsche Welle 
and Radio France International to the global television stations BBC World News, 
CNN, Al-Jazeera and Iranian Press TV as well as the international news agency 
Reuters. Similarly, members of this group access media through more platforms 
than the ones members of the other groups access. They use both the old media 
(newspapers, radio and television) and the new media (Internet and mobile 
telephony) platforms to access and consume media goods. But even more 
significantly, this is the only group that relies mostly on the Internet for their 
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media consumption. They do, like most of the groups, also use traditional radio 
and television sets regularly; but the dominant platform they said they rely on is 
the Internet. They use Internet not just for the consumption of new media products, 
but also for the consumption of old media goods delivered through the Internet. 
For instance, they do not only consume the BBC‘s online reports on the Internet 
and mobile devices, but they also listen to its radio broadcasts and watch its 
television programmes on the Internet—in addition to using conventional radio 
and television sets in consuming its products. The following comments from each 
member of this group illustrate the scenario:   
Most of the information I source is from the Internet. Of course, I do 
watch TV and listen to physical radio… But majority of it is on the 
Internet: newspapers, news agencies‘ reports, TV stations, radio stations. I 
listen to them or read them mostly on the Internet… (For radio) I listen to 
the BBC more than the others, but once in a while I listen to Voice of 
America, Radio Deutsche Welle and Radio France International (Deputy 
editor). 
 
I use the Internet most of the time. I also listen to radio and watch 
television… I listen to BBC regularly in the morning… Sometimes I 
watch satellite television, the BBC World News and Al-Jazeera television 
(Sports editor). 
 
It is the Internet; the Internet is my major platform (Deputy political 
editor). 
 
I listen to the BBC very often; I also watch CNN and then Al-Jazeera… 
The Internet really (is the major platform) (Political editor). 
 
I think in a day I spend between 10 and 14 hours on the Internet; so most 
of the stories I get come from the Internet (Deputy news editor).  
 
I think because of my work I always get it through the Internet. I browse 
BBC, Al-Jazeera and Reuters… I (also) listen to radio, the Hausa service 
and the English service (and watch) Al-Jazeera and Press TV (Business 
editor). 
 
The dominance of the Internet as the key means of accessing international media 
by members of this group is indisputable. They read written reports and listen to 
radio broadcasts and watch television images all on the Internet. One of them tried 
to quantify the time he spends daily on it: ‗between 10 and 14 hours‘. Another 
attributed his over reliance on it to the nature of his ‗work‘. Internet consumption 
is part of their work. Compare the members of this group with the Njoboli 
peasants who admitted that they had never accessed media through the Internet, 
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and the difference could only be imagined. But then, for members of this group, 
media consumption is not only for news and information and entertainment; it is 
also for earning a living. Little wonder then that their pattern of consumption 
differs markedly from that of other groups—each group, though, has its own 
distinctive pattern; the key issue here being that the difference between this group 
and any other is clearly more pronounced. During the discussion, all members of 
this group said that they use the Internet—and the traditional media too—as part of 
their work. They consume media products for both personal and professional 
reasons. Many non-media people also do, but again the key difference here being 
that members of this group consume media products as part of their function of 
producing media products for others to consume. 
 
Another aspect of their marked difference with the other groups in this study is 
their tendency to be participatory consumers of global media products—not in the 
sense of they being professional producers of media products but in the sense of 
being voluntary consumers-cum-producers. Many of them do participate in 
interactive programmes in which audiences are offered chance to express their 
views or produce their products: 
Well, I use Twitter, I use Facebook—more Facebook than Twitter—and 
whenever I come across article in the Internet, I look at the way where I 
can express my views (Deputy news editor). 
 
I do regularly (participate through) Facebook. Whenever there is a topic I 
have interest in I offer my own contribution (Political editor). 
  
I participated in one BBC programme during the World Cup and another 
one with Radio Deutsche Welle (Sports editor). 
 
 
None of the groups discussed earlier in this study exhibits this tendency. Although 
the Njoboli peasant group has expressed strong love for the BBC Hausa Service‘s 
participatory programme Ra‘ayi Riga (Have Your Say), none of them has ever 
participated in the programme. They probably would have wanted to, but technical 
and technological deficiencies would not allow them. Professional skills, easy access 
to technology and knowledge of relevant subject of discussion enable the journalists 
to participate in the interactive programmes with ease. 
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However, the gulf between the journalist group and others began to narrow as the 
issues of rating of international media and assessment of their roles and perception 
of the West were raised. The position of the journalists was not different from that 
of the other groups when they picked out BBC as the media they listen to mostly 
(as their responses cited earlier showed and the subsequent ones would further 
indicate)—nor did they differ with others in generally rating the BBC as the most 
credible international broadcaster. Although few of the journalists also rated Al-
Jazeera very high—one of them said it was more credible than the BBC—the 
rating was not really different from the one obtained from some of the Katsina 
group members who had also  given positive rating to Al-Jazeera. The journalist 
who is more definite about Al-Jazeera‘s credibility is, like the case of the Katsina 
group members too, keen to also speak positively about the BBC, though his 
loyalty to Al-Jazeera is unflinching:  
Al-Jazeera to me is more credible than the BBC because Al-Jazeera gives 
more, kind of, alternative news than the BBC. Though the BBC balances 
stories, I think, I‘d rather go for Al-Jazeera… But I want to say that if I 
want to get business stories I prefer BBC to Al-Jazeera; that‘s business, 
because business deals with facts and details and data (Business editor). 
 
He is specific on the areas he places greater trusts to each of the two broadcasters. 
His position is not far different from that of the participant in Katsina focus group 
(supervisory councillor for agriculture) who said that, due to proximity factor, he 
preferred Al-Jazeera for stories of the Arab world—and BBC for general stories. 
Others in the journalist group are more categorical in their preference for the BBC 
and the influence they believe it has in their comprehension of global events and 
even in their career choice and development—as these two explain: 
Well, on the international scene, I listen mostly to the BBC and the Cable 
News Network (CNN)…the BBC in terms of its content and reportage of 
events. It influences me in understanding mostly international events and 
within the sub-region, that‘s Africa down to West Africa (Deputy political 
editor). 
 
I personally developed interest in sports (through) listening to radio way 
back in early 1980s. I listened to BBC World Service‘s sports world… I 
developed a lot of interest in sports through the BBC World Service 
(Sports editor). 
 
For the last respondent listening to BBC‘s sport programmes propelled his interest 
in sports and guided his career choice, as the result of which he eventually 
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becomes sports editor. This is an additional angle to the kind of role international 
media play in people‘s lives, and even more significantly for those working in the 
media.  
 
However, despite their heavy consumption of international media products and 
their admission of their influence in their personal and professional lives, and the 
favourable ratings they gave them, particularly the BBC and Al-Jazeera, the media 
practitioners too have their own reservations about the international media. They 
believe that the interests of the media-owning countries or their ideological 
orientations determine the editorial policies and programmes of their media. 
Although they are less critical of the BBC, they believe that it is still a typical 
Western media with Western bias: 
I see it as a classic Western media pursuing the interest of the West 
(Business editor). 
 
I think maybe Western media…typical Western media but with some of 
the strengths that I mentioned: less cynical, less skewed—they made a lot 
of efforts to balance reports to be accurate and everything—but Western 
media (Deputy editor).  
 
The business editor was categorical; the deputy editor was a bit cautious but he too 
concluded that the BBC is a ‗typical Western media‘. This is not a derogatory 
view per se but it is a subtle way of saying that it does manipulate things to 
advance Western ideological interests. It is not the image that the corporation 
wants to project to the world, but that is what these audiences who actually have 
favourable view of the broadcaster believe it is. The BBC executives want the 
audiences to see the station as an impartial international broadcaster offering news 
and analysis from an ‗international perspective‘ (Pfaffner, 2008; BBC Guidelines, 
2010). The audiences, however, judge it based on their perception of its products. 
The journalist group as a whole feels that it is essentially a Western medium. 
  
Generally, this group shares the view held by most of the other groups, particularly 
the Katsina group, that all international media are agents of ideological warfare—
in conformity with Gramsci‘s (1971) and Althusser‘s (1971) conception of media 
as state ideological apparatuses. The main difference between the journalist group 
and others regarding this issue is that the journalists do not put it as strongly and as 
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forcefully as any of those groups. Their comments appear to be more carefully 
crafted and more measured than the others‘—as these two reveal: 
I think all the international media we‘ve mentioned here, the way they 
present their news and programmes is slanted towards some ideological 
thing that they pursue—whatever interest—all of them (Deputy editor). 
 
You know, the media houses usually have interests and I certainly believe 
that these international media come with their own interests, especially the 
Western media, and sometimes their reportage is slanted or tilted in a way 
that they can achieve certain interests (Political editor). 
 
The group believes that the international media have their respective ideological 
leanings and that these leanings colour their programming. But as their comments 
show, they are more subtle and less judgmental on the issue, using softer language 
in making their description, than the ones used by other groups. They, for instance, 
avoided using words like ‗propaganda agents‘, ‗unfair‘, ‗dislike‘ and similar terms 
that were frequently used by the other groups. They seem to prefer using words 
such as ‗slanted‘ and ‗interests‘ to express their feelings on the issue. Even where 
lengthy explanation and specific examples are offered there appears to be a 
tendency to exhibit a measure of detachment over whatever position the Western 
media are alleged to have taken. The following comment gives a good example: 
By reviewing events that had happened in the past, most especially during 
the Cold War, we have the Western media reporting events relating to 
ideological leanings—capitalism and socialism—and you can easily pick 
their stand on these issues. But towards the end of 1980s the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
the key issue of where they stand changed completely towards something 
else. Issues like globalisation came in; issues like terrorism, you know. So 
when you listen to the Western media you hear some of the perspectives 
concerning these issues, you can pinpoint where they stand. Sometimes it 
is brazen, you can easily understand whether it is being slanted or not by 
the way they present them—the news and the perspectives—so it is easy 
for one to detect (Sports editor). 
 
The sports editor‘s observation of geopolitical changes and Western media‘s 
changing roles convinced him of their ideological commitment, just as the other 
groups‘ members too made their own observations about the Western and non-
Western media‘s commitments. But he did not follow it with open support or 
condemnation as some participants in the preceding groups tend to do; he simply 
expressed his disagreement in a subtle way. The slanting of stories and analyses—
sometimes ‗brazen‘—by the international media to suit their ideological interests 
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as he and other members of his group allege means that the group has reservations 
about the contents produced. Their comments confirm these reservations; and the 
following responses reveal the kind of approach some of them adopt to contend 
with such kind of contents in their interactions with international media: 
My understanding of the media generally is that when I want to have 
information regarding the West I go to news channels like Press TV, Al-
Jazeera and things like that. And when I want to read about the Arab 
nations, I go for the BBC and CNN because I understand that they both 
have interests which they want to realise, and that means giving you the 
news from their own perspectives. So rather than just listen to their own 
side of the story, I tend to go to other ones like Press TV which is 
controlled by Iran or Al-Jazeera which is less Western (Deputy news 
editor). 
 
Yes, I think (he) is right… To know about the West, I think, it is better to 
go to other stations like Al-Jazeera and Press TV (Business editor). 
 
The Qatari-owned Al-Jazeera (Miles, 2005) and Iran‘s Press TV are seen here as 
the alternative media—though Al-Jazeera, as would be seen in the next group 
discussion, is seen by some as becoming actually Westernised. The Press TV, a 
24-hour English language television network launched in 2007, is part of Iran‘s 
growing international broadcasting efforts to reach out to the rest of the world and 
offer alternative voice (Press TV, 2011; Wikia, 2011). The Islamic Republic of 
Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) which has been expanding since the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution has a world service, broadcasting in 30 foreign languages (including 
Hausa language service) in the country‘s drive to use its soft power resource to 
advance its foreign policy objectives (Dehshiri and Majidi, 2009; IRIB, 2011; 
Wikia, 2011). It appears from this discussion, and in some of the individual 
interviews discussed earlier, that the Press TV is gaining popularity in Nigeria. In 
this discussion, the deputy news editor and business editor feel that monitoring 
both the Middle-Eastern media (Press TV and Al-Jazeera) and Western media to 
get the opposing sides would cancel each other‘s ‗slanting‘ and provide balanced 
views of both the West and the Middle-East. It is a contrary view to that of the 
supervisory councillor for agriculture (in Katsina group) who felt that Al-Jazeera‘s 
Arab background gave it a better edge to tell the stories of the Arab world. In both 
cases, aspects of inter-media selectivity have clearly set in. They both select which 
media to consult for which content. The following comment by the deputy editor 
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differs from both perspectives, but it still reinforces the concept of inter-media 
selectivity: 
I listen and watch BBC more (because) I think the BBC has wider reach 
than Al-Jazeera and CNN, and is also less slanted. All of them are slanted, 
but the BBC is less slanted than CNN, for instance, or compared to Al-
Jazeera (Deputy editor). 
 
His perception of BBC as having ‗wider reach‘ and being ‗less slanted‘ persuades 
him to consume its products more than the others‘. Perception of credibility serves 
as a factor here in inter-media selectivity. The BBC‘s perceived credibility, in his 
view, makes it a preferred choice ahead of CNN and Al-Jazeera. But selectivity 
among the journalist group does not stop at the inter-media level alone; it goes 
down to the level of a single medium, as the following comment shows: 
When you listen to any medium and the message that it has given out, you 
tend to select, based on your ideological conviction or your interest. As a 
person, when I listen to a medium of communication, I don‘t tend to 
accept things hook, line and sinker… My field of experience and my 
personal conviction give me the opportunity to select—that‘s selective 
influence. So I consume media messages based on those (factors) (Deputy 
political editor). 
 
This participant makes it clear that work experience and ideological and personal 
convictions are factors that play roles in his selective perception of media 
messages. These factors appear to play important roles in media consumption 
among many participants in this, and other, groups. The journalist group, perhaps 
because of their media savvy-ness, appear to have high level of selectivity, not just 
because of religious and ideological convictions as seem to be primarily the case 
of Katsina and Yola groups (though it might also be a primary factor here), but 
also because of their professional background.  
 
Abuja Group II (youths) 
The university students: the bastion of resistance 
This is a group of undergraduate students of Abuja University, located in 
Gwagwalada town, about one hour drive from the Nigeria‘s capital Abuja. It 
contains nine students—eight males and one female—seven in their 20s and two 
in their early-30s. They are in their final year, except one who is a year behind. 
The participants include some executive members of the political science students‘ 
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association, led by its president. Unlike all the other groups that are composed of 
almost entirely Muslims, this group contains both Muslims and Christians. They 
were drawn mainly to represent the views of students and youths who are regular 
consumers of international media products. Although they are from different 
socio-economic backgrounds, the majority have a middle class background. They 
did not indicate support for any particular political party in Nigeria, but they 
appear to generally hold radical political views critical of the establishment. With 
nine participants, this is the largest of all the focus groups in this research, and has 
the longest of all the sessions. The session was held at a noisy club directly 
opposite the temporary campus of the university in the centre of the town (we 
could not get a place inside the congested campus). The discussion took place at a 
time when the uprisings in the Arab world, particularly the Libyan one, were 
dominating news headlines and they repeatedly cited the Libyan case to support 
some of their arguments. 
 
What came out of the discussion reveals a pattern of international media 
consumption somewhat similar to that of the Yola lower middle class group. It is 
mainly a combination of radio listening and television watching, with the major 
difference being that the students also access international media through the 
Internet and mobile telephone devices (though marginally) and consume more of 
English programming than the Hausa programming (unlike the Yola groups that 
consume more of Hausa programming). The international radio broadcasters the 
students said they regularly interact with are the BBC and VOA while the global 
television they watch are CNN, BBC World News, Al-Jazeera, Iran‘s Press TV 
and American television network Fox News Channel. Two foreign newspapers, 
the International Herald Tribune and The Guardian of London, were also 
mentioned among the media they said they are conversant with. The following 
short extracts from their responses reveal the range of the international media they 
regularly access:  
I usually listen to the BBC, CNN and VOA… I watch them on satellite 
television… I (also) access them on the Internet and my handset (though) not 
regularly (Female student). 
 
I am conversant with the BBC, CNN and international papers like The 
Guardian (UK) (Iliya). 
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The international media I do access include BBC, Al-Jazeera, CNN, Press TV 
and the International Herald Tribune (Students‘ union executive). 
 
Basically I access BBC, CNN and mostly Al-Jazeera (Alfa). 
 
The international media have become a household name in the sense that as 
long as you have your (mobile phone) handset, you can access them easily. I 
access many of them—CNN, BBC, Al-Jazeera, VOA (Political science 
students‘ association president). 
 
This was the representative sample of their comments about the international 
media they usually interact with. And from further comments and explanations 
during the session it is quite evident that they are conversant with international 
affairs at the level that could have only been possible through engagement with the 
international media. But they are not heavy consumers like the journalist group or 
even above average consumers such as the Katsina group. They are more of 
moderate consumers whose consumption and comprehension of global news is 
apparently complemented by their university studies. Some of their comments 
appear to be based more on some theoretical generalisations than on specific 
details drawn from long-term familiarity with the international media; others are a 
combination of sweeping generalisations and specific instances.  
 
Like all the previous groups, this group too exhibits its preference to the 
consumption of BBC products: every one of them does regularly listen to the 
BBC, and most of them said they do listen to it more often than the other 
international broadcasters. However, what this group did not do—and it is one of 
the most remarkable thing that distinguishes them from the other groups—was to 
single out BBC as being a more credible broadcaster than any other. They simply 
lumped BBC among the Western media and gave all of them a blanket 
condemnation—another trait that sets this group apart from the rest. This group 
generally has a very negative perception of the West and its media. For most of 
them all the Western media are one and the same thing, with one common 
objective: to help subjugate the weaker part of the world for the benefit of the 
West. One after the other, these students articulated this theme and used different 
situations and trends of argument to support their position. For instance, this 
participant cites alleged Western media‘s negative depiction of the Third World 
nations and positive portrayal of Europe to back his claim:   
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In my opinion, the Western media in particular are kind of biased media, 
considering the fact that they present to us one-sided analysis of issues. 
When they present issues concerning Nigeria, Africa and other Third 
World countries, the analysis is always one of crises, troubles, anarchy, 
economic troubles, crimes and everything. When they give us their 
analysis of maybe European countries, they divert you from what is really 
existing in their areas…sometimes hiding the real story. For instance, 
recently during the economic recession, Greece virtually collapsed as a 
nation. Nobody got to show us what led to the collapse of the Greece‘s 
economy… If it was an African nation, for instance, the whole story would 
have been different, but because Greece is a European nation, so many 
things were distorted; at the end there was a bailout from the European 
Union (Oskar). 
 
The ‗they-versus-us‘ format of argument used by some of the respondents in the 
‗Results and Analysis I‘ chapter is frequently employed by members of this group 
too. This participant began with the generalisation of the alleged Western media‘s 
negative depiction of ‗Nigeria, Africa and other Third World countries‘ by over 
playing their own crises and down playing Europe‘s. He then went to the specific 
case of Greece‘s economic crisis, which he feels was not adequately and accurately 
covered by the Western media. Either he has not been keenly following the coverage 
of Greece‘s crisis to see the kind of details some of the Western media have been 
giving or he has followed it keenly but is not satisfied with it, his perception is that 
there is a cover up; and that the coverage would have been different, if it were an 
African country facing a similar crisis. And in any case, he notes, ‗at the end there 
was a bailout from the European Union‘ because Europe had to save one of their 
own. Another student is even more forceful in his criticism of the West and its 
media, citing a different example and scenario, to advance his argument: 
International media like Fox News, CNN, BBC, to me, are part of the 
cartel of Western system of governance; not primarily out to give 
information, but primarily out to design information as instructed by the 
Western governments. I‘ll use the experience of Africa as the case study, 
the most recent being that of Libya and other countries… Why should the 
coalition forces come to Libya, can‘t they leave us, Africans, to solve our 
problems… This is the plot of the Western world, and they have not 
perpetually achieved this plot primarily through the use of their military 
power, but through the use of their media, that is, with the instrument of 
propaganda (Ayuba). 
 
The same style of opening the argument with generalisation and then narrowing to 
specific instance was used by this student too. As wide as the ideological leanings 
or editorial policies or ownership structures of the Fox News and CNN and BBC 
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might be, this participant perceives them as performing the same role. As far as he 
is concerned, they are simply ‗part of the cartel of Western system of 
governance…primarily out to design information as instructed by the Western 
governments‘ to help perpetuate the West‘s domination of the world. He then gave 
the example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation‘s (NATO) intervention in 
Libya‘s conflict where the government and the rebels battle for the control of the 
country as part of the wider uprisings in the Arab world (Bakr, 2011; Reuters, 
2011). The focus group discussion was held just after the NATO forces—they are 
called coalition forces since the United Arab Emirate too offers contribution—had 
launched their first strike against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi‘s forces in Libya 
following the United Nations‘ decision to impose a ‗no-fly zone‘ in the country 
(UN, 2011). In the lengthy 740-word argument (in its pre-edited version the 
longest made by any of the participants), this participant actually cited a specific 
case of Western media‘s reporting of Colonel Gaddafi‘s allegation of NATO‘s 
attack killing civilians as well as NATO‘s denial and counter allegation that if 
Gaddafi had shown ‗civilian bodies‘ to support his allegation, it must have been 
the bodies of the civilians he had killed. And, noted the participant, the media 
followed the report with an analysis that subtly said that it must have been Gaddafi 
who had killed the civilians. ‗―Yes, Gaddafi is capable of doing such thing‖,‘ he 
quoted one of the Western commentators to have said. This, in his view, shows the 
extent to which the Western nations are using their media to dominate the weaker 
parts of the world which he said they did not achieve ‗primarily through the use of 
their military power, but through the use of their media‘. 
 
His position is very popular among the students who are clearly sympathetic to 
Colonel Gaddafi. Although the Libyan leader had earned sharp negative criticisms 
in Nigeria in 2010 when he suggested that the country be split into two, along 
Muslim-Christian line, to end its frequent sectarian violence, he was generally a 
popular figure in the country for his earlier concept of African unity. The West‘s 
antagonism against him revives his popularity among many Nigerians; and these 




The fact remains that since Libyans, through their leader (Gaddafi), are not 
thinking in the Western mode, they are not thinking like America—not 
minding the fact that US and Britain are practising parallel democracy—
but since they are not thinking like Americans, they are against the world; 
so the world would be against them. The world would only be against you, 
if the BBC is well funded, CNN is well motivated, Al-Jazeera—all of 
them—to give you a special image, to paint you to become the enemy of 
the world (Political science students‘ association president).  
 
This respondent added Al-Jazeera to the list, perhaps because Al-Jazeera is 
generally believed to be among the anti-Gaddafi media, with its owners, the Qatari 
royal family, working actively against the Libyan leader (Reuters, 2011; Bakr, 
2011). In this student‘s opinion, Al-Jazeera works alongside the BBC and CNN to 
‗paint‘ any country as an ‗enemy of the world‘, as long as that country refuses to 
think like America. To most of these students, promotion of US hegemony goes 
beyond the Western media and extends to the media of their allies. The following 
comment too emphasises the issue of alleged Western domination and double 
standards, generalising on the case of Europe and Africa: 
When you look at the international media critically, I can say they are an 
irony to what they preach to people. They bring out things that are not real 
to reorient people to make them instrument of the Western world to 
achieve the Western aims… The only thing that the West wants is a 
subjugated Africa, an Africa that can develop the European world like in 
the colonial days (Students‘ union executive). 
 
Other arguments put forward by the students to portray their negative perception 
of the West and its media are the alleged promotion of Western culture and 
denigration of other cultures by these media—as these two comments reveal: 
They (Western media) always see Europe and European culture as the 
best. They look at European technology, civilization, modernization and 
development of the polity as the best thing that any man should achieve in 
the world… And this is to ridicule every other culture in the world to show 
the supremacy and originality of their own culture (Hamid). 
 
They (Western nations) know the power of the media; they are meant for 
propaganda; that is their major role. If they want show my country Nigeria 
now—they don‘t want to show Nigeria unless there is a plane crash… 
Have you ever watched where they show a philanthropist in Nigeria 
distributing food? No, they won‘t do that. They want to show you 
programmes designed for America so that they would tell you how they 
develop an aeroplane that can fly in certain seconds, they would show you 
how a building was constructed. There is no fairness. International media 
have been well-packaged to re-colonise Africa so that we remain 
subjugated (Political science students‘ association president). 
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Both the cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1969) and media imperialism (Boyd-
Barrett, 1977) perspectives were repeatedly explored by these students from their 
own conceptions of these terms and the prevailing situations to express their 
strong opposition to the West and its media. They have the most pessimistic 
perception of the West among all the focus groups in this study. Their antagonism 
to the West is similar to the one reflected by the Islamist group in Morocco, noted 
for their ‗coherent rejection of Western modernness‘ (Tarik, 2010, p.134). The 
Moroccan Islamists expressed negative view of Western media, and ‗perceived 
Western modernity as the culture of capitalism, imperialism and globalisation, a 
culture erected on the principles of greed and an unjust economic system‘ (Tarik, 
2010, p.135). Although the Abuja student group is not an Islamist group in any 
form or shape (some of its members are not even Muslims, as stated earlier, and 
the rest are moderate Muslims), the majority of its members share the view of the 
Moroccan Islamists in their denunciation of the West. With their total opposition 
to Western media texts, the Abuja students‘ predominant decoding practices 
(Morley, 1980) appear to have fallen within the context of ‗oppositional reading‘ 
(Hall, 1980) as they reject wholesale the meanings preferred by the contents‘ 
producers.  
 
The negative perception of the West among these students is so overwhelming that 
even the two dissenting voices in the group that appear to be sympathetic to the 
West and its media seem to be careful in presenting such position. Incidentally, the 
first dissenting voice came from the only female participant in the discussion. She 
expresses her view in a general term and in non-confrontational tone: 
My own perception is that the international media are important but many 
Nigerians do not have access to all of them because they do not have the 
services of DSTV (Digital Satellite Television distribution firm)… These 
media are supposed to link up people with the rest of the world… Nigeria 
belongs to several international organisations and the media can facilitate 
understanding of this. Lack of access hinders their influence. If the media 
do not influence people to make them change their attitudes, most people 
would be acting anyhow. The media create good relationship between 
peoples; they are really trying, but they ought to do more. They are really 
important and do help in strengthening relationship between people across 




It is clear here that her position is radically different from the views expressed by 
her colleagues. She chose to emphasise what she believes to be the positive roles 
the international media play in the world; and even expressed concern over lack of 
access to all of them among many Nigerians, thereby limiting their influence in 
changing people‘s attitude—something she also lamented. ‗If the media do not 
influence people to make them change their attitudes, most people would be acting 
anyhow,‘ she said. This is a positive perception of the international media; and it is 
clearly away from the ‗manipulative‘ and ‗propaganda‘ roles the others believe 
they are playing. Although she did not cite specific examples—as others did—she 
has still succeeded in putting across her views, which others apparently respected 
but ignored. 
 
The other participant who also holds some dissenting views adopted a different 
approach from that of the female student. He articulated his opinions by arguing in 
defence of his position, endorsing the aspects he shares with the majority in the 
group and justifying the minority viewpoints he holds. In the lengthy argument 
below, he looks at both the issue of cultural imperialism and propaganda role of 
the media, and offers his perspectives on each: 
For me basically, the media have been trying in the area of entertaining, 
educating and informing me. In fact, within 24 hours you‘d be abreast of 
information wherever you go, and for that they have my vote. Secondly, 
leave it or take it, this cultural dichotomy of a thing, we have been the 
target of cultural imperialism. But then, it has come to stay, we call it 
cultural diffusion. As you can see me now, I am in an English wear, 
speaking English language. Leave it or take it, it is still part of me. But 
now down to international politics, I must confess that media in that 
context is used effectively to propagate foreign policies… BBC, as it is, is 
built to protect the kind of interests that help Britain‘s progress; CNN is 
fashioned to project its own kind of interest. I must say here that there is 
no media in the world that is absolutely free or absolutely independent. 
There is a kind of regulatory measures put in place regarding their 
operations and interests. They have the kind of mindset that they are 
working towards. Look at the American operation in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
their interest in Libya and the rest; it is a kind of economic and political 
interests. So these media are fashioned to pursue those interests 
internationally (Iliya). 
 
This participant first highlighted what he believes to be the positive roles of the 
international media, and then went on to argue that even the negative roles are not 
necessarily as negative as portrayed by the other students. Although he shares 
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some aspects of their views that the propaganda role of the international media is 
negative, he is not as critical of it as they are. With regard to cultural imperialism 
claim which he admits non-Westerners are indeed being targeted, he leans on the 
optimistic side describing it as ‗cultural diffusion‘—which he accepts as a reality 
of life: ‗As you can see me now, I am in an English wear, speaking English 
language. Leave it or take it, it is still part of me‘. He views it in the context of 
what Ien Ang (1996) describes as cultural hybridity, ‗a fluid diversity emanating 
from constant cultural traffic and interaction rather than from the persistence of 
original, rooted and traditional ―identities‖‘ (p.155). In this sense, he feels, the fear 
of perceived ‗cultural imperialism‘ is unfounded. This is perhaps because ‗global 
media do affect, but cannot control local meanings‘ (Ang, 1996, p.151).  
 
The dilemma between his acceptance of ‗cultural diffusion‘ and the other students‘ 
rejection of ‗cultural imperialism‘ is similar to the scenario reported by Tarik 
(2010) regarding Moroccan socialist youth group‘s negotiation with ‗Western 
modernness‘ (pp.129-134). In Morocco‘s case a 24-year-old student, Adil, was 
quoted to have voiced their dilemma when he said: ‗We either lose our identity 
completely by becoming French, or we remain Moroccan… We have never been 
to France yet we have French habits‘ (pp.129-130). It is, as Tarik (2010) notes, the 
‗problem of cultural identity…a complex cultural space where two cultural 
identities, each with a different temporality, coexist within the same cultural 
spatiality: the mind of the post-colonised‘ (p.130). In the case of some of the 
students in this focus group, they are actually wrestling with multiple cultural 
identities: that of the former colonial master Britain, the American one on the 
television screens, the dominant Hausa-Fulani Muslim culture in Northern Nigeria 
and their own ‗original‘ ethnic identities. It is indeed a very complex and 
competitive cultural space.   
 
Summary 
This chapter has teased out the pattern and particularities of the consumption of 
global media goods by a wide range of groups in the three geopolitical zones of 
Northern Nigeria: the urban lower middle class, working class and peasant groups 
in the Northeast; local officials in the Northwest; and journalists/middle class and 
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university students/youth groups in North-central zone. It reveals that the groups 
do regularly interact with a variety of international media (about 15 of them) and 
consume their products—particularly the BBC products—although their level and 
pattern of consumption and the platforms they use for the consumption do differ in 
some respects.  
 
The members of the urban lower middle class group appear to be above average 
consumers of international media products, relying on radio and television to 
access mainly Hausa but also English programmes. Their engagement with global 
media seems to provide a case of consumption amid contestation, revealing a 
largely negative conception of the West but somewhat positive perception of the 
BBC, though still rejecting some of its products due to apparent mediating roles of 
religious, ideological and other factors. The working class group are above 
average consumers of global media products, relaying mainly on radio but 
marginally combining it with television. They show a negative perception of the 
West but positive conception of its media which they regard as repository of 
knowledge—though they are still selective in consuming their products. The 
peasant group‘s pattern of consumption of international radio products is markedly 
different from that of any group in this study, as they are the only group that rely 
exclusively on radio for such consumption. They are moderate consumers with 
high level of believability, showing very positive disposition towards the West and 
its media, though they still display some level of selectivity apparently primarily 
influenced by religious factors.  
 
The members of Katsina group have, among all the groups, the highest level of 
exposure to international television broadcasts, which they complement with radio 
listening, consuming both English and Hausa programmes. They hold negative 
views about the West but share positive perceptions of the BBC and Al-Jazeera. 
They are highly selective in their consumption of global media products perhaps 
mainly due to religious, ideological, cultural, personal and other mediating factors. 
The Abuja journalist group members are the heaviest consumers of global media 
products and the most media savvy of all the groups. They are the only group that 
rely primarily on the Internet to access the global media goods, using traditional 
platforms only marginally. They show a subtle but mild negative perception of the 
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West and positive perception of the BBC and Al-Jazeera, and exhibit a high level 
of selective believability apparently influenced by professional, personal, religious 
and ideological factors. The university students/youth group‘s consumption of 
international media appears to be moderate, combining mainly radio listening with 
television watching and marginal use of Internet and mobile telephony. They 
present a classic case of predominantly oppositional reading of media texts, with 
the majority of them expressing views that reveal total rejection of the West and 
its media. They exhibit aspects of selective believability that seem to be influenced 
by ideological, cultural and other extra-communication factors. 
 
The highlights of the findings are that Northern Nigerians do have active 
interactions with international media which play important roles in their everyday 
life, enhancing their comprehension of both national and international affairs and 
apparently influencing their cultural, personal and professional lives. They 
generally have negative perceptions of the West but positive perceptions of the 
BBC which they regard as a credible international broadcaster, although retaining 
what they consider to be Western bias against the Islamic world and Africa. The 
collective verdict of the groups on the BBC is that it is an institution that plays the 
contradictory roles of being a propagandist and, to some degree, an impartial 
broadcaster. All the groups‘ patterns of media consumption exhibit some forms of 
selectivity, picking which messages to believe and which to reject or reinterpret, 
both within a medium and across a range of media, influenced by their 
predispositions and other extra-communication factors. Selective believability, as 
discovered here, is not a simple straightforward audience activity; it is a highly 
complex audience activity influenced by layers of extraneous factors. There is a 
clear evidence of selective believability among all the groups apparently 
influenced by religious, ideological, cultural, professional and personal factors—
with Islam (being a religious, cultural and ideological force among most of them) 





Discussion, Implications and Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
The deluge of historical, statistical and empirical data brought together and 
analysed in this study has pointed to a string of conceptual and theoretical strands 
that were largely ignored or unnoticed by previous studies. Systematically 
synchronised and carefully articulated, these strands may provide solid ground for 
constructing coherent concepts and sound theories in reception research and media 
and cultural studies. This chapter attempts to explore those prospects as it 
recapitulates the key findings of this research; and highlights the areas of these 
findings‘ divergence from, and consistency with, those of the previous studies; the 
conceptual and theoretical strands explored; and their potentials of yielding new 
methodological and theoretical perspectives in media and communications studies. 
It also unfolds the implications of the findings to communications scholars, media 
practitioners, global broadcasters and public diplomacy executives and operators. 
The general conclusions that could be drawn from the work and the areas that 
require further examinations are also laid out in this chapter.   
 
Discussing the key findings 
Since the details of all the specific findings of this study were all presented and 
analysed in their respective areas in the preceding chapters, it is only the key 
findings that are brought forward here for further discussion and contextualisation. 
Starting with the more generalised findings before moving to those that are more 
specific, a key general finding that has been clearly established from all the angles 
of this study is that the BBC has a long and complex relationship with its Northern 
Nigerian audiences—a relationship that is still being shaped and transformed by 
the changing dynamics of global geopolitics and advancement of delivery 
technologies. From both the BBC producers‘ and the audiences‘ perspectives it 
was found to be a deep and complicated engagement marked by what Sabry 
(2010) calls the dynamics of temporality and spatiality. Northern Nigeria itself is a 
vast multi-cultural and multi-lingual region whose long historical and cultural 
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interactions with North African Muslims produced a predominantly Islamic 
culture with the indigenous Hausa language serving as the lingua franca. British 
colonialism and subsequent postcolonial engagements with the region added to the 
multiplicity of the cultural encounters; and the massive distribution of cultural 
goods by the global media has widened the scope of such interactions to an 
unprecedented level. This general finding is not just an echo of Larkin‘s (2008) 
conception of Northern Nigerians‘ encounter with the media and modern 
technology, it is both a confirmation of that and a revelation of new trends 
produced by the encounter, especially with the expanding global media scope and 
rapidly changing technologies.  
 
The pattern of Northern Nigerians‘ consumption of international media products 
and the nature of their engagement with the distribution technologies, as revealed 
by this study, are so complex and striking that they could hardly be understood 
without comparing the level of the variability among the audiences themselves. 
The peasant group, for instance, who have never accessed media products from the 
Internet and have to rely exclusively on radio for their global media consumption, 
present a sharp contrast to the middle class journalist group, who use multiple 
platforms but predominantly Internet for their media consumption. The following 
comments from a member in each of the two groups illustrate the contrasting 
situations. While the herdsman in Njoboli village‘s peasant group declared that 
‗honestly we have no Internet here; and I do not go out and spend my time to look 
for Internet to search for BBC‘, the deputy news editor of a newspaper in Abuja in 
the journalist group said: ‗I think in a day I spend between 10 and 14 hours on the 
Internet; so most of the stories I get come from the Internet‘. These two 
respondents represent an approximation of their respective groups‘ experience. 
Lumping together people with such a wide disparity of experience in interactions 
with media and technology and making a general statement about them is 
undoubtedly daunting. Using the term ‗complex‘ is often a safer way of making 
the description, but that does not really describe the whole situation. It needs a 
specific example, such as the one above, to bring out the real picture. The 
consolation in the particular case of these two groups, though, is that despite the 
sharp contrast in their consumption pattern and engagement with distribution 
technologies, there are many areas of commonality such as their high consumption 
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of BBC products, their perception of its credibility and their selective believability 
(more on these later) that are open to making safe generalisations.  
  
The BBC World Service has since 1957 been specifically targeting the Hausa-
speaking Northern Nigerians through the Hausa language service with Western 
cultural goods which constitute a large chunk of their global media diet. This study 
reveals that Northern Nigerians do have regular interactions with a wide range of 
international media and that the BBC is the one they have the highest level of 
interactions with. This is consistent with the findings of the BBC‘s own annual 
surveys in Nigeria (BBC World Service, 2007, 2008; BBC Global News, 2009, 
2010). Also consistent with the results of these surveys is the finding by this study 
that Northern Nigerian audiences regard BBC as the most credible broadcaster. 
One by one, as individuals or as groups, the vast majority of the respondents rated 
the BBC as the most credible and trustworthy broadcaster. The criteria they used 
in making their assessments are also vast and varied: accuracy, timeliness, use of 
diasporic personnel with whom they share cultural affinity, and depth and 
impartiality of BBC‘s coverage of global and national news stories. These positive 
perceptions set the tone for the enduring engagement and its consequences, 
although the negative perceptions too and their accompanying effects are equally 
part of the overall relationship, as this study clearly shows. 
 
Northern Nigerians‘ engagement with the BBC has not prevented them from 
interacting vigorously with other global broadcasters, as stated earlier; the BBC 
just happens to be their preferred broadcaster for the reasons noted above. The 
cumulative impact of Northern Nigerians‘ interactions with global broadcasters, 
though, is hard to measure because, as many researchers (Klapper, 1960; Liu and 
Johnson, 2011, p. 4) have rightly pointed out, assessing media impact is a very 
‗difficult task for empirical research‘ due to the existence of intervening variables; 
and even more so because ‗proving effects is so difficult‘ (Liebes and Katz, 1993, 
p.8). In any case, exhaustive assessment of media influence on their audiences is 
usually beyond the realm of a single study. Still, though with some caution, it is 
clear from the results of this study that international media do exert significant 
influence on the lives of Northern Nigerians. There is near unanimity by all the 
respondents that the global media they interact with do exercise different forms of 
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influence on their lives. Whether in the more general form of affecting their 
everyday life through the basic media functions of informing, educating and 
entertaining them, or in the more specific form of enhancing their comprehension 
of international and national affairs, raising their awareness of their civic rights 
and responsibilities and influencing specific personal decisions and professional 
endeavours (particularly in the case of journalists), the audiences have given 
accounts of how useful their engagements with these media have been. They do, 
however, express their concerns over the propaganda role of the global 
broadcasters, their perceived penchant for the protection of their owners‘ interests 
and their alleged capacity to influence local cultural values—all of which also 
point to their perceptions that the media do indeed have influence. The fact that the 
audiences themselves said they prefer BBC to other broadcasters and that they 
consume its products more than others‘ suggest that the BBC probably exerts more 
influence on their lives than the other international broadcasters do. 
  
However, there are significant cautions that one must exercise in relation to both 
the credibility rating of the BBC and the issue of influence. The findings of this 
study suggest that the Northern Nigerians‘ favourable ratings of the BBC are not 
absolute; they are limited to the comparison of the station with other broadcasters. 
For instance, the audiences do have reservations about the BBC‘s coverage of the 
Islamic world and, to some extent, of Africa. They regard BBC as a classic 
Western medium that portrays the West positively and the Muslim world and 
Africa negatively. These complaints are rampant in the narratives of the 
respondents, whether as individuals or as groups and whether they use strong 
language or a subtle one to highlight them. It ranges from the description of BBC 
as a ‗typical Western media‘ (by the deputy editor in the journalist group)—a 
subtle way of accusing it of showing pro-Western bias—to outright accusations of 
being ‗partisan and in some ways even anti-Muslims or anti-Arabs‘ (as claimed by 
the female ex-editor); or even a more blanket accusation as shown in this claim by 
the director of Izala Islamic sect in the Yola lower middle class group: ‗The 
problem with the BBC is that it would…not report something positive about 
Islam‘. Significantly, these people are among the respondents who believe that the 
BBC is the most credible international broadcaster. Since their reverence to BBC 
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has not removed their reservation of its coverage of the stated areas, their views on 
less respected broadcasters are even more critical.  
 
Most of the respondents have indeed accused other Western broadcasters of being 
far worse culprits in the alleged negative portrayal of non-Western entities. Even 
the non-Western media Al-Jazeera, which some of them had praised for being an 
alternative medium prior to the eruption of Libyan crisis, was later condemned by 
some respondents as being part of Western conspiracy against Africa because of 
its perceived anti-Muammar Gaddafi coverage [its owners, the Qataris, support 
anti-Gaddafi rebels in Libya (Reuters, 2011; Bakr, 2011)]. The student group who 
appear to be the strongest critics of global broadcasters over alleged negative 
portrayal of Africa, for example, grouped Al-Jazeera in the Western media 
category due to what they see as its hostility towards Gaddafi. ‗The world would 
only be against you, if the BBC is well funded, CNN is well motivated, Al-
Jazeera—all of them—to give you a special image, to paint you to become the 
enemy of the world,‘ claimed the political science students‘ association president. 
So the negative perception is neither restricted to one set of global broadcasters 
nor is it exclusive to a particular segment of the respondents.  
 
Closely related to this, and possibly the precursor of it, is the Northern Nigerians‘ 
negative conception of the West. Again, one by one and group after group, 
passionately or with considerable measure of restraints, the vast majority of the 
respondents expressed views that clearly reveal unfavourable disposition towards 
the West. There are elements of ambivalence—slightly differential but largely 
negative views of the West among some individual respondents (I respect them, 
but I don‘t love them that much, said the local publisher)—or even positive 
perceptions as noticed in the peasant group, but the predominant position is that 
the Northern Nigerians‘ conception of the West is negative. This finding is not 
really different from other findings elsewhere. Many studies (Gentzkow and 
Shapiro, 2004; Pew Center, 2004, 2006; Pintak, 2006) have shown mutually 
negative perceptions between Muslims and the United States in particular. In their 
study, based on data from a survey of over 10,000 respondents in nine mainly 
Muslim nations and responses from Americans, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) 
found mutual negative perceptions between Muslims and Americans. ‗Moreover, 
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this antagonism is not only driven by opposed interests… It also reflects radically 
different, and often distorted, perceptions of the facts themselves‘ (Gentzkow and 
Shapiro, 2004, p. 117). ‗At its root lies an essential truth: each side sees the world 
through a very different prism,‘ noted Pintak (2006, p.188). 
 
From the responses in this study the Northern Nigerians‘ negative perception of 
the West was apparently prompted by what they perceive to be the West‘s 
antagonism towards Islam and the West‘s domination of Africa. A recap of few 
comments from both the individual and focus group interviews highlights their 
perspectives. ‗They (the West) suppress Islam far more than imagined. This is why 
we, Muslims, dislike them,‘ said the motorcycle mechanic in the Yola working 
class group. ‗We‘re not too happy with the way they (Britain) ganged up with the 
US, and they‘re all for the Gulf invasion, regardless of the laws,‘ declared the 
female ex-editor. ‗The only thing that the West wants is a subjugated Africa, an 
Africa that can develop the European world like in the colonial days,‘ alleged a 
students‘ union executive in the student group. The respondents cited several 
instances such as the 1991 Gulf war, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the NATO‘s bombings of Libya and the war on terror 
to illustrate what they believe to be the West‘s double standards and antagonism 
towards the Islamic world. The alleged pro-Western coverage of those issues by 
Western media, including the BBC, and their alleged negative reports about Africa 
are what they regularly cite as evidence of unfairness of the Western media to 
Muslims and Africans. They simply believe that the Western media are the 
extension of the West, and despite admission by many of them that these media do 
exhibit remarkable level of independence, the common feeling is that these media 
would not do anything that could radically harm the interests of the West.  
 
Despite their negative—or ambivalent—perceptions of the West due to what they 
perceive to be the West‘s unfairness to Muslims and Africans, Northern Nigerians‘ 
complex mediated encounter with the West can hardly be described only in terms 
such as rejection of the West or acceptance of the West or even negotiating with 
the West—as Sabry (2010) discovered in the case of Moroccans‘ experience or as 
Hall (1980) and Morley (1980) theorise about audiences‘ engagement with the 
media—it is probably a more deeply complicated and contested issue. The 
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complexity could be seen even within a response of an individual (as in the case of 
the school teacher in the Yola working class group who in one breath was talking 
about BBC being a credible broadcaster that influenced his life and in another said 
he stopped listening to it because of its unfairness to Saddam Hussein, and 
switched to Al-Jazeera which he felt was fairer) and among the individuals and 
groups with the level of fluidity of their responses during the discussions. For 
instance, some respondents would begin their discussion with praises for the West 
only to quickly switch to its condemnation when making reference to its relations 
with Islam or Africa. The antagonism is mainly towards the United States—which 
incidentally did not even have a history of colonial domination of Nigeria but has 
difficult relations with Muslims—and, to a lesser degree, Britain (which has both a 
history of colonial domination of Nigeria and difficult relations with Muslims—its 
inclusion seems to be more due to its close ties with the United States than of the 
colonial link, though that too could not be completely ruled out), hardly do they 
mention any other Western nation. To almost all of them, as explained in chapter 
VII, the ‗West‘ is simply the United States and Britain, though they know it is far 
beyond that. The other component parts of the West do not seem to matter to them 
much. 
 
Similarly, although the collective unfavourable disposition towards the West is not 
in doubt, it is not collectively marked with anger or intense antagonism. It is to 
some extent a polite disapproval. ‗Negotiation‘ looks close to capturing it, though 
it is not necessarily a conscious and deliberate negotiation. The majority of 
respondents appear to prefer living a parallel life with that of the West without 
disrespecting each other‘s culture; but they also seem ready to share common 
norms and cultural values with the West, especially those that are universal to 
humanity. They have positive perceptions of the West, for instance, on issues of 
good governance, transparency and human rights which they feel Western 
governments have good records of, at least in their domestic affairs. So it is not 
really a simple case of ‗rejection‘ or ‗acceptance‘; it is far more complicated than 
either. But then, as Sabry (2010) argues, cultural encounter is never a 
straightforward matter. ‗Encounters are cultural phenomena par excellence, and 
culture is nothing other than an amalgamation of different encounters and the 
dynamics they produce‘ (Sabry, 2010, p. 10, emphasis original). 
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In whatever context this dynamism is viewed, the Northern Nigerians‘ engagement 
with international media produced neither the scenario Daniel Lerner (1958) had 
envisaged about the Middle Eastern Muslims‘ encounter with the media nor the 
one painted by Siegfried Kracauer (1952, cited in Larkin, 2008) on a similar 
situation. As discussed extensively in the literature review, Lerner and Kracauer 
have given two sharply contrasting accounts of the impact, or possible impact, of 
Western media on the Muslim Middle East. Lerner (1958) had a vision of a 
Middle East that would be modernized along the Western model, having been 
exposed to Western media and Western civilization. ‗What the West is,‘ he writes, 
‗the Middle East seeks to become‘ (p. 47). The empirical evidence from this study 
shows that Northern Nigerian Muslims do not seem to like that path. Nor do they 
really do what Kracauer said the Arabs had done. Kracauer had painted a Middle 
East that had ‗an ingrained aversion, strongest in rural areas,‘ to Western 
modernity. ‗The Bedouins reject whole-sale the infidels and their devilish 
inventions‘ (Kracauer, 1952, cited in Larkin, 2008, p. 114). The Hausas do not 
totally reject the West, but they do reject wholesale ‗their devilish intentions‘ (to 
use Larkin‘s words, p. 114). 
 
The difference did not end there. Unlike Kracauer‘s observation that the strongest 
aversion of Western modernization was witnessed in the rural Middle East, this 
research found that the strongest denunciation of the West came from the urban 
university students. The key caution here, though, is that these students have a 
clear view of the difference between Westernization and modernisation, and their 
stance on each is equally clear. They are favourably disposed to modernity but 
ideologically opposed to the West. In fact, in this research the rural dwellers, the 
Njoboli peasant group, are the ones who hold the most favourable views on the 
West. Their case is the one that is almost consistent with Daniel Lerner‘s later 
work. In his 1963 essay, Lerner has argued that the diffusion of information 
‗stimulates the peasant to want to be a free holding farmer…the farmer‘s wife to 
want to stop bearing children, the farmer‘s daughter to wear a dress and to do her 
hair‘ (p. 348). The Njoboli peasant group in this study exhibits a tendency that 
almost fits into this frame. ‗Listening to (international broadcasters) shows me how 
to secure my rights from the government, how to deal with other people; it 
enlightens me of other religions and where they have strongholds,‘ said the 
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farmer-teacher in Njoboli peasant group. His words seem to reinforce what Lerner 
claimed virtually five decades before. But that is perhaps where the similarity 
ends, at least with regard to this issue.  
 
Another important finding worth recapitulating here is the one that reveals the 
resilience of radio as a viable medium in Northern Nigeria, despite the spread of 
new distribution technologies and multiplication of platforms. There was never a 
doubt about radio‘s utility particularly in Nigeria or in Africa as a whole 
(Spitulnik, 2000; Mano, 2004; Larkin, 2008), but what this research has found 
significant is its ability to remain relevant in the face of rapid technological 
revolution that has transformed the way many people interact with the media. This 
study did, of course, find evidence of radio losing parts of its ground to television 
and Internet (at least one group relies mainly on the Internet to access media and 
another uses more of television than radio), but the medium has not been 
discarded—most of the groups rely mainly on radio to access international media 
and all the groups mentioned it as one of their platforms. Significant also is the 
profound nature of radio‘s utility in the everyday lives of Northern Nigerians, as 
the testimonies of some of the respondents reveal. For instance, the governor‘s 
aide in the Yola working class group said: ‗Radio to me is more than an object of 
entertainment; it is a school. This radio (brandishing his radio set) is my library; it 
is my record keeper; it is like half of my brain‘. The shop owner in the Yola lower 
middle class group stated that ‗wherever I am—either in a vehicle or walking—I 
have my radio set, day and night, so as to monitor the BBC‘. These were their own 
descriptions of the magnitude of space they feel radio occupies in their daily lives.  
 
Mytton and Forrester (1988) have predicted that radio‘s resilience would linger for 
long, and the evidence here seems to confirm it. ‗In a world of rapidly changing 
electronic media technology one of the oldest, and in some ways crudest, means of 
delivery seems likely to continue to prevail,‘ they assert. ‗It continues to have the 
advantages of simplicity, ease of access, and lack of susceptibility to governmental 
interference—all advantages not possessed by any of the alternatives‘ (Mytton and 
Forrester, 1988, p. 479). Some of the mobile telephony devices do possess almost 
all of these advantages—and a lot more—but they have not yet dislodged radio, 
though they may have the potential of doing so in the future. The BBC Hausa 
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Service too has recognised this potential and moved in quickly to capitalise on it 
by distributing contents through mobile telephony (Tangaza, 2009). Their concern 
is that despite radio‘s resilience, the Internet and mobile telephony do indeed 
present a real threat to it, and the best strategy of addressing it is to harness their 
potentials too. ‗We try to adapt to changing media environment by introducing 
new things and making sure that we don‘t miss out on any platform,‘ the BBC‘s 
executive editor for African region declared. This is part of the rationale of the 
BBC‘s decision to adopt a ‗multimedia strategy‘ in content delivery and 
participatory programming (Hiller, 2010a, p.2). And, as this study reveals, it is one 
of the strategies that has helped the corporation to maintain its edge over other 
broadcasters.    
 
The conception of the BBC as an organ of British public diplomacy is another area 
that presents an interesting scenario for this study. With international broadcasting 
essentially regarded as being part of public diplomacy effort or ‗soft power‘ 
resource (Browne, 1982; Rampal and Adams, 1990; Nye, 2004a, p. 5) and the 
BBC World Service being funded by the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, it was obvious from the onset that the BBC would always be seen as an 
‗instrument of British public diplomacy‘ (Sreberny et al., 2010a, p. 130). But the 
corporation‘s claim of being an impartial broadcaster—and an open attempt to be 
so, coupled with the belief by many that it is so—produced a complex picture. 
Another twist was added when the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the 2004 
spending review classified BBC as one of the ‗partners‘ in British public 
diplomacy (FCO, 2005, p.4)—though both sides have insisted that its editorial 
independence remains untouched. With all these permutations, it became vital to 
examine the claims from the perspectives of both the producers of BBC contents 
and its consumers. 
 
Respondents from both the production and reception sides offered divergent 
perspectives on the issue, but the aggregate views reveal that the BBC does indeed 
serve as an organ of British public diplomacy, despite its claim of being just an 
impartial international broadcaster. They noted that it plays the dual but 
contradictory role of being both a provider of impartial international news and a 
promoter of British public diplomacy—as previously observed by others (Rampal 
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and Adams, 1990; Nye, 2004a, 2004b; Sreberny et al., 2010a, 2010b). However, 
the finding is not as simplistic as it appears on the surface. First, from the 
reception side the overwhelming feeling is that, although the BBC does provide 
credible news and analysis, it still acts as a propagandist—even if in a subtle way. 
The most serious issue thrown up by this perspective is that the audiences tend to 
reject those messages that they suspect to be part of the ‗propaganda‘ or public 
diplomacy role of the station. The following two comments illustrate such 
tendency among the audiences. ‗Those (BBC programmes) that they do for 
humanity, we accept them; the ones they do to deceive people, we listen to them, 
but reject them,‘ remarked the mason in the Yola lower middle class group. 
Another member of the group, the director of Izala Islamic sect, was equally 
emphatic on what he would do with those BBC reports that he feels are not 
impartial: ‗Foreign propaganda will not help me. In this respect I won‘t believe 
the BBC‘. And in that respect the public diplomacy objectives—if the propaganda 
or ‗the slanting‘ of stories was meant to achieve them—face defeat. 
 
But then, it is not all the audiences that constantly engage in ‗guerrilla warfare‘ 
with the media (Eco, 1972, cited in Morley, 2006, p. 102) to repeatedly reject 
offensive texts (and accept only the favourable ones); there are many who do not 
necessarily do this regularly or who may sometimes let their guards slip. The 
Njoboli peasant group, for instance, do not regard international broadcasters as 
propaganda tools; they believe that they were established for altruistic reasons. In 
their case, the public diplomacy objectives might have been achieved, or at least 
seem to be achievable easily. The trouble, though, is that the peasants are the 
lesser target of the foreign policy makers; and although the BBC World Service 
would obviously be pleased to have huge audiences and to be believed by any 
segment of them (if not all), the preference is probably on the influential groups. 
After all, they were the original target of at least its most influential language 
service, the Arabic Service, when it was introduced in 1938 aiming at ‗the 
executive class‘ not ‗the man under the palm tree‘, as the programme organiser S. 
H. Perowne put it (cited in Briggs, 1985, p. 143). Of course, much has changed 
since then—and more will—as the power of the men under the palm trees 
becomes more evident, as the Arab uprisings indicate. But with the changes too, so 
would emerge the relevance of a new ‗executive class‘.  
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There is the producers‘ perspective too on the BBC‘s role in public diplomacy. 
Their unanimous view is that the BBC‘s image as a credible organisation serves as 
a source of goodwill for Britain—which is also part of what Lord Carter Public 
Diplomacy Review Committee (FCO, 2005) at least expects—an ideal soft power 
resource (Nye, 2004a, 2004b; Jisi and Nye, 2009). To start with, the respondents 
from the BBC side generally reject the audiences‘ claim that the BBC does engage 
in deliberate ‗propaganda‘ or packaging for Britain and the West. They did not 
admit claims of any interference in their daily operations from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). ‗I have been here with the BBC for more than 20 
years and I cannot recall any instance where FCO actually asked us to cover this 
or not to cover that,‘ insisted the BBC executive editor for African region to echo 
what other personnel have declared about editorial non-interference. What they did 
admit, though, was the existence of a subtle but fundamental interference in the 
sense that it is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that decides for the World 
Service which language services they should operate and where their target areas 
should be. This is how the executive editor for African region puts it: ‗we are paid 
for by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office through grant-in-aid. They decide 
what languages or target areas we should be covering, but they have no say in the 
contents and contributors of any given programme in any given language service 
or target area‘. In this case the public diplomacy role is clearly expected even if it 
is not automatically guaranteed.  
 
As a broadcasting body, the BBC resents being seen as an instrument of public 
diplomacy and all the personnel interviewed rejected suggestions that they were 
working to serve that interest. What they did not resent was the idea of BBC‘s 
credibility being seen as a source of goodwill for Britain. Former BBC World 
Service correspondent in Lagos who has become producer at its headquarters in 
London asserted that ‗people have a better impression of Britain and so on 
because of the BBC; it is the British Broadcasting Corporation and people know it 
is the British Broadcasting Corporation.‘ This is one of the benefits Lord Carter 
Committee (FCO, 2005) said the BBC brings to Britain. And it is one public 
diplomacy objective that many people believe is being achieved, though that too 
has to be backed with concrete action for it to be long lasting because, as the last 
respondent equally noted, the good impression gained through the BBC‘s good 
 345 
image tends to disappear when a real encounter with Britain reveals that it is not as 
good as the impression created. ‗I think the divergence happens more the more 
they interact with Britain proper,‘ he noted. This shows that for the gains to be 
sustained, the good image created needs to be backed by concrete action. The 
clearest picture produced by both perspectives is that the long-term effectiveness 
of the BBC‘s public diplomacy role appears to depend more on its ability to be an 
impartial provider of news and analysis than on any attempt to deviate from that.  
 
Conceptualisation and theorisation  
The data gathered for this research produced a variety of results, some of which 
challenge few established thoughts and point to new perspectives and postulations 
not seen in previous studies. Perhaps the analyses and discussion of the results 
done here, and in the previous chapters, have collectively provided adequate 
explanations and clarifications for full understanding of various aspects of this 
study. Deeper reflections, however, further indicate that some of its significant 
findings do possess the potential of providing new conceptual and theoretical 
perspectives in audience research and media studies. Three significant areas 
identified by this study (selective believability, the concept of primary mediator 
and the dynamics of credibility and believability)—all of which would be 
discussed below under their respective headings—have such potentials. Consistent 
patterns and relationships noticed with remarkable regularity among the findings 
suggest far bigger significance than ordinarily thought. There is, for instance, a 
near unanimity among the audiences in rating the BBC as the most credible 
broadcaster at the very time they were rejecting, with remarkable consistency, its 
messages that do not conform to their prevailing beliefs. At first, this pattern of 
consumption was thought to have fallen within the realms of selective exposure, 
selective perception and selective retention, as identified in previous works 
(Klapper, 1960; Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974; Piepe et al., 1978; Morley, 1980; 
Mutz, 1998; Liu and Johnson, 2011). But closer examination indicates that it goes 
far beyond that. There are indeed elements of both selective exposure and selective 
perception in connection with the Northern Nigerians‘ consumption of global 
media messages, but what emerged here appears to be far more complex than both.  
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In the first place, it would not have been merely a case of selective exposure and 
selective perception, or even selective retention, because from the onset the 
methodological approach adopted for this study is different from the 
methodological strategies often employed to examine those phenomena—which 
tend to be fundamentally psychological or socio-psychological in nature—though 
the approach here does not totally exclude the possibility of noticing them, as it 
eventually appears to have done so. Unlike the tradition of exposing the audiences 
to specified media texts and examining their responses to them shortly afterwards 
[(Klapper (1960) admits that such studies mainly examine short-term 
consumption], this study looked at their long-term consumption of media 
messages and the possible cumulative impact the long-term exposure could have 
on them. And unlike the strategy of seeking their responses to the restricted media 
texts shown to them, this study employed an approach that offered them ample 
opportunities to supply unrestricted responses that were not limited by content 
constraints, temporality and spatiality. With this leverage, they poured out their 
own testimonies, in their own words, based on their own individual and group 
experiences and using both their retentive and cognitive capabilities to cite 
examples that range from those media reports of events that happened on the day 
of the interview to those that the elderly among them could remember to have 
happened two or even three decades earlier. So since the study was not strictly 
designed to reveal only those audience activities dealing with selective exposure, 
selective perception and selective retention alone, it succeeded in generating 
massive data that reveals far more audiences‘ activities in their interactions with 
global media than those originally thought. Consequently, they reveal audiences‘ 
activities that appear to have gone beyond the realm of the three selective 
processes listed above. It is an unexpected finding, with its resultant conceptual 
difficulties. Since none of the three known selective processes is adequate enough 
to accurately describe it, an appropriate concept that can adequately capture it 
needs to be found. This is what brings in the concept of ‗selective believability‘. 
   
Selective believability 
This is a highly complex cognitive activity marked by both the audiences‘ 
predispositions and the apparent contradictory nature of their consumption of 
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media messages. It does contain some elements of the psychological mechanisms 
of selective exposure and selective perception (Klapper, 1960; Vidmar and 
Rokeach, 1974; Piepe et al., 1978; Mutz, 1998; Liu and Johnson, 2011) that 
appear to work in concert with other cultural, religious, ideological and social 
factors that affect audiences‘ consumption of media products. The phenomenon 
was unexpectedly noticed in the course of this research during both the individual 
and group interviews when respondents, apparently unconsciously, shift their 
views, often radically, from one opposing position to the other—and when 
reminded of such radical shift, they almost always offer identical answers to 
justify their decisions. It was usually in the case of their assessment of media and 
the messages they consume. For instance, often at the beginning of the interview 
they would unequivocally affirm their confidence in the credibility of the BBC, 
stressing its trustworthiness, how much they rely on it to judge the accuracy of 
other media reports and so on; but midway into the interview, when issues related 
to the coverage of the Muslim world came in, they would suddenly, at their own 
volition, shift their position and accuse the BBC of being unfair in its coverage of 
such issues. Instantly, the trust that they said they have of the station would vanish 
from their discussion, and its reports on such issues would be dismissed as 
untrustworthy.  
 
This happened with remarkable regularity and consistency across almost all range 
of the respondents. Take the case of this tailoring business owner in the Yola 
lower middle class group who had at the early part of the focus group discussion 
said he trusted the BBC ‗very well, because even if I listen to other radio stations 
and get reports from them, I still wait to hear what the BBC would say. If its report 
differs with that of the other stations, I won‘t believe the other stations‘ report 
until it is confirmed by the BBC—that is the final. Once I listen to the BBC, it 
removes my doubts‘. However, midway into the discussion, when one of the 
participants brought up the issue of BBC‘s coverage of Islamic nations, the 
tailoring business owner made a dramatic U-turn and said the BBC had been less 
than honest in that respect. ‗Things like America‘s invasion of Iraq, you would find 
that the (BBC‘s) reports are contradictory. The contradiction is especially 
because it is the issue of Islam,‘ he alleged. Suddenly, the image of BBC being the 
medium that serves as a benchmark upon which he judges the credibility of other 
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media disappeared along with its trademark of finality and ability to erase 
‗doubts‘. It was replaced by that of a media that carries ‗contradictory‘ reports.  
 
His case was even less dramatic than that of the shop owner (in the same group) 
who said he always moved around with his radio set ‗so as to monitor the BBC. I 
don‘t want get the news from a second-hand source; I prefer to get it directly from 
the BBC because whatever happens around the world and in Nigeria, if I don‘t get 
it from the BBC, I don‘t feel comfortable‘. But when the same issue of BBC‘s 
coverage of the Islamic world came up, his perspective changed radically: ‗Well, 
in my understanding, I think they (the BBC) exaggerate things when it comes to 
Islam because some of the terror attacks (being reported), the Muslims would not 
carry such attacks… I think there are fabrications…because they are dealing with 
Islamic nations‘. The same medium he said he did not feel comfortable without 
constantly monitoring is the one he swiftly accused of engaging in ‗fabrications‘. 
There was also the case of the school teacher in the Yola working class group 
(illustrated in a different case before) who had earlier said that he trusted the BBC 
so much it influenced his change of attitude but later stated that he became so 
annoyed with its ‗unfair‘ reporting of Saddam Hussein that he at one time even 
‗stopped listening to it completely‘ and later ‗reduced listening to (it) and shifted 
to Al-Jazeera‘. His case appears to exhibit significant elements of selective 
exposure while theirs tilt more towards selective perception (Klapper, 1960; 
Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974). But, as would be seen later, the phenomenon is more 
complex than both selective exposure and selective perception. 
 
In the individual interviews category too cases of selectivity are rampant. The 
female school administrator who had originally expressed total affirmation on the 
media she believed to be the most credible (‗The BBC, of course…their news has 
been genuine…they give us first hand information‘) quickly shifted her position 
when the issue of BBC‘s coverage of the Islamic world came up and now said the 
station was ‗not very accurate‘. Similarly, the local publisher, who had initially 
said: ‗I trust the BBC most because we believe that it is not censored. They find the 
way of telling the truth‘, changed his position within the same interview and said: 
‗Truly speaking, I think, over 60 or 70 per cent of their programmes are based on 
their policies... They would tell you what you‘re supposed to know from their own 
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perspective‘. From the medium he trusted most because it was not ‗censored‘ to 
the one whose programmes were at least 60 per cent based on her owner‘s policies 
and which tells ‗you what you are supposed to know‘ from its own ‗perspective‘, 
the shift is quite dramatic. These cases, as stated above, are all over the data 
generated. And the respondents insisted that they were not contradicting 
themselves; that they only expressed exactly what they believe; and that although 
they believe the BBC‘s reports more than they believe other media‘s, they still 
reject many of its reports on the Muslims and Islamic world. 
 
The issue of selectivity in this case was brought out by the audiences themselves; 
they made it clear that they do select what they want to believe—though 
sometimes the selectivity appears to be an unconscious act. And apparently the 
audiences do the selection based on how they assess the content of the media, and 
guided by their predispositions and other extra-communication factors. Many 
audiences, as stated earlier, do distinguish between the roles of the international 
broadcasters as news providers and as propagandists; and they tend to reject those 
messages they view as propaganda. The comment from the education supervisory 
councillor in the Katsina group provides a classic example here: ‗I honestly select 
what to believe because there is no radio or television station that has no 
agenda… So I assure you that we are selective, to avoid becoming victims of their 
propaganda‘. While for him, and his group, selectivity serves as a defence 
mechanism to guard against ‗becoming victims of propaganda‘—as noted in 
previous cases of selective perception (Klapper, 1960; Vidmar and Rokeach, 
1974)—for some the selection is done for ‗uses and gratifications‘ purposes 
(Blumler and Katz, 1974), as the case of the deputy political editor in the Abuja 
journalist group seems to show: ‗When you listen to any medium and the message 
that it has given out, you tend to select based on your ideological conviction or 
your interest‘. The affirmation of audience selectivity is indeed consistent with 
that of other audience studies too (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955/2006; Morley, 1980). 
And in some cases it is even overstated, as this comment by Connell (1979) 
suggests: ‗Any reading is never simply consumptive… Any reading is also, and 
always, interrogative‘ (cited in Morley, 1980, p. 150). Perhaps not always, 
especially if the message is congenial with the audiences‘ existing beliefs; but 
there is little doubt that interrogation is an integral part of media consumption.  
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It is not only in the various forms stated above that the phenomenon of selectivity 
is exhibited by audiences in their media consumption; it is also identified in other 
forms. The preceding discussion on the findings that reveal high consumption of 
BBC and other Western media products and the subsequent findings which show 
that the same audiences still have negative perceptions of the West—despite its 
positive portrayal by the same media—expose a major contradiction between 
consumption and perception, and show that the audiences do indeed select what 
they want to believe, regardless of the credibility rating they award to the media. It 
seems that even the combined forces of high consumption of Western media and 
positive credibility rating of these media have not been able to make the audiences 
embrace the West; nor have they been able to erase their power of selecting what 
they want to believe. This element of resilience—this ability to withstand other 
forces that the three known selectivity processes (selective exposure, selective 
perception and selective retention) cannot withstand—is perhaps the most striking 
element that sets the concept of selective believability apart. 
 
There are other distinguishing features too. The consumption of wide range of 
media messages (including dissonant messages) which is evident in the case of 
selective believability contrasts sharply with the concept of selective exposure, 
which is the tendency of the audiences to expose themselves to only those 
messages that ‗accord with their existing attitudes and interests‘ (Klapper, 1960, p. 
19; Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974). Although there are elements of selective 
exposure exhibited by some of the audiences here—as in the case of the school 
teacher who suspended listening to BBC because of its Iraq‘s reporting and 
switched to Al-Jazeera, for instance—careful observation shows that they are not 
exclusively selective exposure. The same man, for instance, when asked which 
medium he trusted more between the BBC and Al-Jazeera, said: ‗On issues that 
relate to Islam, I trust the Al-Jazeera more; but on those issues which are not 
related to Islam, I trust the BBC more‘. His case turned out to be a case of inter-
media selectivity (which is here considered to be part of selective believability) 
rather than that of selective exposure.  
 
Another distinguishing attribute of selective believability is that it does not seem 
to have obvious link with selective retention, even though it may have an element 
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of it. The key feature of selective retention is the tendency of the audiences to 
forget unsympathetic messages ‗more readily than they forget sympathetic‘ ones 
(Klapper, 1960, p. 19). Sometimes the phenomenon of selective retention overlaps 
with that of selective perception, as Klapper (1960) noted, but the former is more 
identified with forgetfulness. Although no test was conducted in this study to find 
out which of the messages the respondents retain more, the respondents do not 
appear to be forgetful of unpleasant messages. They seem able to remember 
dissonant messages as accurately as they do congenial ones. They were, for 
instance, able to recall unsympathetic messages of yesteryears. Some of them were 
recalling unpleasant media reports of 20 years—as the case of the former female 
editor who cited instances of alleged biased BBC reporting of the first Gulf War of 
1991 shows. 
 
Of the three previously identified selective processes (selective exposure, selective 
perception and selective retention), what selective believability appears to have 
more in common with is selective perception—the tendency of audiences to reject 
‗unsympathetic material…or to recast and interpret it to fit their existing views‘ 
(Klapper, 1960, p. 19; Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974; Liu and Johnson, 2011). There 
are elements of this tendency among many of the audiences who exhibit selective 
believability trait in their consumption of news and current affairs programmes of 
global broadcasters. They were probably exhibiting that tendency when they, for 
instance, perceive the West negatively, even though the media they consume 
portray the West positively. They were also possibly displaying that trait when 
they shift their view of praising BBC for its ‗credibility‘ in its coverage of general 
subjects to that of condemning it in its ‗unfair‘ coverage of the Islamic world. 
And, of course, all the selective processes (including selective exposure and 
selective retention) are cognitive activities that deal with handling messages based 
on previous experiences and personal idiosyncrasies. Selective believability just 
appears to be a more complex cognitive activity with perhaps stronger 
involvement of extraneous forces of beliefs, cultural values and attitudes.   
 
The concepts of selectivity and active audience are, of course, not without their 
own controversies even among the scholars who in principle accept their relevance 
in audience studies (as discussed in both the ‗Literature Review‘ and ‗Results and 
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Analysis III‘ chapters). Ang (1996), for instance, has warned that ‗audiences may 
be active in myriad ways in using and interpreting media, but it would be utterly 
out of perspective to cheerfully equate ―active‖ with ―powerful‖, in the sense of 
―taking control‖ at an enduring structural or institutional level‘ (p. 139). Similarly, 
Morley (2006), whose earlier work The ‗Nationwide‘ Audience (1980) had 
reiterated the concept of selective perception, later questions audience work that 
‗exaggerated, and wrongly romanticized the supposed power and freedoms of 
media consumers‘, arguing that it is wrong to assume that audiences are in 
constant struggle with the media, ‗in which they constantly produce oppositional 
readings of its products‘ (p. 102). And there are even others who feel that 
selectivity is class-related. Piepe et al. (1978), as noted earlier, have identified the 
middle class pattern of media consumption with ‗selective perception‘ and that of 
the working class with ‗blanket perception‘ (p. 46). But, as repeatedly cited, 
Morley (1980, p. 29) has dismissed this as ‗too crude‘, contending that his own 
research ‗shows plenty of examples of selective perception‘ on the part of both 
working class and middle class groups. 
 
The findings of this study serve as both the reinforcement of the concept of 
selectivity and the revelation of its current dynamics in the face of the changing 
media landscape resulting from the ongoing revolution in communications 
technologies. They clearly show that audiences do actively select and interpret 
media messages in ‗myriad ways‘. They also reveal that selectivity can take 
different forms and that selective believability—which this study identifies—
appears to be a complex and comprehensive form of selectivity that combines both 
the elements of selective exposure and selective perception on one hand, and the 
stronger involvement of extraneous forces such as beliefs, cultural values and 
attitudes on the other. This is neither an exaggeration of the concept nor an attempt 
to discount the viability of other factors that come into play in the complex activity 
of media consumption. It is merely an attempt to put it into its proper context as 
dictated by the empirical evidence, and to reflect the dynamism of its current form. 
This is particularly significant in the face of the new euphoria about ‗the power‘ of 
the new media, especially with the role they are playing in the uprisings across the 
Arab world (Basu et al., 2011; Beaumont, 2011; Pintak, 2011; Tisdall, 2011). 
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The primary mediator 
As clearly noted in the preceding discussion, and in the results and analysis 
chapters, several extra-communication factors do come into play in the audiences‘ 
engagement with the media. That in itself is not surprising. Previous studies are 
replete with reports of how psychological, sociological, cultural and a range of 
other factors affect audiences‘ consumption of media messages. Lazarsfeld et al. 
(1948) and Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955/2006) have reported extensively on the role 
of interpersonal influence in mediated communications; Klapper (1960) listed 
many factors ranging from predispositions to inter-personal influence and group 
norms; Morley (1980) talked about cultural, ideological and social factors; and 
many more spoke of selective exposure and selective perception (Klapper, 1960; 
Vidmar and Rokeach, 1974; D‘Allessio and Allen, 2007; Liu and Johnson, 2011). 
So the issue of extraneous forces mediating media consumption is neither new nor 
unusual. What is striking about the findings of this study, however, is the role 
religion—Islam in particular—seems to play in Muslim Northern Nigerians‘ 
interactions with global broadcasters. The phenomenon of selectivity itself, as 
explained above, is influenced by extraneous forces of beliefs, cultural values, 
personal attitudes and so on. And Islam in the case of Muslim Northern Nigerians 
appears to be the most potent factor of them all.  
 
Going through the bulk of the data gathered, it is clear that the narratives of most 
of the respondents repeatedly rated Islam as the strongest factor that affects the 
level at which they accept or reject the products of global broadcasters. Either as 
individuals or in groups the respondents repeatedly explained that they regularly 
reject messages that are in conflict with their religious beliefs. They repeatedly 
questioned reports that they consider to have portrayed Islam or Muslims in a 
negative light. They repeatedly accused Western media of negative portrayal of 
the Muslim world. Islam, it is clear, plays a prominent role in their everyday life, 
and that role appears to have been extended down to their media consumption. 
There are, of course, other factors such as cultural values (which for them are also 
part of—or closely linked to—their religion), social group membership, ideology 
(which they also link with their religion), professional calling and personal 
attitudes and so on, all of which play different mediating roles, but it is Islam that 
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is more regularly mentioned (or more clearly noted) as being the principal factor in 
mediating their consumption of news and current affairs programmes of 
international broadcasters. Series of examples used in the preceding passages and 
chapters to illuminate some points have equally illustrated the prominence they 
give to religion. Aspects such as the respondents‘ allegations of Western media‘s 
unfair coverage of Muslims and Islamic world and their rejection of reports that 
they felt were biased against Muslims were well illustrated above—and deserve no 
regurgitation here. 
 
Instances where the respondents specifically mentioned Islam as being the primary 
factor that guided them in selecting which media messages to believe, and which 
to ignore, were also cited in some of the preceding passages. A few similar 
examples, though, can provide further illustration here. Perhaps the clearest of 
them was offered by the elected councillor in the Katsina focus group when he 
said: ‗For the followers of Islam they have their doctrine that guides their lives; 
and whatever Muslims listen to they would judge it based on Islamic injunctions to 
see if it is righteous or not…and take those that are righteous and reject those that 
are not‘. Another member of the group, the secretary of the local council, 
concurred: ‗Surely, if one radio station broadcasts something, another broadcasts 
its own…you‘ll listen to them all and pick the ones among them and form your 
opinions, the ones that do not harm your religious belief‘. Others, such as the 
director of Izala Islamic sect in the Yola lower middle class group, are perhaps the 
obvious promoters of such notion, but his perspective is still worth restating here: 
‗If BBC reports a thing that is unrelated to my religion, I make use of it. But things 
concerning my religion I don‘t because my religion has its own scripture and it is 
necessary to believe what the scripture says… I reject anything that contradicts 
my religious belief‘. The centrality of religion in the lives of these people can 
hardly be overemphasised. The conception that religion plays such a strong role in 
their media consumption essentially emanated from their own narratives and from 
the inferences one makes when they make reference to related issues.  
 
A glaring case of inferential evidence of Islam mediating Muslim Northern 
Nigerians‘ global media consumption is the finding that reveals the respondents‘ 
negative perception of the West. The reasons they supplied for their negative 
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disposition towards the West were well explained and need no repeating here too, 
but it is significant to recall that they mainly focused on the alleged Western 
antagonism against Islam. Of course, some of the respondents do also indicate 
other reasons, such as colonial, socio-economic, cultural and ideological factors; 
but the most mentioned reason was the perceived conflict the West has with Islam. 
They feel that the West, particularly the United States, has not been fair to the 
Islamic world, and as such they too have no reason to particularly like the West. 
Since most of them have no experience of a direct physical contact with the West, 
it is obvious that their knowledge of the West is essentially a mediated one—both 
through the mass media and through interpersonal interaction, but largely through 
the media. The bulk of the media products they said they consume are Western 
media products. The inferences are therefore easily drawn: that they consume 
Western media products and still view the West negatively indicate that there are 
other mediating forces affecting such consumption; and that they frequently cite 
Islam as the main reason of their discomfort with the West shows that Islam is the 
strongest mediating factor in this case.  
 
It is not quite clear why Islam becomes the major mediator but it is easy to locate 
the indicators. One obvious reason is that Islam, as mentioned earlier, does play a 
significant role in the lives of Muslim Northern Nigerians; it is not confined to 
religious rituals alone. As extensively discussed in the ‗Historical Context‘ 
chapter, Islam was well ingrained in the political, socio-economic, ideological and 
cultural life of the entity that later became Northern Nigeria long before the arrival 
of Europeans in the region (Stewart, 1986; Dorward, 1986; Last, 1989; Batran, 
1989). British colonialism did significantly influence the system but it did not alter 
the core values of the dominant groups in the region. Many Northern Nigeria 
Muslims regard Islam as a complete way of life that goes beyond daily religious 
rituals to much wider social, ideological, cultural and political spheres. And it 
seems that the influence of Islam in their everyday life extends to their 
consumption of international media products.  
 
Another reason that might have made Islam the factor in this case could be the 
over concentration by international media on the coverage of stories and issues 
that are directly related to Muslims and Islamic world—ranging from numerous 
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Middle East conflicts and Afghan and Iraqi invasions to war on terror and Arab 
uprisings and even sectarian conflicts in Nigeria. It is possible that the way the 
international media contents have for long been dominated by Islam-related issues 
has unconsciously prompted the audiences‘ immune systems to deploy their 
Islamic guards. Most likely it is a combination of both—the strong influence of 
Islam in their lives and the daily diets of unpleasant stories about the Muslim 
world—and perhaps other factors as well. The main focus here, though, is to stress 
the fact that Islam does play a primary mediating role in these audiences‘ 
consumption of news and current affairs programmes of international media. It is 
possible that in other places it is a different factor—say, political ideology or 
culture or any strongly-held view—that serves as the primary mediator; but among 
Northern Nigerian Muslims this study has discovered that it is Islam that holds 
such a prime position. 
 
It is also significant to note that the Islam‘s mediating role has not pushed them 
away from the Western media to the media owned by Muslims such as the 
Qataris‘ Al-Jazeera and Iran‘s Press TV. Far from that; it apparently only widens 
their choice. Although there is evidence of growing consumption of these media 
too among the Northern Nigerian audiences (and even few of them say they trust 
Al-Jazeera more than they trust BBC, at least when it comes to Islam-related and 
Arab-related stories, for instance), the dominant global media products they 
consume are the Western media products. Even the lone respondent who said he at 
one time stopped listening to BBC and switched to Al-Jazeera said he later 
resumed his BBC listening (in addition to retaining Al-Jazeera too). Like the 
selective believability phenomenon, discussed earlier, the Islam‘s mediating role 
does not curtail inter-media consumption; it appears to even facilitate it. 
 
Many may argue that there is nothing remarkable about the findings that show that 
religion can play a strong mediating role in media consumption since it is always 
known to be an influential and emotive phenomenon in many societies. Past 
studies have long noted the strong resistance to reception of media messages 
among people with strongly-held views (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955/2006; Klapper, 1960; Morley, 1980; Liebes and Katz, 1993). 
Klapper, for instance, argues that ‗the more intensely an attitude is held, the less 
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likely it is to be changed by persuasive communication‘ (p. 46). Similarly, a claim 
(cited earlier) by former New York Herald Tribune television critic John Crosby 
that ‗the more important the subject is, the less influence the guy with the mike 
has‘ provides further illustration. ‗In matters of the most profound importance to 
the individual—say, religion—I doubt that…anyone else could sway a single soul 
a single inch,‘ he asserts (cited in Klapper, 1960, p. 44). Klapper concurs, but with 
a caution: ‗Communication researchers have come to similar though by no means 
so absolute conclusions‘ (Klapper 1960, p. 44). That seems to be right. But then, 
there is even a fundamental difference between some of those past cases and the 
issue being discussed here—though both have touched on media influence and 
audiences‘ immune systems. Some of the previous cases were talking about 
media‘s ability, or inability, to change people‘s beliefs. This study is in no way 
broaching any idea of media influencing people to change their religion—nor are 
the media in question interested in anything of a sort. 
 
The focus in this particular case is the mediating role religion is found to be 
playing in the Muslim Northern Nigerians‘ consumption of news and current 
affairs programmes of global broadcasters. And the findings here have not only 
shown religion to be playing such role, they have actually shown that it does serve 
as the primary player of that role. Islam is found here to be the most formidable 
fortress shielding its adherents against alien ideas. This is a resolute repudiation of 
Daniel Lerner‘s notion of Islam‘s vulnerability to Western cultural penetration. 
Lerner (1958) has argued that Islam‘s resistance to Western cultural influence was 
unsustainable. ‗The symbols of race and ritual fade into irrelevance when they 
impede living desires for bread and enlightenment‘ (Lerner, 1958, p. 405). It is not 
yet clear what they would do ‗for bread‘; but the evidence available here indicates 
that such symbols in Northern Nigeria have not yet done so for Western 
‗enlightenment‘. The findings here have not only debunked Lerner‘s assertion, but 
they have also contradicted one of the key scholars he copiously cited to advance 
his thesis. Quoting G. E. von Grunebaum‘s 1955 work, Lerner spoke of the 
efficacy of Western ‗―rationalist and positivist spirit‖ against which ―Islam is 
absolutely defenceless‖‘ (Lerner, 1958, p. 45). Ironically, in the case of Northern 
Nigerian Muslims, as this study shows, Islam emerges as the most formidable 
fortress against which Western influence appears to be almost hapless. They do 
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not embrace the West. But, as noted earlier, they do not also do what Kracauer 
(cited in Larkin, 2008) said the Bedouins did: reject the West wholesale. They do 
‗negotiate‘ with the West, perhaps pick what they want from them and apparently 
reject what they dislike. And Islam appears to be one of the factors—indeed the 
primary factor—that influence such negotiation.  
 
The dynamics of credibility and believability 
The final significant segment of the findings deserving conceptual and theoretical 
consideration is the dynamics of relations between credibility and believability. 
This is inter-twined with the issues of selective believability and mediating role of 
religion discussed above. As pointed out earlier, this study has found that 
audiences do select which media messages they wish to believe, and that several 
factors do influence their selectivity and consumption of the news and current 
affairs programmes of international broadcasters. These are abstract phenomena 
that are outside the control of both the broadcasters and their products. However, 
the quality of the media and the contents they produce do also appear to have their 
own bearing on the audiences‘ engagement with them. The reputation of a 
broadcaster, its orientation, operation, strength and staffing; and the nature of its 
contents, the language it uses and the way the contents are delivered all have their 
impact on the way its contents are received by the audiences.  
 
The findings in this study do show that audiences are conscious of the quality of 
the media and contents they consume. If they perceive the media and its contents 
to be credible, they tend to engage more with that media and believe much of its 
products. The bulk of the respondents reveal that they interact with the BBC and 
consume its products more than they do with any other foreign media because they 
perceive the BBC to be a more credible and relatively more independent media 
that produces accurate, timely, balanced and relevant news and current affairs 
programmes. It is not surprising that audiences tend to believe the products of 
credible media more than they do those of the media with lesser credibility 
(Rampal and Adams, 1990). It is also clear that credibility is particularly important 
with regard to news and current affairs programmes; and it is a major factor 
affecting ‗the effectiveness‘ of international broadcasters (p. 94). Rampal and 
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Adams (1990) have argued that ‗credibility in an international station‘s news and 
public affairs programming is a prerequisite to any success the station can achieve 
in aiding the foreign policy objectives of the broadcasting country‘ (p. 94). 
International stations with high credibility rating such as the BBC appear to be 
more effective in achieving those objectives because the target audiences tend to 
believe them.   
 
The real surprise comes up when audiences decide to reject the contents of the 
media they regard as credible. It has been sufficiently discussed here that although 
the Northern Nigerian audiences adjudge the BBC to be the most credible 
medium, they still reject some of its products. The combined forces of regular and 
cumulative consumption of BBC and its positive credibility rating, as stated 
before, have been unable to surmount the audiences‘ power to select what they 
wish to believe. It is part of the contradictory nature of media consumption which 
the audiences themselves admit and explain. Credibility, many of the respondents 
insist, does not automatically translate into believability. Other variables do 
sometimes come into play. It is important to note here, though, that in most cases, 
the BBC reports that the audiences tend to reject are the reports on Muslims and 
the Islamic world about which their rating of the station is not really great. A recall 
of the comment made by one of the respondents, the local newspaper publisher, 
illustrates the whole scenario: ‗There is a difference between being credible and 
being able to influence my decisions. You see…I look at Islam as a peaceful 
religion; they look at Islam as a kind of religion that propagates fights, terrorism 
and what have you. So…anytime they mention Muslims, I know where to draw my 
own line. But I know for sure that credibility is not the same as being sincere‘. He 
has offered a justification for rejecting the messages of the media he had earlier 
rated as credible by arguing that the rejection was prompted by the media‘s own 
bias. In a way he is also challenging the credibility of the station; but he does not 
seem keen on pursuing that line of argument because on aspects that do not touch 
on his religion, he had virtually no doubt of the station‘s credibility. That is why 
he is keen to stress that credibility is not enough an attribute to make all its 
contents truly believable. It is easier for him to locate the factor from the media‘s 
side than to situate it within his own predispositions.   
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His case was even more measured; there are others who made blanket 
generalisation (as noted in some of the examples provided in the preceding 
passages) that they would reject any media message that contradicts their religious 
belief. ‗I reject anything that contradicts my religious belief,‘ said the director of 
Izala Islamic sect in the Yola lower middle class group. The female restaurant 
owner in the same group gave her condition for believing BBC reports thus: ‗those 
issues that do not contradict your religion, if they (BBC) report it—and you have 
confirmation that it indeed happened—you believe them. But anything that affects 
your religion—if they report things contrary to your belief, you have to check with 
your religious book‘. Despite the trust she has of the BBC, she is effectively 
saying that she would still not believe its reports that contradict her religious 
belief. These kinds of comments are rampant across the data gathered. And they 
do highlight the existence of a gap between credibility and believability. 
 
In essence, it appears that credibility, as crucial as it is to any media content, is not 
enough to make all contents believable; some of them may still need to conform to 
the audiences‘ predispositions, particularly their deeply-held beliefs, before they 
could be accepted. But it is significant to place the same caveat here, as was put in 
discussing selectivity above, that it is not in all cases of media reception that this 
kind of complex activity becomes its main characteristic. It seems to be linked 
more with media messages that are not compatible with audiences‘ prevailing 
views. In cases where messages are congenial with audiences‘ dominant beliefs, 
media consumption seems to be less complicated. In such situations the media 
play what Lazarsfeld and Katz (1955) call reinforcement function; they are merely 
reinforcing existing views. When media messages fall outside the premises of the 
audiences‘ dominant views, however, the audiences‘ defences become alert; and 
they are often mobilised into action. In such cases, it seems, the credibility of the 
media alone could not subdue the defences and make the messages acceptable to 
the audiences. The gap between credibility and believability may have to be filled 
by the mediating factors before the messages could be accepted—if at all. All 
these seem to suggest that in audiences‘ consumption of unpleasant media 
messages credibility is not the only condition for believability. Credibility is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for believability. 
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Implications  
This study has unveiled the pattern and consequences of consumption of Western 
media products by the mainly Muslim Northern Nigerians, focusing mainly on 
their consumption of the BBC World Service‘s news and current affairs 
programmes. It has offered insights into both the Northern Nigerians‘ long and 
complex engagement with the BBC and their cultural encounter with the West—
the mode of their resistance to, or rejection of, some Western cultural goods as 
well as that of acceptance and assimilation of certain Western cultural values. In 
general terms, this study has widened the epistemological, theoretical and 
methodological scopes of media and cultural studies. First, the findings on the 
pattern of Northern Nigerians‘ media consumption, most particularly the 
identification of the concept of selective believability, the mediating role of 
religion and the dynamics of relations between credibility and believability, are 
significant conceptual and theoretical developments in media and communications 
studies. There is no claim here, though, that these are well-refined concepts and 
theories; but they do appear to possess the potential of being so, and they could 
really provide new direction in reception research and communications studies.  
 
The unique methodological approach employed for this research has helped 
greatly in producing some of the significant and surprising findings noted above. 
For instance, combining individual interviews, focus group discussions and 
content analysis techniques to examine the production side of the media, the 
content itself and the reception side (the audiences) might have been quite tasking, 
but it has engendered a thorough interrogation of various angles and aspects of the 
subject and yielded comprehensive results. The decision to use qualitative methods 
to generate the primary data and supplement it with ample statistical data 
generated by the large scale BBC surveys proved very helpful in providing both 
the general insights and the specific details of audiences‘ engagement with the 
media. It has also confirmed the claim that quantitative and qualitative approaches 
are not playing conflicting roles; they complement each other (Morrison, 1998). 
The practical application of some of the qualitative methods here has helped in 
refining them. Harmonising individual interview and focus group methods, for 
example, offers a new approach of getting insights into both individual and group 
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consumption of media messages. And operationalisation of focus group technique 
in this research has not only confirmed the original assumption about the viability 
of the method in presenting group dynamics and generating rich materials 
(Morrison, 1998; Greenbaum, 2000), it has also shed new light on how the method 
works in audience research, particularly on its effectiveness in unveiling 
consensus-building strategies within the groups. All these collectively point to 
methodological improvements that can greatly enhance audience research.  
 
The ramifications of several findings of this study are not confined to the academic 
circle of media and communications alone; they do extend to other disciplines and 
to different spheres of life. The assessment of BBC World Service‘s performance 
in general and its role in British public diplomacy in particular (even though 
limited to just a tiny part of the world) would be of interest to BBC personnel, 
public diplomacy operators and scholars. Of greater significance is the potential 
the findings have of being replicated at a wider scale. This study, for instance, has 
examined and found that the BBC does indeed play a dual but contradictory role 
of being both a provider of international news and analysis and a promoter of 
British public diplomacy—as others (Rampal and Adams, 1990; Nye, 2004a, 
2004b; Sreberny et al., 2010b) have previously noted. But it has specifically 
identified areas which indicate that the effectiveness of BBC‘s public diplomacy 
role might have been exaggerated. Its effectiveness, this research shows, lies more 
on the BBC being seen, and actually working, as an impartial news provider not as 
a promoter of British public diplomacy because the audiences do make distinction 
between the two, and they tend to disapprove of the latter role. Even on the issue 
of its goodwill generation potential—people associating BBC‘s credibility with 
Britain—the findings indicate that its long-term effectiveness depends on concrete 
action on the ground. Many Northern Nigerian Muslims who love the BBC for its 
liberal and credible image, for instance, stopped associating that image with 
Britain as a country when Britain joined the United States to invade the Muslim-
dominated nations of Afghanistan and Iraq. And they do that despite getting 
Britain‘s constant messages on the BBC that their action was only meant to fight 
terrorism, which they too disapprove of. The situation seems to have yielded 
adverse effect: instead of the BBC‘s credibility to help Britain, it was the Britain‘s 
action that harmed BBC as the audiences began to question its credibility. 
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Understanding these intricacies is essential in assessing the role of media in public 
diplomacy and in designing programmes with such intentions. The instance of 
Northern Nigeria cited here could offer a general trajectory on the impact of such 
role in relation to the Islamic world. This is significant, given the West‘s battle for 
the hearts and minds of the Muslims (Thussu, 2005, 2006), which appears to be 
failing, perhaps due to the same reasons noted above. It may even have greater 
resonance for Britain, when viewed from its public diplomacy effort and its high 
expectation on the BBC World Service‘s contribution towards it, being a public 
diplomacy partner that, for instance, got £225 million out of the £617 million 
public diplomacy funding for 2004/05 financial year (FCO, 2005, p. 6) and even 
higher amounts in the subsequent years (Hiller, 2010b), as stated earlier. The 
current government‘s spending cuts have, of course, started affecting the funding 
now (Robinson and Sweney, 2010; Foster, 2010), but there is a new effort to 
review that (Wynne-Jones, 2011). The significance of proper comprehension of 
this complexity is not only for the broadcasting and public diplomacy executives; 
it also has ramifications in the study of international relations, particularly on the 
role of media in public diplomacy, and in related disciplines. As cited in the 
‗Introduction‘ chapter, Sreberny (2010b, p. 28) captures it correctly when she 
argues that ‗even bad public diplomacy is better than war, so we might do well as 
scholars of transnational media, communications, and politics to understand it 
better‘.   
 
Just as the findings show that the effectiveness of media in playing public 
diplomacy role depends on their ability to present accurate and impartial 
information, so is also their effectiveness in influencing other issues. This is more 
crucial now with the multiplication of communication channels and media outlets 
due to the advances in distribution technologies that are now making the control 
and suppression of information almost impossible. Although this equally creates 
rooms for propaganda and branding, in reality it lessens the effectiveness of 
propaganda and checks the long-term effects of branding. The Northern Nigerians‘ 
negative perception of the West was partly caused—even if marginally—by their 
ability to get media messages from alternative sources, such as Al-Jazeera and 
Iran‘s Press TV, and also partly informed by their feeling that the Western media 
do also serve as their countries‘ organs of public diplomacy. The days of sending 
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one message to domestic audiences and another to international audiences may not 
have been over for politicians, but the new delivery technologies have terminated 
the benefits of such strategy. This research reveals that many Northern Nigerian 
audiences are able to access information from many sources and they do detect 
‗slanting‘ of reports or ‗branding‘ by different media. For instance, the Western 
media‘s alleged ‗slanting‘ of stories to demonise radical Islamists may be useful in 
persuading domestic audiences in the West to support governments‘ spending on 
war and reduce opposition to it due to loss of soldiers abroad, but it tends to repel 
those whose hearts and minds the West wants to win. The implication of this is 
like the one on public diplomacy issue: the effectiveness of media lies on its 
ability to tell the truth.  
 
This study‘s findings on the BBC‘s strategies of effective deployment of delivery 
technologies could also be of great benefit to other media organisations. The 
findings, for example, show that the BBC‘s influence is not only the product of its 
perceived credibility, but it is also due to its effective utilisation of delivery 
technologies to reach many audiences through multiple platforms. The 
convergence of the old media and the new one, and the way they are being 
leveraged to deliver products to audiences are some of the most radical 
transformations taking place in the media and communications industries. The 
BBC‘s engagement with the new technologies is both part of its survival strategy 
and part of maintaining its competitive edge. It is, for instance, the new 
technologies that help drive its interactive programming which many Northern 
Nigerian audiences seem to enjoy. The findings reveal that these new technologies 
do not only enhance engagement with the audiences, both in delivering the 
products to them and in receiving feedback from them, but they also bring 
corporate efficiency and efficiencies among media personnel.   
 
Another strategy that this study found to be working for the BBC (which others 
too could benefit from) is its employment of diasporic personnel with their 
‗transnational cultural capital‘ (Sreberny, 2010b, p. 282) to work in its language 
services. Sreberny noted that the ability of the diasporic figures to represent the 
targeted region and ‗to portray British cultural activities and social life (usually in 
a positive light)‘ and the leveraging of the online services could serve as a key to 
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World Service‘s survival (p. 282). This study found that the strategy serves 
another purpose too: it enhances BBC‘s credibility. Some of the Hausa Service 
audiences, for instance, feel that the diasporic personnel, with whom they share 
cultural and religious values, are unlikely to put out contents that would be 
harmful to them. Incidentally, this strategy could also help to mitigate the 
difficulty of delivering dissonant messages to the more discerning audiences. 
Although the findings have not shown any evidence of this happening, they do 
suggest that combining this with careful selection of contents might deliver good 
results. The practical application of these specific findings could indeed go down 
to the level of guiding broadcasting executives and producers in content selection 
in their specific programme-making endeavours and general journalism practice. 
All these would have greater chance of working, though, when given a holistic 
treatment based on the conceptual and theoretical thrusts brought out by this study.  
 
Conclusions 
This study has outlined the complexity of transnational postcolonial audiences‘ 
engagement with international media at the time when the media landscape is 
undergoing radical transformation engendered by advances in communications 
technologies and dynamics of geopolitics. It has unpacked the pattern, 
particularities and consequences of the consumption of news and current affairs 
programmes of global broadcasters by the mainly Muslim Northern Nigerians. 
Although the research focused primarily on the BBC World Service‘s engagement 
with its audiences in Northern Nigeria, it did foray into adjoining areas to capture 
the big picture and put it in proper perspective. This yielded results with far-
reaching ramifications for audience research, media and cultural studies and 
related disciplines. The findings show that the BBC has a long and complex 
relationship with its Northern Nigerian audiences; and that the relationship was 
shaped—and is still being shaped and transformed—by the dynamics of global 
geopolitics and advancement of delivery technologies. 
 
The study reveals that Northern Nigerians, who have long historical links with 
both the Islamic world and the West, have been extending their cultural encounters 
with them through constant interactions with the international media. The 
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interactions have been impacting on their everyday life, enhancing their 
comprehension of international and national affairs, raising their awareness on 
civic rights and responsibilities and influencing specific personal decisions and 
professional endeavours, even though the audiences do raise concerns over the 
propaganda role of the global broadcasters. The BBC was found to be the most 
influential international broadcaster in Northern Nigeria mainly due to its 
perceived credibility and trustworthiness, although perceptions of alleged bias in 
its coverage of Muslims and Islamic world appear to be posing a threat to such 
influence. The study also found that the media do play public diplomacy role but 
their effectiveness in playing such a role depends more on their perceived 
impartiality than on indulgence in any clever branding devices.  
 
The findings also reveal trends and consistent relationships worthy of conceptual 
and theoretical considerations. The media consumption pattern of transnational 
audiences was found to be a complicated and variable activity influenced by 
personal predispositions and religious, cultural, ideological and other extra-
communication factors. Audiences‘ interaction with global media is sometimes 
characterised by the phenomenon of selective believability—a complex cognitive 
activity (influenced by extra-communication factors) dealing with the rejection (or 
sometimes recasting) of dissonant messages and acceptance of congenial ones—
that is exercised in relation to consumption of messages both within a single 
medium and across a range of media. The phenomenon of selective believability 
tends to be high when audiences are confronted with unpleasant media messages. 
However, where the messages are compatible with the audiences‘ prevailing 
views, media consumption tends to be less complicated, with a near non-existence 
of the phenomenon. Audiences‘ dominant belief tends to be the primary mediator 
in their consumption of media messages. It could be the audiences‘ religious 
belief, ideological orientation, cultural value or any strongly-held view. In the case 
of Muslim Northern Nigerian audiences Islam—which for many serves as a 
religious, ideological and cultural force—plays the primary mediating role in their 
consumption of news and current affairs programmes of global broadcasters. The 
credibility of media is essential for the acceptability of its messages but there is 
often a gap between credibility and believability when the messages are not 
compatible with the audiences‘ prevailing views. The mediating variables tend to 
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fill that gap. The findings also reveal that credibility is not the only condition for 
believability. Credibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
believability in audiences‘ consumption of dissonant media messages.  
 
These are tentative generalisations resulting from the empirical evidence in this 
study. They are open to rigorous probe and refinement, even as they have already 
indicated new directions for further studies. There is, for instance, the need for 
further research to refine the concept of selective believability, using large samples 
and employing comparative analysis models. What is specifically required here is 
a replication of this research with large samples, but simultaneously examining 
both the audiences‘ consumption of news and current affairs programmes on the 
one hand (as done here) and their consumption of leisure and entertainment 
products on the other. This will provide further evidence to both revalidate the 
existence of the selective believability phenomenon itself and establish whether it 
has a universal application to media consumption in general or it is just confined 
to the consumption of news and current affairs programmes. Similar endeavour 
could equally explore the viability of the primary mediator concept and see if it 
indeed exists in relation to the consumption of all genres and if it is consistent or 
variable in different genres.  
 
On international broadcasting too this study throws up fresh challenges for further 
research. First, the BBC World Service—always an interesting subject for a 
variety of studies—is in particular need of further research in the specific areas 
resulting from the changes taking place within and outside the organisation. This 
study was conducted at the time when the station was—and still is—undergoing a 
number of changes mainly prompted by the government‘s spending cuts. Some of 
the effects of such decisions are already being seen in the cutting of the number of 
language services, reduction of some broadcasting services and staff and 
reorganisation of some departments and so on. These are immediate consequences; 
long-term effects may take time to manifest. It would be a viable area of research, 
for instance, to study the consequences of the spending cuts on the quality of BBC 
World Service‘s programming, the station‘s ability to engage with new 
communications technologies and its effectiveness in promoting British public 
diplomacy. On a wider scope too, this study has noted, though broadly, that global 
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broadcasting is often shaped by—but also helps in shaping—global geopolitics. 
With the kind of changes taking place in global politics due to the gradual shift of 
power and wealth from the West to Asia and the ongoing uprisings in the Arab 
world—a region that has for long been a major (if not the major) area of focus for 
international broadcasters—other viable areas for research (at least of exploratory 
nature) have also emerged. It would be interesting to find out how broadcasting is 
impacting on these changes and how they too have been altering the ecology of 
global broadcasting. Similarly, with the ongoing shift to audience-participatory 
programming, enhanced by new technologies, as this study reveals, it would 
equally be of great interest to investigate how interactive programming is affecting 
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NUMBER: OPENING SIG 
DURATION: 0’25"] 
 
Presenter:  London‘s calling. You are listening to the Hausa Service of the BBC 
on 13 and 16 metre wave bands and on some FM stations in West Africa. 
Listeners, this is Aminu Abdulkadir welcoming you to our 1445 transmission 
(Nigeria‘s and Niger‘s time), which is 1345 GMT and Ghana‘s time. 
 
[GOTO: RMAN 
NAME: C1-5-NORMAL BED 
NUMBER: MENU BED -Play for 10secs, Fade & Keep under narration. 
DURATION: 0’10"] 
 
Presenter:  In this programme you will hear that:  
 
1. The global financial markets have slumped today, despite efforts by world 
leaders at the weekend to bolster financial institutions. 
 
2.  In Accra, the capital city of Ghana, some influential Nigerian and Ghanaian 
businessmen are holding a meeting. What do they want to achieve? 
 
Clip:  Our hope is that the leaders of these two countries (Ghana and Nigeria) 
would agree to implement whatever is discussed and agreed upon (at this 
meeting). 
 
3. And in Niger Republic, the government has announced next year‘s budget. 
 
4.  You would also hear that a conference has begun in Abuja aimed at boosting 
Northern Nigeria‘s economy. 
 
[GOTO: RMAN 
NAME: C2-4-MENU TAG 
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DURATION: 0'04"] 
 
Presenter:  All these after you first listen to the news from Suwaiba Ahmad. 
  
[GOTO: LIVE 
NAME: NEWS FOR ABOUT 5 MINS] 
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Stock prices have fallen sharply in Europe and Asia, even after European 
governments spent the weekend trying to prop up the financial institutions to save 
them from collapse. Richard Jerram is an economist in Tokyo. 
[GOTO: RMAN 
NAME: Illus News Clip Asia Shares 
DURATION: 0'05"] 
He said: ‗It‘s clear that people are losing their money. They‘re worried about 
what‘s going on in the financial market. And their thinking is: what would the 
situation be next year?‘  
A BBC Europe business correspondent said that there is no coordination among 
European nations about this problem that is facing the world at the moment. The 
stock markets in London, Paris and Frankfurt have all fallen by 4 per cent. 
 
Later today, European finance ministers would meet to discuss the financial crisis 
facing their countries. There is concern that the countries are taking individual 
actions to improve the situation. A BBC correspondent said that one of the 
measures attracting attention is the one taken by Germany of providing money to 
private banks to save them from collapse. The concern here is that it would be 
necessary for the other countries to take similar measures to prevent financial 
transactions among them. 
 
One of the main insurance companies of China, Ping An, has said it has suffered 
an unprecedented loss of $5.2 billion. Zhang Xiang, a worker for the company, 
says that the announcement by the company has shed more light to the 
shareholders on how the market situation is. 
[GOTO: RMAN 
NAME: Illus News Clip China Bank 
DURATION: 0’05"] 
He said: ‗This announcement has brought to an end the uncertainty the people are 
in, and confirms that the shareholders have confidence in us‘. 
The company‘s announcement contrasts with what Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
said on Sunday, that the country‘s banks are now more in a position to stand on 
their feet. 
 
Pope Benedict has said the current international financial crisis demonstrates the 
folly of materialism and ambition. 
[GOTO: RMAN 
NAME: Illus News Clip Pope Money 
DURATION: 0’05"] 
A BBC correspondent said: ―Speaking at the meeting of bishops from all over the 
world, the Pope said: ‗We have seen the collapse of big banks and money is not 
something that lasts forever.‘‖ 
Pope Benedict said people should not hinge their hopes on any materialistic 
victory, or work or money. He said they should depend on the Creator. 
 
The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has called for renewed effort to 
arrest the leader of the rebel movement in Uganda, Joseph Koni, after soldiers 
loyal to him carried out series of attacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has said that Mr Koni and other leaders of 
the Lord‘s Resistance Army (LRA) continue to commit criminal activities that 
terrorise the region. He said the LRA has used the talk with the Ugandan 
government to buy time to return to fighting. 
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Presenter:  That was Suwaiba Ahmad with the news from the Hausa Service of 
the BBC. 
 
[GOTO: ZIP 1 CUT 3 DUNIYA 
NAME: Fade to studio on wave] 
 
Presenter:  As you have heard in the news, stock prices have tumbled in Europe 
and Asia as international stock markets react to the agreements reached at the end 
of the week aimed at boosting the financial positions of European banks. The 
major stock markets in France, Germany and United Kingdom have all started 
trading 4 per cent lower than at the close of trading on Friday. The BBC‘s Europe 
business correspondent said that the market is responding to lack of clear position 
in Europe about the financial crisis facing the world. Nafisa Ahmad has compiled 
this report for us. 
 
[GOTO: RMAN 
NAME: FINANCE SHARES 
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DURATION: 2’01"] 
 
CLIP:   The main reason why American Congress reached an agreement with 
President Bush to pump $700 billion into Wall Street is to stabilize the world‘s 
financial markets. But what follows from the markets of Europe and Asia was not 
good. The stock markets went down about 4 per cent in many countries, and bank 
stocks suffered more. In Tokyo an economic expert at the Macquarie Capital 
Securities, Richard Jerram, has said that shareholders are in a state of fear about 
what could happen next. 
He said: ―The situation is frightening. People are losing money. And they are 
worried about the future of the market. I think everybody is worried about what 
the market would be like next year as the prediction is that it would be difficult for 
all to be fine‖.  
Politicians have spent the weekend trying to find a solution to the problem. The 
German government witnessed how the efforts of a private company that was 
trying to save one of the country‘s biggest banks came to naught. In the end it had 
to pump in $69 billion to save it. 
The country has followed the example of the Irish Republic, and the government 
of Denmark is also giving guarantees to people with money in the banks. The 
President of Greylock Capital Management, Hans Hume, has said that it is 
possible for Europe to face the problem of saving other financial institutions.  
 
He says: ―I think the situation is worse than people realise. The thing here is that 
there are big markets in London that sell American assets. So I think the 
governments have to wade into the problem again‖. 
As markets see no end to the current crisis, that would be another source of 
concern to the European governments.  
 




Interactive Text Messages 
Presenter: In his message to us, Hassan Alhaji Dauda, Mai Kanti Inusari, says, ―I 
salute members of the Congress in America for resolving to help revive their 
country‘s economy.‖  
 
However, Sulaiman Babban Rimi, Kagarko, in Kaduna State, Nigeria, says, 
―America and Europe, it is your capitalist system that has thrown you into the 
situation you find yourselves in now‖.  
 
Presenter:  In Abuja, Nigeria, a conference on boosting economy and increasing 
investment in the northern states has opened. Governors from the 19 northern 
states, experts and investors have come together to look into the reasons for the 
backwardness of Northern Nigeria compared to the rest of the country. Most 
manufacturing industries in the North have collapsed due to lack of funds and high 
cost of production. Our correspondent, Mohammed Abba, has attended the 
conference and our Abuja editor, Ahmed Idris, has contacted him for more details.  
REPORT  2’25”   
A: The conference concentrated more on the economy. As the speakers 
explained, the North is backward economically compared to the other parts of the 
country. 
Q: Have they touched on manufacturing in the North or not? 
A: They talked about manufacturing in the North and how they are 
deteriorating, but the way to revive them was to use what is produced in the North. 
And what the North mostly produces are crops. Therefore, if the agricultural sector 
is developed, more would be available to revive the manufacturing industry in 
Northern Nigeria.  
 
Q: One thing that people are used to hearing is that after conferences like this, 
recommendations would be made, and after it everything would be dead and 
buried. Have they said, at this meeting, what definite steps the governors would 
take afterwards? 
 
A: Well, as the chairman of this conference, Ibrahim Gambari, the UN 
official, said, meetings like this happen and end without finding anything concrete. 
And even if something concrete is found, implementation would be a different 
matter. He said that effort would be made at this time to ensure that whatever 
policy is arrived at during this conference, it would not be difficult to implement in 
Northern Nigeria. 
 
Q: Have the governors themselves given any assurance that what would 
happen this time would be any different to what obtained in the past few years? 
 
A: As only two governors were able to attend the conference – that of Bauchi 
and Zamfara… 
 
Q: From the 19 governors? 
 
A: From among the 19…it was only two who were able to attend the 
conference. And it was the Bauchi State governor who explained to me that they 
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talked about electricity supply, and that they would invite international investors 
who could provide other sources of energy, not necessarily hydro-electric.  
 
Presenter:  That was Mohammed Abba speaking with Ahmad Idris in Abuja. 
 
Interactive Text Messages 
Presenter: And now here are some of your messages. 
 
―May Allah make the conference on the economy of Northern Nigeria currently 
taking place become useful to all states of the country‖. This was from Saidu 
Abbas Dansadau, Zamfara State, Nigeria. 
 
―Northerners, we should have determination and contentment so as to be self-
sufficient in economic and social matters,‖ says Sa‘ad Garba Kagarko.    
 
Presenter:  In Ghana‘s capital, Accra, it is another talk on business and industry. 
A three-day meeting begins today of big businessmen and industrialists of Nigeria 
and Ghana. The aim of the meeting is to boost business and investment in the 
West African countries. And more than 200 delegates are attending the meeting. 
Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, Chairman of the African business organisation, Africa 
Roundtable, one of the leaders of this conference, has explained to our 
correspondent in Accra, Iddi Ali, the significance of the gathering and the main 
topics on their agenda: 
 
REPORT:  2’29” 
   
A: What is happening is that trade among the ECOWAS-member states is not 
going on smoothly, while what should be the case is that all Chambers of 
Commerce within ECOWAS countries, should be trading among themselves. But 
mostly they are on what is called bilateral chambers, where each chamber could be 
working with a company in Europe, China or America, without interacting among 
themselves. This thing worries us. It brings inflation. It brings lack of 
understanding. It brings poverty and so on. Now is the time for them to unite and 
understand that they have the same goal, which is trade. 
 
Q: So what are the things you are going to discuss about in order to resolve 
this problem? 
 
A: We will unite all these into one organisation, by integrating Nigeria and 
Ghana Chambers of Commerce. These two countries constitute 60 per cent of the 
GDP of ECOWAS countries. So if the two countries – Ghana and Nigeria – unite, 
the other ECOWAS countries would follow suit. And that is what should be done. 
 
Q: So what is the agenda you are going to work with? 
 
A: Whatever is discussed and agreed upon, we hope the leaders of these two 
countries would agree to its implementation. 
 
Q: What are the things? 
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A: There are a number of protocols of trading together. There is freedom of 
movement of people and freedom of movement of goods and services. They aren‘t 
working. It was only agreed upon and left lying there. It is now hoped that all 
these kinds of things would be implemented, because it is understood that 
implementation is the key to everything. 
 
Q.  What do you hope to achieve after this conference? 
 
A: It is the opening of the markets—not only between Ghana and Nigeria, but 
also among all ECOWAS countries. 
 
Presenter:  That was Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, the Chairman of the African 
business organisation, Africa Roundtable. 
 
Presenter:  In Niger Republic too, the government there is talking about money. 
In the Republic of Niger, the country‘s Finance Minister, Mahaman Lamine Zeine, 
has presented next year‘s budget to the parliament, at its resumption after the rainy 
season holiday. In the budget, the government intends to spend CFA 735 milliards 
to cater for the health, defence, education, food and other needs of the people. Last 
year‘s budget amounted to CFA 572 milliards. From Niamey, Idy Barou sends this 
report. 
 
REPORT:  2’36” 
 
This year‘s budget is higher than last year‘s by CFA162 milliards. Why is this 
year‘s larger than that of last year? This was the question I asked the Finance and 
Economy Minister of Niger Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine. 
 
A: The increase is of about 162 milliards. It is due to the increase we got from 
petroleum revenues…it is called bonus. We put all of it in the budget for the 
benefit of all people in the rural areas and…(not very clear). The work would 
include building infrastructure, (improving the) health (sector) and fighting 
poverty. All these are what the money would be used for. 
 
Q. Minister, in your speech you touched on the problem Niger is facing in the 
northern part of the country, in Agades Province. Specifically, what do you mean? 
Is some money going to be earmarked to bring back peace (in the province) or is it 
for the purchase of arms? 
 
A: Who wants war? Everybody wants peace. The prayers are for peace to 
return to the region. All the people of Niger to…(uncompleted sentence). 
 
Q: What is the reaction of the opposition on this matter? Dr Sanusi Tambari 
Jaku is an economist and also the leader of PNA Al‘umma party in Niger. 
 
A: We would take about fifteen days looking into the budget, passing what we 
agree with and what we don‘t agree with…(uncompleted). There are ideas that we 
think are good, like the amount allocated for this year‘s elections. 
 
Idy: I later (got) the opinion of an ordinary Nigeriene as follows: 
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A: We hope parliamentarians will forget all their political and other 
differences and think of the nation and serve the nation and all its people, 
especially people in the rural areas who work more than anyone else and are 
poorer than others. 
 
Idy: Today‘s sitting was opened with some show of resentment from the 
opposition, especially the parliamentarians from the PNDS Tarayya party, who 
walked out for a short while. They were complaining about the delay by the 
Speaker, Alhaji Muhammane Usmane, in opening the session.  
Idy Barou from Niamey, Niger Republic. 
  
Presenter:  The time now is almost 3‘03.5‖ in Niger and Nigeria. We are 
presenting you this programme from the Hausa Service of the BBC. You can also 
listen to us on the Internet at bbchausa.com.  
 
[GOTO: RMAN 
NAME: C1-2-MID STING 
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DURATION: 0’04"] 
 
Presenter:  Next you will hear that teachers in Nigeria, like their colleagues in 
other parts of the world, are celebrating World Teachers‘ Day.  
 
But let us first go back to Nigeria, where today Commonwealth countries have 
started a three-day conference on communication in Abuja. The meeting was 
organised by the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation in 
collaboration with the country‘s Ministry of Communications and the Nigerian 
Communications Commission, where they invited experts and communication 
companies of the Commonwealth to find ways of improving communication in the 
African continent, especially in rural areas. Eleven African countries are attending 
the meeting, including non-Commonwealth members, such as Chad. One of the 
items on the agenda is having broadband Internet connection. Raliya Zubairu 
attended the opening ceremony and here is her report from Abuja. 
 
REPORT:  3’15” 
 
The theme of the conference which was organised by the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation in collaboration with the country‘s Ministry of 
Communications and the Nigerian Communications Commission is: Providing a 
Better Means of Communication in the Rural Areas to Boost Africa‘s Economy. 
Dr Bashir Gwandu is a commissioner at the Nigerian Communications 
Commission, (NCC) and has explained to me what the aim of the conference is. 
 
A: It is a forum where you have members of the Commonwealth. They are to 
discuss ways of improving means of communication in the rural areas and cities 
where there are no means of communication. These different countries would sit 
and share the ideas they had used to improve communications in their rural areas 
so that other could learn from them and do likewise in their own areas.  
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Q: In what ways could improvement in communications boost business in the 
rural areas in particular?  
 
A: Investigation has shown that improvement in communications in the rural 
areas also improve business. Let me give you an example with a fish seller. If the 
fish caught is not sold that day, you may…(not clear) as there is neither 
refrigerator nor electricity. But if you have a phone you call an area near you and 
ask whether there is market or not. If there isn‘t, you can call somewhere else. 
Where there is market, you could go there and sell your fish. So also is tomato. 
 
Raliya: At the moment Nigeria has almost 60 million telephone lines. And about 
60 per cent of the cities in the country have telephone line connection. All the 
same, there are numerous problems telephone subscribers often face in their daily 
activities. An example is the abrupt cutting of line when one is speaking or 
sending a message. The Nigerian President too, has acknowledged this in his 
opening address, which was delivered on his behalf by the Secretary to Federal 
Government, Alhaji Yayale Ahmed. 
 
YAYALE AHMED: 
―These positive indices notwithstanding, the sector is still faced with very serious 
challenges.‖ 
 He added that he hoped the experts that were attending the conference 
would help Nigeria find ways to overcome these challenges. 
 The conference would also deliberate on ways of providing African rural 
areas with better means of communication. These areas have remained behind 
despite the introduction of mobile phone technology. 
 Dr Ikowo Payo Gabra (as heard) is the head of the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation, and has explained to me the challenge in this 
regard. 
DR IKOWO 
He said, ―One of the most important inhibitors to rural penetration is the absence 
of power.‖ 
He explained that the communications machines depend on electricity and other 
fuels. And that most villages in Africa do not have electricity. 
Eleven African countries attended the conference. They included Chad, which is 
not a member of the Commonwealth.  
Raliya Zubairu, BBC Hausa in Abuja, Nigeria. 
 
Presenter:   Still in Nigeria. It is today that teachers in Nigeria joined their 
colleagues in other parts of the world to celebrate World Teachers‘ Day. It was the 
United Nations that designated the 5th of October as the day of looking into the 
importance of teaching to the community and the challenges facing teachers and 
schools. The theme of the day this year is ―Matters Pertaining to Teaching.‖ But 
teachers in Nigeria are celebrating the day at a time when they continue to 
complain about worsening state of education in the country and the lack of 
payment of their entitlements by the authorities. Yusuf Tijjani attended the 
celebrations in Abuja, and he sent this report. 
 
REPORT:  2’45” 
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These were the dances performed by the Nigerian teachers to celebrate World 
Teachers‘ Day. Malam Husaini Zakari Tilde is the Publicity Officer of the 
Nigerian teachers‘ union, and has explained to me the importance of this day. 
 
A: This is a happy day for all teachers around the world. In Nigeria, we have 
gathered here to tell the government and the people of this country the situation 
teachers find themselves in and the progress teaching profession has achieved. 
 
Q: What situation have you found yourselves in? 
 
A: The situation teachers have found themselves in is that salary and condition 
of service of teachers in Nigeria are not equal to what teachers are getting in other 
parts of the world. Teachers are among those with the lowest salary compared to 
other workers who are also professional. 
 
Q: So are teachers celebrating this anniversary? Teacher, Awwalu Sallau, has 
told me that: 
 
A: In reality, no one can tell you that teachers in Nigeria are happy. If you 
look at developed countries…all developed countries have developed because of 
education. Look at the salary of the teacher. A teacher in Nigeria is someone to be 
looked down upon. If you look at a teacher‘s salary, you would find that someone 
with a degree like you would be earning over a hundred and seventy thousand 
Naira, while you are earning just over eighteen thousand Naira. How can you say 
there is happiness? 
 
YUSUF: While teachers are complaining, what is the federal government 
doing to improve the condition of teachers in the country? Hajiya A‘ishatu 
Ibrahim Dukku is a minister in the Ministry of Education in Nigeria. 
 
A: As you can see, money for teacher-training programme has been increased 
from 15 per cent of 70 per cent to 10 per cent (sic) of all the money we get from 
the federal government, that is, Consolidated Revenue Fund. And you can see 
what states are doing to improve the condition of teachers, because they know that 
without the help of teachers whatever type of class you build, whatever materials 
are provided, good education will not be obtained. 
 
YUSUF: This year‘s celebration is happening months after the teachers strike 
in Nigeria over demand for better wages.  
Yusuf Tijjani from Abuja in Nigeria. 
 
Presenter:  The European Union has this morning opened its first immigration 
centre outside Europe. The European Commissioner for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, opened the centre today in Bamako, the capital 
of Mali. The EU hopes the new centre in Mali would help people get work legally 
in Europe and also curtail illegal immigration. Each year thousands of people from 
West Africa try to enter Europe illegally, and many die along the way. Our West 
Africa correspondent, Will Ross, sends this report. 
 
REPORT:  1’45 
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It is the President of Mali, Amadou Toumani Toure, who commissioned the 
Centre for Immigration in the country. And he was the one who hosted the people 
who are worried by illegal immigration. Among them were ministers from France, 
Spain and the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, 
Luis Michel. 
 A lot of Malians, who are desperately looking for work, hope this centre 
would find work for them. But the European Union has reiterated that there was no 
vacancy at the moment. The European countries might be able to employ people 
through their office in Bamako, something that Spain is doing in Senegal, where it 
employs hundreds of people from time to time every year to collect fruits. But 
because the need for work is widespread, getting employment depends on luck. 
 The European Union said that its Bamako office would be offering legal 
advice on travelling and training for work. It would also undertake an 
enlightenment campaign about the danger of travelling illegally. 
 Even last week, the Spanish coast guards had to rescue 230 young Africans 
from a ship, which was the biggest ship carrying illegal immigrants to have 
reached Spain. 
 Malians have now turned emigrating for work into a culture. That is why 
the country has a minister responsible for Malians outside the country because one 
third of the population is now outside the country. 
 High price of food and fuel have recently made living in the country more 
difficult, which is why a lot of people want to work in Europe. 
 
Presenter:  That was a translation of a report by Will Ross. And which marks the 
end of the reports we could bring you in this programme. But as we still have 
some time remaining, I think, Suwaiba, you have to read us at least one headline. 
 
SUWAIBA:  Okay, Aminu. 
 
Stock prices have fallen sharply in Europe and Asia, after European governments 
spent the weekend trying to prop up financial institutions to prevent them from 
collapse. 
 
Presenter:  Okay, thank you very much Suwaiba. Listeners, this brings us to the 
end of this programme until 1930 GMT that is 8:30pm in Nigeria and Niger, when 
we would bring you a completely new programme, which would come to you on 
those metre wave bands, that is 15, 19 and 41. And you can always listen to us on 
the internet at bbchausa.com. On behalf of everybody and Elhadj Diori Coulibaly 
who produced the programme as you have heard it, I‘m saying have a nice day 
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Nigeria‘s Broadcasting Regulator 
National Broadcasting Commission  
(NBC) 
 
The National Broadcasting Commission is a parastatal of the Federal Government 
of Nigeria, empowered to regulate the broadcasting industry by Act No. 38 of 
1992 as amended by Act No. 55 of 1999.  The Federal Government of Nigeria, in 
line with the recommendations of the Committee on National Mass 
Communications Policy, promulgated the enabling decree on August 24, 1992. 
This decree and its amendment have been adopted as Acts of the National 
Assembly numbers 38 and 55 in line with our present democratic status. 
 
LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION HISTORY 
The pioneer Director General, Dr. A. Tom Adaba, was appointed with a 10-man 
board, with Peter Enahoro as chairman and Bright Igbako as secretary to the 
commission. In July 1999, the second Director General, Mallam Nasir Danladi 
Bako, was appointed. He resigned his appointment in November 2002, and was 
succeeded by Dr. Silas Babajiya Yisa. Mr. M. 'Bayo Atoyebi came in next and 
held the post on acting capacity between August 2006 and March 2007. The 
present Director General is Engineer Yomi Bolarinwa (fsne). He was appointed in 
March 2007 on acting capacity, and (the then) President Umaru Musa Yar‘adua 
confirmed his appointment with effect from February 17, 2009. With average staff 
strength of 301, the commission has the mandate to manage the broadcast industry 
and ensure that the people‘s right to quality broadcasting is assured. 
 
COMMISSION MEMBERSHIPS 
Statutorily, the commission is composed of a chairman and nine members (later 
amended by law to 10), who are part-time members, and who shall hold office for 
three years, renewable for another three years only. The director general of the 
commission, who is the chief executive, is also a member of the commission, but 
he has tenure of five years in the first instance, and may be reappointed for such 
periods as the president may determine. 
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 The pioneer board, which was inaugurated on October 6, 1992, was chaired by 
Mr. Peter Enahoro. It served till 1994.  Other pioneer board members were Chief 
Ralph Okpara (mni), Prof Elo Amucheazi, Alhaji Hassan Sani Kontagora, Chief B. 
Akin Odunsi, Mr. T. J. Onomigbo Okpoko (SAN), Mr. Ede O. Dafinone, Alhaji 
Shehu Aliyu Ka‘oje, Mrs. Modukpe Adeogun, Dr. Dotun Okubanjo and Alhaji 
Sidi H. Ali and Dr. A. Tom Adaba, the pioneer director general. Mr. Bright Igbako 
was the pioneer secretary to the commission. 
 
The second board, chaired by Mr. Otu Robert Akpan, served from 2001 to 2003. 
Other members were Alhaji Kolawole Bidmus, Mrs Pamela Ezinwa Ukaku, Prince 
Godwin Atibile, Dr. John Akpeh, Hajiya A‘ishatu Modibbo, Ms. Ade Adeniran 
Ogunsanya, Hon Benjamin Okoko, and Alhaji Umar Usman Lamido. Mal Nasir 
Danladi Bako was the second director general, having taken over from Dr. A. Tom 
Adaba in 1999 and served till 2002. He was succeeded by Dr. Silas Babajiya Yisa, 
who served from 2002 to 2006. Mr. Mudashiru Adebayo Atoyebi served as acting 
director general from August 2006 till March 2007, when Engineer Yomi 
Bolarinwa took over from him. The current board was inaugurated on Tuesday, 
July 28, 2009, with Alhaji Ibrahim Najume as chairman. Other members are Alhaji 
Abdullahi Kuda, Chief Peter Nwaboshi, Chief Doyin Ogungbe, Engineer Yakubu 
Rasheed, Chief Patrick Adaba, Yomi Ayorinde, Hon Barr Akhere Ugbesia, Hon 
Mike Mku, Engineer Yomi Bolarinwa, the Director General, and Mrs Odusote 
representing Federal Ministry of Information and Communications. 
 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
The commission‘s responsibilities include advising the federal government on the 
implementation of the National Mass Communication Policy, with particular 
reference to broadcasting, as well as licensing Cable, DTH and all terrestrial radio 
and television services. The commission is also responsible for undertaking 
research and development in the broadcast industry, upholding the principles of 
equity and fairness in broadcasting and establishing and disseminating a national 
broadcasting code while also setting standards with regards to the contents and 





The Act of the National Assembly empowers the commission to carry out a 
number of duties, some of which include, licensing, monitoring, regulating and 
conducting research in broadcasting in Nigeria. It is also the duty of the 
commission to ensure the development, in a dynamic manner, through the 
accreditation of the mass communication curricula in all the tertiary and other 
institutions related to broadcasting. The National Broadcasting Commission is 
mandated by Section 2 subsection (1) of Act No 38 of 1992 as amended by Act No 
55 of 1999 to carry out the following functions: 
(a) Advising the federal government on the implementation of the National Mass 
Communication Policy, with particular reference to broadcasting; 
(b) Receiving, processing and considering applications for establishment, 
ownership or operation of radio and television stations including; 
(i) Cable Television Services, Direct Satellite Broadcast and any other medium of 
broadcasting 
(ii) Radio and television stations owned, established or operated by the federal, 
state and local governments 
(iii) And stations run under private ownership. 
(c) Recommending applications, through the minister of information and national 
orientation, to the President, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, for the 
grant of radio and television licences; 
(d) Regulating and controlling the broadcast industry; 
(e) Undertaking research and development in the broadcast industry; 
(f) Receiving, considering and investigating complaints from individuals and 
corporate bodies, regarding the contents of a broadcasting station and the conduct 
of a broadcasting station; 
(g) Upholding the principles of equity and fairness in broadcasting; 
(h) Establishing and disseminating a national broadcasting code and setting 
standards with regards to the contents and quality of materials for broadcast; 
(I) Promoting Nigerian indigenous cultures, moral and community life through 
broadcasting; 
(j) Promoting authenticated radio and television audience measurement and 
penetration; 
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(k) Initiating and harmonizing government policies on trans-border direct 
transmission and reception in Nigeria; 
(l) Regulating ethical standards and technical excellence in public, private and 
commercial broadcast stations in Nigeria. 
(m) Monitoring broadcasting for harmful emission, interference and illegal 
broadcasting; 
(n) Determining and applying sanctions, including revocation of licences of 
defaulting stations, which do not operate in accordance with the broadcast code 
and in the public interest; 
(o) Approving the transmitter power, location of stations, areas of coverage as well 
as regulate types of broadcast equipment to be used; 
(p) Ensuring qualitative manpower development in the broadcasting industry by 
accrediting curricula and programmes for all tertiary training institutions that offer 
mass communications in relation to broadcasting; 
(q) Intervening and arbitrating in conflicts in the broadcast industry. 
(r) Ensuring strict adherence to the national laws, rules and regulations relating to 
the participation of foreign capital, in relation to local capital in broadcasting; 
(s) Serving as national consultant on any legislative or regulatory issues on the 
broadcasting industry; 
(t) Guaranteeing and ensuring the liberty and protection of the broadcasting 
industry with due respect to the law and;  
(u) Carrying out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full 
discharge of all or any of the functions conferred on it under, or pursuant to, this 
act. 
HOW TO APPLY FOR A BROADCAST LICENCE 
 
1.     A prospective applicant must have a limited liability company registered with the 
Corporate Affairs Commission. Its article and memorandum of association must 
include broadcasting (please note, however, that section 10 of the NBC Act No 38 
of 1992 prohibits the issuance of a licence to a religious organisation or a 
political party).   
2.     The company will write to the commission seeking approval to purchase a set of 
application forms, indicating the kind of service (radio, TV, MMDS, etc) and 
location(s) intended.  
 383 
3.     Upon receiving approval, the company may then purchase a set of application 
forms at the cost of N50,000 only. The package will include a copy of the Nigeria 
Broadcasting Code and other publications that would provide an insight into 
broadcasting in Nigeria.   
4.     The set of forms purchased should then be completed and returned, along with a 
comprehensive feasibility study of, and business plan for, the proposed station, to 
the office of the Director General.   
5.     The application is processed by the commission, recommended to the board of 
the commission, for onward transmission, through the minister of information and 
communications, to the President. (The President, by constitutional provision has 
the power to give the final approval for radio and television broadcast licences).   
6.     On approval, the successful applicant is expected to pay the prescribed licence 
fee and sign a licence agreement with the secretary to the commission before being 
allocated an appropriate frequency.   
7.     Currently, the lifespan of a licence is five years. A licence lapses and stands 
revoked if not utilised within two years of issuance.   
8.     Licence fees are categorised A and B according to the economic viability of an 
area. 
  
LOCAL PROGRAMME CONTENT  
Every licensee is required to adhere to a minimum of 60 per cent local broadcast 
content for open television and 80 per cent local broadcast content for radio. The 
cable/satellite retransmission stations are mandated to reflect a minimum of 20 per 
cent local content in their programming. 
  
RENEWAL OF A LICENCE  
An application for the renewal of a licence shall be made to the commission within 
a period of six months before the expiration of the licence. For avoidance of 
doubt, the airwaves are held in trust for the public; therefore, the licensee is 
accountable to the public through the commission. Thus a public hearing may be 
organised, as part of the licensing renewal procedure, for the public assessment of 
(the) affected broadcast station.  
In applying for the renewal of a licence, the applicant shall:  
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1.   Clear all outstanding financial and administrative obligations to the 
commission  
2.   It shall submit to the Director-General, NBC, through the commission‘s zonal 
director in the area of operation, 15 copies of (the) application  
 3.   The application shall include:  
•       A detailed report of the station‘s faithfulness to its statements of intent in the 
original application form for the expiring licence, in accordance with the second 
schedule of the NBC Decree No 38 of 1992 
 •       A report of its compliance with the following:  
a.     The relevant provisions of the 3rd schedule of the NBC Act 38 of 1992 such as 
submissions of quarterly schedules accompanied by synopses of programme listed 
b.      Keeping of daily station logbooks for transmitted programmes, transmitter 
output power and radiating frequencies 
c.     Making available for inspection by the staff of the commission its broadcast 
facilities including equipment and station log book 
d.     The Nigeria Broadcasting Code provisions:  
•     Emphasizing national cohesion, national security, respect for human dignity 
and family values  
•     Compelling accuracy, objectivity and fairness; Right of Reply, integrity, 
authenticity, good taste and decency; presentation of womanhood with respect and 
dignity; legal, decent and truthful advertisement; protection of children from X-
rated programmes and harmful or deceitful adverts  
•     (Prohibiting) inciting broadcasts, advertisement of magical cures, exploitation 
of children, sponsorship of newscast and monetization of political coverage etc 
4.    Other rules and regulations issued from time to time by the NBC. 
  
•     Statement of accounts for the period under review 
  
•     Completed application forms for renewal of the licence accompanied by a    
feasibility report for the renewal period sought. 
 
Source: National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). [online] Available from: 
<http://www.nbc.gov.ng/index.php> [Accessed 30 June 2011]. 
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Appendix III 
List of Participants* 
Individual Interviews 
Face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with the following 
BBC personnel in London and Abuja 
 BBC‘s executive editor for African region (in London) 
 BBC Abuja bureau editor (in Abuja, Nigeria) 
 BBC World Service correspondent in Nigeria/later producer (in London) 
 Former BBC Hausa Service‘s senior producer/senior reporter (in Abuja) 
 BBC Hausa Service‘s senior correspondent/formerly producer (in London) 
 
Face-to-face in-depth interviews with these listeners of international 
broadcasters in the Northern Nigerian cities of Yola, Kano and Abuja 
 
   Former school administrator (female)        Former soldier/ex-parliamentarian 
   Former newspaper editor (female)             Local newspaper publisher 
   Postgraduate student                                   University lecturer  
   Television producer                                    Trade unionist 




Focus group interviews were conducted in three geopolitical zones of 
Northern Nigeria: Northeast (Yola and Njoboli), Northwest (Katsina) 
and North-central (Abuja and Gwagwalada)  
 
Yola Group I: the lower middle class (six participants) 
a) Middle-level businessman/local director of Islamic movement Izala 
b) Politician who is also the local chairman of retirees‘ union  
c) Mason who runs a small construction business  
d) Owner of a small tailoring enterprise  
e) Female restaurant owner 
f) Shop owner  
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Yola Group II: the working class (six participants)   
   a) Primary school teacher                            b) Aide to governor (has working class status) 
   c) Electricity worker                                    d) Motorcycle mechanic  




Njoboli Group: the peasant group (eight participants) 
     a) Farmer/day labourer                                  b) Farmer/shop keeper 
     c) Farmer/cattle herder                                  d) Farmer/petty trader 
     e) Farmer/teacher                                          f) Farmer/student  
     g) Farmer/tailor                                             h) Herdsman  
 
Katsina Group: the local politicians (five participants) 
a) Secretary of Katsina Local Government Council  
b) Supervisory councillor in charge of social services  
c) Supervisory councillor in charge of agriculture 
d) Former bank worker-turned-politician 
e) Elected councillor 
  
Abuja Group I: the journalists (six participants) 
 a) Deputy daily newspaper editor               b) Political editor 
 c) Sports editor                                            d) Business editor 
 e) Deputy news editor                                 f) Deputy political editor 
 
Abuja Group II: the university students (nine participants) 
This is a group of nine undergraduate students (one of them female), in their 20s 
(two of them in their 30s), that could effectively be also described as a youth 
group. They are students of the University of Abuja; and, all but one, were in their 
final year at the time of the interview (March 2011)—the other student was a year 
behind the rest. 
 
* To guarantee confidentiality (some respondents sought to remain anonymous), only the 
posts or job titles or job categories of the participants are listed here. Of course, those with 
prominent posts could easily be identified by those who know that they do, or did, hold 
such positions. But fortunately, those who hold, or held, the easily recognisable posts 
were not among those who had sought anonymity during the interviews. Still, all personal 
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